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INC. Cert to CA 11 
(Vance, 
v. F. Johnson: 
~~~ T. Clark, 
ABBOTT 5 d" :--.~issenting; 
LABORATORIES, ~ ~ ~curiam) .-
et al. ~- Feder~i~ ~ 
 
1. SUMMARY: Whether the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition 
of price discrimination applies to purchases for resale when made 
by state-operated hospitals. 
2. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: This case involves a suit by 
local retail pharmacies who claim they have been injured by the 
;Vo eo~.flu.:r ~ut tiJ~ c;;:i'sf~ ~~.r- (~l-[2e;rr~;' t.ui"P 1·L·"~" 
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lower prices being charged by drug manufacturers to competing 
~---------------------~ 
pharmacies operated in conjunction with the County Hospital and 
~-~---------------------------------
the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the State 
University. The petr, a trade association to which the claims of 
its member pharmacies have been assigned, alleged that sales by 
the state-owned pharmacies are in violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 u.s.c. §13, which forbids any person engaged in 
commerce to discriminate in price between different purchasers 
where the effect of such discrimination is to substantially 
lessen competition. The resps requested dismissal on the grounds 
that sales of goods made to a governmental agency are exempt from 
the Act. 
The DC (Pointer) agreed. 1 Although recognizing that the 
issue is a close one, the DC relied upon Congress' failure to 
overturn the long-standing interpretation that governmental 
purchases are beyond the intended reach of the Act. The authors 
of the Robinson-Patman Act had expressed the opinion that the 
legislation did not apply to sales to governmental institutions. 
This has also been the consistent position of commentators, the 
Attorney General, and every judicial decision on the question. 
Twice Amendments were defeated that would have brought 
governmental purchases within the Robinson-Patman Act. 
1The DC first found that the petr Association could 
maintain the action as an assignee for the private pharmacies and 
that the Eleventh Amendment at least did not bar the request for 
injunctive relief. 
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The DC found additional support for its conclusion in 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 {1976): 
"The policy considerations discussed in National 
League, resulting in rejection of a federal 
statute specifying minimum prices to be paid by 
governmental bodies for labor comparable to that 
required of private institutions, appear to be no 
less cogent when deciding whether another federal 
statute should be interpreted to specify minimum 
prices to be paid by governmental bodies for 
goods comparable to that required of private 
institutions." 
The DC also distinguished Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 u.s. 389 {1978) {governmental agencies are not 
automatically exempt from antitrust laws), and Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass'n, 425 u.s. 1 {1976) 
{sales to private, nonprofit hospitals within Robinson-Patman 
Act). Louisiana Power involved claims under the broader Sherman 
Act and challenged activities that had been undertaken 
volitionally by municipalities independent of any state directive 
or policy. Abbott Laboratories was concerned with sales to 
nongovernmental hospitals and indeed noted without criticism that 
the trial court had dismissed counts based on sales to 
governmental hospitals for failure to state a claim. 425 U.S. at 
4, n.2. 
~ 
On appeal, a majority of the CA 5 {now CA 11) panel 
affirmed, adopting the DC's opinion. Judge Clark dissented, 
arguing that when a state moves outside its traditional sphere of 
activity and into retail competition with private enterprise it 
should be treated in precisely the same manner as its 
competitors. This position is implicitly endorsed by Abbott 
Laboratories and by statements in the legislative history that 
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the Act would not limit the government only so long as the state 
functions as a consumer rather than as a competitor. The key to 
Abbott Laboratories is that a nonprofit institution's act of 
exemption to Robinson-Patman does not apply when hospitals act as 
competitors instead of consumers. Finally, National League of 
Cities is completely inapposite since the retail sale of drugs is 
hardly a traditional government function or an incident of state 
sovereignty. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The petr essentially reiterates Judge 
Clark's dissent. The case is inconsistent with Abbott 
Laboratories and with the legislative intent that Robinson-Patman 
should have a broad reach. Governmental purchasing should be 
exempt only insofar as it is not in competition with private 
entities. 2 Having argued that the decision conflicts with Abbott 
Laboratories, petr goes on to claim that the issue is one of 
first impression (!) that should be resolved by this Court. 
Resp notes that the issue of whether Robinson-Patman was 
intended to apply to governmental purchases was not before the 
Court in Abbott Laboratories. Although this Court has never 
decided the issue, other courts have consistently found such an 
exception over the past thirty years. In view of this consistent 
interpretation and application of the Act, petr's policy argument 
2Petr points to an exchange in a House Committee hearing 
where Representative Teegarden, co-author of the Act, stated that 
"if two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should 
say then the fact that one is operated by the City does not save 
it from the Bill." Petn., p. 8. 
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should be addressed to Congress. Finally, applying the Act would 
emasculate Alabama's statutory policy to obtain the lowest price 
possible for its pharmaceutical purchases and would interfere 
with the operation of its State Hospital and University in 
violation of the considerations discussed in National League of 
Cities. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr's argument that the state exemption 
should not extend beyond purchases for its own consumption is a 
strong one. The legislative history does not support an 
\ 
exemption when the government purchases products for resale. 
Certainly the retail sale of pharmaceuticals is not a traditional 
state activity protected by National League of Cities. 
On the other hand, it is probably difficult to differentiate 
between government purchases for consumption and for resale. The 
requirement of a separate purchasing system by the latter may 
well interfere with the former. Thus it may not be unreasonable 
to simply exempt all governmental purchasing from the Act. The 
only other recent CA decision is Champaign-Urbana News Agency, 
Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 632 F.2d 680 (CA 7 1980), holding 
that a military exchange service is a governmental 
instrumentality exempt from Robinson-Patman. 
Given the absence of a conflict, I recommend a denial. 
There are two responses. 
December 10, 1981 
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From: Justice Powell 
JAN 2 5 1982 Circulated: ____________ __ 
Reoiroulated: ____________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC. v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 81-827. Decided January-, 1982 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to state and local governments 
that have entered the commercial marketplace as retailers of 
goods to the general public in competition with private firms. 
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit an-
swered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of 
certiorari. 
I 
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing busi-
ness in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15 
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies op-
erated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. 1 In 
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county 
pharmacies were receiving preferential prices from the drug 
manufacturers and were using their favored position to com-
pete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general 
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale 
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13.2 Petitioner sought 
' The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hos-
pital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the Univer-
sity of Alabama. 
2 Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality . . . where such commodities are sold 
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the 
2 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARM. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
injunctive relief and treble damages. 3 
The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that 
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other tradi-
tional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this 
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B. 
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
and by other commentators and government officials indicat-
ing that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the in-
tended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district 
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to 
governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding 
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light 
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or 
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13. 
3 The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to 
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed 
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief. 
'See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32 
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether 
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district 
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the 
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the 
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies." 
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936). 
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occa-
sions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable 
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of 
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental 
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana 
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7 
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from 
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the inter-
pretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including 
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered 
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962). 
5 In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that 
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARM. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 3 
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented. 
II 
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the 
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction be-
tween government purchases for its own consumption and 
government purchases for resale to the general public. 6 It 
may be agreed that the legislative history of the Robinson-
Patman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indi-
cate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act 
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an ex-
emption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the 
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale 
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in 
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the 
federal government would continue to be able to purchase 
goods at discounts not available to other purchasers: 
"The Federal Government is not in competition with 
other buyers from these [wholesalers] .... [T]o have a 
discrimination, there must be a relative position between 
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not 
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach 
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. , 378 F. 2d 212 
(CA9 1967); Portland R etail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 
F . 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf. 
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc . v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632 
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to 
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 
(W.D. Ky. 1941), affd on other grounds , 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Nei-
ther the government nor a city in its purchase of property . . . is in compe-
tition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the 
article.") (emphasis added). 
6 Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies 
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by 
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for 
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act. 
. . 
: ' 
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the parties to the discrimination which constitutes an in-
jury to one as against the other. I think the answer is 
to be found in that . 
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer 
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San 
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimina-
tion could be predicated there, because the two are not 
in the same sphere at all. 
"The Federal Government is saved by the same dis-
tinction, not of location but of function. They are not in 
competition with anyone else who would buy." 7 
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail 
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for 
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government 
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy 
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government pur-
chases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court 
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1 
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of 
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption pro-
vided in the Non profit Institutions Act. The exemption is 
limited, extending only to "purchases of . . . supplies for 
their own use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institu-
tions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court 
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for re-
7 Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to 
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). 
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting 
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is 
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock 
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper 
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to an-
swer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each 
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other, 
then they are in a different sphere." !d., at 209. 
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sale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and 
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of 
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general 
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted 
that to extend the exemption to cover retail resales to walk-
in customers "would make the commercially advantaged hos-
pital pharmacy just another community drug store open to all 
comers for prescription services and devastatingly positioned 
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425 
U. S., at 17-18. 
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland 
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor 
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption. 
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption 
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of compe-
tition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or not the Non-
profit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospi-
tals, 8 the distinction it draws between purchases for 
consumption and purchases for re~ale to the general public is 
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private non-
profit hospitals. 
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to 
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and 
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the 
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Regulation Assn, 
- u. s. - (1981). 
III 
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and 
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally, 
and that the exceptions from their application are to be con-
strued strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail 
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said 
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This 
sseeLafayette v. Louisiana Power& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 n. 14 
(1978). 
6 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARM. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is pri-
vate or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978). 
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legis-
lative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the 
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of 
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government phar-
macies that compete in the retail market with private phar-
macies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to 
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained 
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of 
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Brock & 
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that 
Congress intended to protect small business from what was 
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to 
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest 
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision 
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, 
anQ I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari. 
CHAMBERS 0 F 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.iuprtmt <!Jo-ttri o-f flrt ~tb .itattg 
Jlufringtttn, ~. <!J. 2llbi~~ 
February 8, 1982 
Re: 81-827 - Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories 
Dear Lewis, 
Please add my name to your opinion dissenting from 
denial of certiorari. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 










From: Just ice Powell 
Circulated: ____________ __ 
2nd DRAFT Reoiroulated:FEB 9 198! 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC. v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 81-827. Decided February-, 1982 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, 
dissenting. 
The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to s~nd local governments 
that have enteredJhe comme~arketl:)lac~ ~retailers of 
goods to the general public in competition with private firms. 
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit an-
swered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of 
certiorari. 
I 
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing busi-
ness in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15 
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies op-
erated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. t In 
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county 
pharmacies were receiving pref~ential prices from the drug 
manufacturers and were using their favored position to com-
pete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general 
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale 
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13. 2 Petitioner sought 
'The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hos-
pital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the Univer-
sity of Alabama. 
2 Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold 
2 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARM. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
injunctive relief and treble damages. 3 
The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that 
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other tradi-
tional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this 
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B. 
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
and by other commentators and government officials indicat-
ing that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the in-
tended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district 
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to 
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the 
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or 
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13. 
3 The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to 
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed 
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief. 
• See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32 
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether 
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district 
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the 
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the 
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies." 
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936). 
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occa-
sions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable 
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of 
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental 
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana 
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7 
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from 
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the inter-
pretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including 
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered 
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962). 
( 
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governmental purchases; 5 and indicated that such a holding 
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light 
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented. 
II 
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the 
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction be-
tween government purchases for its own consumption (aild) 
government purchases for resale to t~. 6lt 
may be agreed that the legislative history of t e Robinson-
Patman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indi-
cate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act 
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an ex-
emption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the 
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale 
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in 
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the 
federal government would continue to be able to purchase 
5 In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that 
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not 
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach 
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212 
(CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 
F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf. 
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632 
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to 
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W 
D Ky. 1941), affd on other grounds, 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither 
the government nor a city in its purchase of property ... is in competition 
with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the arti-
cle.") (emphasis added). 
6 Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies 
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by 
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for 
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act. 
Pet. for Cert. 9. 
4 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARM. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
goods at discounts not available to other purchasers: 
"The Federal Government is not in competition with 
other buyers from these [whole~have a 
discrimination, there must be a relative position between 
the parties to the discrimination which constitutes an in-
jury to one as against the other. I think' the answer is 
to be found in that. 
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer 
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San 
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimina-
tion could be predicated there, because the two are not 
in the same sphere at all. 
"The Federal Government is saved by the same dis-
tinction, not of location but of function. They are not in 
competition with anyone else who would buy." 1 
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail 
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for 
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government 
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy 
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government pur-
chases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court 
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1 
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of 
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption pro-
vided in the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The exemption is 
7 Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to 
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). 
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting 
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is 
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock 
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper 
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to an-
swer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each 
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other, 
then they are in a different sphere." !d., at 209. 
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limited, extending only to "purchases of ... supplies for 
their own use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institu-
tions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court 
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for re-
sale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and 
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of 
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general 
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted 
that to extend the exem tion to cover retail resales to walK-
in customers "woul make e commerciallx_ a._Enta_ge!!_hos-
pital pharmac just anotfier communit drug store open to all 
comers for prescnption services and devastatingly positioned 
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425 
U. S., at 17-18. 
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland 
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor 
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption. 
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption 
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of compe-
tition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or nOrthe NOn-
profit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospi-
tals, 8 the distinction it draws between ·purchases for 
consumption and purchases for resale to the general public is 
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private non-
profit hospitals. 
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to 
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and 
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the 
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Regulation Assn, 
- u. s. - (1981). 
III 
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and 
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally, 
8 See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 n. 14 
(1978). 
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and that the exceptions from their application are to be con-
strued strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail 
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said 
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This 
is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is pri-
vate or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978). 
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legis-
lative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the 
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of 
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government phar-
macies that compete in the retail market with private phar-
macies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to 
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained 
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of 
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Broch & 
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that 
Congress intended to protect small business from what was 
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to 
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest 
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision 
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC. v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 81-827. Decided February-, 1982 
·JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, I dissenting. 
The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to state and local governments 
that have entered the commercial marketplace as retailers of 
goods to the general public in competition with private firms. 
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit an-
swered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of 
certiorari. 
I 
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing busi-
ness in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15 
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies op-
erated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. 1 In 
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county 
pharmacies were receiving preferential prices from the drug 
manufacturers and were using their favored position to com-
pete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general 
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale 
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13. 2 Petitioner sought 
1 The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hos-
pital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the Univer-
sity of Alabama. 
2 Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold 
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injunctive relief and treble damages. 3 
The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that 
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other tradi-
tional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this 
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B. 
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
and by other commentators and government officials indicat-
ing that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the in-
tended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district 
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to 
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the 
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or 
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13. 
3 The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to 
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed 
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief. 
'See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32 
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether 
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district 
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the 
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the 
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies." 
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936). 
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occa-
sions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable 
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong. , 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of 
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental 
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana 
N ews Agency, Inc . v. J. L. Cummins News Co ., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7 
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from 
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the inter-
pretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including 
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered 
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962). 
.. 
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governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding 
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light 
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented. 
II 
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the 
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction be-
tween government purchases for its own consumption and 
government purchases for resale to the general public. 6 It 
may be agreed that the legislative history of the Robinson-
Patman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indi-
cate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act 
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an ex-
emption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the 
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale 
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in 
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the 
federal government would continue to be able to purchase 
6 In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that 
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not 
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach 
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212 
(CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 
F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf. 
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632 
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to 
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W 
D Ky. 1941), affd on other gr-ounds, 132 F. 2cl 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither 
the government nor a city in its purchase of property ... is in competition 
with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the arti-
cle.") (emphasis added). 
• Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies 
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by 
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for 
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act. l Pet. for Cert. 9. 
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goods at discounts not available to other purchasers: 
"The Federal Government is not in competition with 
other buyers from these [wholesalers] .... [T]o have a 
discrimination, there must be a relative position between 
the parties to the discrimination which constitutes an in-
jury to one as against the other. I think-the answer is 
to be found in that. 
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer 
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San 
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimina-
tion could be predicated there, because the two are not 
in the same sphere at all. 
"The Federal Government is saved by the same dis-
tinction, not of location but of function. They are not in 
competition with anyone else who would buy." 7 
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail 
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for 
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government 
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy 
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government pur-
chases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court 
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1 
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of 
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption pro-
vided in the Non profit Institutions Act. The exemption is 
' Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to 
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). 
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting 
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is 
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock 
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper 
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to an-
swer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each 
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other, 
then they are in a different sphere." Jd., at 209. 
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limited, extending only to "purchases of . . . supplies for 
their own use by schools . . . hospitals, and charitable institu-
tions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court 
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for re-
sale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and 
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of 
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general 
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted 
that to extend the exemption to cover retail resales to walk-
in customers "would make the commercially advantaged hos-
pital pharmacy just another community drug store open to all 
comers for prescription services and devastatingly positioned 
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425 
U. S., at 17-18. 
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland 
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor 
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption. 
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption 
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of compe-
tition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or not the Non-
profit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospi-
tals, 8 the distinction it draws between purchases for 
consumption and purchases for resale to the general public is 
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private non-
profit hospitals. 
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to 
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and 
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the 
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and R egulation Assn, 
-u.s.- (1981). 
III 
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and 
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally, 
• See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14 
(1978). 
. . 
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and that the exceptions from their application are to be con-
strued strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail 
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said 
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This 
is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is pri-
vate or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978). 
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legis-
lative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the 
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of 
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government phar-
macies that compete in the retail market with private phar-
macies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to 
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained 
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of 
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Brock & 
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that 
Congress intended to protect small business from what was 
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to 
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest 
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision 
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, 
and I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari . 
Justice WHite 
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dissenting. 
The question in this case is whether the Robinson-Patman 
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13, applies to state and local governments 
that have entered the commercial marketplace as retailers of 
goods to the general public in competition with private firms. 
Because this is a substantial question, and because I think 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit an-
swered the question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of 
certiorari. 
I 
Petitioner is an association of retail pharmacists doing busi-
ness in Jefferson County, Alabama. Respondents are 15 
drug companies and certain state and county pharmacies op-
erated in conjunction with state and county hospitals. 1 In 
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the state and county 
pharmacies were receiving preferential prices from the drug 
manufacturers and were using their favored position to com-
pete with private pharmacies in retail sales to the general 
public. Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale 
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13.2 Petitioner sought 
' The respondent pharmacies include those operated by the county hos-
pital and by the hospitals and clinics of the Medical College of the Univer-
sity of Alabama. 
2 Under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold 
.. .. 
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injunctive relief and treble damages. 3 
The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The court found that 
sales to governmental agencies are "beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other tradi-
tional governmental purposes." Pet. at 20a. In reaching this 
conclusion the court relied primarily on statements by H. B. 
Teegarden, the chief draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
and by other commentators and government officials indicat-
ing that sales to governmental agencies are beyond the in-
tended scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district 
and appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to 
for use, consumption or resale within the United States ... , and where the 
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or 
... injure ... competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U. S. C. § 13. 
3 The District Court found that one of the defendants-the Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama-was immune from any claim to 
damages by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed 
from suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief. 
'See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30-32 
(1963). But Congressman Patman did not address the question whether 
the Act applies to governmental purchases for retail resale. The district 
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General indicating that the 
Act did not apply to sales to the federal government. Again, however, the 
question was assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies." 
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936). 
The District Court also relied on the fact that Congress has on two occa-
sions considered, without enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable 
to sales to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). However, neither of 
these bills was specifically directed to the question of sales to governmental 
agencies for resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana 
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688 (CA7 
1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable inferences [can] be drawn from 
the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the inter-
pretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including 
the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered 
change." United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962). 
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governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding 
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light 
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U. S. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the 
basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark dissented. 
II 
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting opinion, the 
Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental distinction be-
tween government purchases for its own consumption and 
government purchases for resale to the general public. 6 It 
may be agreed that the legislative history of the Robinson-
Patman Act, and subsequent interpretations of the Act, indi-
cate that governmental bodies are not subject to the Act 
when purchasing for their own consumption. Such an ex-
emption properly may be implied because, as a consumer, the 
government does not use the advantage of cheaper wholesale 
prices to injure competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in 
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that the 
federal government would continue to be able to purchase 
5 In only two of the cited cases, however, did the district court hold that 
sales to governmental agencies in competition with private firms were not 
covered by the Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not reach 
the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212 
(CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 
F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974), remanded on other issues, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). Cf. 
Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News Co., 632 
F. 2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military exchange store for resale to 
military personnel are not subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W 
D Ky. 1941), affd on other grounds, 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither 
the government nor a city in its purchase of property ... is in competition 
with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling the arti-
cle.") (emphasis added). 
6 Petitioner only argues that purchases by the government pharmacies 
for the purpose of resale to members of the general public are covered by 
the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for 
f 
the purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered by the Act. 
Pet. for Cert. 9. 
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goods at discounts not available to other purchasers: 
"The Federal Government is not in competition with 
other buyers from these [wholesalers] .... [T]o have a 
discrimination, there must be a relative position between 
the parties to the discrimination which col!stitutes an in-
jury to one as against the other. I think the answer is 
to be found in that. 
"In other words, if seller A makes a price to a retailer 
in New York and a different price to a retailer in San 
Francisco, all other things aside, no case of discrimina-
tion could be predicated there, because the two are not 
in the same sphere at all. 
"The Federal Government is saved by the same dis-
tinction, not of location but of function. They are not in 
competition with anyone else who would buy." 7 
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase for retail 
resale is a completely different animal from a purchase for 
consumption." Pet., at 29a. An exemption for government 
purchases for consumption rests on considerations of policy 
and legislative intent wholly inapplicable to government pur-
chases for resale to the public generally. Indeed, this Court 
recognized just such a distinction in its decision in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U. S. 1 
(1976). The issue in that case was whether the purchase of 
drugs by pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption pro-
vided in the Non profit Institutions Act. The exemption is 
; Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to 
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). 
The quotation in text is included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting 
opinion. Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of this case is 
Teegarden's response to the question put to him by Congressman Hancock 
as to whether a wholesaler could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper 
price than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would have to an-
swer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals are in competition with each 
other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. If they are not in competition with each other, 
then they are in a different sphere." I d., at 209. 
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limited, extending only to "purchases of . . . supplies for 
their own use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institu-
tions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c. The Court 
held that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for re-
sale to former patients, for dispensation to employees and 
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or of 
their dependents), and for resale to members of the general 
public, the exemption was not available. The Court noted 
that to extend the exemption to cover retail resales to walk-
in customers "would make the commercially advantaged hos-
pital pharmacy just another community drug store open to all 
comers for prescription services and devastatingly positioned 
with respect to competing commercial pharmacies." 425 
U. S., at 17-18. 
This case is indistinguishable in principle from Portland 
Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a competitor 
rather than a consumer it loses its claim to exemption. 
When it acts solely as a consumer, it may claim exemption 
because the basic purpose of the Act-protection of compe-
tition-is no longer at issue. Thus, whether or not the Non-
profit Institutions Act applies directly to government hospi-
tals, 8 the distinction it draws between purchases for 
consumption and purchases for resale to the general public is 
equally applicable to government hospitals as to private non-
profit hospitals. 
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a barrier to 
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to the state and 
county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs to members of the 
general public is hardly an attribute of state sovereignty. See 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Regulation Assn, 
- u. s. - (1981). 
III 
We have stated repeatedly that "the antitrust laws and 
Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed liberally, 
8 See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14 
(1978). 
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and that the exceptions from their application are to be con-
strued strictly." Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail 
Druggists Assn, supra, 425 U. S., at 11. And we have said 
that implied antitrust immunity is not favored. Ibid. This 
is true whether the institution seeking the exemption is pri-
vate or the political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978). 
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and legis-
lative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and despite the 
Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, the Court of 
Appeals implied an exemption for sales to government phar-
macies that compete in the retail market with private phar-
macies. The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was "to 
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained 
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of 
their greater purchasing power." FTC v. Henry Broch & 
Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). It is not easy to assume that 
Congress intended to protect small business from what was 
seen as the unfair competition of large corporations only to 
leave these very same businesses vulnerable to the greatest 
potential competitor of all-the government. The decision 
of the Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, 
and I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari. 
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job 11/07/82 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. 
Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827 
Questions Presented 
1. Are sales made to state and local governmental agencies 
ordinarily exempt per se from the proscriptions of the Robinson-
Patman Act? 
2. If sales to state and local governmental agencies are 
ordinarily exempt per se from the proscriptions of the R-P Act, does 
that general exemption extend to sales to state or local 
governmental agencies that compete in the public marketplace with 





Petr, a nonprofit corporation comprised of pharmacists 
thoughout Jefferson County, Alabama, brought suit alleging that resp 
drug manufacturers were selling drugs to resps University of Alabama 
Pharmacy, Russell Ambulatory Center Pharmacy (both subdivisions of 
the University of Alabama Medical Center) and Cooper Green Hospital 
Pharmacy (a county hospital) at discriminatory "bid prices," and 
that these pharmacies were selling drugs procured by "bid 
purchasing" to the general public in direct competition with 
----------------------~--~'-------------------------
privately owned pharmacies. Petr contended that resp governmental 
---------~~~ purchasers knowingly induced such lower prices and that sales by 
these pharmacies were in violation of the R-P Act. Petr sought 
injunctive relief and monetary damages for compensation of injuries 
suffered as a result of the violations. 
All resps filed motions to dismiss petr's cplt, stating as ---
grounds for dismissal, among other things, that sales of goods made 
to a governmental agency or instrumentality are exempt as a matter 
of law from the sanctions of R-P Act. The DC held "that 
governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U.S.C. §13c, beyond -
the intended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, -- ------ ,. at least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 
traditional governmental purposes." A panel of the then CAS 
affirmed on the basis of the DC's opinion, with Judge Thomas Clark 
~ssenting, stating that the majority's decision c~s with 
Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists, Inc., 425 u.s. 1 
(1976). 
j. 
Summary of the Parties' Contentions 
1. Petr. The R-P Act contains no reference to any exemptions 
f/Jt:.. ____.. -
other than the nonprofit institution exemption found in §13c. There ~ 
is no explicit exemption in favor of sales to state or local 
~ 
governmental agencies on the face of the Act and to hold otherwise 
would amount to an expansion of the exemption that does appear. The 
legislative history at least indicates that Congress did not intend 
to exempt from the proscriptions of the R-P Act sales to state or 
local governmental agencies where those agencies are competing in 
the public marketplace with privately owned business enterprises. 
2. Resps. The R-P Act does not cover governmental purchasers. 
The legislative history of the Act exhibits a congressional intent 
to exclude government from its scope and a belief by Congress that 
the exclusion would be recognized without the need for explicit 
statutory language. That conclusion is supported by the rule of 
statutory construction that prohibits an interpretation that poses a 
significant constitutional question absent clear expression that 
such interpretation was Congress's intent. Se~LRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Application of the Act to 
the states would interfere with the integral operations of state 
functions and threaten rights reserved to the states by the lOth A. 
Discussion 
I. Statute and Statutory Construction 
A. Face of the Statute. The Act does not state whether it 
applies to sales to state and local governmental agencies. The 
Court has affirmed, however, the comprehensive coverage of the 
antitrust laws and has recognized that they represent "a carefully 
studied attempt to bring within the[m] every person engaged in 
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial 
intercourse among the states." United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association, 322 u.s. 533, 553 (1944). The terms 
"persons" and "purchasers" are sufficiently broad to cover 
governmental bodies. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (citing with approval Rangen, 
Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965) 
(holding that, under §13(c) and circumstances of case, "any person" 
includes state governmental procurement officers)). The Court has 
held that the word "person," as used in the Clayton Act and the 
Sherman Act, includes states and their political subdivisions. See 
Community Communications Co., Inc. v.~:y of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 
835, 843~(" [The antitrust laws], like other federal laws 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply 
to municipalities as well as to other corporate entities."); City of 
~afayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 394-397 
(1978) (plurality opinion). 
The Act expressly applies to discrimination in prices between 
the purchasers of like commodities "where such commodities are sold 
for use, consumption, or resale." 15 u.s.c. §13(a). A price 
discrimination in favor of a purchaser who buys for his own use or 
consumption violates the Act no less than does a discrimination in 
favor of a purchaser who resells, provided that there is injury to 
competition. If, therefore, governmental purchases are subject to 
the Act, absent some exemption, it applies regardless of the 
government's intended use of the goods. 
B. Rule of Statutory Construction. Petr argues that there is 
no ambiguity in the R-P Act and that the face of the Act contains no 
per se exemption in favor of sales to state and local governmental 
agencies. Petr contends that there is thus no need to resort to the 
legislative history of the Act to determine whether Congress 
intended to exempt sales to state and local governmental agencies 
from its proscriptions. E. g., Ex parte Collett, 337 u.s. 55, 61 
(1949). The Court, however, has retreated from this principle and 
held that legislative history should be considered even though the 
language of a statute appears to be clear. See, e. g., Watt v. 
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (POWELL, J.). 
c. Resps argue that the prospect that 
its purchases--not only for its /b~ 
v 
universities and hospitals, but also for its highways, highway ~ 
patrol, ~r isons /~~ourts, etc. --might be subject to the R-P Act ( ~ 
h . . h~ raises substantial questions under the lOth A. In Cat ol1c BlS op, 
the Court stated that, where the application of a statute to a p~ 
1-c~ 
"would give rise to serious constitutional questions," the Courtt?AJ 
must first identify 'the affirmative intention of Congress clear~ 
expressed' before concluding that the Act" applies. 440 U.S., at 
501. Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-30 
(1937) (in light of lOth A challenge, duty to adopt interpretation 
"[e]ven to avoid a serious doubt" of constitutionality). 
II. Constitutional Problem 
A. lOth A Problems for Blanket Application of Act to State and -
Local Governmental Purchasing. In United Transportation Union v. 
Long Island R.R., 102 S.Ct. 1349 (1982), the Court set forth three 
,., . . 
conditions for finding that a statute conflicts with the lOth A: (1} 
the statute regulates the states as states; (2} it addresses matters 
that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty; and (3} it 
directly impairs the states' ability to structure integral 
operations in areas of traditional functions. Id., at 1353 (quoting 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 
452 u.s. 264, 287-288 (1981}}. 
1. States as States. Resps argue that, if the Act were to 
be construed as applicable to state institutions, it would regulate 
the states as states. Such regulation includes the regulation of 
state institutions, because they "derive their authority and power 
from their respective States" and provide "integral governmental 
services" within the ambit of the lOth A protection. National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 n.20 (1976}. Because 
the CAll's judgment would apply to all state institutions, it is 
difficult to contend that it would not act on the states as states 
as to at least some governmental functions, if not to the hospital 
and the university here. 
2. "Attribute of State Sovereignty." Resps contend that, if 
the R-P Act interferes with the relationship between a state and its 
suppliers by removing the state's freedom to negotiate prices below 
prevailing trade levels for goods purchased, then the Act regulates 
an attribute of state sovereignty to no less an extent than did the 
FLSA in National League of Cities when it attempted to interfere 
with the state's freedom to compensate its employees less generously 
than does private industry. Similarly, because a state's execution 
of its functions depends upon the expenditure of state funds to 
purchase various goods, the attributes of state sovereignty 
necessarily include appropriation of state funds, the state's 
purchase of goods, and the state's disposition of those goods. It 
would seem that each of those attributes is affected when the price 
the state pays for the goods, and the price at which it resells 
goods, is subject to federal control. 
3. Integral Operation of Traditional State Functions. Resps 
argue that, without some immunity, the Act impacts upon every 
function of state government, including its most traditional 
functions, because the Act constitutes an across-the-board 
regulation of purchasing, is not limited to any particular goods, 
supplier, or industry, and is expressly applicable to all purchases, 
whether for resale, use, or consumption. In this respect, the R-P 
Act in indistinguishable from the FLSA. This Court expressly 
recognized in National League of Cities that "schools and 
hospitals ••• provid[e] an integral portion of those governmental 
services which the States and their political subdivisions have 
traditionally afforded their citizens." 426 U.S., at 855. 
If the R-P Act applies to state purchases for consumption, 
because a favorable price could cause competitive injury at the 
primary line of competition, see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking 
Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 (1967) ("Sellers may not sell like goods to 
different purchasers at different prices if the result may be to 
injure competition in either the seller's or the buyers' 
{4 market ..•• ") (emphasis added), the state would be a potential deft 
~ /f in a case brought by a competitor of the state's supplier every time 
l the state purchases goods for its many functions. Because the Act 
would thus treat states as it does private businesses and prevent 
them from securing favorable discounts, higher prices for 
governmental operations would translate into a some mix of fewer 
governmental services or higher taxes. This is the same impact 
found fatal in National League of Cities. 
4. Conclusion. The Court's opinion in Catholic Bishop would 
suggest that, because the extension of the R-P Act's coverage to 
state and local governmental purchasing presents "a significant 
risk" that the lOth A will be infringed, and because "[t]here is no 
clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress" to include 
state and local governmental purchasing, the Act should 
at least exempting certain state and local governmental 
from its scope. 
be read as } 
purchasing ( 'j;--
--- __..-
B. Tenth Amendment Challenge to a Limited Application. In 
your dissent from denial of cert in this case, you indicated that 
National League of Cities would ~t pose a problem to coverage of a 
state's retail operations, because "[r]etail sale of drugs to 
I~ members of the general public is hardly an attribute of state 
sovereignty." Although the activities of a hospital clearly 
implicate a public interest, it is true that the functions performed 
by it have not been traditionally associated with sovereignty, and 
have long been at least partly in the private domain rather than the 
prerogative of the state. Thus, its activities--including 
so clearly governmental in nature as to 
a public function. 
Conclusion. Application of the R-P Act to the state's 
. \\ h . " d . . . t'consumpt1on pure as1ng woul g1ve r1se to ser1ous" lOth A concerns. 
ctJWr\, ~'> 
Petr's interpretation of the Act as fully applicable to all state 
and local governmental purchasing must be rejected unless there is~ 
an "affirmative intention" "clearly expressed" to provide such 
coverage. Application of the R-P Act to the retail activities 
challenged here raises no significant constitutional concerns. The 
question as to that limited coverage is whether there is any basis ---in_the statute or in the legislative history for contending that ---Congress intended such an interpretation of the Act's scope. 
-----------------------------------------III. Legislative History and Application of Act 
to All Governmental Purchases 
It is fair to say that the immediate purpose of the R-P Act was 
not to regulate competitive bidding by state and local governmental 
agencies, but to curb the purchasing power of chain stores. See, ~ 
~, 1 ABA Antitrust Section, The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and Law 
8-19 (ABA Monograph No. 4, 1980). 
A. Original Legislation. 
1. Reports. There is apparently nothing in the Senate or 
House committee or conference reports discussing the issue. 
2. Debates. There is apparently nothing in the Senate or 
House floor debates addressing the issue presented. 
3. Hearings. In testimony given before the House Judiciary 
Committee by H.B. Teegarden, a representative of the u.s. Wholesale 
Grocers Association and principal draftsman of the R-P Act, the 
following exchange took place: 
Mr. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent 
the granting of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act 
does so. So far as that problem is concerned, it is no 
different from that which exists under the present Clayton 
Act. 
Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge 
discounts. Take that electric fan, for instance. You go 
to the ordinary store and the list price is $35. The 
Procurement Division procures them delivered, one at a 
time, for $13.18. Now, would that discount be barred by 
this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a 
discount contrary to the present bill would be barred--
that is, the present law--would be barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal 
Government is not in competition with other buyers from 
these concerns. Therefore a discrimination--it is so 
applied universally in interstate commerce law, in the 
railroad law--to have a discrimination, there must be a 
relative position between the parties to the 
discrimination which constitutes an injury to one as 
against the other. I think the answer is to be found in 
that. 
In other words, if seller A makes a price to a 
retailer in New York and a different price to a retailer 
in San Francisco, all other things aside, no case of 
discrimination could be predicated there, because the two 
are not in the same sphere at all. 
The Federal Government is saved by the same 
distinction, not of location but of function. They are 
not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
Mr. Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding 
all along the line, would it not, in classes of goods that 
would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on 
Government orders? 
Mr. Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No~ I think not. 
Mr. Michener: If it did do it, you would not want 
it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No~ I would not want it. It 
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding anywhere 
else, and I do not see how it would with the Government. 
Mr. Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, 
county, exactly the same as anybody else, same quantity, 
same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden. No. 
Mr. Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city 
hospital any chea~er than they would to a privately-owned 
hospital, under t is bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. 
In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous 
questions of fact in a particular case. If the two 
hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say 
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not 
save it from the bill. If they are not in competition 
with each other, then they are in a different sphere. 
Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to 
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings]. 
"I......_ 
M T d b tl bm . tt d f l . tt b . f t th r. eegar en su sequen y su 1 e a wr1 en r1e o e 
House Judiciary Committee. Mr. Teegarden then not only interpreted 
the Act's prohibitions as directed to nongovernmental entities, but 
he also stated that the Act's benefits would accrue to private 
entities. See 1935 Hearings, supra, at 261 (recommending passage 
"for the protection of private rights"). More specifically, he 
stated: 
2. Would the bill prevent competitive bidding on 
Governmental purchases below trade price levels? L--_____________ _ 
This question was raised by a member of the committe 
at the hearing. The answer is found in the principle of lr~~ 
statutory construction that a statute will not be ~
construed to limit or restrict in any way the rights, 
I 
prerogatives, or privileges of the sovereign unless it so 
expressly provides--a principle inherited by American 
jurisprudence from the common law •..• 
The further insertion of the clause proposed under 
topic 4 below, requiring a showing of effect upon 
competition, will further preclude any possibilty of the 
bill affecting the Government. 
Id., at 250 (emphasis added). ~ps contend that the principle 
" 
regarding application of a statute to the sovereign applies to both 
state and __ _fu§~ral governments. Although Mr. Teegarden may have 
intended to include both state and federal governments in the 
' '· 
•' 
principle, the principle itself generally means that the government, 
in passing a law, does not give up what it does not expressly 
surrender. At most, the rule of statutory construction supports an 
exemption for the federal government's purchases. Compare United 
"'::::--~ 
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 u.s. 600, 606 (1941) (United States not 
"person" within meaning of §7 of Sherman Act), with Georgia v. 
Evans, 316 u.s. 159, 162 (1942) (state is person within meaning of 
1. AG's Comments. A contemporaneous construction of a new law 
by an official charged with its enforcement is highly persuasive of 
the statute's proper meaning. See, e. g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 
U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Six months after the Act was passed, the U.S. AG 
responded to an inquiry by the Secretary of War regarding the Act's 
application "to government contracts for supplies." W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 31 (1963) • In ruling that 
such contracts are outside the Act, the AG explained his conclusion 
on the same grounds cited by Mr. Teegarden: 
[Statutes] regulating rates, charges, etc., in 
matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily apply the 
Government unless it is expressly so provided; and it does 
not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government ..•• 
The Act of June 19, 1936, merely amended the Act of 
October 15, 1914 .•• and, in so far as I am aware, the 
latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as applicable 
to Government contracts. 
Ibid (later in the letter using phrase "Federal Government"). The 
AG therefore had several reasons "for avoiding a construction that 
would make the statute applicable to the Government in violation of 
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters, in the absence 
of any clear indication that it intended to depart from that policy 
in this instance." Id., at 32 (relying upon Emergency Fleet Corp. 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 u.s. 415, 425 (1928), in which 
this Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to a 
federal corporation that competed with private enterprise). 
It is difficult to read the AG's opinion as saying anything 
about the Act's applicability to state and local governmental 
agencies. The AG's statement of the principle of sovereign immunity 
does not extend to state and local governments, particularly when 
they act in a proprietary capacity. The AG's argument, however, 
that discounted sales to the federal government seldom would cause 
the competitive injury required to find a violation of the R-P Act 
reinforces the fact that the opinion does not contemplate a 
situation involving governmental competition with private 
enterprises. 
2. Patman. Rep. Patman, however, interpreted the AG's opinion 
as exempting local and state governmental purchases: 
No. 62. Question. If a manufacturer sells to 
government, municipal, or public institutions at a lower 
price than he sells to his wholesale customers, is he in 
violation of the law if he does not make the same price 
for the same quantity available to the wholesaler to whom 
he sells? 
Opinion. The Attorney General of the United States 
has ruled that the Act does not apply to the government. 
No. 63. Questions. If a manufacturer sells his 
product to wholesalers, and also sells to government, 
municipal, or public institutions at a price lower than he 
·•' 
sells to his wholesale customers to meet the price of his 
competitor, how does the law apply? 
Opinion. The Robinson-Patman Act does not apply. 
W. Patman, The Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963). 
Rep. Patman's interpretation of the Act is certainly entitled 
to weight, but here he seems to be relying on the AG's opinion, 
which may not, as noted above, be applicable to state and local 
governments. 
\\.. 
C. Subsequent t t egislative Events. It is now established 
~(u~fo~~na~y) that post-enactment action or inaction by Congress 
in the face of judicial or administrative construction of a statute 
provides evidence of legislative intent. Se~errill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1839 (1982); FTC v. 
Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349, 351-352 (1941) (rejecting a proposed 
interpretation of the Clayton Act because, among other reasons, the 
FTC had never asserted such an interpretation despite 25 years of 
administrative enforcement of a statute that Congress had not 
amended) . 
1938 Exemption for Nonprofit Institutions. Petr contends -- -because Congress addressed the question of exemptions when it 
for sales to nonprofit institutions, the Legislative 
clearly and succinctly, did not see fit to include --
exemption for sales to state and local governmental agencies. 
~ -~ Because the Nonprofit Institutions Act of 1938 did not exempt 
~'~)overnment purchases, application of the Act to such purchases would 
~~~ace the government in a less favorable position than eleemosynary 
~ ~~titutions. Resps, on the other hand, argue that the only 
~al interpretation is that Congress did not include 
governmental agencies in the 1938 Act because they were not covered 
by the R-P Act in the first place. 
Merely the existence of an exemption for nonprofit institutions 
is poor support for either party's contentions. 
2. 1951 and 1953 Bills. In 1951 and 1953, Rep. Patman 
introduced bills to amend the Act by adding a new section, 
immediately following §2(f) (pertaining to liability of buyers) to 
define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). Rep. Patman's 
amendments would not have imposed liability upon the state as a 
purchaser by merely defining "purchaser," because the Act does not 
impose liability upon a "purchaser," but rather upon any "person" 
who (i) discriminates in price between "purchasers," §2(a), or (ii) 
knowingly induces or receives a discrimination in price, §2(f). His 
bills would, however, have imposed liability upon any manufacturer 
that discriminates in price between government (state or federal) 
and other customers. The bills apparently would have applied to 
purchases for consumption as well as resale. It is arguable that, 
if the word "purchaser" did not (absent an amendment) include 
government, then the word "person" did not include the government. 
3. Hearings. In 1967 and 1968, Congress conducted public 
hearings on the drug industry. The House committee learned that 
drug manufacturers often sell to governmental (federal, state, 
county, and city) agencies at favorable prices. See Competitive 




Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 15, 1094. Two examples of the testimony will suffice: 
a. NARD. Earl Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, who appeared 
on behalf of NARD, stated: "When a drug supplier sells drugs to 
Federal, State, or municipal government institutions, the price 
charged by the supplier may be without regard to the Robinson-Patman 
Act." H. Rep. 90-1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968) (citing as 
authority Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 
(SDNY 1955) (dicta), aff'd, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2 1956); F. Rowe, Price 
Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 84-85 (1962)). "To the 
extent that these governmental purchasers resell or redistribute the 
drugs to confined patients, there would probably be no adverse 
competitive effects in any event because the community pharmacies 
are not functionally in competition with such institutions for such 
drug sales, under settled Robinson-Patman precedent." H. Rep. 90-
1983, supra, at 7. Mr. Kintner then construed the Act as applicable 
to purchases by private institutions if purchased for resale. Id. , 
at 8. 
b. Dixon. FTC Chairman Paul Dixon discussed, in a letter to -the House Subcommittee, the practice of granting discounts to 
hospitals: "This agency, of course, does not have, nor does it seek, 
control or influence over State or Federal health care programs or 
their potential effect on private markets." Id., at 74. The FTC 
was expressly aware of 
"the eroding influence--on the market of retail druggists-
-presented by expanding Federal, State and private group 
health care programs, the ability of the Federal 
Government to purchase from a number of drug manufacturers 
at substantially below wholesale cost and in some 
instances hospitals, both nonprofit and proprietary, 
selling to outpatients or even nonpatients. Id., at 73. 
This disclaimer of any authority over transactions involving state 
health care programs by the FTC, which is entrusted with enforcement 
of the Act, is entitled to weight. 
4. Committee Action in 1968. The Committee concluded that the 
Act should "be applied to discriminatory drug sales favoring 
nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to 
the extent there is prescription drug competition at the retail 
level with disfavored retail druggists." Id., at 79 (emphasis 
added). See e. g., id., at 77 (noting "[t]he difference between 
drug pri9es charged retailers and wholesalers as compared to those 
charged institutional and governmental customers"): id., at 78 
(singling out "[n]ongovernmental health-care institutions" for their 
"competition with neighboring retail druggists"). 
C. ~clu~ It is safe to say that there is no 
"affirmative intention" "clearly expressed" to include all 
governmental purchasing within the scope of the R-P Act. Thus, 
~ petr's interpretation must be rejected. On the other hand, although 
t subsequent legislative inaction would suggest that Congress is not 
~atisfied with the general belief that governmental purchases are 
exempt from the R-P Act, there is also little basis for a per se 
exemption for all state and local governmental purchasing. 
IV. Limited Exemption 
A. General Principles. Petr contends that the Court could 
construe o support an exemption for state-supported activities 
( 
where the state or local government is functioning as a consumer 
" 
rather than as a competitor. The Court has stated, however, that 
' 
any exemptions from the antitrust laws should be construed narrowly. 
See, e. g., Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S., at 11-12: FMC v. 
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973). 
~ B. Legislative History. The ~ly exemptiory from 
~~~ for nonprofit institutions containe~, which 
,1/'f~~o years after the R-P Act was enacted: "Nothing in the [R-P Ac 
shall apply to purchases of their supplies for their own use by 
~ ~chools, ~lleges, ~iversities,vpublic libr;ries,~hurches, 
~ ~x; -l:"2.s_12it~ls, ~-!hari table institutions not operated for profit." 
~~ e House and S~nate Reports specifically refer to this Act as 
~~pplyin~ to eleemosynary inst : tuti~~s, which are commonly understood 
~- to mean £rivate charitable entities, and neither speaks of the 
~ amendment applying to aqy governmental agency. See S. Rep. No. 
Y' 1769, 75th Cong., 3d/sess. (1938): H.R. Rep. No. 2161, 75th Cong., 
3d Sess. (1938). It is at least questionable whether Congress 
included in the 1938 Act government schools, libraries, or 
hospitals--the only three entities mentioned that might be 
governmental--and thus treated these bodies more favorably than 
numerous other governmental agencies not named. 
Petr and the NARD contend, however, that §13c was intended to 
protect governmental institutions to the extent they purchased 
supplies for their own use. Rep. Walter, sponsor of the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act, was involved in one floor debate on the subject: 
,L Mr. Sabath: Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to vJVV- object, may I inquire of the gentleman whether this bill 
~{.Y) .. f' \ will also apply to institutions that are maintained and 
L ~ controlled by municipalities and cities. Many of the 
~~ institutions that are financed by municipalities and by 
,\ p tate might come a o '~nder its provisions? 
~~-eiJ· ~~ . ~~~ 




Mr. Walter: The bill clearly covers that class of 
institution. All cha~itable institutions are cove' e by 
the provisions o'f this "1'hll. c~r i-~
Mr. Sabath: Does the gentleman think a county 
hospital or a city sanitarium wholly financed by a city, 
county or State, would come within the provisions of this 
act? 
Mr. Walter: Yes, I do. 
81 Cong. Rec. 8706 (1937). But see id., at 8705 ("The purpose of 
the bill is to enable an institution maintained by public 
subscriptions in whole or part to receive discounts for purchases of 
t lu " goods for 1ts own use."). This is the strongest evidence of 
. ' 
Congress's intent whether the R-P Act applies, at all, to state and 
---local governments. But see FTC v. Anheuser-Buscn, Inc., 363 u.s. 
536, 553 (1960) (warning against reliance "upon a statement of a 
single Congressman"). The Court has implicitly agreed with this 
reading. See~ty of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.l4 (plurality 
opinion) (noting that Congress included within the 1938 jet "public 
........ ~ 
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local 
government"). Thus, it is a defensible interpretation that 
purchases by all nonprofit hospitals and universities, governmental 
and private, fit within this exemption as long as they are for the 
............. -- --- ~---------------
institution's "own use." See Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S., ...._________ 
at 14 (exempting only drug purchases made by a nonprofit hospital 
for use that "promotes the hospital's intended institutional 
operation in the care of persons who are its patients"). 
C. Conclusion. It is probably fair to say that, if Congress 
"intended" ~exemption, such an exemption was to cover purchases 
<"' 
for government consumption only. It seems relatively certain that --Congress did not intend to sanction anticompetitive bid purchasing 
,. 
by governmental agencies for the purpose of those agencies competing 
with private enterprise. Congress probably did not foresee ------governmental agencies entering the retail market for pharmaceutical 
drugs or any other consumer item. 
Summary 
The DC and CA's holding is that governmental purchases, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional 
governmental purposes, are beyond the intended reach of the R-P Act. 
Thus, the Court need only to reverse that ruling and does not 
,,- . l\..\ 
necessarily have to find or create an exemption for consumpt1ve 
purchasing. As the memo shows, however, I have found it difficult 
to discuss the former without discussing the latter, and the Court 
probably should not worry about making a somewhat broader ruling 
than is absolutely necessary. Under current doctrine, the analysis 
would probably proceed in this manner: 
1. Find Catholic Bishop problem for no exemption, ~ problem 
/\ 
for limited exemption. 
2. Find legislative history supports a §13c exemption, as 
/ ------·"" u ,, 
defined in Portland Retail Druggists, for comsumption purchasing by 
governmental hospitals and schools. 
3. Reverse. 
job 11/07/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, No. 81-827 
I was unable to track down all the legislative history upon 
which the parties (and I in this memo) rely. What materials I did 
find, however, gave me some asssurance of the accuracy of the 
quotations cited and of the thoroughness of research reflected in 
the briefs. 
81-827 JEFFERSON CO. PHARMACEUTICAL v. ABBOTT Argued 11/8/82 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, No. 81-827 
You asked me to outline the steps necessary to find an 
exemption under §13c for the consumption purchasing of public 
schools, hospitals, and libraries, but reverse the CAll's finding of 
a broad exemption for all governmental purchasing. I also set forth 
another possible route of decision. 
I. Bench Memo's Suggestion 
1. Petr's Argument. Although petr's arguments are not always 
consistent, it is fair to say that petr makes two alternative 
arguments: (1) the Robinson-Patman Act applies to all governmental 
purchasing; and (2) the R-P Act only applies to that governmental 
purchasing not exempted by §13c. The options are thus: 
a. Catholic Bishop Problem for Blanket Application. Blanket 
application of the R-P Act to all governmental purchasing would 
create lOth A problems. Under NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U.S. 490 (1979), where the application of a statute to a party 
"would give rise to serious constitutional questions," the Court 
must first identify 'the affirmative intention of Congress clearly 
expressed' before concluding that the Act" applies. The issue is 
thus whether blanket application of the R-P Act to all governmental 
purchasing was the "clearly expressed" "affirmative intention" of 
Congress in 1936. 
b. Limited Application of Act to ·~ Purchasing for Resale. 
This limited application raises no lOth A problem, because retail 
sale of drugs is not a traditional state function. The issue here 
is whether there is sufficient basis for finding that Congress 
intended §13c to apply to governmental agencies. 
c. CAll's View. The issue here is whether Congress intended 
such a broad exemption. 
3. Statutory History. All the Court's choices depend upon 
congressional intent. There is little support for the CAll's 
position in the legislative history, and no affirmative intention 
clearly expressed of Congress's intent to apply the R-P Act to all 
governmental purchasing. The strongest evidence is for some §13c 
2. 
exemption for the consumption purchasing of governmental libararies, 
schools, and universities. The Court's holding in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists, 425 u.s. 1 (1976), would 
thus be equally applicable to governmental drug purchasing for 
retail sale. 
II. Another Route 
If youj are willing to disregard (or discard) Catholic Bishop's 
unprincipled statutory construction rule, you could--most fairly--
find little legislative history to support~ exemption for 
governmental purchasing. You then could say that, if the R-P Act is 
limited, it must be by the lOth A. The Court need not define that 
limit in this case, because the cplt here does not implicate a 
traditional state function • 
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Justice Rehnquist ~ ~ 
~'t ~~~4££ 4; ~ 
~~~~~~¢'_o~~ · 
Justice O'Connor ~ '"::::' 
S~-4~· 
C HAMBE RS Of' 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL S TEVENS 
.§uprtuu <!fltlttt gf flrt ~ttb ~hrltir 
~rurltingfun. ~. <!f. 2llbi~~ 
November 12, 1982 
Re: 81-827 - Jefferson Co. Pharmaceutical 
v. Abbott Laboratories 
Dear Chief: 
After further reflection I have decided to vote to 
affirm. I am now persuaded that the approach that Bill 
Rehnquist took in his Blue Chip opinion should be followed 
here. Regardless of how the Court might have regarded the 
availability of a lOb(S) cause of action if it had 
confronted the question in the 1940's or 1950's, the general 
recognition of such a claim in the intervening years really 
compelled the Court to accept such claims as a legitimate 
part of our law. In a way this case presents the other side 
of a similar coin. Even though I would have sustained the 
claim such as the petitioners if it had arisen in the 1940's 
l
or 1950's, it seems wrong to ignore the consistent and 
~ virtually uniform understanding of the legal and business 
community that the Robinson-Patman Act simply does not apply 
to sales to governmental entities. Even without any ruling2 f-
from this Court, the considerations that underlie the _1 ~ 
doctrine of stare decisis seem fully applicable. ~ 
A multitude of marketing relationships have 
unquestionably been developed on the assumption that the 
statute is wholl ina licable to this area of the economy. 
I am inclined to elieve tna~ tne vast maj o rity of those 
relationships would remain undisturbed by a holding that the 
statute is applicable because few would pose any practical 
threat to competition. Nevertheless, the process of re-
examination with its attendant litigation costs would give 
rise to the adverse consequences that the doctrine of stare 
decisis is intended to forestall. 
Moreover, if we take the petitioner's counsel at his 
word and assume that not only all sales for the university's 
.... 
- 2 -
own use but also all sales for resale to students, faculty, 
and possibly their families as well, are beyond the reach of 
the Act, that which remains seems relatively insignificant. 
In sum, although I would have voted otherwise thirty or 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 12/20/82 ABBOTT SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Jim DATE: Dec. 20, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n 
This memorandum records general impressions on 
the basis of a hurried reading of your draft. It is 
evident that you have done an enormous amount of research, 
and you have used the materials thoughtfully and - for the 
most part - persuasively. 
I nevertheless would like to discuss with you a 
different organization of the opinion. I suggest this 
with some hesitation 1as I haQ'~ only gtrne through vout 6 
~ 1-1-.A.-
~~~~~~~, but I did want to t•l~ to ~~u before we 
separate for the holidays. 
2. 
The present structure of the opinion, after Part 
I, seems to me to be as follows: 
Part II leads off with some excellent quotations 
as to the comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws. 
Commencing on p. 7, and continuing top. 13, the draft 
addresses primarilv the "issue" whether a state or local 
hospital may be a "purchaser" or a "person" under the Act. 
Part III-A discusses legislative history, III-B 
is limited to the opinions of the u.s.A.G., and that of 
the California A.G., but with a full footnote on 
Representative Patman (n. 28). 
Part III-C addresses respondent's reliance on--~ 
~~~-
~- -----~- This extends from p. 19 top. 26, and seems a 
0 
good bit too long. 
3. 
Part IV is a nice closing jury argument ~ t;-loJat ~ 
~· 
Certainly the foregoing organization is an 
acceptable way to write the opinion. But let me try out 
on you a different organization: 
First: make clear the narrowness of the issue 
before us. We are not concerned with federal government 
purchases and sales; only those to a state and stale and 
loca~ndeed, we are not concerned in this case 
~ 
by purchases for use in traditional governmental 
functions. Rather, the only issue before us involves 
aA 
purchases and sales for the non-government function of 
~ 
competing in the retail pharmacv and drug store market 
with private enterprise. Yet, the court helow held - and 
respondents contend - that the Act exempts all purchases 
J 1- J.t.~~p~ LA.---~~~ 
t--1-~~~~ ,L.v ·~-
~  
and sales by a 
purchase and use of the goods purchased. 
4. 
Part II could~ open~ with a paragraph to the 
foregoing effect. 
.. tv-IL~ -t-
Then, i• tR.e-rQ -R-ei! mer-i'h 4-n f structu~the 
11 
~~~,·-~ 
opinion in the customary · way~R whiefi ue esceFtaiR 
congressional intent? We commence by~~ting the ~~~ 
You state this very well in the first sentence of the 
opinion on p. 1. 
. 
~ ~ ~ ~LAA-.-.,..'""LA-~&<..o{ 
ORe of COiigi eS"s4.GRa;J. iR~ • 
is 
. ~f- W.e__ 
We ~ look to the language itself. AI ~fi:i:Hk~ 
~ -
~ ~~.u~~~~ 
Dl{ -een-ttl argue that the plain langua~~ controls. ~ In u;i.w·z ~ > 
~t-H.-~l~~~P-1~~~) 
q ~~ broad scope,( the burden ~Y is on those who 
. 
<' 
~ 5 • 
. ·
~ 
,) t.Q. state and loca~nti ties/\ 
exemption is viewed as extending to purchases 
competing in the private market. 
As a part of the "plain language" point, you can 
dispose of whether state and local governmental agencies 
come within the terms "purchaser" and "person". My 
recollection is that respondents do not deny being 
included within these terms. It therefore seems 
unnecessary to make the rather extended argument presently 
in pp. 8-13. You do have some excellent language 
these cases that ~~~the 
at some other point. We oculd, of course, in 
from 
opinion 
acknowledging respondent's concession in this respect, say 
that this was compelled by several decisions of this 
. ,.,. 
assuming ambiguity, 
comprehensive coverage of 
. 5 and 
legislative history discussion logically would come next. 
I would be a little more affirmative at the beginning (p. 
11) . ~~fiape k/e could say that in view of the purpose of 
the Act, and the absence of any relevant exemption 
language, the legislative history falls far short of 
supporting respondent's claim. his is certainly 
\ ' 
Such an opening could be followed with the 
stronger portions of your section on legislative history. 
Perhaps you could at least reduce the length of n. 26. 
I would not be inclined, at least in our initial 
~ 
circulation, to include the twoAparagraphs on attorney 
generals' opinions. ~ld~~ lead into the U.S. 
Attorney General's opinion by a citation to Udall. 
fAA- 4:-~ 
Rather, can we not dismiss the u.s. Attorney General's 
1\ 
opinion as clearly applying only to the federal 
government. 
Finally, we ~ come to what is probably the 
toughest part of our opinion: dealing with the judicial 
interpretation of the Act. My impression is that the 
8. 
present discussion is a good deal too long and detailed. 
~b-f '1' . h h b 1' ~ I am not am1 1ar w1t t e case~ I e 1eve we can state 
positively a~ ta~ ~~~iR~ that this Court has never held 
or suggested that the claimed exemption must be read into 
the Act. I believe you say - and if so it is important -
that until CAS's decision in this case no Court of Appeals 
had so held. This would leave us with the District Court 
cases to deal with. It is not entirely clear to me from 
your draft whether there is even a single District Court 
decis~n on the issue before us: Whether, assuming that 
the federal government is entirely exempt and further 
assuming - without deciding - that state and local 
entities may be exempt with respect to governmental 
$" 
function, has any case held that an exemption exists that 
1\ 
,, . ' 
enables state and local entities to compete ~ 
A 
"'0 0 ,< ... 
~ in the private markets? 
* * * 
The foregoing is quite sketchy, and I have not 
been nearly as thoughtful as you have been. I have 
dictated the foregoing primarily for purposes of a 
discussion with you. 
9. 
In our brief discussion yesterday, you raised a 
question whether we should anticipate - as fully as you 
have - what the dissenting opinion will say. My 
inclination is not to go quite so far, or so fully in 
anticipation, as the present draft. We certainly need to 
address the principal arguments made by responde~, but 
- ._;I 
this~be done quite as judiciously as you have done. 
1\ 
After all, as Potter Stewart once told me, when writing 
,, 
... ~ .. ·~\ ... 
10. 
~~~ 
for the Court vou are an advocate and want your opinion to 
t\ 
be affirmative and convincing. A judge - particularly a 
Justice here - also must be fair and ~t recognize the 
principal arguments against his view. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 12/20/82 ABBOTT SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Jim DATE: Dec. 20, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n 
This memorandum records general impressions on the 
basis of a hurried reading of your draft. It is evident 
that you have done an enormous amount of research, and you 
have used the materials thoughtfully and - for the most part 
- persuasively. 
I nevertheless would like to discuss with you a 
different organization of the opinion. I suggest this with 
some hesitation, but I did want to discuss this before we 
separate for the holidays. 
The present structure of the opinion, after Part 
I, seems to me to be as follows: 
Part II leads off with some excellent quotations 
as to the comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws. 
Commencing on p. 7, and continuing top. 13, the draft ad-
dresses primarily the "issue" whether a state or local hos-
pital may be a "purchaser" or a "person" under the Act. 
Part III-A discusses legislative history, III-B is 
limited to the opinions of the U.S.A.G., and that of the 
California A.G., but with a full footnote on Representative 
Patman (n. 28). 
2. 
Part III-C addresses respondent's reliance on ju-
dicial decisions. This extends from p. 19 to p. 26, and 
seems a good bit too long. 
Part IV is a nice closing jury argument. 
Certainly the foregoing organization is an accept-
able way to write the opinion. But let me try out on you a 
different organization: 
First: make clear the narrowness of the issue 
before us. We are not concerned with federal government 
purchases and sales; only those to a state as8 et~te and 
local government entities. Indeed, we are not concerned in 
~~ 
this case p(purchases for use in traditional governmental 
functions. Rather, the only issue before us involves pur-
chases and sales for the non-governmental function of com-
peting in the retail pharmacy and drug store market with 
private enterprise. Yet, the court below held - and respon-
dents contend - that the Act exempts all purchases and sales 
by a state and its agencies regardless of the purpose of the 
hY~~ 
purchase and use of the goods purchased. If ~ is an im-
~ 
plied exemption, it does not extend to non-governmental pur-
poses. 
Part II could open with a paragraph to the forego-
ing effect. 
Then, we could structure the opinion in the cus-
tomary way where the issue is congressional intent f' We com-
mence by restating the question. You state this very well 
in the first sentence of the opinion on p. 1. The answer 
turns on what Congress intended. 
3. 
We look first to the language itself. We can ar-
gue that the plain language controls. No such exception is 
expressed, and in view of the purpose and broad scope of the 
Act's language, the burden is on those who would argue that 
Congress intended - but did not choose to say so - that 
state and local entities could compete unfairly with private 
business. 
As a part of the "plain language" point, you can 
dispose of whether state and local governmental agencies 
come within the terms "purchaser" and "person". My recol-
lection is that respondents do not deny being included with-
in these terms. It therefore seems unnecessary to make the 
rather extended argument presently in pp. 8-13. You do have 
some excellent language from these cases that can be worked 
into the opinion at some other point. We could, of course, 
in acknowledging respondent's concession in this respect, 
say that this was compelled by several decisions of this 
Court. These could be cited either in the text or a 
footnote. 
Perhaps we should concede that, despite the ab-
sence of an express exemption, it is unlikely that Congress 
would have intended the Act to apply to purchases for gov-
ernmental use as contrasted with entering private markets. 
We look to the legislative history to see whether the latter 
also could have been intended. The legislative history dis-
4. 
cussion logically would come next. I would be a little more 
affirmative at the beginning (p. 11) • We could say that in 
view of the purpose of the Act, and the absence of any rele-
vant exemption language, the legislative history falls far 
short of supporting respondent's claim. 
I would make the point that before Congress con-
sidered leaving state entities free to compete unfairly with 
the private sector, surely it would have held hearings on an 
issue of such importance. Such an opening could be followed 
with the stronger portions of your section on legislative 
history. Perhaps you could at least reduce the length of n. 
26. 
I would not be inclined, at least in our initial 
circulation, to include the two present paragraphs on attor-
ney generals' opinions. Nor would I lead into the u.s. At-
torney General's opinion by a citation to Udall. Rather, 
can we not dismiss in a note the u.s. Attorney General's 
opinion as clearly applying only to the federal government. 
Finally, we come to what is probably the toughest 
part of our opinion: dealing with the judicial interpreta-
tion of the Act. My impression is that the present discus-
sion is a good deal too long and detailed. Although I am 
not familiar with the cases, I believe we can state posi-
tively that this Court has never held or suggested that the 
claimed exemption must be read into the Act. I believe you 
say - and if so it is important - that until CAS's decision 
in this case no Court of Appeals had so held. This would 
5. 
leave us with the District Court cases to deal with. It is 
not entirely clear to me from your draft whether there is 
even a single District Court decision on the issue before 
us: Whether, assuming that the federal government is en-
tirely exempt and further assuming - without deciding - that 
state and local entities may be exempt with respect to gov-
ernmental functions, has any case held that an exemption 
exists that enables state and local entities to compete un-
fairly in the private markets? 
* * * 
The foregoing is quite sketchy, and I have not 
been nearly as thoughtful as you have been. I have dictated 
the foregoing primarily for purposes of a discussion with 
you. 
In our brief discussion yesterday, you raised a 
question whether we should anticipate - as fully as you have 
- what the dissenting opinion will say. My inclination is 
not to go quite so far, or so fully in anticipation, as the 
present draft. We certainly need to address the principal 
arguments made by respondents, but this need not be done 
quite as judiciously as you have done. After all, as Potter 
Stewart once told me, when writing for the Court you are an 
advocate for the majority and want your opinion to be affir-
mative and convincing. A judge -particularly a Justice 
here - also must be fair and recognize the principal argu-
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i('~ 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Jim DATE: Dec. 20, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n ,., 
··~ This memorandum records general impressions on the 
r 
basis of a hurried reading of your draft • . · It is evident 
that you have done an enormous amount of research, and you 
have used the materi~ls thoughtfullY and - for the most part 
-~- ~;· 
different organization of the opinion. I sugqest this with 
some hesitation, but I did want to discuss thi.s before we 
separate for the holidays. ~ '-~< iff, 'I ~ " • } -.. ~ -~ 
~·-·-~ 1·-· ,.:"' 
The present structure of th~ opinion, after Part 
>t'' 
" -r~ "','' .\! 
'';.,~ ,.} I, seems to me to be as follows: 
~~~.~~ ~-! 
.:'f·~:~~ Part "II lea~s off with some excellent quotations 
; d./ 
as to thP comprehensiva coverage of the antitrust laws. 
Co~mencing on p. 7, and continuing top. 13, the draft ad-
dresse~ primarily the "issue" whether a state or local hos-
"~ pital may be a, ~ "purchaser" or a "person" under the Act. 
Part III-A discusses legislative history, III-B is 
limited to the opinions of the u.s.A.G., and that of the 
California~A.G., but with a full footnote on Representative 
Patman (n. 28) • 
•. £ 
2. 
Part III-C addresses respondent's reliance on ju-
dicial decisions. "'t'his extends from p. 19 to p. 26, and 
seems a good bit too long. 
~ 
Part IV is a nice closing iury argument. 
Certainly the foreqoing organization is an acc~pt- ft 
able way to write the opinion. But let me try out on you a 
different organization: ·'': • 
First: make clear the narrowness of the issue 
before us. we are not concerned with federal government 
purchases ~~d ~ales7 only those to a state and state and 
local government entities. Indeed, we are not concerned in 
this case by purchases for. use in traditional governmental ' 
functions. Rather:, the only issue before us involves pur- 11: 
chases and sales for the non-governmental function of com-
peting in the retail pharmacy and drug store market with 
private enterprise. Yet, the court below held - and respon-
dents contend - that the Act exempts all purchases and sales 
by a state and its agencies regardless of the purpose of the 
purchase and use of the goods purchased. If this is an im-
' 
plied exemption, it does not extend to non-governmental pur- · 
L poses. 
" Part II could open with a paragraph to the forego-
ing effect. 
Then, we could structure the opinion in the cus-
tomary way where the issue is congressional intent? We com-

























in the first sentence of the opinion on p. 1. The answer 
turns on what Congress intended. 
I 
We look first to the ·language itself. We can ar- ;~ 
gue that the plain language controls. No such exception is 
expr'essed ,~ and in view of the purpose and broad scope of the 
Act's language, the burden is on those who would argue that 
Congress intended - but did not choose to say so - that 
state and local entities could compete unfairly with private 
business. ' ' 
As a part of the "plain language" point, you can 
dispose of whether state and local governmental agencies 
come within the terms "purchaser" and "person". My recol- • " 
lection is that respondents do not deny being included with-
in these terms. It therefore seems unnecessary to make the 
rather extended argument presently in pp. 8-13. You do have 
some excellent language from these cases that can be worked 
into the opinion at some other. point. We could, of courRe, 
, in acknowledging respondent's concession in this respect, 
say that this was compelled by several decisions of this 
Court. These could be cited either in the text or a 
footnote. 
Perhaps we should concede that, despite the ab-
sence of an express exemption, it is unlikely that Congress 
would have intended the Act to apply to purchases for gov-
ernrnental use as contrasted with entering private markets. 
We look to the legislative history to see whether the latter 
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cussion logically ~ould come next. I would be a little more 
affirmative at the beginning (p. ·11). , We could say that in 
view of the purpose of the Act, and the absence of any rele-
vant exemption language, the legislative history falls far 
short of supporting respondent's claim • 
. ;: r ,would make the poi.nt that before Congress con- i~ 
sidered leaving state .~ entities free to compete unfairly with 
the private ;sector, surely it would have held hearings on an 
issue of such importance ~ . Such an opening could be followed 
with th'e ~stronger portions of your ~·section on legis1.ative 
history. you could at . least reduce the "length of n. 
~. . ~· 
I would not be inclined, at least in our in it tal " . 
circulationi to include the two present paragraphs on attor-
ney generals' opinions. Nor would I lead into the u.s .. At-
torney General's opinion by a citation to Udall. Rather; 
can we not dismiss in a note the u.s. Attorney General's ~ 
opinion as clearly applying only to the federal government. 
~i!'lally, we come to what is probably the toughest 
part of our opinion: dealing with the judicial fnterpreta- ~, 
tion of the Act. My impression is that the pres·ent discus-
sion is a good deal too long and detailed. Although I am 
not famili.ar with th~ cases, I beU.eve tore can state posi.-
tively that this Court has never held or suggested that the 
claimed exemption must be read into the Act. I believe you 
'say - and if so it is' important - that until CAS's decision 











leave us with the District Court cases to deal with. It i5 
not entirely clear to me from your draft whether there is 
even a sinqle District Court decision on the issue before 
us: · t.-lhether, assuming that the federal government is en-
tirely exempt and further assuming - without deciding - that 
state and local entities may be exempt with respect to gov- :, 
ernmental functions, has ' any case held that an exemption 
', 
exists that enables state and local entities to compete 
fairly in the private markets? 
' 
* * * 
is quite sketchy, 
been nearly a~ thoughtful as you have been. I have dictated 
the foregoing primarily for purposes of a discussion 
you. 
In our brief discussion yesterday, you raised 
question whether we should anticipate - as fully as you have 
- what the dissenting opinion will say. My inclination is 
not to go quite so far, or so fully in anticipation, as the 
present draft. We certainly need to address the principal 
arguments made by respondents, but this need not be done 
quite as judiciously as you have done. After. all, as Potter 
Ste~art once told me, when writing for the Court you a~e an 
advocate for the majority and want your opinion to be affir-
mative and convincing. A judge -particularly a Justice 
here - also muRt be fair and recognize the principal argu-
ments against his view. 
,, 
Nov~mber 15, 1982 
81-827 Jefferson Co. Pharmaceutical v. Abbott Laboratories 
Dear Chief: 
John's letter of November 12 (that just came to my 
attention) records a change in his vote in this case. This 
leaves five votes to reverse, including one or more that was 
tentative. 
The case is close. If you follow your usual 
practice of assiqninq it to the Justice who wrote a "dissent 
from denial of cert", I will be glad to try my hand at an 
opinion that will hold five votes. 
In view of the "iffiness" of this case, I would be 
more than glad to take two other cases. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
•. 






TO: Jim DATE: Dec. 27, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association 
I spent a fair part of Christmas Eve (in addition 
to December 23) working on our draft of December 21. This 
was not as dull as it might have been. I would like to win 
this one, and I think the second draft - as should be the 
case - is more persuasive. 
You reorganized it in record time. As a result, a 
good deal of editing seemed necessary. 
I am sure some of my editing will require 
revision, and I want you to look at all of it critically 
both with respect to form and substance. 
I make the following specific comments: 
1. The second draft is narrowly focuses on the 
only issue before us: whether purchases by a state or it 
VV'-
agencies for resale aad competition with private business 
1\ 
are impliedly exempted. We reserve decision - express no 
opinion - as to whether an exemption may be implied for 
2. 
purchases by a state or its agencies for consumption or use 
in traditional governmental purposes. This being so, is 
there a purpose in continuing to emphasize that we are 
talking about a per se exemption? 
2. I do not think we have made clear anywhere in 
the draft that traditional state uses or purposes include 
not only "consumption" (e.g., drugs used in state 
~r-
hospitals), but purchases are made to enable the carrying on 
~ 
of traditional monopolies (e.g. electric utility as in City 
of Lafayette). Perhaps it is just as well to stay away from 
talking about the traditional state operated monopolies. 
For example, what would we say about a city gas company that 
.. 
3. 
competes with a private gas company, and does so with the 
benefit of discounted prices for the purchase of gas from an 
interstate gas transmission company? In such a sitaution, 
there would be competition at the retail level. I am 
inclined, therefore, to think that it is best not to talk 
about the traditional monopolies but continue to talk in 
~~ ll-~~~~k..J~ 
terms of competing in the private market at the retail 
1\ 
level. 
3. It is desirable, I think, to use the language 
of §2a (which 1 assume is the same as 15 u.s.c. §13(a)) 
wherever this is appropriate. For example I am thinking 
5 ,, 
about use of the term
1 
"commodities of like grsde and 
AA.t.L 
q~" s to "discriminate in price 
between different purchasers" - precisely what we have in 
this case. 
4. The testimony of Chariman Dixon seems to me to 











used Dixon's most damaging statement. Justice O'Connor is 
certain to rely on his testimony. 
* * * 
In view of all of my scribbling - for which I 






TO: Jim DATE: Dec. 27, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-827 Jefferson County 
This memo addresses pp. 19-21 where we talk 
about the 1960 hearings and Chairman Dixon's statement. 
Should we not identify the subject matter of 
those hearing? Dixon's statement seems to be the single 
most damaging piece of evidence. Is there anything 
helpful to us in the general context in which he made the 
statement? In any event, I would omit the sentence on 
page 20 commencing with the word "although". Dixon's 
statement certainly will be emphasized by Justice 
O'Connor, and we can reply as best we can.~ have 
2. 
indicated, in my scribbling on page 20, that this may be 
place to reply on cases that discount the relevance of 
post-enactment commentary. But if we add this to the 
opinion, it should come at the end of our brief discussion 
of the 1960 hearings. 
I suggest revising the paragraph commencing at 
the bottom of page 20 to read as follows: 
"It is clear from the report of the House 
Committee that it was not focusing at all on the 
question presented by this case. Its report did 
include the ~~ awkwardly worded 
statement: '[T]here is no basis apparent ••. 
why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act 
should not be applied to discriminatory drug 
sales favoring non-governmental instituional 
purchasers, profit or non-profit, to the extent 
there is prescription drug competition at the 
retail level with disfavored retail druggists." 
Id., at 79 (emphasis added) .27 
Jv 
Althogh not entirely clear, this seems to say 
~~: 
only that private instituional purchasers may not lawfully 
1\ 
facilitate unfair competition at the retail level by sales 
3 • 
at discriminatory prices. Thus, the 1960 hearings shed no 
light even as to congressional intent at that time with 
respect to state purchases for resale in the private 
market.~ 
Note to Jim: With the changes suggested, do you 
think we will have dealt fairly with the 1960 hearings. 
My guess is they will be a major factor in any dissent. 
But we need not anticipate all that will be said so long 
as we cannot be attacked for omitting some significant 
evidence against us. 
If my changes are fair and not vulnerable to 
successful attack, perhaps we need to say little in our 
first circulation about the relative weight to be accorded 
post-enactment commentary before or by Congress. It would 
4 0 
be sufficient, I think, to add a footnote with an 





January 24, 1983 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: JIM BROWNING 
FROM: LFP, JR. 
81-827 JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL 
Although I am recluctant to interrupt your concentra-
tion on the abortion cases, I think some response to Justice 
O'Connor's dissent is appropriate. I am dictating this at 
home, and do not have our opinion with me. Some of the com-
ments below therefore may not be entirely relevant. 
The statements or points in the dissent that caught my 
attention are as follows. 
1. The dissent repeatedly emphasizes that Congress did 
not focus on the issue in 1936. This is irrelevant for two 
reasons. If there was no "focus", it was because in 1936 
the likelihood of state entities competing in the private 
sector was remote. But the absence of any such focus is 
immaterial if the plain language applies. The Sherman Act 
itself is an example of this. It has been vastly extended 
since its enactment. Is the Philadelphia Bank case a good 
example? And certainly Section 1983 now is applied broadly 
to many areas never contemplated in the 1870's. Parratt is 
one example. The Court held that an allegation by a prison 
inmate of the negligent loss of a $23.00 package violated 
his property rights, and that a remedy existed under Section 
1983. Also, cases like Monell, and City of Independence 
may be other examples. My guess is that you can find ex-
2. 
plicit statements by this Court that failure to focus at the 
time of enactment is irrelevant when the language covers the 
action of ~at issue. 
2. On p. 4, the dissent says we have cited no cases 
holding that a state entity is a "person" for purposes of 
exposure to liability as a "purchaser". What is the answer 
to this? I have thought that a purchaser who knowingly re-
ceives a price that enables it to discriminate unfairly 
against its competitors did violate the Act. Moreover, it 
has occurred to me that the pharmacuetical companies - de-
fendants here - may not be as guilty as the state. The com-
plaint alleges, as I recall, knowing participation by these 
companies. Yet, the seller may well assume that a state is 
purchasing for use in its sovereign capacities, and not know 
that the state is competing in the private market. 
3. The dissent argues, as we anticipated, that there 
has been wide spread reliances on the assumption that the 
Act was not applicable. We should add the information you 
dug up showing that discounted prices generally are not made 
available to states. Again, a good deal of the dissent's 
argument - especially as to a supposed assumption or under-
standing - applies only to sales to a state in its sovereign 
capacity. Have we adequately emphasized the distinction 
between consumption in traditonal government functions as a 
sovereign, as comtrasted with the competition we have here? 
Perhaps we have, although it is an important point. 
3. 
Have we cited cases that make this distinction? What 
about Hodel, and the Court's three-part test to determine 
whether League of Cities applies? 
4. On page 8, the dissent tries to make something out 
of our mention that sales to indigents may be in a different 
category. The answer is that special solicitude for the 
plight of indigents is a traditional concern of government. 
The dissent speaks of "resale to indigent citizens". There 
is very little "selling" in public welfare. 
~' The dissent's emphasis on the general understanding -
as the dissent views it - is substantially undercut by the 
Justice Department's Task Force Report in 1978 that you were 
diligent enough to find. I would select one of the 
dissent's statements, and rebut it with a cross-reference to 
our footnote - quoting relevant language. 
~ See, for example, the dissent's discussion in 
part III. It refers to states and manufacturers having 
"structured their marketing relationships" on the "long-
standing assumption" that the Act was inapplicable. The 
only example Justice O'Connor cites relates to state sover-
~ eign functions. There is no evidence in the record of 
/ "structuring" of any kind, and certainly none to facilitate 
state head-to- head competition in private retail markets.* 
*Did br:{fs claim "structuring" to facilitate competition? 
. . 
4. 
Again, the Justice Department Task Force Report is relevant 
here. There may be - at the margin - some close calls. But 
broadly speaking, the distinction between the traditional 
and sovereign functions of the state and competing in pri-
vate markets is widely understood and accepted. 
* * * 
This long-winded memorandam suggests a more detailed 
response that I think is necessary. I have merely recorded 
thoughts as they came to me in reading the dissent. I sug-
gest that you select the most vulnerable statements and 
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P.1F.MORANDUM 
TO: ,"TTM BROWN !111~ 
FROM: LFP, ,JR. 
81-827 JE~FERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL 
~lthouqh I am recluctant to Interrupt vour concentra-
t ion on the abort ion cases, I think some response to .Justice 
O'Connor'~ oissent is appropriate. Tam nictatinq thi~ at 
home, and do not havP our opinion wi. th me. Some of the com-
ments below therefore rnay not be entirely rt:>levant. 
~he statements or points in the dissent that caught my 
at tent i.on arc as follows. 
1. ~he oissent repeatedly emphasize~ that rongres~ did 
not focu~ on the iggue in 1936. ~his 1e irrelevant for two 
re~sons. If there was no "focus", it wa~ herause in 1936 
the J ikeJ ihoon of state enti.ties competing in the private 
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immaterial if the plain languaqe applies . The Sherman Act 
itself is an examole of this. !t has been vastly extended 
since its enactment. Is the Philadelphia Bank case a good 
~Xa'I'TlpJe? 1\nr1 C'lt.'rtai.nly S:ection 1983 no"'' is apPlied broadly 
to many areas never contemplated in the 1670 ' s. Parratt is 
one example. The Court held that an a.lleqation by a prison 
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his property riqhts, and that a remedy existed under. Section 
1983. Also, cases like Monell, and City of Independence 









plicit statements by this Court that failure to focus at the 
time of ~nactrnent is irrelevant whc?"n the language covers the 
action of that i~5ue. 
2. On p. 4, the dissent says we have cited no cases 
holding that a state entity is a "person" for purposes of 
exposure to liab:!.li ty as a "purchaser". ~That i.s the answer 
to this? I have thought that a purchaser who knowingly re-
ceives a price that enables it to discrimtnate unfairly 
against its competitors did violate the A.ct. "1oreover, it 
has occurred to me that t.he pharmacuet ical companies - fle-
fendants here - may not be as guilty as the state. ~he com-
plaint alleges, as I recall, knowi.nq participation by these 
companies. Yet, the seller may well assume that a state is 
purchasinq for u6e in its sovereign capacities, and not know 
that the state is competing in the private market. 
3. ~he dissent argues, as we anticipated, that there 
has been wide spread reliances on the assumption that the 
Act was not applicable. \'Je should add the information you 
dug up showing that discounted prices gc-merallv are not made 
available to states. Again, a good deal of the dissent's 
argument - especially as to a supposed assumption or under-
ztanoing -applies only to sales to a state in its sovereign 
capacity. Have we adequately emphasized the distinction 
between consumption fn tr~ditonal government functions as a 
sovereign, as comtrasted \dth the competition we have here? 
Perhaps we have, although it is an important point. 
,, 
.. ~· .. 
Have we cited cases that make this distinction? What 
about Hodel, and the Court's three-part test to determine 
whether League of Cities applies? 
3. 
4. On page 8, the dissent tri~s to make something out 
of our mention that sales to indigents may be in a different 
category. ~he answer is that special solicitude for the 
ollqht of indiqents is a traditional concern of government. 
The dissent speaks of "resale to indigent citizens". ~here 
is verv little "selling" in public welfare. 
~he dissent's em~hasis on the general understanding -
as the dissent views it - is supstantially undercut by the 
Justice Oenartment's 'T'ask Fore.,. Report in 1978 th!lt you were 
diligent enough to find. I would select one of the 
dissent's statements, and rebut it with a cross-reference to 
our footnote - quoting relevant language. 
5. See, for example, the di~sent's discussion in 
part III. It refers to atateq and manufacturers having 
"structured their marketing relationships" on the "long-
standing assumption" that the Act \4as i nap!)l icable. 'T'he 
only example Justice O'Connor cites relates to state sover-
eign functions. There is no evidence in the record of 
"structuring" of any kind, and certainly none to facilitate 
state head-to- head competi.tion in private retail markets.* 
*Did breifs claim "structuring" to facilitate competition? 
'·:. ....... ·· 
4. 
Again, the ~Justice Department Task Force Report is relevant 
here. There may be - at the margin - some close cal.ls. But 
broadly soeakinq, th~ ~tstinction between the traditional 
and sovereign function~ of the statP and competing in pri-
vate markets is widely understood and accPoted. 
* * * 
This long-winded memor~ndam suggests a more detaile~ 
response that I think is necessary. I have merely recorded 
thoughts as they camP to me in rea~ing the nisscnt. I sug-
gest that you select the most vulnorable statements and 
draft fontnotes that reply. 
I,.F.P., Jr. 
vde 
• CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§u:p-rtntt C!Jou:rl qf flrt ~b .®taft~ 
:.a,gltittgt~ :!B. QJ. 2!1~)!~ 
January 24, 1983 
RE: No. 81-827 Jefferson Co. Pharmaceutical Association 
v. Abbott laboratories 
Dear Sandra: 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~u.pTtntt Qftturlttf flrt ~nittb .:§tahg 
._rulfrhtgttttt. ~. <!f. 20c?'l-~ 
January 24, 1983 
Re: No. 81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical 
Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
sincerelr 
Justice O'Connor 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: JAN 2 5 1983 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-827 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory con-
struction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers pur-
chases of commodities by state and local governments for re-
sale in competition with private retailers. 1 The Court's 
task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 1936 Congress 
which enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. I do not agree 
with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference 
to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reli-
ance on the broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws 
generally. The 1936 Congress simply did not focus on this 
issue. The business and legal communities have assumed for 
the past four decades that such purchases are not covered. 
For these reasons, as explained more fully below, I respect-
fully dissent. 
'This case does not require us to consider, as the cases cited by the ma-
jority suggest, ante, at 7, whether compliance with other federal statutes 
necessitates an implied exemption from the provisions of the Act. The 
question is simply one of congressional intent-i. e., what Congress in-
tended when it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act with respect to coverage 
of governmental purchases for resale. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81--827 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory con-
struction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers pur-
chases of commodities by state and local governments for re-
sale in competition with private retailers. 1 The Court's 
task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 1936 Congress 
which enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. I do not agree 
with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference 
to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reli-
ance on the broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws 
generally. The 1936 Congress simply did not focus on this 
issue. The business and legal communities have assumed for 
the past four decades that such purchases are not covered. 
For these reasons, as explained more fully below, I respect-
fully dissent. 
'This case does not require us to consider, as the cases cited by the ma-
jority suggest, ante, at 7, whether compliance with other federal statutes 
necessitates an implied exemption from the provisions of the Act. The 
question is simply one of congressional intent-i. e., what Congress in-
tended when it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act with respect to coverage 
of governmental purchases for resale. 
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2 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
I 
A 
The majority relies extensively on the interpretation this 
Court has given to the term "person" under the Sherman Act 
and other statutes as a guide to whether the terms "person" 
and "purchasers," as used in § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 
730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (the Act), 49 
Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13, include state and local govern-
mental entities. See ante, at 4-6. In my view, such reli-
ance is misplaced. The question of the Robinson-Patman 
Act's treatment of governmental purchases requires an inde-
pendent examination of the legislative history of that Act to 
ascertain congressional intent. 2 Indeed, the cases cited by 
the majority emphasize that the key question regarding cov-
erage or noncoverage of governmental entities is the intent of 
Congress in enacting the statute in question. 3 Resolution of 
2 The majority cites Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 
(1978), as a case in which the Court applied Sherman Act cases to construe 
the Clayton Act, which the Robinson-Patman Act amends. Ante, at 7, n. 
14. In Pfizer the Court held that a foreign nation is a "person" entitled to 
bring a treble damages action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 15. As the Court acknowledged, id., at 311, § 4 is a reenactment of the 
virtually identical language of § 7 of the Sherman Act. In fact, § 7 was 
eventually repealed as redundant. § 3, 69 Stat. 283; seeS. Rep. No. 619, 
84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955). Reliance on prior interpretation of § 7 of 
the Sherman Act was therefore uniquely appropriate. 
3 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra, at 315 (1978) (§ 4 of 
the Clayton Act) ("The word 'person' ... is not a term of art with a fixed 
meaning wherever it is used, nor was it in 1890 when the Sherman Act was 
passed."); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) (§ 7 of the Sherman 
Act) ("Whether the word 'person' ... includes a State or the United States 
depends upon its legislative environment."); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934) (Rev. Stat. §§ 3140, 3244) ("Whether the word 'person' or 
'corporation' includes a state . . . depends upon the connection in which it is 
found."). See also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-605 
(1941) ("[T]here is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the 
subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive in-
81-827-DISSENT 
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the statutory construction question cannot be made to de-
pend upon the abstract assertion that the term "person" is 
broad enough to embrace States and municipalities. 4 For 
these reasons, the mere fact that in City of Lafayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14 (1978), a 
Sherman Act case, the Court referred to the Robinson-
Patman Act in its discussion of the breadth of the term "per-
son" cannot resolve the question now before us. 
Further, the majority opinion propounds a misleading syl-
logism when it (1) suggests that the term "person" in the 
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed sim-
ilarly, (2) cites Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251 
(1972), for the proposition that the Clayton Act applies to 
States, and (3) then opines that the terms "person" and "pur-
chasers" under § 2 therefore should be construed to include 
terpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate in-
tent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the 
law."). 
It is also worth noting that many of the cases upon which the majority 
relies involved construction of the term "person" for the purpose of deter-
mining whether a particular governmental entity is a "person" entitled to 
sue. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra; United States v. Cooper 
Corp., supra (United States is not "person" entitled to sue under§ 7 of the 
Sherman Act); Georgia v. Evans, supra (State is "person" entitled to sue 
under § 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. 
City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906) (municipality is "person" entitled to 
sue under § 7 of the Sherman Act). 
• I would also note that the majority overstates the significance of Sena- l 
tor Robinson's remarks in connection with its observation that "[t]he word 
'purchasers' has a meaning as inclusive as the word 'person.'" Ante, at 5, 
n. 11. The remarks of Senator Robinson should not be read to suggest 
that the word "purchasers," as used in the Robinson-Patman Act, em-
braces States or municipalities. The senator's observation reflects an af-
firmative response to Senator Vandenberg's concern that, although the bill 
was drafted with a view toward the problems of large chain-store buying 
power in the retail merchandising field, the Act would apply to private en-
terprise in the field of industrial production as well. See 80 Cong. Rec. 
6429--Q430 (1936). 
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4 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
state purchases. Ante, at 6. Because, as the majority ob-
serves, ante, at 6, n. 13, the definitional section of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 12, was intended to apply to the Robin-
son-Patman Act, I do not dispute the first proposition. 
However, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. stated only that a 
State is a "person" for purposes of bringing a treble damages 
action under § 4 of the Clayton Act. 405 U. S. , at 261. 5 
Conspicuously absent from the majority's discussion is any 
authority holding that States or local governments are per-
sons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers under 
the provisions of the Clayton Act. 6 Although Congress 
might now decide that the purchasing activities of States and 
local governments should be subject to the limitations im-
posed by § 2, that is a policy judgment appropriately left to 
legislative determination. 
B 
Nor do I find persuasive the majority's invocation of pre-
sumptions regarding the liberal construction and broad reme-
5 Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351 (1943) ("In a dual system of 
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, 
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and 
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."). 
6 Indeed, one basis for the United States Attorney General's conclusion 
in 1938 that the Robinson-Patman Act is inapplicable to purchases of sup-
plies by the Federal Government was the absence of any judicial decision 
construing the Clayton Act, prior to its amendment by the Robinson-
Patman Act, to apply to governmental contracts. 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539, 
540 (1938). 
Prior to 1929, courts interpreted the original § 2 as addressed only to the 
problem of primary line competition-i. e., injury to competition among 
sellers. See, e. g., National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F. 733 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924). Not until1929 did this Court hold that § 2 
also protected against the type of injury alleged in the present case-i. e., 
secondary line injury, or injury to competition among buyers . . See George 
Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 253 (1929). 
The Robinson-Patman amendment to § 2 clarified that the Act was de-
signed to redress the latter type of injury. 
81-827-DISSENT 
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dial purposes of the antitrust laws generally. Without dero-
gating the usefulness of those principles or suggesting that 
they should never play a role in the Robinson-Patman con-
text, one may nevertheless candidly acknowledge that the 
Court also has identified a certain tension between the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, on the one hand, and the Sherman Act 
and other antitrust statutes, on the other. The Court fre-
quently has recognized that strict enforcement of the anti-
price-discrimination provisions of the former may lead to 
price rigidity and uniformity in direct conflict with the goals 
ofthe latter. See, e. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80, 83 n. 16 (1979); Automatic Canteen 
Co. v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 63, 74 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. 
FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 249 & n. 15 (1951). 7 
At the very least, this recognition raises doubts that the 
Court should liberally construe the Robinson-Patman Act in 
favor of broader coverage. Those doubts are enhanced by 
the fact that Congress' principal aim in enacting the Robin-
son-Patman Act was to protect small retailers from the com-
petitive injury suffered at the hands of large chain stores. 8 
It is consistent with that intent for Congress also to have dis-
played special solicitude for the well-established, below-
trade price buying practices of governmental institutions. 
II 
As the majority documents, ante, at 9, n. 17, the legislative 
history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly indicates that 
Congress envisioned some sort of immunity for governmental 
7 Indeed, the tension between the Robinson-Patman policy of protection 
of competitors and the Sherman Act goal of protection of the competitive 
process has prompted the Court to achieve a partial reconciliation of the 
two by liberal interpretation of the "meeting competition" defense under 
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U. S. C.§ 13(b). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 251 (1951). 
8 H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936); S. Rep. No. 
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); see FTC, Final Report on the Chain 
Store Investigation, S. Doc. No.4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). 
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bodies. 9 The question before the Court is the extent of that 
immunity-in particular, whether the purchase of goods by 
state and local governments for resale in competition with 
private retailers is within the intended scope of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 9, 
the 1936 Congress that enacted the Robinson-Patman Act did 
not focus on the precise issue before the Court. N otwith-
standing this admission, the majority announces the surpris-
ing conclusion that "[t]o create an exemption here clearly 
would be contrary to the intent of Congress." Ante, at 19 
(emphasis added). 
9 Members of the House expressed concern with the effect of the bill on 
the established below-market buying practices of federal, state, county, 
and municipal governments. Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. Before the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1935). In 
response H. B. Teegarden, a principal draftsman of the Act, assured mem-
bers of the House Judiciary Committee that he "would not want" the Act if 
it prohibited, all along the line, the competitive bidding practices of those 
governments. Id. 
Moreover, with respect to subsequent legislative history, I find signifi-
cant the fact that later attempts in Congress to expressly include govern-
mental entities within the coverage of the Act failed. See H. R. 4452, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1952); H. R. 
5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); 
H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961). In particular, I would not dismiss as readily as does the majority, 
ante, at 11, n. 19, the bills introduced by Representative Patman in 1951 
and 1953 to amend the Act to define "purchasers" to include "the United 
States, any State or any political subdivision thereof." The majority spec-
ulates that Representative Patman introduced these bills to reaffirm his 
original intent that these entities would be covered. In light of Repre-
sentative Patman's agreement in his book, W. Patman, The Robinson-
Patman Act 168 (1938), with the United States Attorney General's con-
struction of the Act to exclude purchases by the Federal Government and 
his extension of the Attorney General's rationale to "municipal and public 
institutions," id., it is more plausible to infer that he viewed the bills as 
extending the Act's coverage. 
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The majority is correct in stating that it is not the business 
of this Court to engage in "'policy-making in the field of anti-
trust legislation'" in order to fill gaps where Congress has 
not clearly expressed its intent. Ante, at 19 (quoting United 
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 606 (1941)). It is pre-
cisely because I concur in that admonition that I would re-
frain from attributing to Congress an intent to cover the 
state and local governmental purchases in question here. 10 
A 
In attempting to supply the unexpressed intent of Con-
gress, the majority fails to offer satisfactory guidelines for 
determining the scope of the Act's coverage of governmental 
agencies. 11 The majority assumes, "without deciding, that 
Congress did not intend the Act to apply to purchases for 
10 My resolution of the statutory issue here should not be construed to 
reflect a policy judgment that the Robinson-Patman Act should protect "a 
State's entrepreneurial capacity." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power 
& Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 422 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring). 
We are not concerned here with whether the kind of activity in which these 
governmental entities are enaged appropriately exposes them to antitrust 
liability under the Act. Cf. id., at 418. That question raises policy con-
cerns lying peculiarly within the institutional province of Congress. "A 
court, without the benefit of legislative hearings that would illuminate the 
policy considerations if the question were left to Congress, is not compe-
tent in my opinion to resolve this question . . . . It is regrettable that the 
Court today finds it necessary to rush to this essentially legislative judg-
ment." Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S., at 331 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting). Because the question before us is one of congressional in-
tent and it is far from clear that Congress has supplied an answer to that 
question, I would refrain from substituting the policy judgments of the ju-
diciary for those Congress might embrace. Cf. id., at 320 (CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, dissenting); id., at 33()...331 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
11 To the extent the majority purports to "divine" the will of Congress, it 
comes as no surprise, given Congress' inattention to this precise question, 
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consumption in traditional government functions" and sug-
gests that state purchases of pharmaceuticals for the purpose 
of resale to indigent citizens may not expose the State to anti-
trust liability. Ante, at 4 & n. 7. 
The majority's assumption, however, is inconsistent with 
the principles of statutory construction upon which it pur-
ports to rely. If, absent a clear expression of legislative in-
tent to the contrary, the plain language of the statute con-
trols, then by the majority's own assertions one would have 
to conclude that even purchases for the State's own use or for 
resale to indigents would fall within the Act's proscriptions. 
For, as the majority remarks, ante, at 4, the terms "person" 
and "purchasers" are broad enough to include governmental 
entities, and the legislative history is "ambiguous on the 
application of the Act to state purchases for consump- J ,J 
tion .... " Ante, at 9-10. ()t\'uS5IO 
Moreover, to the extent the majority implies that a State's 
coverage or noncoverage under the Act turns on the distinc-
tion between purchases for resale and purchases for con-
sumption, 12 that distinction is inconsistent with the compe-
tition rationale elsewhere suggested, ante, at 19, to underlie 
the prohibitions of § 2(a). For example, a state university 
hospital might limit the use of its pharmacy to its own faculty 
and staff, thereby falling within the "for their own use" ex-
ception. 13 Nevertheless, the university pharmacy may be in-
flicting competitive injury on private pharmacies that the $ 1 c,.,) /o~IS 
12 The majority thus suggests, though it refrains from holding, that the 
scope of coverage under § 2(a) is coextensive with the "for their own use" 
line drawn by the Non profit Institutions Act of 1938, 15 U. S. C. § 13c, and 
interpreted by the Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Drug-
gists Association, Inc., 425 U. S. 1 (1976). This proposed 
resale/consumption distinction has no foundation in the language of § 2(a), 
which prohibits discrimination "in price between different purchasers of 
commodities ... , where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, 
or resale .... " 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (emphasis added). · 
'
3 See Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association, 
Inc., supra, at 16-17. 
.. 
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university's faculty and staff might otherwise patronize. 14 
Thus, the majority's conflicting suggestions leave in doubt 
what principle-the presence of functional competition or the 
consumption/resale dichotomy-guides the determination 
whether a state or local government's purchases fall within 
the Act's proscriptions. 
B 
Against the backdrop of a legislative history that even the 
majority concedes does not focus on the issue before us 
stands the general consensus in the legal and business com-
munities that sales to governmental entities are not covered 
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority devotes consid-
erable effort to distinguishing or undercutting the authorities 
cited by the respondents. In so doing, and in observing that 
these authorities cannot reveal Congress' intent in 1936, 
ante, at 14 & n. 24, the majority misunderstands the signifi-
cance of this evidence. These authorities simply illustrate 
the virtually unanimous assumption over the past forty-seven 
years of noncoverage of governmental entities-an assump-
tion that has served as the basis of well-established govern-
mental purchasing practices and marketing relationships. 
In the past the Court has relied upon the widespread under-
standing of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act in lim-
iting the scope of the Act's prohibitions. 15 To do so here is no 
less appropriate. 
Despite its attempt to discount the significance of the judi-
cial authorities cited by the respondents, the majority cannot 
dispute that no court has imposed liability upon a seller or 
14 Or, to take another example, a cafeteria operated by a governmental 
agency for the benefit of its employees also might inflict some competitive 
injury on restaurants in the same area that otherwise might enjoy the em-
ployees' patronage. 
15 See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 246-247 (1951) (reliance 
on widespread understanding that the meeting competition proviso of 
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, pro-
vides a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination) . 
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buyer, under either § 2(a) or § 2(f), 15 U. S. C. §§ 13(a) and 
(f), in a case involving an alleged price discrimination in favor 
of a federal, state, or municipal governmental purchaser. 16 
Commentators confirm the general judicial consensus that 
sales to States and municipalities are not covered by the 
16 See Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L . Cummins News 
Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688--{)89 (CA71980) (Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable 
to purchases by instrumentality of Federal Government for resale); Moun-
tain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories Pharmaceutical Products Di-
vision, No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (order 
of consent dismissing with prejudice Robinson-Patman claims based on 
sales to any governmental entity), affd in part and rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980); Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., No. 4--66--5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion) (sale of 
bowling equipment to State not within provisions of Act; alternative hold-
ing that sales exempt under 15 U. S. C. § 13c), affd, 378 F. 2d 212, 217 
(CA9) (sales to state university within § 13c exemption), cert. denied, 389 
U. S. 898 (1967); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development 
Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 96 (EDNY 1957) (disclaiming, on motion for 
reargument, any intention that original opinion could be "construed to sug-
gest that sales to the Government can be thought to be subject to the pro-
visions of the Robinson-Patman Act"); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) ("It is doubtful at best whether the 
Robinson-Patman Act applies at all to sales to Government agencies, state 
or federal.") (holding Act inapplicable to sales by liquor distiller to state 
liquor commissions; alternative holding that no competitive injury suffered 
by plaintiff liquor wholesaler), affd on opinion below, 234 F. 2d 959 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck 
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD Ky. 1941) (alternatively holding that 
Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to sales to municipal housing commis-
sion and suggesting that "the Act does not apply to sales to the govern-
ment, states, or municipalities"), affd, 132 F. 2d 425 (CA6 1942), cert. de-
nied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943). 
While one may concede that most of these cases do not focus on the pre-
cise situation of purchases by state or local governments for resale, they 
nonetheless reflect the consensus of judicial opinion that governmental 
bodies are not subject to liability under § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended 
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority would dismiss many of these 
cases with the simple observation that they predate the Court's decision in 
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978). 
Ante, at 16, n. 29. For reasons already noted, however, in my view City 
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Act. 17 Moreover, Congress' failure to enact bills extending 
Robinson-Patman coverage to these entities buttresses this 
interpretation of the Act. Seen. 9, supra. 
This same understanding has been expressed in testimony 
before Congress. In 1967 and 1968 a congressional sub-
committee conducted public hearings on the problems of 
of Lafayette does not resolve the issue before us in this case. 
Moreover, cases that the majority suggests are supportive of its posi-
tion, ante, at 17, n. 30, are similarly distinguishable. For example, both 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 
(Alaska 1982), and Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. 
Supp. 393 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d, 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. de-
nied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966), indicate only that the Robinson-Patman Act 
may apply where the State, as in Sterling, or the municipality, as in 
Hitachi, is the victim of commercial bribery under § 2(c), 15 U. S. C. 
§ 13(c), rather than the favored customer. 
17 E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 224 (1979) (2d ed. 1979) ("In 
spite of [any] contrary indications [among state attorneys general], it is 
generally believed that the exemption applies to governmental purchases 
at any level."); W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson Patman Act 
30 (1963) (indicating the Act is inapplicable to sales to government, munici-
pal, or public institutions); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Rob-
inson-Patman Act 84 (1962) ("The preponderance of reasoned opinion 
treats State or municipal bodies on a par with the Federal Government's 
exemption."); 4 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation 
§ 24.06 at 24-70 (1982) ("[T]he prevailing view is that such sales [to states 
and municipalities] are excluded from Robinson-Patman liability."). See 
also 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973) (indicat-
ing that lower federal courts have generally held the Act inapplicable to 
sales to states and municipalities, that one lower federal court has held the 
Act may be applicable if the State is the disfavored customer, and that 
opinions among state attorneys general are divided). 
Although not specifically addressing any consumption/resale distinction, 
a past Attorney General of the United States also has opined that pur-
chases by state and local governments are not within the Act's prohibition 
against price discrimination. Report of the Attorney General Under Ex-
ecutive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962) 
(identical bidders on contracts with state and local governments cannot 
contend that the Act prohibits bidding below the schedule price, because 
the Act is not applicable to government contracts). 
81--827-DISSENT 
12 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBO'IT LABS. 
small businesses in the phannaceutical industry. The sub-
committee heard testimony from both representatives of 
phannaceutical manufacturers and retail phannacists regard-
ing the industry-wide practice of price discrimination in sales 
of phannaceuticals to governmental purchasers-federal, 
state, county, and municipal. 18 Several witnesses also di-
rectly expressed their assumption that the Robinson-Patman 
Act does not apply to such sales. 19 
18 Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Commit-
tee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 48 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Merritt Skinner, 
community pharmacist); id., at 258 (William Apple, executive director of 
the American Pharmaceutical Association); id., at 296, 318-319 (Hyman 
Moore, H.L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc.); id., at 500 (Henry DeBoest, 
vice president of Eli Lilly & Co.); id., at 705 (Donald van Roden, vice presi-
dent and general manager of pharmaceutical operations for Smith Kline & 
French Laboratories); id., at 792 (Joseph Ingolia, vice president and gen-
eral manager of Schering Laboratories); id., at 817 (Lyman Duncan, vice 
president of American Cyanamid Co.). 
Based upon this overwhelming evidence, the Select Committee on Small 
Business concluded in its report to the House: "The difference between 
drug prices charged retailers and wholesalers as compared to those 
charged .. . governmental customers is extremely substantial, often being 
over 50 percent." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). 
19 See 1967-1968 Hearings, at 15-16 (Earl Kintner, former FTC Com-
missioner, counsel for the National Assocation of Retail Druggists) (''When 
a drug supplier sells drugs to Federal, State, or municipal governmental 
institutions, the price charged by the supplier may be without regard to 
the Robinson-Patman Act, because such sales are probably exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 731 (W. Abrahamson, president of Or-
tho Pharmaceutical Corp.) ("[T]he only special pricing we have ever en-
gaged in are [sic] in bidding situations to [federal, state, or local govern-
ment] agencies excluded from the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 1069 (C. 
Stetler, president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) 
("There is nothing immoral or unlawful about incremental cost pricing in 
cases-such as sales to the Government .. . -where the Robinson-Patman 
Act does not apply."). 
Even one congressman on the subcommittee expressed his understand-
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In 1969 and 1970, the same House subcommittee investi-
gated the problems of small businessmen under the Robin-
son-Patman Act. In these hearings witnesses again ex-
pressed the view that gove~mental purchases at any level 
are not covered, highlighting the problem of favorable prices 
on governmental purchases for resale and making a plea for a 
change in the law. 20 
ing that the Act does not apply to governmental purchasers. See id., at 
1092 (Rep. Corman) ("[I]f there were no exemption under Robinson-
Patman for the Government, what would be the situation as to their pur-
chases?"). The colloquy that followed Representative Corman's question 
further evidences the assumption that governmental purchases are outside 
the scope of the Act, even in the case of resales. 
"Mr. Stetler. If there was no exemption under Robinson-Patman, I 
presume some of these practices would be illegal under Robinson-Patman. 
Mr. Cutler. If I could try to answer that, [Representative] Cor-
man .... [A]bsent the one case of these resales . . . , I suppose the lack of 
exemption would make no difference, because the Robinson-Patman Act 
would not apply for other reasons, because you are not discriminating be-
tween two people engaged in commerce and competing with one another. 
Further, there is a real question as to whether the Robinson-Patman Act 
applies under any circumstances where you are bidding under a competi-
tive bid. So for both of these reasons, the answer to your question would 
be that the same pricing practices might still lawfully prevail under Robin-
son-Patman without the exemption for the government . ... " 
Id. (emphasis added). 
20 William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs for the National Associ-
ation of Wholesalers, testified: 
"Over the years, the Robinson-Patman Act has not been extended to 
cover sales to the Government. In the days when Government purchases 
constituted a relatively small volume in the marketplace, this exemption 
posed few problems. But today, with the vast growth in Government pur-
chases, Federal, State, and local, ... the continued exemption creates 
many unfair competitive situations. 
We believe that Congress must turn its attention to this problem." 
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act, Hearings Before the Spe-
cial Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of 
the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 
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III 
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly 
reveals that Congress intended to exclude governmental en-
tities from the Act's proscriptions to some extent. How-
ever, Congress did not focus on the issue before us and there-
fore did not provide a clear rationale governing coverage and 
noncoverage. In an area in which bright lines are needed to 
guide state and local governments in their purchasing prac-
tices, the majority fails to identify any principle triggering in-
clusion or exclusion. 
Moreover, one cannot doubt that state, county, and munici-
pal governments and manufacturers of commodities have 
structured their marketing relationships with each other on 
the longstanding assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act 
does not apply to those transactions. That understanding 
finds substantial support among the courts and commen-
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74 (1969-1970). See id., at 76-77 (Everette 
Macintyre, acting chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) (affirming 
that sales to the Federal Government, even in the resale context, are not 
subject to the Robinson-Patman Act). 
Harold Halfpenny, legal counsel for the Automotive Service Industry 
Association, focused most precisely on the problem of which petitioners 
complain-i. e., competitive injury to private industry when governmental 
entities receive more favorable prices on purchases of commodities for 
resale. 
"[W]hile the Act is silent on the subject, its legislative history and subse-
quent interpretation support the proposition that sales made to Federal or 
State governmental bodies are not subject to the provisions of the Act. 
This may be injurious to competition in several ways. . . . 
[T]here are 'second line' situations where competition exists between the 
Government and private indsutry in the resale of commodities. 
The Federal Trade Commission has not recommended legislation to 
make the Robinson-Patman Act applicable to sales to governmental pur-
chases. However, in our opinion, Congress should consider acting on its 
own volition." 
!d., at 623 (emphasis added). 
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tators. State and local governments have developed pro-
grams for providing services to the public, including medical 
care to the indigent and the medically needy, 21 based on the 
same assumption. The majority's holding that sales of com-
modities to state and local governments for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise are covered by the Act will en-
gender significant disruption-not only through government 
and industry reexamination and restructuring of marketing 
relationships, but also, unfortunately, through possible ter-
mination of services and supplies to needy citizens 22 and 
through litigation associated with the process of reexamina-
tion. 23 The Court rests its decision primarily on one state-
ment in the legislative history, 24 taken in isolation from other 
remarks designed to assure concerned House members that 
the Act would not force the abandonment of governmental 
below-market buying practices which the majority's holding 
now calls into question. Given Congress' failure to delineate 
the extent of the Robinson-Patman Act's coverage or 
noncoverage of state and local governments, I would allow 
Congress to speak on this issue rather than disrupt long-
21 See, e. g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §§ 14100-14126 (1980 & Supp. 
1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, ~~5-1 to 5-14 (Supp. 1982-83); Mont. Code 
Ann. §§ 53-&-103 to 53-6-144 (1981); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 365, 365-a 
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); Tex. Human Res. Code Ann. 
§§ 32.001-32.037 (1980); Va. Code§§ 63.1-134 to 63.1-144 (1980). 
22 The administrative burden of developing internal accounting and 
recordkeeping procedures to segregate commodities purchased for resale, 
plus the additional financial strain of paying higher prices for these pur-
chases, may induce state and local governments to terminate programs and 
services already in place. More significantly, however, the uncertainty 
generated by the majority's failure to establish clear lines of demarcation 
for coverage and noncoverage and the fear of exposure to treble damages 
liability might well cause cautious legislators facing budgetary dilemmas to 
eliminate these programs. 
23 I note that the Court has not indicated that today's holding will have 
only prospective effect. 
24 See ante, at 10. 
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standing practices and programs and judicially arm private 
litigants with a powerful treble damages action against these 
governments. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment 
below. 
lfp/ss 12/27/82 Rider A, p. 5 (Jefferson County) 
JEFFS SALLY-POW 
The issue presented by this case is a narrow 
one. We are not concerned with sales to or purchases by 
the federal government. Nor are we concerned with state 
purchases for consumption or use in traditional 
governmental functions. Rather, the issue before us 
involves only state purchases for the purpose of competing 
- with the advantage of discriminatory prices - in the 
retail pharmacy market with private enterprise. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, 
that the Act exempts all state purchases regardless of the 
purpose of the purchase. We may assume, without deciding 
that Congress did not intend the Act to apply where state 
purchases are for traditional governmental functions, and 
< 
~ ·i ' 
2 . 
that therefore such purchases are exempt per se. If there 
is such an implied exemption, we do not think it applies 
where a state has chosen to compete in the private market 
with the advantage of discriminatory prices. 
III 
In construing a statute, we look, of course, to 
the language of the statute itself. 
Jim: Do you not think the "call" for what is now note 7 





The effect of our decision today on the pricing 
policies, though perhaps critically important for small 
retail pharmacies, may be minimal on drug manufacturers. 
The investigating Subcommittee in the 1960s obtained 
written responses from about 50 manufacturers to questions 
about pricing. See 1967-1968 Hearings, supra note 21, in 
Appendix. Although some of the answers were incomplete or 
ambiguous, as a whole they indicate industrywide reliance 
on any alleged exemption for state purchases. Only six 
manufacturers indicated that they gave greater discounts 
to state agencies than they gave to individually owned 
community pharmacies. Id., at A21, A23, A29, A78, A88, 
2. 
A95. Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers 
received greater discounts. Id., at A24, A26. The 
manufacturers split on whether to give chains larger 
discounts than state agencies, but the overwhelming number 
of manufacturers indicating any difference in catalog 
~ 
prices stated that wholesalers received a larger~iscount v 
than state agencies. Thus, as one would expect, pricing 
is more closely related to the volume of purchases than to 
whether the purchaser is a governmental of private entity. 
( \0 
lfp/ss 02/14/83 Rider F, p. 4 (Jefferson Co.) 
JEFFF SALLY-POW 
7. Special solicitude for the plight of 
indigents is a traditional concern of state and local 
governments, and a state's aid to indigents is an exercise 
of its sovereign powers. If, in special circumatances, 
sales were made by a state to a class of indigents, the 
question presented, that we need not decide, is whether 
such sales would be "in competition" with private 
enterprise. The District Court correctlv assumed that the 
private and state pharmacies in this case are "competing 





~STIGB ~~ would create rules of statutory construction 
~ . 
for the Robinson-Patman Act different from those that the Court has 
used for ~ other antitrust laws. The only distinction offered is 
a "certain tension" between the policies behind the Act and the 
Sherman Act. See post, at 5. Our task in this case, however, as 
her dissent ~' is to determine congressional intent in 
~~ 
passing the Robinson-Patman Act, and our familiar Fulco ef. 
construction ~the antitrust laws ~~s rQprei!Hitltative 
A 
of • 
the longstanding judicial understanding that Congress intended the 
~ 
a~~r~&t laws to have a broad scope. 
·' 
lfp/ss 02/09/83 Rider H (Jefferson County) 
JEFF SALLY-POW 
Justice Stevens agrees that state and local 
governments are "purchasers" within the meaning of the 
Act. See post, at 1. He joins in the dissent, however, 
on the basis of a novel theory: that state and local 
agencies are never "in competition" with private parties 
within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. Post, at 
This, of course, is an economic fiction. If in 
fact a state particulates in the private retail 
pharmaceutical market, it is competing with the private 
participants. Moreover, this is an allegation of the 
compliant before us. Justice Stevens relies on one 
statement by witness Teergarden in the 1935 House 
Hearings, but ~~ther statement by the same 
2 • 
witness that if "two hospitals are in competition with 
each other, I would say then that the fact that one is 
operated by the city does not save it from the bill". See 
1935 Hearings, supra, n. 17, at 209. Nor does Justice 
Stevens explain why there was public competition with 
private enterprise in City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389 
(1978) and (Denver cable television case). 
RIDER H 
::s 
JUSTICE STEVENS h~~ RQ p~~ agree~ witR ue that state and 
local governments are "purchasers" within the meaning of the Act. 
See post, at 1. He disagrees wit~ ~, however, that such a 
conclusion is dispositive of the case before us. For him, it is 
necessary to find new grounds for affirming the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. JUSTICE STEVENS would hold that that state and 
local agencies are never "in competition" with private parties. 
Although this is generally a factual inquiry in other Robinson-
Patman Act cases, and no one disputes actual competition from the 
State in this case, see supra n. 7, or in the pharmaceutical 
industry as a whole, see post, at 12-13 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting), 
JUSTICE STEVENS believes that he is obligated to engage in this 
legal fiction solely because of one statement in Mr. Teegarden's 
testimony in the 1935 House hearings. On its face, Mr. Teegarden's 
statement that "[t]he Federal Government is saved by the same 
distinction, not of location but of function" refers only to Federal 
purchases. But more important is Mr. Teegarden's answer to a 
question that clearly did relate to the applicability of the Act to 
state purchasing: "In the final analysis, it would depend upon 
numerous questions of fact in a particular case. If the two 
hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the 
bill." See 1935 Hearings, supra n.l7, at 209. Two things are 
clear: (i) Mr. Teegarden did not understand a state purchaser could 
2. 
never be "in competition" with a private entity; and {ii) "in 
competition" cannot be determined any way but on the facts of the 
case. See also id., at 250 {remarks of Mr. Teegarden) {"requiring a 
showing of effect upon competition"). To contend that Mr. Teegarden 
was "equivocal" in his answer on this point is to introduce 
ambiguity where none has been thought to exist. Thus, JUSTICE 
STEVENS's novel interpretation of the Act to require a conclusive 
presumption of no competition when the state is a purchaser has no 
basis in the only passage of legislative history that he cites as 
support. 
Interestingly, the "in competition" element of a Robinson-
Patman claim was seen by Representative Hancock as extending the Act 
to state purchases rather than limiting it. 
Mr. Hancock. I do not want to appear too stupid here, 
but your answer seems to be predicated upon a premise that 
this bill would only prevent discrimination in price as 
between purchasers engaged in competition. I do not find 
that in the bill. 
Mr. Teegarden. I think it is implicit in the term 
"discrimination." 
Mr. Hancock. Why should you say that? ••• 
Why do you not add, "between different purchasers 
engaged in competition"? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not think there would be any 
serious objection to adding that. 
Mr. Hancock: As it reads now, you can see why it 
would not prevent the city or the State or the Federal 
Government from buying below the regular established price 
paid by a private corporation or an individual. You have 
to read something into the law. 
Mr. Teegarden. The legal history of the term, 
"discrimination", and its application for some 40 or 50 
years by the Interstate Commerce Commission--
Mr. Hancock: Implies competition? 
Mr. Teegarden: It involves the concept of 
competition. 
Now, in these cases of discrimination which have 
come, where it has proved possible to show a tangible 
discrimination, the court has relied upon the fact that 
the parties to the discrimination were in competition with 
each other. 
Id., at 212-213 (emphasis added). 
3. 
RIDER G 
'77--~~-~ ~~ ~~~ 
~USTICE O'CONNOR~ lgs ~er e ase, not on the words of 
~ 
statute, or ~ tAe legislative history , of the 1936 Aet, but (i) 
~~ t:J- r ~1.4.-Ud J 
~ugeneral consensus in the legal and business communities that 
'\ 1\ 
sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-
Patman Act," post, at 9r and (ii) the fa€t "that state, county, and 
municipal governments and manufacturers of commodities have 
structured their marketing relationships with each other on the 
longstanding assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply 
to those transact ions," id., at 14-15. See also post, at 4 
{STEVENS, J., dissenting). B~===:e:llyeiB are~k 
:i:u~. 
Fit,..s~F --e~lthou~-i'S cl.e.ar, /J. s JUSTICE O'CONNOR points out, 
see post, at 12-14 nn. 19 & 20, ~ some in the business and legal 
~~
co~unity thougat that an exemption existed for all state purchases~ 
A~~~ ~ ,.,~ i..-L-
1\tQI\c;d 1 thi• tl:'!ouEjl"lt a "consensus" is to disregard the opinion of 
~ commentators, see note 31, suprar the views expressed that 
the Act is applicable to state purchases, see infra, at 11 & n. 19, 
18 & n. 33r and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department 
~ 
of Justice, see infra, at 18 & n. 34. It is more ~rl'\ to say that 
there was an unsettled question of federal law that demanded this 
Court's attention. 
Second, although i~ be cleaF that some pharmaceutical~ 
da as n zJ wz.J.A.,. ~ ~ ~ I 
anufacturers ~e diEcriminate in favor of state purchasers, it is ., 
ot as clear as the dissent would have us believe that this price 
.~.· . 
- 2. 
discrimination is attributable solely to any perceived exemption. 
The investigating Subcommittee in the 1960s obtained written 
responses from about 50 manufacturers to questions about pricing. 
See 1967-1968 Hearings, supra note 21, in Appendix. Although some 
of the answers were incomplete or ambiguous, as a whole they do not 
indicate industry-wide reliance on any alleged exemption for state 
purchases. Only six manufacturers indicated that they gave greater 
discounts to state agencies than they gave to individually owned 
community pharmacies. Id., at A21, A23, A29, A78, A88, A95. 
Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers received greater 
discounts. Id., at A24, A26. The manufacturers split whether to 
give chains larger discounts than state agencies, but the 
overwhelming number of manufacturers indicating any difference in 
catalog prices stated that wholesalers received a larger discount 
than state agencies. Thus, as one would expect, pricing closely 
correlates with volume, and it may be that the generally large size 
of governmental orders is more determinative of manufacturers' 
pricing and the "structur[ing] of their marketing relationships" 




JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, repeatedly 
emphasizes that Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the 
issue presented here. See post, at 6, 7 & n. 10, 14, 15. This fact 
is irrelevant, for two reasons. First, the likelihood of state 
entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936, and it 
cannot be contended seriously that Congress specifically intended to 
allow the competition at issue here. Second, the absence of 
congressional focus is immaterial if the 
rejecting an argument similar to that of the dissent's here, 
• ~ ..£-A...h • 5t 
;;;;;,::.;.;-......:.;..;::_;:_:.::...:__:;...;;;.,:.._.;;;.;;.:;-...,..;;.....,.......,."" 1 A Sou t -Eastern Unde rwr 1 te r s;;.i 
Appellees argue that the Congress knew, as doubtless 
some of its members did, that this Court had prior to 1890 
said that insurance was not commerce and was subject to 
state regulation, and that therefore we should read the 
Act as though it expressly exempted that business. But 
•••• we fail to find in the legislative history of the Act 
an expression of a clear and unequivocal desire of 
Congress to legislate only within that area previously 
declared by this Court to be within the federal power. 
We have been shown not one piece of reliable evidence that 
the Congress of 1890 intended to freeze the proscription 
of the Sherman Act within the mold of then current 
judicial decisions .•.. 
322 U.S., at 356-358. See, e. g., Browder v. United States, 312 
U.S. 335, 339 {1941) {"Old laws apply to changed situations. The 
reach of the act is not sustained or opposed by the fact that it is 
sought to bring new situations under its terms.") {footnotes 
omitted); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 197 {1901) {"While a 
statute is presumed to speak from the time of its enactment, it 
embraces all such persons or things as subsequently fall within 
~·. 
scope."). The dissent certainly has not shown "an expression of a 
clear and unequivocal desire of Congress" to use the word "person" 
differently from the broad definition that we consistently have 
found it intended in the other antitrust laws. 
2. 
RIDER A 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, criticizes our use 
of antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. 
She would distinguish all of these cases, which uniformly hold 
States to be included in the word "persons," because none has held 
"that States or local governments are persons for purposes of 
exposure to liability as purchasers under the provisions of the 
Clayton Act." Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). She apparently 
concedes, however, that if such a case existed it would be 
dispositive here. See id., at 3-4. Thus, JUSTICE O'CONNOR must be 
making the odd argument that there is no case support for our 
holding because the Court has never so held before. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR takes no notice of our decision last term in 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 843 
(1982), in which the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like 
other federal laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon 
'persons,' of course apply to municipalities as well as to other 
corporate entities." Rather, she creates a distinction between 
"persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust laws and "persons" 
subject to suit under those laws, without citing any support for 
this distinction. It is interesting to note that not even JUSTICE 
STEVENS, who joins her dissenting opinion, agrees with JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR on this legal conclusion. See post, at 1 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
RIDER B 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR would create rules of statutory construction 
for the Robinson-Patman Act different from those that the Court has 
used for the other antitrust laws. The Qnly distinction offered is 
a "certain tension" between the policies behind the Act and the 
Sherman Act. See post, at 5. Our task in this case, as her dissent 
7kL 
concedes, is to determine congressional intent, ~ eur familiar 
rules of construction ~t~ust laws are themse~ves 
representative of the longstanding judicial understanding th~a~t~--­
~~..._ 
Congress intended the antitrust laws to have a broad scope. 
rinciple, with the rules of statutory construction that 
eveloped to give it force in cases that come before us, is thus 
to our present inquiry than are some perceived 
the application of the Act to an economy also covere 
y the Sherman Act. It is impossible to conclude otherwise than 
at the dissent, despite its disclaimers, construes the Act "to 
lect a policy judgment," id., at 7 n. 10 
~~ ~ ~-/)~~ cL..I- w .__ 
~f ~ ~ ~~~1- .. . 1""' ~ ~L.4~d~ 
~~~U<....~~~rt, 
~~4~~~ 
~ -"'-1 Hu.- ~ ~-
RIDER E 
Although it fails to list the state entities that compete with 
private business and will thus be affected by our decision, JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion cites a host of practical problems 
that application of the Act to state purchasing will create. See 
post, at 14-15. Assuming such burdens are proper considerations 
given Congress's intent to include States within the coverage of the 
antitrust laws generally, it is not clear why the dissent considers 
the burdens of compliance with the Act uniquely different from the 
burdens of compliance with the other antitrust laws, which do 
include States within their coverage. 
. ..
RIDER C 
Our holding is limited to finding that sales to state /j 
JY ~ purchasers for resale in competition with private enterprises are 
rt'. not exempt from the limitations of the Robinson-Patman Act. We use 
the Act's familiar analytical distinction between purchases for 
consumption and purchases for resale to show that Congress at least 
intended the Act to cover state purchases for resale in the private 
market. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, criticizes us 
for not creating "bright lines" to guide state purchasing practices, 
see post, at 7 & n. 11, but such criticism is really a complaint 
that our holding is no broader than it has to be to decide the case 
before us. The discussion that the dissent desires is not necessary 
to our review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held 
that the Act did exempt state purchases for resale. We need not 
decide the outcome of other governmental purchasing issues that are 
more appropriately presented and resolved in concrete factual 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Jefferson County, No. 81-827 
I have prepared you several riders in response to the two 
dissents. I am sure that you will only want to make a few--if any--
of the comments, but these give you some variety. I would recommend 
that at least Rider I be put into the draft. JUSTICE STEVENS uses 
that quote, and it looks better for you too to quote it when you are 
quoting the passage in full. 
'dB ~~~ R1er ~~
,,~/...~~): 
The effect of our decisi6tr toda~on ~ pricing pol~~ 
~ drug _:a~~ct~ay be minima)! The investigating Subcommittee 
in the 1960s obtained written responses from about 50 d~ag ~ 
manufacturers to questions about pricing. See 1967-1968 Hearings, 
supra note 21, in Appendix. Although some of the answers were 
incomplete or ambiguous, they do not indicate ~~th~ rs a~ 
industrywide reliance on any alleged exemption for state purchases. 
d)nly six manufacturers indicated that they gave greater 
~ 
discounts to state agencies than they gave to individually owned 
community pharmacies. Id., at A21, A23, A29, ~~~5. 
Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers ~ greater 
-"\ tn-c-
discounts. Id., at A24, A26. The manufacturers split whether to 
give chains ~~~iscounts than state agencies, but1 the 
overwhelming number of manufacturers in 
catalog prices stated that whol~~s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ " a..z. ~ ~.4?'~ 
state agencies. Thus,~pricing 




JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, 
questions our use of anti trust cases to define a word 
common to the antitrust laws. She would distinguish all 
u-1-
of these cases, ~ uniformly hold States to be included 
in the word "persons," because none has held "that States 
or local governments are persons for purposes of exposure 
to liability as purchasers under the provisions of the 
Clayton Act." Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). The 
dissent takes no notice, however, of our decision last 
term in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 
102 s.ct. 835, 843 (1982), in which the Court stated that 
the antitrust laws, "like other federal laws imposing 
civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course 
apply to municipalities as well as to other corporate 
entities." No authority is cited for the dissent's 
distinction between "persons" entitled to sue under the 




JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, ~ur use 
of antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. 
f.~IL ?..t;;be wettl-d-iM~i.•~l of theft ca_:~~~ uniformly hold 
T~- States to be included in the word "persons," because none has held 
~ "that States or local governments are persons for purposes of 
exposure to liability as purchasers under the provisions of the 
nw..~ 
Clayton Act." Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). /\-8-fre takes no 
notice, however, of our decision last term in Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 843 (1982), in 
which the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal 
laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course 
apply to municipalities as well as to other corporate entities." 
~ ~~"'~~~~~ Rat'A~;=~:!'! a.,..-distf'nction between "persons" entitled to sue 
under the antitrust laws and "persons" subject to suit under those 
laws,. w~tl:lont ei t i ng aft¥ :!ll~~er.t .€or.. this cHstiflet-io~. 
~II -------RIDER G 
The dissent of JUSTICE O'CONNOR relies in large part, not on 
the words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on 
assertions that a "general consensus [existed] in the legal and 
business communities that sales to governmental entities are not 
covered by the Robinson-Patman Act." Post, at 9. See also post, at 
4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). JUSTICE O'CONNOR is ~1~~ correct 
that some in the business and legal community did think that an 
exemption existed for all state purchases. See post, at 12-14 nn. 
19 & 20. But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the 
opinion of commentators, see n~ ~' supra; the views expressed 
that the Act is applicable to state purchases, see infra, at 11 & n. 
2~~, 18 & n. 3)f; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the 
'7 
Department of Justice, see infra, at 18 & n. 3A. It is more 
accurate to say that ~was an unsettled question of federal law 
that demanded this Court's attention. 
RIDER H 
JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be 
"purchasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. See 
post, at 1. He joins in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, however, on the 
basis of a novel theory: that state and local agencies may never be 
in "competition" with private parties within the meaning of the Act. 
See ibid. This, of course, is an economic fiction: If in fact a 
State participates in the private retail pharmaceutical market, it 
is clear that it is competing with the private participants. 
JUSTICE STEVENS relies on one statement by witness Teegarden in the 
~~ -1-t:> 
1935 House Hearings, but disreg~d• e~e significance of a further 
" 
statement by the same witness: "In the final analysis, it would 
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. If the 
two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then 
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from 
the bill." See 1935 Hearings, supra n. )(, at 209. 
S conclusive presumption of the Act has 
of legislative history that 
r9 
RIDER D 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, repeatedly 
emphasizes that Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the 
issue presented here. See post, at 6, 7 & n. 10, 14, 15. This f~ 
~~  1:; fi:~-o~ Fi • st, the likelihood of state 
entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936 1 ~ jt 
cannot be contended ~hat Congress specifically intended to 
...f A-4 A~~ ;~, 
allow the competition at issue here. Seco~, tne absence of 
~ 
congressional focus is immaterial ~ the plain language applies. 
-'\ 
See, e. g., Browder v. United States, 312 u.s. 335, 339 (1941): De 
Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 197 (1901): South-Eastern Underwriters, 
322 U.S., at 356-358. 
Rider B 
For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Representative Keogh 
also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to federal 
purchases only for resale. See H.R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961); H.R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 722, 85th 
Con g • , 1st S e s s • ( 19 5 7 ) ; H • R . 5 213 , 8 4 t h Con g • , 1 s t S e s s • ( 19 5 5 ) • 
.._,.. 
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The effect of our decision today on ~pricing 
policies, though perhaps critically important for small 
retail pharmacies, may be minimal on drug manufacturers. 
The investigating Subcommittee in the 1960s obtained 
written responses from about 50 manufacturers to questions 
about pricing. See 1967-1968 Hearings, supra note 21, in 
Appendix. Although some of the answers were incomplete or 
ambiguous, as a whole the~icate industrywide reliance 
on any alleged exemption for state purchases. Only six 
manufacturers indicated that they gave greater discounts 
to state agencies than they gave to individually owned 




A95. Indeed, two indicated that independent retailers 
received greater discounts. Id., at A24, A26. The 
manufacturers split on whether to give chains larger 
discounts than state agencies, but the overwhelming number 
of manufacturers indicating any difference in catalog 
J.-
prices stated that wholesalers received a large vS iscount v 
than state agencies. Thus, as one would expect, pricing 
is more closely related to the volume of purchases than to 
en. 
whether the purchaser is a governmental ~ private entity. 
----
job 12/19/82 
FIRST DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, 
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether sales to and purchases 
by state and local hospitals of pharmaceutical products 
for resale in competition with private retail pharmacies 
are exempt per se from the proscriptions of the Clayton 
Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 
49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. §13 (the Act). 
I 
Petitioner is a trade association of retail 
pharmacists and pharmacies doing business in Jefferson 
County, Alabama. Petitioner, as assignee of its members~ 
claims, commenced this action in 1978 in the District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, naming as 
( 
defendants the respondent pharmaceutical manufacturers; 
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama (the 
University); and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The 
University operates a medical center, including hospitals, 
in conjunction with the State university and medical 
2. 
school. Located in the university medical center are two 
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, 
existing as a public corporation incorporated pursuant to 
Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive 
relief under § § 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 
§§15, 26, for alleged violations of §2(a), (f) of the 
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
u.s.c. §§13(a),(f). Petitioner contends that respondent 
manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their products to 
the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper Green 
( ~ ~la..&. ~*~-~<·l-1->') 
Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those at which they 
"' 
sold like products to petitioner's assignors. Petitioner 
1 rn relevant part, 15 u.s.c. §13(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either 
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price 
between different purchasers of commodities of 
like grade and quality, where either or any of 
the purchases involved in such discrimination 
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold 
for use, consumption, or resale within the 
United States ... , and where the ef feet of such 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any 
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or 
prevent competition with any person who either 
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 




further alleges that the governmental purchasers knowingly 





selling drugs so 
procured to the general public in direct competition with 
privately owned pharmacies. There also are allegations 
that the price discrimination is not exempted from the 
proscriptions of the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c.3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, setting forth 
dismissal that sales of goods made to 
as grounds for 
tfttr~ ( }t VI' "' I I 
a ~overnmental ~ 
instrumentality are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the 
District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations 
that local retail pharmacies had been injured by the 
2section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination 
in price which is prohibited by this section. 
3section 13c provides: 
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of this title, 
shall apply to purchases of their supplies for 
their own use by schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, 
hospitals, and charitable institutions not 
operated for profit. 
4. 
challenged price discrimination and that at least some of 
the governmental purchases were not exempt under § 13c. 4 
--o----...ial.JddJmt1l-i-i.fiR~i~~rltT:1~a~tE"t1Vvt!e---±inntt~e!"!r~~~r~e~taatt-4::te-erntl!~~,r---~ held that 
"governmental purchases are, without regard to 15 U.S.C. 
§l3c, beyond the intended reach of the Robinson-Patman 
Price Discrimination Act, at least with respect to 
purchases for hospitals and other traditional governmental 
purposes." 656 F.2d 92, 102. 5 The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, per curiam, "on the basis of 
the district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F.2d, at 
93. 6 
4656 F.2d 92, 98 (CAS 1981) (reprinting District 
Court's opinion in Appendix). 
5Petitioner's antitrust claims were dismissed 
solely on the basis that State and municipal hospital 
purchases were exempt per se from the Robinson-Patman Act. 
See 6 56 F. 2d, at 10 3 ("The court does not here base its 
decision upon the 'state action' doctrine as explicated in 
Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 [ (] 1943) .... "). We thus have 
no occasion to determine whether some other rule of law 
might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman 
Act claims. 
6The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, 
agreed that "[t)he claims against the Board must ... be 
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself." 
656 F.2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages 
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this 
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision. 
5. 
We granted certiorari because the issue presented is 
an important question of federal law that should be 
settled by this Court, and now reverse.? 
II 
On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the 
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has 
recognized that those laws represent "a carefully studied 
attempt to bring within the [antitrust laws] every person 
engaged in business whose activities might restrain or 
monopolize commercial intercourse among the states." 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 
U.S. 533, 553 (1944) . 8 As the CHIEF JUSTICE stated for 
7The dissenting op1n1on in the Court of Appeals 
found the majority's decision inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act because, to the 
state's great purchasing power, "the court adds the 
advantage of a license to make use of price discrimination 
in its wholesale purchases." 656 F. 2d, at 9 3-94 (Clark, 
J., dissenting). The dissent Sftent 01'1 to StiitiQ that i:t r 
would "hold that, for the purposes of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, when a state moves outside its traditional sphere of 
activity and into retail competition with private 
enterprise, it should be treated in precisely the same 
manner as its competitors." We need not, however, decide 
q r the breadth of the Robinson-Patman Act as it applies to 
. ~ State and local governmental purchasing, because our 
~ .. ~.~~~ holding is limited to finding that there is no per se 
0 ... vV ~~~ exemption for such purchasing. 
~#"':~ 8see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 
~~-~ /~ 434 u.s. 308, 312-313 (1978): Mandeville Island Farms, 
~ A ..... . r Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 u.s. 219, 236 
~ (1948) (stating that antitrust laws are "comprehensive in 
~ ~ [their] terms and coverage, protecting all who are made 
"T LJ.,..( w~ t. victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be 







M-~-k{, ~t.. .. ~~~ 
~~-....... ~~-c..~..,.-py ~ ~·....,••t:..4~•4 ~ 
the Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 ~ .,. 
~ 
(1975), "our cases have repeatedly established that there 
is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from 
the antitrust laws, id., at 787 (citing United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 u.s. 321, 350-351 (1963) ~ 
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)) .9 In City of 
~gi 
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. ~ 
~~~=~=:~a~-8~~ 
 
'\the purposes and scope 
of the anti trust laws: "[T} he economic choices made by 
public corporations ... designed as they are to assure 
maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not 
inherently more likely to comport with the broader 
interests of national economic well-being than are those 
of private corporations acting in furtherance of the 
interests of ... its shareholders." 
.( 
perpetrated") (emphasis added). 
Id., at 403, 408 
9see, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & 
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 u.s. 378, 388 
(1981)~ City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 
435 u.s. 389, 398, 399 (1978) ~ Abbott Laboratories v. 
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 12 
(1976) ~ United States v. National Assn. Securities 




(footnotes ~ed) .10 
The Robinson-Patman Act does 
~he Lfle!!' it exempt/ sales · to or purchases by State and 
local governmental agencies. 11 The only express exemption 
10 rn one important sense, competition from 
government can be more invidious than that from chain-
stores, at which the Robinson-Patman Act particularly was 
aimed. See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 
75-76 (1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 u.s. 536, 
543-544 (1960)~~9 ~aubi lEe volume of purchases permits 
any large, relatively efficient retail organization to 
pass on cost savings to consumers, and to that extent, 
consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to 
the extent that Lower prices result from less overhead, in 
the form of no taxes, government subsidies, and free 
services, governmental agencies me:r;-ely redistribute the 
burden of the costs from the ~H\iit!e consumers to the 
citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman 
Act simply would give governmental agencies further 
advantages in the commercial market, perhaps enough to 
eliminate private competitors. Because consumers, as 
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the 
drugs sold by government distributors, and because there 
is no reason to assume that governmental retailers will 
provide retail distribution any more efficiently than 
private retail pharmacists, consumers ultimately will 
suffer to the extent that governmental retail activities 
eliminate more efficient, private retail distribution 
systems. 
Exemptions from the antitrust laws inherently distort 
the market, and it hardly need be noted that governments 
are significant purchasers in the markets for almost all 
goods produced. See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association, Annual Survey Report 1979-1980, at 11 
(purchases by State and local government hospitals 
constitute 4% of the market; federal hospitals 2.3%). 
11Respondents argue that application of the Act to 
the State of Alabama would present a significant risk of 
conflict with the Tenth Amendment and that therefore this 
construction of the Act should be avoided. See NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 u.s. 490, 501 (1979). 
There is no risk, however, of a constitutional issue 
arising from the application of the Act in this case: The 
retail sale of pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably 
'[an] attribute[] of state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. 
Wyoming, No. 81-554, at 9 (January 1982) (quoting 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Association, Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288 (1981)). It is 
simply too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot 
regulate States under its commerce clause powers when they 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
from the Act's proscriptions is that for 
institutions contained in 15 U.S.C. §13c. 12 Th issue is 
~thus whether a State or local hospital may be a 
"purchaser" for purposes of § 2 (a) or a "person" for 
l purposes of §2 (f) . 
We need not discuss the word "purchasers" in §2(a) at 
any great lengthl3 to cast doubt on the holding of the 1 
courts below that State and local hospitals are exempt~ 
se from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
because the word "person" in the antitrust laws has been 
before us on several occasions. 1 4 In Chattanooga Foundry 
are engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden 
v. Terminal Railway, 377 u.s. 184, 188-189, 192-193 
(1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain 
governmental purchasing from the Act's limitations, such 
as for government consumption for traditional governmental 
functions, those traditional state functions may be 
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette, 
435 u.s., at 413 n.42 (plurality opinion). 
12Because the District Court properly assumed, for 
purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least 
some of the hospital purchases would not be covered by the 
§13c exemption, see notes 3, supra, and accompanying text, 
we need not decide whether the express exemption would 
support summary judgment in cases against governmental 
hospitals purchasing for their own use. 
13The word "purchasers" most likely has a meaning as 
inclusive as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 
(1936) (remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton 
Anti trust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. 
The pending bill does not segregate any particular class 
of purchasers, or exempt any special class of 
purchasers."). 
Footnote(s) 14 will appear on following pages. 
9. 
& Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906), 1 
the Court held that a municipality is a "person" within 
the meaning of §8 of the Sherman Act, the general 
definitional section, and that the city could maintain a 
treble-damage action under §7, the predecessor of §4 of 
the Clayton Act. 1 5 Some 36 years later, Georgia v. Evans, 1 
316 u.s. 159, 162 (1942), held that the words "any person" 
in §7 of the Sherman Act included States. By the time the 
Court decided City of Lafayette, we were able to state 
without qualification that "the Court has held that the 
definition of 'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities 1 
and States." 435 U.S., at 395. 
14The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly 
in the antitrust statutes. Section 8 of the Sherman Act, 
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210, 15 u.s.c. §7 (1976 ed.), and §1 of 
the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 15 u.s.c. §12 
(1976 ed.), are general definitional sections which define 
"person" or "persons" "wherever used in this [Act] ... to 
include corporations and associations existing under or 
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the 
laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or 
the laws of any foreign country." 
15section 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 
210 (1890) was repealed in 1955. Section 4 of the Clayton 
Act, ch. 323, 33 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976 ed.), 
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who shall 
be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the anti trust laws may sue ther for 
in any district court •.. , and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained .... " Section 4 is made 
applicable to all of the antitrust statutes by §1 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. §12 (1976 ed.). See City of 
Lafayette, 435 u.s. 396-397 & 13. 
10. 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous 
to require compliance by municipalities with the 
substantive standards of other federal laws which 
impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.'" Id., at 400. 16 But 1 
one case is of particular relevance to our discussion of 
the antidiscrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act at issue here. In Union Pacific R. v. United States, 
313 u.s. 450 (1941)' the Court considered the 
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 1 
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1) 
(1976 ed.) (repealed in 1978) , 17 "a statute which 
essentially is an anti trust provision serving the same 
purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act." City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 1 
402 n.l9. 18 The Court there had no trouble finding that a 
16see California 












17That statute, in language similar to that used in 
§2 of the Clayton Act, as amended, made it unlawful for 
"any person, persons, or corporation to offer, grant, or 
give, or to solicit, accept, or receive any rebate, 
concession, or discrimination in respect to the 
transportation of any property in interstate or foreign 
commerce by any [covered] common carrier." 
l8Accord, Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A 
Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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municipality was a 'person' within the meaning of the 
statute. See 313 U.S., at 467-468. See also City of 
Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401-402 n.l9. 
We believe that it is not enough to distinguish City 1 
of Lafayettel9 from the case before us on the basis that 
City of Lafayette involved claims under the Sherman Act 
rather than under the Robinson-Patman Act. Such 
distinction gives no weight to the Court's specific 
reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in its discussion of 1 
the all-inclusive nature of the term "persons." 435 U.S., 
at 397 n.l4. The issue presented in Abbott Laboratories 
did not concern sales to governmental hospitals, but the 
principles set forth there, and that underly its analysis, 
are equally pertinent to the issue presented here.20 Nor 1 
71, 89 n. 100 (1974). 
19The only apparent difference between the scope of 
the two laws is the extent to which the activities 
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's 
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the commerce clause, 
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-
201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover 
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is 
otherwise subject to the Act. 
20 
It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be 
construed liberally, and that the exceptions 
from their application are to be construed 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in 
the Robinson-Patman Act any differently than we have that 
word in the Clayton Act, which it amends. 21 Unless there 
is some clear expression in the legislative history22 to 
strictly. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, 
351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956) ~ FMC v. Seatrain Lines, 
Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. 
Standard Oil Co., 395 u.s. 642, 646-647 (1969). 
The Court has recognized, also, that Robinson-
Patman "was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit 
all devices by which large buyers gained 
discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by 
virtue of their greater purchasing power." FTC 
v. Brach & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960); FTC~ 
Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 u.s. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be 
construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. 
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 
(1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968). 
425 u.s., at 11-12. 
21 Indeed, the House committee report specifically 
states that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the 
Clayton Act will apply without repetition to the terms 
concerned where they appear in this bill, since it is 
designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H.R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936); s. 
Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). See 80 Cong. 
Rec. 3116 (1936) ("Many have complained because the 
provisions of the bill apply to 1 any person engaged in 
commerce. 1 The original Clayton Act contains that 
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under 
consideration. The language of the Clayton Act was used 
because it has been construed by the courts."). That the 
common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts 
should be, when possible, construed consistently with each 
other should not be surprising given their common 
purposes. See 80 Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep. 
Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a 
new policy or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted 
in 1914, and it was the purpose of that act to do just 
what this law sets out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 
(remarks of Senator Logan). 
2 2Al though the face of the Act contains no express 
exemption in favor of sales to or purchases by State and 
local governmental agencies, the Court has often held that 
legislative history should be considered even though the 
language appears to be clear. See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska, 
451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. Colorado Publ1c 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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I 
indicate that our prior analyses and interpretations of 1 
the other antitrust laws are not applicable to the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 23 the Court of Appeals should have 
·considered the issue whether State and local governments 
were exempt per se from the limitations of the Act long 
ago settled. 1 
III 
A 
The legislative history on whether the Robinson-
Patman Act was intended to apply to governmental 
purchasing is meager and largely unenlightening. There is 1 
nothing in the Senate or House committee reports, or in 
Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 u.s. 1, 9-10 (1976). 
It is thus not surprising that the Court has also 
considered "how far Congress intended to extend its 
mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the 
answer in its "purpose and legislative history." Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 (1974). See 
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959): 
Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72, 
78 (1953). 
23 It is clear that the burden is not on petitioner 
at this late date to show Congress's specific intent to 
include state and local governments within the Robinson-
Patman Act. In Lafayette and Union Pacific, the Court 
found that cities were plainly "persons" within the 
meaning of the Sherman and Elkins Acts without any direct 
evidence of congressional intent on the subject. See also 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 u.s. 308, 317 
(1978) (holding that a foreign nation is a "person" within 
§4 of the Clayton Act). 
14. 
the floor debates, discussing the issue. There is, 
however, evidence that some members of Congress were at 
least aware of the possibility of the Act applying to 
governmental purchases. Not surprisingly, most members 1 
were concerned, not about state and local governmental 
purchasing, but whether the Act would limit the federal 
Government's purchasing. The most i.mpEH't!mt -piece of i!f' 
relevant legislative history is the testimony of the Act's 
principal draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House 1 
committee. 24 Although it is difficult to determine 
24 
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, 
prevent the granting of discounts to the United 
States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present 
Clayton Act does so .•.. 
Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government 
gets huge discounts. . . . . Now, would that 
discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should 
unless a discount contrary to the present bill 
would be barred--that is, the present law--would 
be barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: 
The Federal Government is not in competition 
with other buyers from these concerns. 
The Federal Government is saved by the same 
distinction.... They are not in competition 
with anyone else who would buy. 
Rep. Hancock: It would eliminate 
competitive bidding all along the line, would it 
not, in classes of goods that would be covered 
by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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exactly what Mr. Teegarden thought about the application 
of the Act to State and local governmental purchasing, one 
conclusion is certain: Mr. Teegarden expressly stated that 
the Act would apply to the purchases of municipal 1 
hospitals in at least some circumstances. 25 Thus, Mr. 
on Government orders? 
Rep. Hancock: Government, State, city, 
municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would 
not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It 
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding 
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would 
with the Government. 
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the 
city, county exactly the same as anybody else, 
same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell 
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would 
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in 
this way. In the final analysis, it would 
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a 
particular case. If the two hospitals are in 
competition with each other, I should say that ' 
the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings]. 
25other conclusions also may be possible: (i) that 
purchases by any governmental agency are not affected when 
the government is not in .competition with other buyers; 
and (ii) that the Act would not prevent governmental 
purchasing by competitive bidding. Neither of these 
readings, however, is necessarily inconsistent with our 
holding today. 
16. 
Teegarden's comments are no support for the per se 




26Mr. Teegarden subsequently submitted a itten 
brief to the House committee. Mr TQega~cen first 
rejected outright the desirability of ~ exemptions: 
"Since the bill as drawn has been pared down so carefully 
to those transations which in their very nature smack of 
unjust discrimination, no reason appears why it should be 
restricted: and no other antitrust law is so restricted." 
1935 Hearings, supra note 24, at 249. He then posed the 
question whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive 
bidding on Governmental purchases below trade price 
levels." Mr. Teegarden stated that "[t)he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute 
will not be construed to limit or restrict in any way the 
rights, prerogatives, or privileges of the sovereign 
unless it so expressly provides--a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law ..... " He also 
noted that "requiring a showing of effect upon 
competition, will further preclude any possibility of the 
bill affecting the Government. 1935 Hearings, supra, at 
250 (footnotes omitted). 
It is arguable that Mr. Teegarden intended to include 
both State and federal governments in his use of the word 
"Governmental," but his comments do not compel that 
conclusion. All the cases cited by Mr. Teegarden suggest 
that the sovereign exception, as used in the United 
States, means that a government, in passing a law, does 
not give up what it does not expressly surrender. See 
United States v. Herron, 87 u.s. (20 Wall.) 227, 257 
(1874): Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 
Wall.) 227, 239 (1874). In the same year that Congress 
passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court in United States 
v. California, 297 u.s. 175, 186 (1936), stated that 1t 
could "perceive no reason for extending [the presumption 
against including the sovereign in a statute] so as to 
exempt a business carried on by a state from the otherwise 
applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing 
in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable 
of being obstructed by state as by individual action." 
See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 562-563 (1957). 
At most, the rule of statutory construction, as used by 
Mr. Teegarden and applied to the Robinson-Patman Act, 
supports an exemption for the federal government's 
purchases, the existence of which is not before us. Cf. 
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-605 
(1941) (holding that the United States was not a "person" 
under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble 
damages). Moreover, he clearly assumed that governmental 
purchasing would not compete with private purchasing, thus 
eliminating for his purposes even the possibility of the 
Act applying to State and local governments. 
17. 
B 1 
This Court has said that a contemporaneous 
construction of a new law by an official charged with its 
enforcement is highly persuasive of the statute's proper 
meaning. See e. g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 u.s. 1, 16 
(1965). Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney 1 
General of the United States responded to an inquiry by 
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to 
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539 
(1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the 
Act, the Attorney General explained: 
[S)tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., 
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily 
applyA the Government unless it is expressly so 
provided; and it does not seem to have been the 
policy of the Congress to make such statutes 
applicable to the Government .... 
The Act of June 19, 1936, merely amended 
the Act of October 15, 1914 ... and, in so far as 
I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded 
heretofore
27 
as applicable to Government 
contracts. 
27 Id., at 540 (later in the letter using phrase 
"Federal Government" and stating other reasons "for 
avoiding a construction that would make the statute 
applicable to the Government in violation of the apparent 
policy of the Congress in such matters"). The Attorney 
General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 u.s. 415, 425 (1928), in 
which this Court upheld the granting of favorable 
telegraph rates to a federal corporation that competed 





1he Attorney General's 
~~ 
opinion a.e sayic.g- a.Ryefii.J:I.g about the Act's applicability 
W...; 
to State and local governmental agencies. 28 Indeed, the 
Hv-~ 
v~ year, the Attorney General of California 
i\ 
expressly concluded that State and municipal governmental 
2 
purchasing was within the proscriptions of the Act. See 2 
Opinion of the Attorney General of California, 1932-1939 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[55,156, 415-416 (1937) . 29 It thus 
28 Representative Patman, however, did interpret the 
opinion as exempting State and local governmental 
purchases. See W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-
Patman Act 30 (1963). Representative Patman's 
interpretation of the Act is certainly entitled to weight 
where it indicates his intent in 1936, but here he seems 
to be interpreting the Attorney General's opinion. 
Representative Patman's intentions are probably better 
reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to 
amend the Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United 
States, any State or any political subdivision thereof." 
H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 3377, 83d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history 
on these bills, but it is arguable that Representative 
Patman believed that the original intent needed to be 
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney 
General's construction of the Act to the contrary. In any 
case, Congress's failure to pass these bills probably 
stems from a reluctance to subject federal purchases to 
the Act. 
Respondents argue that, when Congress passed 
legislation amending the Robinson-Patman Act in 1938, its 
failure to overrule Rep. Patman's views, as expressed in 
his book, is persuasive evidence of its intent to leave 
the prior interpretation intact. See United States v. 
American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 
280-281 (1975). A rule, however, that Congress must 
"overrule" one Congressman's interpretation of an Act of 
Congress, else that interpretation becomes law, is not 
only novel, but would make any legislative history 
impossible to do and Congress's clarification of the law 
very difficult. 
29Two other early state attorney general opinions do 
not decide whether the Act applies to state purchasing for 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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cannot be said that the legislative history surrounding 
the Act's passage manifests that clear congressional 
intent necessary to take State and local governmental 2 
purchasing from within its confines. 
c 
Respondents' principal argument is that subsequent 
ry~~~~ 
legislative events, and een~istenk j~s~al construction, 
~ J1 
have confirmed that governmental purchases are outside the 2 
Act. We have found, on occasion, such evidence persuasive 
of the construction of the Act that we too should adopt. 
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 200-
201 (1974), we noted that "the courts in nearly four 
decades of litigation" had given the Robinson-Patman Act a 2 
certain construction and held that, "[i]n the face of this 
longstanding interpretation and the continued 
congressional silence, the legislative history [did] not 
warrant our extending §2 (a) beyond its clear language to 
retail sales. See Opinion of Attorney Gerneral of 
Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~55,157, at 416 
(1937) (concluding Act "not applicable to the purchasing 
departments of the state when purchasing materials and 
supplies for the state"): Opinion of Attorney Gerneral of 
Wisconsin, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937) (purchase of 
commercial fertilizers for agricultural experiment 
stations: no indication of any purchase for resale). 
20. 
reach a multitude of local activities that hitherto have 2, 
been left to state and local regulation."30 
Respondents rely heavily on hearings held on the 
Robinson-Patman Act in the late 1960's. 3l During those 
hearings, the House committee was told that price 
discrimination in favor of governmental hospitals was 2 
outside the Act,32 and Chairman Paul Dixon of the Federal 
30see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 u.s. 258, 273-274 (1972) 
(treating professional baseball as an anomaly under the 
anti trust laws because of "[c) ongressional awareness for 
three decades of the Court's ruling ..• , coupled with 
congressional inaction"). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723, 733 (1975) (affirming 
rule adopted by "virtually all lower federal courts facing 
the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting 
this question over the past quarter century"). 
31The most important relevant event in the Robinson-
Patman Act's post-enactment history is the amendment in 
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions. Whether the 
existence of an exemption in §l3c supports an exemption 
from the Act of all governmental purchasing depends 
whether §13c is interpreted to apply to any governmental 
agencies. That is a substantial issue, however, in its 
own right. Compare 81 Cong. Rec. 8 706 ( 19 3 7) (remarks of 
Rep. Pettengill) (reading similar amendment as not 
including "a charitable institution that was not supported 
in any part by public funds"): H.R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968), with 81 Cong. Rec., at 
8706 (statement of Rep. Walter) (agreeing that §l3c would 
apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and 
States). See also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 
n.l4 (including within the Nonprofit Institutions Act 
"public libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by 
local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-
19 n.lO; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (exemption codifies the 
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address it. 
32see, e. g., Small Business Problems in the Drug 
Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities 
of Regula tory Agencies of the Select Commit tee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 15-16 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings]: 
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Trade Commission disclaimed any authority over 
transactions involving state health care programs.33 
Although the statement of the FTC's chairman is entitled 
to weight, it "can hardly be said to have given the 2 
administrative construction the 'notoriety' that this 
Court found persuasive in Udall v. Tallman, 380 u.s., at 
18." Zuber v. Allen, 396 u.s. 168, 194 (1949). The other 
statements express 1 it tle more than informed, interested 
opinions on the issue, and certainly are not entitled to 2 
the consideration given those of Mr. Teegarden. 
What should be important is the conclusion that the 
committee drew from this testimony, and that conclusion is 
far from clear. The committee stated that "[t]here is no 
basis apparent ... why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman 2 
Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the 
Robinson-Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st 
Sess. 73-77, 623 (1969-1970). The committee also was told 
that institutional purchasers frequently purchase drugs at 
lower prices than that paid by retai 1 pharmacies, see 
1967-1968 Hearings, supra, at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and 
many witnesses complained that this discrimination 
adversely affected competition. See id., at A-140-141, p. 
253-262, 273, 291. 
33 See H.R. Rep. No. 1983, at 74. 
22. 
favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit 
or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription drug 
competition at the retail level with disfavored retail 
druggists." Id., at 79 (emphasis added) .34 But to read 2 
that statement as approving a per se exemption from the 
Robinson-Patman Act for governmental purchasing would 
require us to draw an inference that is far from 
compelled. 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, 2 
courts considering the matter of coverage have concluded 
that the Act does not apply to governmental purchasers and 
that not one has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, 
under either §2(a) or §2(f) of the Act, where the 
discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or 2 
county. There are several difficulties with this 
assertion: The number of judicial decisions even 
considering the Act's application to purchases by 
34The commit tee also concluded that the 19 38 
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private 
nonprofit institutions ..• to the extent the sales are for 
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction 
of §l3c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
23. 
government are few in number;35 no Court of Appeals 
apparently had ever expressly adopted, before the one 2 
here, respondents' interpretation of §2;36 most of the 
35The parties bring to our attention less than a 
dozen cases that even involve the application of the 
Robinson-Patman Act to governmental purchasing. See notes 
36 & 37, infra. 
36Five District Courts have suggested in dicta or in 
alternative holdings that there is a per se exemption for 
governmental purchasing. See Pacific Engineering & 
Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ~75,054, at 96,721, 96,742 (D Utah 1974) (but 
finding "no support for the proposition that sales to 
private parties are exempt merely because the ultimate 
consumer is the government"; federal government 
purchaser), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F.2d 790, 
798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite 
different prices), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 879 (1977); 
Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Abbott 
Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D Or. Sept. 11, 1972) 
(unpublished, oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 
F. 2d 486 (CA9 197 4) (finding § 13c applied to the purchases 
and sales), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 1 (1976); Logan 
Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (D 
Idaho May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 
212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University 
within the scope of Nonprofit Institutions Act; expressly 
not addressing whether there is a "so-called governmental 
exemption"), cert denied, 389 u.s. 898 (1967); Sachs v. 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 
19 55) (dicta) , a f f ' d per cur i am, 2 3 4 F . 2 d 9 59 ( CA 2) , c e r t . 
denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956); General Shale Products Corp. 
v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) 
(but alternat1vely holding the Robinson-Patman Act 
inapplicable on the ground that "[n]either the government 
nor a city in its purchase of property considered 
necessary for the purposes of carrying out its 
governmental functions is in competition with another 
buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling that 
article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428 
(CA6 Cir. 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether 
Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to governmental 
agency), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943). Only one 
court seems to have relied solely on the per se exemption 
to dismiss a Robinson-Patman claim. See Mountain View 
Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D Utah, 
Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by 
plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act 
claims based on sales to governmental agencies) , aff' d, 
630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (finding complaint insufficient 
because it failed to identify products that were subject 
to discriminatory treatment or the favored and disfavored 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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cases are simply inapposite; and there are more cases that 
suggest the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to 
governmental purchasing.37 This judicial track record is 
purchasers of any product) . 
37see City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397 n.l4 
(stating that §l3c exempted governmental libraries from 
Robinson-Patman Act); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 
18-19 n.lO (Court not at all troubled by application of 
§l3c to governmental agency in Logan Lanes, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., 378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9), cert. 
denied, 389 u.s. 898 (1969)); Municipality of Anchorage v. 
Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641 (D Alaska 1982) 
(expressly holding that municipality has standing to bring 
Robinson-Patman Act claims for sales to it) ; Burge v. 
Bryant Public School District, 5 20 F. Supp. 328, 3 30-3 3 3 
(ED Ark. 1980) (holding school's purchases not violations 
under §§2(c), 13c), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611, 612 (CAB 1981) 
(holding purch~ses exempt under §13(c)); Champaign-Urbana 
News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 
281, 287, 291 (CD Ill. 1979) (finding the Robinson-Patman 
Act inapplicable to purchases by the Army and Air Force 
Exchange Service because of sovereign immunity, but 
strongly suggesting that State governments would face an 
opposite result), aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687-692 (CA7 1980) 
(finding "strong evidence in the legislative history that 
the Robinson-Patman Act was not intended to include 
purchases by the federal government") (emphasis added); 
Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 
399 (D. Idaho 19 6 5) (" [N] o reason occurs to us why 
J~ [Robinson-Patman Act violations] should not be actionable 
~with respect to sales to a sovereign as well as sales to a 
private citizen or corporation."), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 
858-859 (CA9 1965) (holding that §13 (c) applies to State 
governmental procurement officers acting within the scope 
of their job), cert. denied, 383 u.s. 936 (1966) (cited 
with approval in California Motor Transportation Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)); Sperry Rand 
Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association, 152 F. 
Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY 1957) (refusing to dismiss a 
counterclain alleging that sales to the u.s. Army Signal 
Corps violated §l3a; finding "no cases in which it has 
been held that sales to the Government fall outside" 
§l3a); A.J. Goodman & Sons v. United Lacquer Manufacturing 
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D Mass. 1949) (dismissing 
action alleging price discrimination in sale to State 
because plaintiff had not shown injury; applicability of 
Act to State assumed). Cf. Reid v. University of 
/
Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly 
~~ reserv1ng question whether state agency is exempt from §§2 
/ and l3a). 
25. 
thus simply not the unbroken chain of judical decisions 2 
upon which this Court has generally relied in the past for 
ascertaining a construction of the anti trust laws that 
Congress over a long period of time has chosen to 
preserve. Without a more formidable list of precedents, 
this Court should not deviate from its duty to discern the 2 
intent of the enacting Congress and from our own 
consistent construction of the terms in the antitrust law, 
and instead rely on the recent interpretations of only a 
handful of lower courts. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations 2 
of various commentators and executive officials. The 
difficulty is that most of these sources indicate that the 
question presented is unsettled, 38 do not foreclose our 
38see SA z. Cavitch, Business Organizations 
§1050. 01 [8] [c], at 1050-45 to -46 (1978) (opinions 
"divided" whether Act is applicable): 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70 
(1982) (recognizing "there is some conflict among the 
authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are excluded from Robinson-Patman 
liability"): id. §24.06 [2], at 24-75 to 24-76 (finding 
courts and state attorney generals "divided as to whether 
states and municipalities are to be accorded the same 
status as the Federal Government under the Robinson-Patman 
Act"): E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 (1970) 
("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to 
have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the 
applicability of the act to purchases by state and local 
governments."). Cf. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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holding,39 and in some cases support it. 40 Thus, Congress 
cannot be said to have left untouched a universally held 2 
interpretation of the Act. 
IV 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, 
both for its effects4 1 and for the policies that it seeks 
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n.l66 
for resale must be analyzed 
consumption) . 
(1962) (noting that purchases 
separately from purchases for 
39some deal only with sales to the federal 
government. See Letter from Comptroller General to 
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973), 
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819 
(1973). Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applies to State and local 
purchasing for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney 
General Under Executive Order 10,936, Identical Bidding in 
Public Procurement 11 (1962): 
40The Attorney General of Georgia has found that the 
Robinson-Patman Act applies at least to some governmental 
purchasing. See Opinion of the Attorney General of 
Georgia, 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,162,455, at 63,338 
(1949). Although the opinion specifically addresses sales 
EY a State rather than sales to a State, our immediate, 
broader concern--the applicability of the Robinson-Patman 
Act to activity by a governmental entity in direct 
competition with private enterprises--does not depend on 
whether the State happens to be a buyer or seller. See 
Opinion of Attorney General of North Carolina, 47 N.C.A.G. 
No. 1, 112, 113, 115 (1977) (indicating that whether State 
and local governments enjoy the same exemption as the 
federal government "has rarely been litigated," and 
relying, not on any exemption, but on the fact that State 
purchases at lower prices "would be permitted within the 
Act itself." 
41Respondents criticize our holding because (i) the 
Act would prevent States from securing favorable 
discounts, and higher prices for government would 
unquestionably translate into a combination of fewer 
governmental services and higher taxes: and (ii) 
application of the Act would displace the State's freedom 
to structure integral operations in certain areas. The 
underlying assumption of much of these fears is that 
application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State and local 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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to promote. This Court has warned, however, that "it is 2 
not for the courts to indulge in ~~ bus.iR&eB of policy-
making in the field of antitrust legislation" and advised 
that "[o]ur function ends with the endeavor to ascertain 
from the words used, construed in the light of the 
relevant material, what was in fact the intent of 3 
Congress." United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S., 600, 604-
605 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act 
to all combinations of business and capital organized to 
suppress commercial competition is in harmony with the 3 
spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." 
governmental purchasing will preclude purchasing by sealed 
competitive bidding. Respondents argue that bidding by 
its nature demands price discrimination and that a 
successful low bid below list price cannot be justified on 
the basis of meeting competition, because the object of 
bidding is to "beat" the competition. 
It is not at all clear, however, whether competitive 
bidding is a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act in any 
case, see National Institute on Prices and Pricing, 
Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Antitrust L.J. 
147, 161-162 (1971): Note, Competitive Bidding Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 49 St. John's L. Rev. 512, 519 
(1975): cf. note 25, supra, much less where the State or 
city has specifically authorized or mandated such means of 
purchasing. Moreover, governmental agencies may be able 
to purchase at discount prices because of a host of 
legitimate reasons: i. e., volume, low distributional 
cost, promotional benefits to manufacturers, low credit 
risk. In any case, it is not necessary to decide here 
whether petitioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims have any 
merit or whether the State action doctrine would exempt 
these sales and purchases. 
" 
28. 
South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 u.s.' at 553. The 
legislative history, while barren of any indication that 
Congress intended to exempt states from the Act's 
~~ 
coverage, is full of references to the ~r rO"rs of large 3' 
organizations purchasing from other large organizations 
for resale in competition with the small, local retailers 
in the congressmen's states and districts. There is no 
reason, in the absence of any explicit exemption, to think 
~k~~' ~u.t. 
that congressmen who feared these evils n  3 
A 
to deny the small pharmacies of Jefferson County, Alabama 
..a..~4At­
protection from the competition of the b~ competitor 
of them a11. 42 To create an exemption here would be 
clearly contrary to the intent of Congress. 
v 
We hold that sales and purchases by state and local 
governmental hospitals are not exempt per se from the 
proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of 
42under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would 
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small, 
private retailers. See Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. 
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess. 261 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings] (Mr. 




the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and remanded 




SECOND DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, 
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether sales to and purchases 
by state and local hospitals of pharmaceutical products 
for resale in competition with private retail pharmacies 
are exempt per se from the proscriptions of the Clayton 
Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 
49 Stat. 1526, 15 u.s.c. §13 (the Act). 
I 
Petitioner is a trade association of retail 
pharmacists and pharmacies doing business in Jefferson 
County, Alabama. Petitioner, as assignee of its members' 
claims, commenced this action in 1978 in the District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, naming as 
defendants the respondent pharmaceutical manufacturers; 
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama (the 
University); and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The 
University operates a medical center, including hospitals, 
in conjunction with the State university and medical 
school. Located in the university medical center are two 
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, 
existing as a public corporation incorporated pursuant to 
Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive 
relief under § §4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S. C. 
§§15, 26, for alleged violations of §2(a), (f) of the 
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§13 (a), (f). Petitioner contends that respondent 
7 
manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their products to 
the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper Green 
-' 
Hospital Pharmacy (the "state purchasers") at prices lower 
than those at which they sold like products to 
~ 1 In relevant part, 15 u.s.c. §l3(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either 
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price 
between different purchasers of commodities of 
like grade and quality, where either or any of 
the purchases involved in such discrimination 
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold 
for use, consumption, or resale within the 
United States ... , and where the effect of such 
discr iminati.on may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any 
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or 
prevent competition with any person who either 
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 





the state prices 
in violation of drugs so 
procured to the general public in direct competition with 
privately owned pharmacies. There also are allegations 
that the price discrimination is not exempted from the 
3 proscriptions of the Act by 15 U.S.C. §13c. 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, setting forth as grounds for 
~
dismissal that sales of ~ made to a government 
instrumentali tv are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the 
District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations 
that local retail pharmacies had been injured by the 
2section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination 
in price which is prohibited by this section. 
3section 13c provides: 
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of this title, 
shall apply to purchases of their supplies for 
their own use by schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, 
hospitals, and charitable institutions not 
operated for profit. 
4. 
challenged pric~rimi~n and that at least some of 
the govg£-mRQReai purchases were not exempt under § 13c. 4 
A 
The District Court held that "governmental purchases are, 
without regard to 15 U.S.C. §13c, beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 
traditional governmental purposes." 656 F.2d 92, 5 102. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, ~ 
curiam, "on the bas is of the district court's Memorandum 
of Opinion." 6 656 F.2d, at 93. 
We granted certiorari because the issue presented is 
an important question of federal law that should be 
settled by this Court, and now reverse. 
4 656 F.2d 92, 98 (CAS 1981) (reprinting District 
Court's opinion in Appendix). 
5Petitioner's antitrust claims were dismissed 
solely on the basis that State and municipal hospital 
. purchases are exempt per se from the Robinson-Patman Act. 
See 656 F.2d, at 103 ("The court does not here base its 
decision upon the 'state action' doctrine as explicated in 
Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 [ (] 1943) .... "). We thus have 
no occasion to determine whether some other rule of law 
might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman 
Act claims. 
6The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, 
agreed that "[t]he claims against the Board must ... be 
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself." 
656 F.2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages 
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this 
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision. 
-
lfp/ss 12/27/82 Rider A, p. 5 (Jefferson County) 
JEFFS SALLY-POW 
The issue presented by this case is a narrow 
one. We are not concerned with sales to or purchases by 
the federal government. Nor are we concerned with state 
--. ·--... _ 
purchases for consumption or use in traditional 
governmental functions. Rather, the issue before us 
involves only state purchases for the purpose of competing 
- with the advantage of discriminatory prices - in the 
retail pharmacy 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, 
that the Act exempts all state purchases regardless of the -
purpose of the purchase. We may assume, without deciding > v 
that Congress did not intend the Act to apply where state 
purchases are for traditional governmental functions, and 
2. 
that therefore such purchases are exempt per se. If there 
is such an implied exemption, we do not think it applies 
where a state has chosen to compete in the private market , 
III 
~+ 
a statute, we look1-~ f~)l to In construing 
the language of the statute itself. 
Jim: Do you not think the "call" for what is now note 7 





It is jmpor.:..taR-t ±.9-.ma-kQ. eJ:.ea-r the- ncrr-toWliess of- the 
We are not concerned with sales to or 
purchases by the federal government. Our concern is 
' ~kJ;::i:;::L ~ ~t.h~ 
limited to the tfctivities of t State ar:1g lee«l ~orverl"':ment l 
entt~s. lnd~~d~ ~~~with their ~ 1\ 1\ 
CIY-~ 
f~-6~onsumption in traditional governmental purchases 
~ 
functions. Rather, the specific issue before us involves) 
C'ctNt~ft 
p~I:H'o£-echA-aa-:::te~!-B~~~:t~-""~a"Mft~Wa s;war:~lt-Ee~s:--.~~oJ S ta te;:;;~ :~!~r~ 
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the purpose of competing Ain the retail pharmacy market 
~ -., 
with private enterprise. 
The courts below held, and the respondents contend, 
that the Act exernpt;~~a:-=~: ::;~ 
aA~ n~iee, regardless of the purpose of the 
purchase. ~ t he complaint here alleges injury as a 
~f:c~...,.~~~~ 
result of State and local) r-e-t.ail act b.Li ti'i'i, --we need l"'""t 
~d.-8~ ~-~--~4 
1\~hether sales toA the 
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competition with private retail pharmac ies are exempt ~ 
I\ 
se from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act is a 
question of congressional intent. We look first to the 
language of the Act itsel:::_j ~~ ~ 
~47 The Robinson-Patman Act does not by its terms exempt 
~ ~pr~~. ~>y o;~ ate ....arn> local a::::~ 
ag9"QGias. The only express exemption from the Act's 
proscriptions is that for nonprofit institutions contained 
in 15 u.s.c. §13c. 8 Moreover, as the courts below 
7Respondents argue that application of the Act to 
the State of Alabama would present a significant risk of 
conflict w~th the Tenth Amendment and that therefore this 
construction of the Act should be avoided. See NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979). 
There is no risk, however, of a constitutional issue 
arising from the application of the Act in this case: The 
retail sale of pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably 
' [an] attribute [] of state sovereignty. '" See EEOC v. 
Wyoming, No. 81-554, at 9 (January --, 1982) (quoting 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Association, Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288 (1981)). It is 
simply too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot 
regulate States under its commerce clause powers when they 
are engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden 
v. Terminal Railway, 377 u.s. 184, 188-189, 192-193 
(1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain 
governmental purchasing from the Act's 1 imitations, such 
as for government consumption for traditional governmental 
functions, those traditional state functions may be 
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette, 
435 U.S., at 413 n.42 (plurality opinion). 
Footnote(s) 8 will appear on following pages. 
.. . 
7. 
conceded, "[t]he statutory language--'persons' and 
'purchasers' is sufficiently broad to cover governmental 
bodies. 15 u.s.c. §§13(a,f) ." 9 656 F.2d, at 99. This 
concession was compelled by several of the Court's 
decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
% ~ ,. q 8 1}e-es-ue~ lhe D ·strict Court properly assumed, for 1'1./ ~ /~ purposes of making its summary judgment, that at least 
~ ~ }0 ~- some of the hospital purchases would not be covered by the 
V_Jr ~~ ~ §13c exemption, see note 3, supra, and accompanying text, 
~ _ we need not 4eeMe whether this express exemption would 
, support summary judgment in cases against government 
~ hospitals purchasing for their own use. 
9The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly 
in the antitrust statutes. Section 8 of the Sherman Act, 
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210, 15 u.s.c. §7 (1976 ed.), and §l of 
the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 15 u.s.c. §12 
(1976 ed.), are general definitional sections that define 
"person" or "persons" "wherever used in this [Act] ... to 
include corporations and associations existing under or 
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the 
laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or 
the laws of any foreign country." Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act, ch. 123, 33 Stat. 731, 15 u.s.c. §15 (1976 
ed.), provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person who 
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor 
in any district court ..• , and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained ••.. " Section 4 is made 
applicable to all of the antitrust statutes by §1 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §12 (1976 ed.). See City of 
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. jag, 
396-397 & 13 (1978). 
lOs G . ee, e. g., eorg1a v. Evans, 316 U.S. 15q, 162 
(1942) (holding that the words "any person" in §7 of the 
Sherman Act include States); Chattanooga Foundr~ & Pi~e 
Works v. City of Atlanta, :?.03 u.s. 390, 39 (190 ) 
(holding that a municipality is a "person" within the 
meaning of §8 of the Sherman Act and that the city could 
maintain a treble-damage action under §7, the predecessor 
of § 4 of the Clayton Act) . See also Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, 434 u.s. 308, 317 (1978) (holding 
that a fore1gn nation is a "person" within §4 of the 
Clayton Act) . 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to 
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive 
standards of other federal laws which impose ••. sanctions 
upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9 
8. 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 395 (1978), we were able to state 1 
without qualification that "the Court has held that the 
definition of 'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities 
and 
City 
of Lafayette12 from the case before us on the ~at 
i)- ~ 
City o £= bafaygtte Ainvolved clii:i-m.s .. ~.n~.Q.Qr the ~ Sherman Act 
~,, . '
rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. Such ...... 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 u.s. 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. 
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, (1934). One case 1s of 
particular relevance. In nion Pacific R. v. United 
States, 313 u.s. 450 (1941 , the Court considered the 
appl1cability to a citv of § of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 3 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1) 
(1976 ed.) (repealed in 1978), "a statute which 
essentially is an anti trust prov1s1on serving the same 
purposes as the anti-price discrimination provisions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act." C t of Lafa ette, 435 U.S., at 
402 n.l9. The Court there · · g that a 
municipality was a 'person' within the meaning of the 
statute. See 313 u.s., at 467-468. See also City of 
Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401-402 n.lq. , 
11The word "purchasers"..t~a~eaning as 
inclusive as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 
( 19 36) (remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton 
Anti trust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. 
The pending bill does not segregate any particular class 
of purchasers, or exempt any special class of 
purchasers.") . 
12 The only apparent difference between the scope of 
the two laws is the extent to which the activities 
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's 
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the commerce clause, 
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 199-
201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover 
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is 
otherwise subject to the Act. 
1 
specific 
nature of the term "persons." 435 U.S., 1 
perceive any reason to construe 
Act any 
have ~din the Clayton Act, 
which Unless the Act has 
urp ses, or there is some in 
~-----
egi~-t-o-~14 to indicate that our prior 
13 Indeed, the House committee report specifically 
states that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the 
Clayton Act will apply without repetition to the terms 
concerned where they appear in this bill, since it is 
designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H.R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1936); S. 
Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). See 80 Cong. 
Rec. 3116 (1936) ("Many have complained because the 
provisions of the bill apply to 1 any person engaged in 
commerce. 1 The original Clayton Act contains that 
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under 
consideration. The language of the Clayton Act was used 
because it has been construed by the courts."). That the 
common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts 
should be, when possible, construed consistently with each 
other should not be surprising given their common 
purposes. See 80 Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep. 
Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a 
new policy or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted 
in 1914, and it was the purpose of that act to do just 
what this law sets out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 
(remarks of Senator Logan) . 
1 4Although the face of the Act contains no express 
exemption in favor of sa~es to or purchases b State and 
local governmental agencies, the Court as often held that 
legislative history should be considere even E ough the 
language appears to be clear. See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska, 
451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. Colorado Public 
Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976). 
It is thus not surprising that the Court has also 
considered "how far Congress intended to extend its 




and interpretations of the other anti trust 
applicable to the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 the courts 
should have cons ide red the issue whether State and loca 
governments were exempt per se from the limitations of the 1 
Act long ago settled. 
A 
On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the 
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has 
recognized that those laws represent "a carefully studied 1 
attempt to bring within the [antitrust laws] every person 
engaged in business whose activities might restrain or 
monopolize commercial intercourse among the states." 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 
u.s. 533, 553 (1944) . 16 
mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the 
answer in its "purpose and legislative history." Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 197 (1974). See 
FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S 55, 69-70 (1959); 
Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72, 
78 (1953). --
15rt is clear that the burden is not on petitioner 
at this late date to show Congress's specific intent to 
include State and local governments within the Robinson- 7 
Patman Act. In City of Lafayette and Union Pacific R. v. ~ 
United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (see note 10, supra), 
the Court found that cities were plainly "persons" within 
the meaning of the Sherman and Elk ins Acts without any 
direct evidence of congressional intent on the subject. 
Footnote(s) 16 will appear on following pages. 
1 
11. 
~t in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 
~~~ tlc."J: 
(1975) , ~ "our cases have repeatedly established that there 
is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from 
the antitrust laws, id., at 787 (citing United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351 (1963); 1 
California v. FPC, 369 u.s. 482, 485 (1962)) • 17 In City 
of Lafayette, in applying anti trust laws to a city in 
competition with a private utility, we held that no 
exemption for local governments would be implied. JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, writing for the Court, emphasized the purposes 1 
and scope of the anti trust laws: "[T) he economic choices 
made by public corporations .•. designed as they are to 
assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, 
are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader 
16see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 
434 U.S. 308, 312-313 (1978); Mandeville Island Farms, 
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 
(1948) (stating that antitrust laws are "comprehensive in 
[their] terms and coverage, protecting all who are made 
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be 
perpetrated") (emphasis added). 
17see, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & 
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 
(1981); Cit~ of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 
435 u.s. 3 9, 398, 399 (1978); Abbott Laboratories v. 
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 12 
(1976); United States v. National Assn. Securities 
Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975 • 
12. 
interests of national economic well-being than are those 1 
of private corporations acting in furtherance of the 
interests of. .. its shareholders." 435 U.S., at 403, 408 
(footnotes omitted) •18 
~d ~ese ~me- actit.rust principles, and 
~~..,._ 
the purposes ;t: they further, -to beA helpful 
the ~he Robinson-Patman Act. 
in 
interpreting As 
JUSTICE BLACKMON stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u.s. 1, 11-12 (1976): ~ 
It has been said, of course, that the 
antitrust laws, and Robinson- atrnan in 
particular, are to be construed lib rally, and 
that the exceptions from their appl'cation are 
to be construed strictly. United States v. 
18 In one important sense, retail from 
government can be more invidious than that from chain-
stores, at which the Robinson-Patrnan Act pa ticularly was 
aimed. See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 
75-76 (1979): FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 63 U.S. 536, 
543-544 (1960)-.-- The volume of purchases permits any 
large, relatively efficient retail organizati to pass on 
cost savings to consumers, and to that exten , consumers 
b rely from economy of scale. But to the extent 
hat lower rices result from less overhead, · n the form 
of no taxes, ~everflm~~t subsidies, and free services, 
CJQli-QUUDeRtal agencies merely redistribute the burden of 
he costs from the actual consumers to the ci izens at 
large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patrnan A t simply 
would give '3'9"~nuseftta~ agencies hit the!!' advantag { in the 
~~--rnrnercial market, per_llaps enou h to eliminate private 
corn itors. Beee:1:1se t.onsurners, citizens, ultimately 
will p for the full costs the d sold by 
~8@~~uw~~~~~~·~~~ reason to 
retail 
retail 
u y suffer to the 
extent that go~ernrnental retail ctivities eliminate more 
~ efficient, 1 distri ution systems. 
~~~~ ---
- y~ 
~ ~ ,..~ 
1 
1 
McKesson & Robbins, 351 u.s. 305, 316 (1956); 
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 
(1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 
642, 646-647 (1969). The Court has recognized, 
also, that Robinson-Patman "was enacted in 1936 
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large 
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater 
purchasing power." FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 
U.S. 341, 349 (1968). Because the Act is 
remedial, it is to be construed broadly to 
effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U.S. 132, 336 (1967); Peyton v. 
Rowe , 3 91 U. S . 54 , 6 5 ( 19 6 8) . 
13. 
Thus, in view of the Act's remedial purposes, and the 
broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court, 






us to create SGme special per se exemption is on those who 18 
)\ 
would argue that Congress intended--but did not choose to 
say so--that State and local entities could compete 
business 19 
B 
IR vieu ... ~ ....tae PrG.t '--s ptirposeo ,_-M!:a e£ the ab!'Jeiice o~ 
19 It may be that, despite the absence of an express 
exemption, Congress did not intend for the Act to apply to 
purchases for government consumption as contrasted with 
retail sales. Because the courts below found a per se 
exemption, under the facts of this case, for respondent 
/ 
hospitals' retail activities, we have no occasion to 
decide whether the Act imposes any restrictions on 
~ Hf purchases by State and local governments for consumption 
~ .~ in more traditional government activities. Our task, 
~ ~ however, would not differ from the one here: looking to 
, ..... , .. t" the legislative history to see whether Congress intended 







falls far short of supporting respondents' contention that 
there is a per se exemption for all State and local 
purchasing. Before Congress considered leaving State and 
'bfA local entities free to compete unfairly with the private 
" 
sector, surely it would have held hearings on an issue of 
such importance. Yet there is nothin:f;;~or 
House committee reports, or in the floor debates, 
discussing the issue. 
19 
There is, however, evidence that some members of 19 
Congress were ab t ee&t aware of the possibil~ty of the Act 
applying to governmental purchases. Not surprisingly, 
most members were concerned, not about State and local 
government purchasing, but whether the Act would limit the 
federal Government's purchasing. The most relevant 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's 
principal draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House 
committee. 20 Although it is difficult to determine 
20 
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, 
prevent the granting of discounts to the United 
States Government? 
Footnote continued on next page. 
20 
15. 
exactly what thought about the application 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present 
Clayton Act does so .... 
Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government 
gets huge discounts. . . . . Now, would that 
discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should 
unless a discount contrary to the present bill 
would be barred--that is, the present law--would 
be barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: 
The Federal Government is not in competition 
with other buyers from t n ese concerns. -
The Federal Government is saved by the same 
distinction.... ~hey are not in competition 
with anyone else who would buy. 
Rep. Hancock: It would eliminate 
competitive bidding all along the line, would it 
not, in classes of goods that would be covered 
by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding 
on Government orders? 
Rep. Hancock: Government, State, city, 
municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would 
not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It 
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding 
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would 
with the Government. 
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the 
city, county exactly the same as anybody else, 
same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell 
to a city hospital any cheater than they would 
to a privately-owned hospita , under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in 
this way. In the final analysis, it would 
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a 
particular case. If the two hospitals are in 
competition with each other, I should say that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. 




conclusion 's certain: ~Teegarden expressly stated that 
the Act apply to the purchases of municipal 
hospitals in some circumstances.21 
~ 
Thus, -MFy-
exempt ion found by th 
~~ purchas~ . 22 
1\ 
:N;.. caz:l.Ret be s-aid ~hat:: -the 
14 
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on 
the Judie iary, 74th Cong. , 1st Sess. 208-209 ( 19 35) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings]. 
2lother conclusions also may be possible: (i) that 
purchases by any governmental agency are not affected when 
the government is not in competition with other buyers: 
and (ii) that the Act would not prevent governmental 
purchasing by competitive bidding. Neither of these 
readings, however, is necessarily inconsistent with our 
holding today. 
22~ Teegarden subsequently submitted a written 
brief to the House committee. He first rejected outright 
the desirability of i!.!!Y_ exemptions. See 1935 Hearings, 
supra note 21, at 249. He then posed the question whether 
"tlie bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on 
Governmental purchases below trade price levels." -MF . 
~~eriH!iR~stated that "[t) he answer is found in the 
principle of statutory construction that a statute will 
not be constru strict in any way the 
ri rerogatives, or privileges the sovereign 
L-----~ulrn~ess it so expressly provides--a principle · heri ed b 
American jurisprudence from the common law .•.•• " e also 
noted that "requiring a showing of effec upon 
competition, will further preclude any possibility of the 
bill affecting the Govern!ll~ l!t." Id., at 250 (footnotes 
omitted) ~ * ~  ~ All~ the cases cited ~)r.(. Teegarden suggest that the 
sovereign exceptio as us~ in the United States means 
that a government, ~ pass~ a law, does not give up what 
it does not expressly surrender. In the same year that 
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court in 
United States v. California, 297 u.s. 175, 186 (1936), 
stated that 1 t could "perceive no reason for extending 
[the presumption against including the sovereign in a 
statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state 








conclusion 's certain: ~Teegarden expressly stated that 
the Act apply to the purchases of municipal 




k- cax:~.Ret be said ""l=ha~ the 
lfp/ss 12/27/82 Rider A, p. 16 (Jefferson County) 
JEFF15 SALLY-POW 
~ 
In the absence of any relevant evidence, it simply cannot 
1\ 
be said that the legislative history supports an intention 
to enable, by an unexpressed exemption, a state to enter 
the private competitive markets with congressionally 
approved price advantages. 
J • _ - ------- -, ,.. --- .r---- i\--::;,- ~-nr -...vco 11U\.. '::;I.LVt: U_l:) WOal: 
it does not expressly surrender. In the same year that 
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court in 
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 186 (1936), 
stated that 1t could "perceive no reason for extending 
[the presumption against including the sovereign in a 
statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state 




history surrounding the Act's 
~ manifests that clear congressional intent necessary 
take State and local government purchasing from within 
from the otherwise provisions of an act of 
Congress, all-embrac ng in scope and national in its 
purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed by state 
as by individual acti n." See California v. Taylor, 353 
U.S. 553, 562-563 (19 7). At most, the rule of statutory 
construction, a& ~~Qd . Teegarden and applied to the 
Robinson-Patman Act, supports an exemption for the federal 
government's purchases, the existence of which 1s not 
before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 
600, 604-605 (1941) (holding that the United States was 
not a "person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing 
for treble damages). Moreover, he clearly assumed that 
governmental purchasing would not compete with private 
purchasing, thus eliminating for his purposes even the 
possibility of the Act applying to State and local 
governments. 
23six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney 
General of the United States responded to an inquiry by 
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to 
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539 
(1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the 
Act, the Attorney General explained: 
[S) tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in 
matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily 
apply to the Government unless it is expressly 
so provided; and it does not seem to have been 
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes 
applicable to the Government •••. 
The Act of June 19, 1936, merely amended 
the Act of October 15, 1914 ... and, in so far as 
I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded 
heretofore as applicable to Government 
contracts. 
Id., at 540 (later in the letter using phrase "Federal 
Government" and stating other reasons "for avoiding a 
construction that would make the statute applicable to the 
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the 
Congress in such matters"). The Attorney General 
expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which 
this Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph 
rates to a federal corporation that competed with private 
enterprise. 
l . 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
2 
1
. . d~d . . 1-. 
egislative events, an s~at~~~ QaQ~l~tkQD ~Y several 
a-bL 
District Courts, ~e confirm~ that~government purchases 
are outside the proscriptions of the Act. 
a.-,_.,4 
on occasion, such evidence persuasive ~ the construction 
7 
1 of the Act . tb• t w~...l:GO~dopt .r:n Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
7 
Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200-201 (1974), we note 
that "the courts in nearly four decades of litigation" ha 
Act's applicability State and ·local . government 
agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney 
General of California xpressly con luded that State and 
municipal governmental purchasing as within the Act's 
proscriptions. See 193 -1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1155,156, at 
415-416 (1937). Two o her early state attorney general 
opinions simply do not · e wh ther the Act applies to 
state purchasing for retail ales. See Opinion of 
ttorney Gerneral of Minnesota, 932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
11 157, at 416 (1937); Opinio of Attorney Gerneral of 
Wise sin, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wi . 142 (1937). ~~~~ 
~~--~--~ R resentative Patman did interpret fh~-\ 
~1 opinion as exempting Stat~nd local government purch ses. 
A1 r~ ·~~ See W. Patman, Complete Guide to Robinson-Patman Act 
41 ~;~4/'{' . 30 (1963). R s · ' Interpretation 
T~ J~ is ~~~i~y entitled to :=_i:~t4 }m;~ .' · · . 
~~- , but ~ he ~ ... rcr -Oe Interpreting 
"" Attorney General's op!_nion. Representative Patm 
intentions ~ probabfY A better reflected in his 
introduction~951 and 19~3 of bills to amend the Act to 
define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any 
State or any political subdivision thereof." H.R. 4452, 
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on these 
bills, but it is arguable that R.Qp i::Q ii.eR-t a~e- Pa tm~ ... k 
believed that the original intent needed to be stated 
expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's 
construct ion of the Act to the contrary. In any case, 
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably stems from 
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. 
efl Jl-.be-a~~~~~~ 





given the Robinson-Patman Act a certain construction and 2 
held that, " [ i] n the face of this longstanding 
interpretation and the continued congressional silence, 
the legislative history [did] not warrant our extending 
§2 (a) beyond its clear language to reach a multi tude of 
. - ~~/r/-J ~~ local activities that hifherto have been left to state and 
~--_p,;~; 1\ ~ ~~~~~~ 
"~2 local regulati~) -~  '-fo.M 
£;?!~ Respondents r-eloy ........,.,.;,ry ~n<?.P h1l"-::~e 
~. 
"" .Y/,. JA y Robinson-Patman Act in the late 1960 1 s. 24 Bnr iAg ~hose 
~J 
~· 
hea-r i R9 -., -rh e House committee was told that price 
discrimination in favor of government hospitals was 
outside the Act, 25 and Chairman Paul Dixon of the Federal 
~ 
24The most important relevant event in the obinson-
Patman Act 1 s post-enactment history is the amen ment in 
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions. Whe her the 
existence of an exemption in §13c supports an e emption 
from the Act of all government purchasing depends whether 
§13c is interpreted to apply to any government agencies. 
That is a substantial issue, however, in its own right. 
Compare 81 Cong. Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. 
Pettengill) (reading similar amendment as not including "a 
charitable institution that was not supported in any part 
by public funds"); H.R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968), with 81 Cong. Rec., at 8706 
(statement of Rep. Walter) (agreeing that §13c would apply 
to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). 
See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397 n.l4 
(including within the Nonprofit Institutions Act "public 
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local 
government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19 
n.lO; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (exemption codifies the 
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address it. 
Footnote(s) 25 will appear on following pages. 
2 
2 
b- ~~ ,{-~~ ~PX~  
~ k ~ /,yt~~  ~ ht~~-LJ. O. 




Trade Commission disclaimed any authority over 
transactions involving state health care programs. 26 
~ough the statement of the FTC's chairman is entitled 
to weight, it "can hardly be said to have given the 2 
administrative construction the 'notoriety' that this 
? 
Court found persuasive in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. [ 1,] 
18 [ (1965)]." Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 194 ( ~949) • __ J 
c: 'ffie- ~her statements express little more than ~ 
c~~Jf 
interested opinions on the issue, and certainly are not 2 
entitled to the consideration g~n~~ 
U>fA-~~~~~t:U>f~~. 
'lleesardew.4"""~ 5~ ~-Q.. -ta....-f 
1\ ?t,_ 
What should be important is the conclusion that the 
committee drew from this testimony, and that conclusion is 
25see, e. g., Small Business Problems in the Drug 
Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Activities 
of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 15-16 (1967-1968} [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearin~s]; 
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hear1ngs 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the 
Robinson-Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st 
Sess. 73-77, 623 (1969-1970}. The committee also was told 
that institutional purchasers frequently purchase drugs at 
lower prices than ,.. t..b..a.t paid by retai 1 pharmacies, see 
1967-1968 Hearings, supra, at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and 
many witnesses complained that this discrimination 
adversely affected competition, see id., at A-140-141, 
253-262, 273, 291. ----
26see H.R. Rep. No. 1983, at 74. 
the mandate of the Robinson-Patman 
Act · ed to di scr imina tory drug sales 
favoring nongovernmental instit purchasers, profit 
or nonprofit, to the extent there prescription drug 
competition at the retail level with 2 
druggists." Id., at 79 (emphasis 
that statement as approving a per se exemption from the 
Robinson-Patman Act for government purchasing would 
require us to draw an inference that is far fro 
compelle0 2 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, 
courts considering the matter of coverage have concluded 
that the Act does not apply to government purchasers and 
that not one has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, 
under either §§2(a} or 2(f} of the Act, where the 2 
discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or 
. J 27The committee also concluded that the 1938 
~~:,~v\.1 ~ Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private 
I~-, nonprofit institutions ..• to the extent the sales are for 
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H.R. Rep. No. 
,~.~ ~L~ 1983, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction 
r~-~- / 
1 
of §13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
~ •J'L.1. ~ 
~~~~f~! 
fV Ji~ \4- ~~ '1 . 
~ v~ 
22. 
county .( here are 
~ 
assertion: (i) this 
/\.; 
Court has never held or suggested that 
a per se exemption for all State and local government 
purchasing existed: 28 ( i i) the number of judicial 2 
decisions even considering the Act's application to 
purchases by government entities is relatively small: 29 
~~~k _/'~ ~~~-£--
(iii) no Court of Appeal~ appar-QJ:lt;ly h.-d Q\t.e.c expressly 
'\ ~~ ;t 
adopted, before the~~Ae here, respondents' interpretation 
( 
of §2: (iv) most of the District Court cases upon which 2 
~ respondents rely are simply inapposite; 30 (v) it is not 
A~ 
~' / 28 rndeed, if anything, our opinions have ~d-\ 
'3 ..... ~t the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 
f1V ~ 6 397 n.l4: Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 · n.lO: 
~ 
~ California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
u.s. 508, 513 (1972). 
~ 29The parties bring to our attention less than a c./: ~ dozen cases, many with unpublished opinions, that even 
t.~'\ involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to 
rv government purchasing. See notes 31-33, infra. Cf. Blue ~ 
~.A~ Chit Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) ~ 
v"'' ""1. (af irming rule adopted by "virtually all lower federal 
~ 0 · courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases 
Jlb presenting this question over the past quarter century.") 
(emphasis added). 
30see Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[75,054, at 96,721, 
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving federal government 
as ultimate purchaser: relying on Attorney General's 
opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition 
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 879 
(1977): General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under 
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on 
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in 
its purchase of property considered necessary for the 
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
23. 
clear that ~published District Court opinion has relied 
a... 
solely on .,t:.Re per se exemption for all State or local 
government purchasing to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
~ '.s-
claim alleging injury as a result ofA. government l"et.;.iJ. 2 
~~~~~~~31 
 and (vi) there are several cases that suggest the 
Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to government purchasing 
for purposes of retail sales. 32 This judicial track 
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in 
bu!ing and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied) , 
af 1 d, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 Cir. 1942) (expressly 
reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to 
sales to government agency) , cer t. denied, 318 U.S. 780 
(1943). 
31cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 
No. C-77-0094 (D Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished 
opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice 
Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to governmental 
agencies), aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (finding 
complaint insufficient because it failed to identify 
products that were subject to discriminatory treatment or 
the favored and disfavored purchasers of any product) ; 
Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Abbott 
Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D Or. Sept. 11, 1972) 
(unpublished, oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 
F.2d 486 (CA9 1974) (finding §13c applied to the purchases 
and sales), vacated and remanded, 425 u.s. 1 (1976). Two 
District Courts have suggested in alternative holdings 
that there is a per se exemption for governmental 
purchasing for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (D Idaho May 26, 
1966) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216 
(CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within the scope 
of Nonprofit Institutions Act; expressly not addressing 
whether there is a "so-called governmental exemption"), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). One case's discussion 
of the issue presented here is dicta. See Sachs v. Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) 
(dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956). It also should be noted that 
all of these cases predate our discussion in City of 
Lafayette. 
32see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. 
S u pp. 3 2 8 , 3 3 0-3 3 3 (ED Ark . 19 8 0) , a f f ' d , 6 58 F . 2 d 611 , 
Footnote continued on next page. 
24. 
~ &.A.c-~~~4 
record is ~t~s s i m,plq ..cot the unbroken chain of jud ical 
decisions upon which this Court has gen% alJ.y relied in 2 
the past for ascertaining a construction of the antitrust 
laws that Congress over a long period of time has chosen 
to preserve. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations 
of various commentators and executive officials. ~ 2 
~~-~~~~s~t.J 
di££ietl~ ~ meat of these sources indicate that 
1\ ~
question presented is unsettled, 33 r;o not foreclose 
the 
our 
612 (CAS 1981): Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. 
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill. 
1979) (finding the Act inapplicable to purchases by the 
Army and Air Force Exchange Service because of sovereign 
immunity, but strongly suggesting that State governments 
would face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687-
692 (CA7 1980): A.J. Goodman & Sons v. United Lacquer 
Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D Mass. 1949). 
Other cases cut against any per se exemption for 
government purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. 
Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641 (D Alaska 
19 8 2 ) : S t e r 1 in g N e 1 son & Sons v . Range n , Inc • , 2 3 5 F . 
Supp. 393, 399 (D. Idaho 1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858-
859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966): Sperry 
Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association, 
152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. 
University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio 
1952). 
1 
33see 5A z. Cav~  ' Business Organizations 
§105D.Ol[8) [c), at 105D-45 to -46 (1978) (opinions 
"divided" whether Act is applicable): 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70 
(1982) (recognizing "there is some conflict among the 
authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are excluded from Robinson-Patman 
liability"): id. §24.06[2), at 24-75 to 24-76: E. Kintner, 
A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 (1970) ("Although [the 
Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the 
matter where the federal government is concerned, some 
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act 
to purchases by state and local governments."): F. Rowe, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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34 and~ cases support 
IV 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been 
both for its effect~for the po that it seeks 
Price Discrimination Under 
n.l66 (1962). 
Robinson-Patman Act 84 
34some deal only sales to the federal 
government. See Lette Comptroller General to 
Robert F. Sarlo, Veter s Administration (July 17, 1973), 
reprinted in 1973-2 rade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819 
(1973). Almost a fail to mention, much less decide, 
whether the Act plies to State and local purchasing for 
retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under 
Executive der 10,936, Identical Bidding in Public 
Procureme 11 (1962); 
See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 
. 1 , 112 , 113 , 115 ( 19 7 7 ) ; G a . Op . At t y . Ge n . 7 2 3 , 7 2 7 
(1948-1949). 
36Respondents criticize our holding because ( i) the 
Act would prevent States from securing favorable 
discounts, and higher prices for government would 
unquestionably translate into a combination of fewer 
government services and higher taxes; and (ii) application 
of the Act would displace the State's freedom to structure 
integral operations in certain areas. The underlying 
assumption of much of these fears is that application of 
the Act to State and local government purchasing will 
preclude purchasing by sealed competitive bidding. 
Respondents argue that bidding by its nature demands price 
discrimination and that a successful low bid below list 
price cannot be justified on the basis of meeting 
competition, because the object of bidding is to "beat" 
the competition. 
It is not at all clear, however, whether competitive 
bidding is a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act in any 
case, see National Institute on Prices and Pricing, 
Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Antitrust L.J. 
147, 161-162 (1971); Note, Competitive Bidding Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 49 St. John's L. Rev. 512, 519 
(1975); cf. note 21, supra, much less where the State or 
city has specifically authorized or mandated such means of 
purchasing. Cf. 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979) 
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to promote. "'!'+H:-s- Cou r t ha~~vef 1 tRt!l"t "it is 
~~J 
not for ~ to indulge in ... policy-making in the 
1\ 
field of antitrust legislation•,~a~:;~d -tha-t n [o]ur 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the 
words used, construed in the light of the relevant 
material, what was in fact the intent of Congress." 
United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S., 600, 604-605 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act 
to all combinations of business and capital organized to 
suppress commercial competition is in harmony with the 
spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." 
South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 u.s.' at 553. The 
legislative history t. 
economic evil of 
large organizations purchasing from other large 
(concluding that City of Lafayette and §2(a) do not 
preclude a county from granting an exclusive franchise for 
garbage collection). Moreover, governmental agencies may 
be able to purchase at discount prices because of a host 
of legitimate reasons: i. e., volume, low distributional 
cost, promotional benef1ts to manufacturers, low credit 
risk, lack of competition with private enterprise. In any 
case, it is not necessary to decide here whether 
petitioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims have any merit or 






organizations for resale in competition with the small, 31 
local retailers , in tl:le ~smen-' e ~ iiR el- 6l:~4:~te--.~ 
There is no reason, in the absence of any explicit 
exemption, to think that congressmen who feared these 
~~~~ 
evils intended to deny ~ small~ pharmacies of Jefferson 
County, Alabama ) protection from the competition of the 32 
strongest competitor of them a11. 37 To create an 
exemption here~ clearlyAcontrary to the intent of 
Congress. 
v 
We hold that sales to and purchases by State and 32 
,Jill"" 
local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private~ not exempt per se from the 
proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and remanded 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
37under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would 
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small, 
private retailers. See Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. 
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess. 261 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings] (~ 
Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of 
private rights"). 
33 
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE January 7, 1983 
Re: 81-827 - Jefferson County Pharmaceutical 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
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January 7, 1983 j 
No. 81-827 Jefferson County Pharmaceutical 
Association, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories 
Dear Lewis, 
In due course, I will circulate a · dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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C HAMB ERS OF 
.JUSTI C E WM . .J . BRENN A N, .JR. 
Dear Lewis: 
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'A~sn ; v. Abbott Lab6r~tories, Inc , · '' 
I will await the dissent . 
Sincerely, 
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January 11, 1983 
Re: 81-827 - Jefferson County Pharmaceutical 
Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await the dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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January 14, 1983 
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cc: The Conference 
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h t .. ~~ h h h 1 f T e ques 10n ra ~AlS case 1s w et er t e sa e o 
A 
pharmaceutical products to a state,/ for ~~~21e in competi-
tion with priva~e retail pharmacies,/ is exempt from the pro-
visions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
The petitioner, a trade association of retail 
pharmacies in Alabama, filed this action. Respondents, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, are alleged to sell their 
products to the state at prices lowe~than those charged the 
private pharmacies. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that state purchases - whether 
for resale or not - are ~xem~t from the Robinson-Patman_ Act / 
Cvl(.,~~~ 
~~ of that Act A does flOt: ex~1pt sa ie::s:::; eo . ~. 
The legislative history is essen-
tially silent on the question. 
The Act is a component of 
our cases repeatedly have held~that 
the antitrust laws. 
A-~~ 
a ~y pr~sumption 
1\ 




t:J-1 l1u._ ~ !-
2. 
In 1976, in Beer v. u.s.,;'e held that §5 applies 
only to changes in voting procedure;/that have a r~trogres­
sive effect on minority voting strength. Applying the prin-
C.W~~..{ 
ciplef of our decision in Beer, we hold that the~se of num-
bered posts / and staggered term~ in the city's new plan will 
not have a retrogressive effect. 
Court and 
Accordingly we vacate the decision of the District 
&~ 
remand for further proceedings. 
~ 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun have filed opinions 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice White 
dissents. 
1st DRAFT 
To: The Chief Justice /J 




Justice Powell . / 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens 
From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: - -=J.._..AN._.__..2__.2o..---o;l9 ..... 83"""'-- -
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-827 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory con-
struction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers pur-
chases of commodities by state and local governments for re-
sale in competition with private retailers. 1 The Court's 
task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 1936 Congress 
which enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. I do not agree 
with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference 
to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reli-
ance on the broad r~dial purposes of the antitrust laws 
/
--- generally. The 193~ongress simply did not focus on this ..-;~ "' J (). J..o 
~- me ast four decades thatSuch purc"hases are not coveredj ~ ~ J.
' 1 ·~.PL., - .• --1-s-su-e-.. The business~ l~ai cogu:mfm"bes hav~d for 1-- I~ 
' j 1 ' For these reasons, as exp ame more fri ly below-;-1 respect-
~~~ fully dissent. 
~ d 'This case does not require us to consider, as the majority suggests, ~ 
·-- , 1- '":5 ante, at 7, whether compliance with other federal statutes necessitates an /11 ~.h 1--
~ __...};;--~ implied exemption from the provisions of the Act. The question is simply ~/ 
~ 1 vr · one of congressional intent-i. e., what Congress intended when it enacted "1"" • J ~ 
tM-- the Robinson-Patman Act with respect to coverage of governmental pur- I ~




2 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
I 
A 
The majority relies extensively on the interpretation this 
Court has given to the term "person" under the Sherman Act 
and other statutes as a guide to whether the terms "person" 
and "purchasers," as used in § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 
730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (the Act), 49 
Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13, include state and local govern-
mental entities. See ante, at 4-6. In my view, such reli-
ance is misplaced. The question of the Robinson-Patman 
Act's treatment of governmental purchases requires an inde-
pendent examination of the legislative history of that Act to 
ascertain congressional intent. 2 Indeed, the cases cited by 
the majority emphasize that the key question regarding cov-
erage or noncoverage of governmental entities is the intent of 
Congress in enacting the statute in question. 3 ResolutioiiOf 
2 The majority cites Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 
(1978), as a case in which the Court applied Sherman Act cases to construe 
the Clayton Act, which the Robinson-Patman Act amends. Ante, at 7, n. 
14. In Pfizer the Court held that a foreign nation is a "person" entitled to 
bring a treble damages action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 15. As the Court acknowledged, id., at 311, § 4 is a reenactment of the 
virtually identical language of § 7 of the Sherman Act. In fact, § 7 was 
eventually repealed as redundant. § 3, 69 Stat. 283; seeS. Rep. No. 619, 
84th Gong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955). Reliance on prior interpretation of § 7 of 
the Sherman Act was therefore uniquely appropriate. 
3 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra, at 315 (1978) (§ 4 of 
the Clayton Act) ("The word 'person' ... is not a term of art with a fixed 
meaning wherever it is used, nor was it in 1890 when the Sherman Act was 
passed."); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942) (§ 7 of the Sherman 
Act) ("Whether the word 'person' ... includes a State or the United States 
depends upon its legislative environment."); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934) (Rev. Stat. §§ 3140, 3244) (''Whether the word 'person' or 
'corporation' includes a state ... depends upon the connection in which it is 
found."). See also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-605 
(1941) ("[T]here is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the 
subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive in-
terpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate in-
tent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the 
• I 
81-827-DISSENT 
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the statutory construction question cannot be made to de-
pend u on the abstract assertion that the term "person..,' is 
broa enou to em race tates an mumc1palitles. 4 For 
these reasons, the mere fact that in City of Lafayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 n. 14 (1978), a 
Sherman Act case, the Court referred to the Robinson-
/ 
Patman Act in its discussion of the breadth of the term "per- ? / 
son" cannot resolve the question now before us ~ . p 
Further, the majority opinion propounds a~syl- ~ 
logism when it (1) suggests that the term "person" in the /2A1 ~
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed sim-
ilarly, (2) cites Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251 
(1972), for the proposition that the Clayton Act applies to 
States, and (3) then opines that the terms "person" and "pur-
chasers" under § 2 therefore should be construed to include 
state purchases. Ante, at 6. Because, as the majority ob-
serves, ante, at 6, n. 13, the definitional section of the Clay-
law."). 
It is also worth noting that many of the cases upon which the majority 
relies involved construction of the term "person" for the purpose of deter-
mining whether a particular governmental entity is a "person" entitle to 
sue. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, supra; nite States v. Cooper 
corp., supra (United States is not "person" entitled to sue under§ 7 of the 
Sherman Act); Georgia v. Evans, supra (State is "person" entitled to sue 
under § 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. 
City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906) (municipality is "person" entitled to 
sue under § 7 of the Sherman Act). 
'I would also note the misleading character of the majority's citation of 
Senator Robinson's remarks in connection with its observation that "[t]he 
word 'purchasers' has a meaning as inclusive as the word 'person."' Ante, 
at 5, n. 11. The remarks of Senator Robinson should not be read to sug-
gest that the word "purchasers," as used in the Robinson-Patman Act, 
embraces States or municipalities. The senator's observation reflects an 
affirmative response to Senator Vandenberg's concern that, although the 
bill was drafted with a view toward the problems of large chain-store buy-
ing power in the retail merchandising field, the Act would apply to private 




4 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
ton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 12, was intended to apply to the Robin-
son-Patman Act, I do not dispute the first proposition. 
However, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. stated only that a 
State is a "person" for purposes of bringing a treble damages 
action under §4 of the Clayton Act. 405 U. S., at 261. 5 
Conspicuously absent from the majorit 's discussion is any 
aut orit ho din a a es or loca governments ar~ per-
sons for purposes of ex osure to lia i ity as urc aser:Unaer 
the provisions of t e Clayton Act. 6 Although ongress 
might now decide that the purchasing activities of States and 
local governments should be subject to the limitations im-
posed by § 2, that is a policy judgment appropriately left to 
legislative determination. 
B 
Nor do I find persuasive the majority's invocation of pre-
sumptions regarding the liberal construction and broad reme-
dial purposes of the antitrust laws generally. Without dero-
• Cf Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943) ("In a dual system of gov-
ernment in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save 
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an un-
expressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is 
not lightly to be attributed to Congress."). 
6 Indeed, one basis for the United States Attorney General's conclusion 
in 1938 that the Robinson-Patman Act is inapplicable to purchases of sup-
plies by the Federal Government was the absence of any judicial decision 
construing the Clayton Act, prior to its amendment by the Robinson-
Patman Act, to apply to governmental contracts. 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539, 
540 (1938). 
Prior to 1929, courts interpreted the original§ 2 as addressed only to the 
problem of primary line competition-i. e., injury to competition among 
sellers. See, e. g., National Biscuit Co. v. FTV, 299 F'. 733 (CA2), cert. 
aenied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924). Not until1929 did this Court hold that § 2 J 
also protected against the type of injury alleged in the present case-i. e., 
secondary line injury, or injury to competition among buyers. See George 
Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 253 (1929). 
The Robinson-Patman amendment to § 2 clarified that the Act was de-
signed to redress the latter type of injury. 
81.:..S27-DISSENT 
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gating the usefulness of those principles or suggesting that 
they should never play a role in the Robinson-Patman con-
text, one may nevertheless candidly acknowledge that the 
Court also has identified a certain tension between the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, on the one hand, and the Sherman Act 
and other antitrust statutes, on the other. The Court fre-
quently has recognized that strict enforcement of the anti-
price-discrimination provisions of the former may lead to 
price rigidity and uniformity in direct conflict with the goals 
ofthe latter. See, e. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80, 83 n. 16 (1979); Automatic Canteen 
Co. v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 63, 74 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. 
FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 249 & n. 15 (1951). 7 
At the very least, this recognition raises doubts that the 
Court should liberall cons rue the Robinson-Patman Act in 
favor of broader coverage. Those doubts are en an y 
th~ncipal aim in enacting the Robin-
son-Patman Act was to protect small retailers from the com-
petitive injury suffered at the hands of large chain stores. 8 
It is consistent with that intent for Congress also to have dis-
played special solicitude for the well-established, below-
trade price buying practices of governmental institutions. 
II 
As the majority documents, ante, at 9, n. 17, the legislative 
history of the Robinson-Patman Act clearly indicates that 
Congress envisioned some sort of immunity for governmental 
7 Indeed, the tension between the Robinson-Patman policy of protection 
of competitors and the Sherman Act goal of protection of the competitive 
process has prompted the Court to achieve a partial reconciliation of the 
two by liberal interpretation of the "meeting competition" defense under 
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 13(b). See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 251 (1951). 
8 H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936); S. Rep. No. 
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); see FTC, Final Report on the Chain 
Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). 
81--827-DISSENT 
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bodies. 9 The question before the Court is the extent of that 
immunity-in particular, whether the purchase of goods by ~ 
state and local governments for resale in competition with {} / 
private retailers is within the intended scope of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 9, ~ 
the 1936 Congress that enacfeathe Roi>inson-Patman Act did 
not focus on e preci issue efore the Court. N otwith-
s an mg th1s mission,· t e maJori y announces the surpris-
ing conclusion that "[t]o create an exemption here clearly 
would be contrary to the intent of Congress." Ante, at 19 
(emphasis added). 
The majority is correct in stating that it is not the business 
9 Members of the House expressed concern with the effect of the bill on 
the established below-market buying practices of federal, state, county, 
and municipal governments. Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. Before the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 (1935). In 
response H. B. Teegarden, a principal draftsman of the Act, assured mem-
bers of the House Judiciary Committee that he "would not want" the Act if 
it prohibited, all along the line, the competitive bidding practices of those 
governments. !d. 
Moreover, with respect to subsequent legislative history, I find at least 
somewhat significant the fact that later attempts in Congress to expressly 
include governmental entities within the coverage of the Act failed. See 
H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1 2); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st 
ess. (1957); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 430, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). In particular, I would not dismiss as readily as 
does the majority, ante, at 11, n. 19, the bills introduced by Representative 
Patman in 1951 and 1953 to amend the Act to define "purchasers" to in-
clude "the United States, any State or any political subdivision thereof." 
The majority speculates that Representative Patman introduced these bills 
to reaffirm his original intent that these entities would be covered. It is 
equally plausible-or perhaps even more plausible in light of Represent-
ative Patman's failure in his book, W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 
168 (1938), to disagree with or criticize the United States Attorney Gener-
al's construction of the Act to exclude purchases by the Federal govern-
ment and his extension of the Attorney General's rationale to "municipal 
and public institutions," id.-to infer that he viewed the bills as extending 
the Act's coverage. 
t:!:rc ~ ~ 
.3j-~, 
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of this Court to engage in "'policy-making in the field of anti-
trust legislation'" in order to fill gaps where Congress has 
not clearly expressed its intent. Ante, at 19 (quoting United 
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 606 (1941)). It is pre-
cisely because I concur in that admonition that I would re-
frain from attributing to Congress an intent to cover the 
state and local governmental purchases in question here. 10 
A 
In attempting to supply the unexpressed intent of Con-
gress, the majority fails to offer satisfactory guidelines for 
determining the scope of the Act's coverage of governmental 
agencies. 11 The majority assumes, "without deciding, that 
Congress did not intend the Act to apply to purchases for 
consumption in traditional government functions" and sug-
gests that state purchases of pharmaceuticals for the purpose 
'
0 My resolution of the statutory issue here should not be construed to 
reflect a policy judgment that the Robinson-Patman Act should protect "a 
State's entrepreneurial capacity." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power 
& Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 422 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring). 
We are not concerned here with whether the kind of activity in which these 
governmental entities are enaged appropriately exposes them to antitrust 
liability under the Act. Cf. id., at 418. That question raises policy con-
cerns lying peculiarly within the institutional province of Congress. "A 
court, without the benefit of legislative hearings that would illuminate the 
policy considerations if the question were left to Congress, is not compe-
tent in my opinion to resolve this question . . . . It is regrettable that the 
Court today finds it necessary to rush to this essentially legislative judg-
ment." Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S., at 331 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting). Because the question before us is one of congressional in-
tent and it is far from clear that Congress has supplied an answer to that 
question, I would refrain from substituting the policy judgments of the ju-
diciary for those Congress might embrace. Cf. id., at 320 (CHIEF JUSTICE 
BURGER, dissenting); id., at 330-331 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
11 To the extent the majority purports to "divine" the will of Congress, it 
comes as no surprise, given Congress' inattention to this precise question, 
that no "bright lines" for coverage and noncoverage emerge from its 
opinion. 
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of resale to indigent citizens may not expose the State to anti-
trust liability. Ante, at 4 & n. 7. 
The majority's assumption, however, is inconsistent with 
the principles of statutory construction upon which it pur-
ports to rely. If, absent a clear expression of legislative in-
tent to the contrary, the plain language of the statute con-
trols, then by the majority's own assertions one would have 
to conclude that even purchases for the State's own use or for 
resale to indigents would fall within the Act's proscriptions. 
For, as the majority remarks, ante, at 4, the terms "person" 
and "purchasers" are broad enough to include governmental 
entities, and the legislative history is "ambiguous on the 
application of the Act to state purchases for consump-
tion .... " Ante, at 9-10. 12 
Moreover, to the extent the majority implies that a State's 
coverage or noncoverage under the Act turns on the distinc-
tion between purchases for resale and purchases for con-
sumption, 13 that distinction is inconsistent with the compe-
tition rationale elsewhere suggested, ante, at 19, to underlie 
the prohibitions of § 2(a). For example, a state university 
hospital might limit the use of its pharmacy to its own faculty 
and staff, thereby falling within the "for their own use" ex-
12 I would add, however, that-regardless of Congress' intent-exclusion 
from coverage of state purchases for consumption in traditional govern-
mental functions is supportable on Tenth Amendment grounds. I there-
fore agree with the majority's recognition, ante, at 3, n. 6, that coverage of 
these purchases would raise significant Tenth Amendment problems. 
18 The majority thus suggests, though it refrains from holding, that the 
scope of coverage under § 2(a) is coextensive with the "for their own use" 
line drawn by the Nonprofit Institutions Act of 1938, 15 U. S. C. § 13c, and 
interpreted by the Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Drug-
gists Association, Inc., 425 U. S. 1 (1976). This proposed 
resale/consumption distinction has no foundation in the language of § 2(a), 
which prohibits discrimination "in price between different purchasers of 
commodities ... , where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, 
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ception. 14 Nevertheless, the university pharmacy may be in-
flicting competitive injury on private pharmacies that the 
university's faculty and staff might otherwise patronize. 16 
Thus, the majority's conflicting suggestions leave in doubt 
what principle-the presence of functional competition or the 
consumption/resale dichotomy-guides the determination 
whether a state or local government's purchases fall within 
the Act's proscriptions. 
B 
Against the backdrop of a legislative history that even the 
majority concedes does not focus on the issue before us 
stands the general consensus in the legal and business com-
munities that sales to governmental entities are not covered 
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority devotes consid-
erable effort to distinguishing or undercutting the authorities 
cited by the respondents. In so doing, and in observing that 
these authorities cannot reveal Congress' intent in 1936, 
ante, at 14 & n. 24, the majority misunderstands the signifi-
l 
cance of this evidence. These authorities simply illustrate 
the v!:tually ~ni~ous ass~mpti,on over the past fort~en 
years o"f noncoverage"OrgOvernmental entities-an assump-
tion at as serve as e asis of well-established govern-
mental purchasing practices and marketing relationships. 
In the past the Court has relied upon the widespread under-
standing of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act in lim-
iting the scope of the Act's prohibitions. 16 To do so here is no 
14 See Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association, 
Inc., supra, at 16--17. 
15 Or, to take another example, a cafeteria operated by a governmental 
agency for the benefit of its employees also might inflict some competitive 
injury on restaurants in the same area that otherwise might enjoy the em-
ployees' patronage. 
16 See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 246--247 (1951) (reliance 
on widespread understanding that the meeting competition proviso of 
§ 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, pro-
vides a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination). 
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less appropriate. 
Despite its attempt to discount the significance of the judi-
cial authorities cited by the respondents, the majority cannot 
dispute that no court has imposed liability upon a seller 
buyer, under eit er a or § 2(f), . S. . §§ 13(a) and 
(f), in a case involving an alleged price discrimination in favor 
of a federal, state, or municipal governmental purchaser. 17 
17 See Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J .L . Cummins News 
Co., 632 F. 2d 680, 688-689 (CA7 1980) (Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable 
to purchases by instrumentality of Federal Government for resale); Moun-
tain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories Pharmaceutical Products Di-
vision, No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (order 
of consent dismissing with prejudice Robinson-Patman claims based on 
sales to any governmental entity), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980); Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., No. 4--Q6-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion) (sale of 
bowling equipment to State not within provisions of Act; alternative hold-
ing that sales exempt under 15 U. S. C. § 13c), affd, 378 F . 2d 212, 217 
(CA9) (sales to state university within § 13c exemption), cert. denied, 389 
U. S. 898 (1967); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development 
Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 96 (EDNY 1957) (disclaiming, on motion for 
reargument, any intention that original opinion could be "construed to sug-
gest that sales to the Government can be thought to be subject to the pro-
visions of the Robinson-Patman Act"); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) ("It is doubtful at best whether the 
Robinson-Patman Act applies at all to sales to Government agencies, state 
or federal.") (holding Act inapplicable to sales by liquor distiller to state 
liquor commissions; alternative holding that no competitive injury suffered 
by plaintiff liquor wholesaler), affd on opinion below, 234 F. 2d 959 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck 
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD Ky. 1941) (alternatively holding that 
Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to sales to municipal housing commis-
sion and suggesting that "the Act does not apply to sales to the govern-
ment, states, or municipalities"), affd, 132 F . 2d 425 (CA6 1942), cert. de-
nied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943). 
While one may concede that most of these cases do not focus on the pre-
cise situation of purchases by state or local governments for resale, they 
nonetheless reflect the consensus of judicial opinion that governmental 
bodies are not subject to liability under § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended 
by the Robinson-Patman Act. The majority would dismiss many of these 
·. 
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Commentators confirm the general judicial consensus that 
sales to States and municipalities are not covered by the 
Act. 18 
cases with the simple observation that they predate the Court's decision in 
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978). 
Ante, at 16, n. 29. For reasons already noted, however, in my view City 
of Lafayette does not resolve the issue before us in this case. 
Moreover, cases that the majority suggests are supportive of its posi-
tion, ante, at 17, n. 30, are similarly distinguishable. For example, both 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 
(Alaska 1982), and Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. 
Supp. 393 (Idaho 1964), afrd, 351 F. 2d, 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. de-
nied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966), indicate only that the Robinson-Patman Act 
may apply where the State, as in Sterling, or the municipality, as in 
Hitachi, is the victim of commercial bribery under § 2(c), 15 U. S. C. 
§ 13(c), rather than the favored customer. 
18 E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 224 (1979) (2d ed. 1979) ("In 
spite of [any] contrary indications [among state attorneys general], it is 
generally believed that 'the exemption applies to governmental purchases 
at any level."); W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson Patman Act 
30 (1963) (indicating the Act is inapplicable to sales to government, munici-
pal, or public institutions); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Rob-
inson-Patman Act 84 (1962) ("The preponderance of reasoned opinion 
treats State or municipal bodies on a par with the Federal Government's 
exemption."); 4 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation 
§ 24.06 at 24-70 (1982) ("[T]he prevailing view is that such sales [to states 
and municipalities] are excluded from Robinson-Patman liability."). See 
also 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973) (indicat-
ing that lower federal courts have generally held the Act inapplicable to 
sales to states and municipalities, that one lower federal court has held the 
Act may be applicable if the State is the disfavored customer, and that 
opinions among state attorneys general are divided). 
Although not specifically addressing any consumption/resale distinction, 
a past Attorney General of the United States also has opined that pur-
chases by state and local governments are not within the Act's prohibition 
against price discrimination. Report of the Attorney General Under Ex-
ecutive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962) 
(identical bidders on contracts with state and local governments cannot 
contend that the Act prohibits bidding below the schedule price because 
the Act is not applicable to government contracts). 
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This same understanding has been expressed in testimony 
before Congress. In 1967 and 1968 a congressional sub-
committee conducted public hearings on the problems of 
small businesses in the pharmaceutical industry. The sub-
committee heard testimony from both representatives of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and retail pharmacists regard-
ing the industry-wide practice of price discrimination in sales 
of pharmaceuticals to governmental purchasers-federal, 
state, county, and municipal. 19 Several witnesses also di-
rectly expressed their assumption that the Robinson-Patman 
Act does not apply to such sales. 20 
'
9 Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Commit-
tee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 48 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Merritt Skinner, 
community pharmacist); id., at 258 (William Apple, executive director of 
the American Pharmaceutical Association); id., at 296, 318-319 (Hyman 
Moore, H.L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc.); id., at 500 (Henry DeBoest, 
vice president of Eli Lilly & Co.); id., at 705 (Donald van Roden, vice presi-
dent and general manager of pharmaceutical operations for Smith Kline & 
French Laboratories); i d., at 792 (Joseph Ingolia, vice president and gen-
eral manager of Schering Laboratories); id., at 817 (Lyman Duncan, vice 
president of American Cyanamid Co.). 
Based upon this overwhelming evidence, the Select Committee on Small 
Business concluded in its report to the House: "The difference between 
drug prices charged retailers and wholesalers as compared to those 
charged ... governmental customers is extremely substantial, often being 
over 50 percent." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). 
20 See 1967-1968 Hearings, at 15-16 (Earl Kintner, former FTC Com-
missioner, counsel for the National Assocation of Retail Druggists) ("When 
a drug supplier sells drugs to Federal, State, or municipal governmental 
institutions, the price charged by the supplier may be without regard to 
the Robinson-Patman Act, because such sales are probably exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 731 (W. Abrahamson, president of Or-
tho Pharmaceutical Corp.) ("[T]he only special pricing we have ever en-
gaged in are [sic] in bidding situations to [federal, state, or local govern-
ment] agencies excluded from the Robinson-Patman Act."); id., at 1069 (C. 
Stetler, president of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) 
("There is nothing immoral or unlawful about incremental cost pricing in 
'. 
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In 1969 and 1970, the same House subcommittee investi-
gated the problems of small businessmen under the Robin-
son-Patman Act. In these hearings witnesses again ex-
pressed the view that governmental purchases at any level 
are not covered, highlighting the problem of favorable prices 
on governmental purchases for resale and making a plea for a 
change in the law. 21 
cases-such as sales to the Government ... -where the Robinson-Patman 
Act does not apply."). 
Even one congressman on the subcommittee expressed his understand-
ing that the Act does not apply to governmental purchasers. See id., at 
1092 (Rep. Corman) ("[l]f there were no exemption under Robinson-
Patman for the Government, what would be the situation as to their pur-
chases?"). The colloquy that followed Representative Corman's question 
further evidences the assumption that governmental purchases are outside 
the scope of the Act, even in the case of resales. 
Mr. Stetler. If there was no exemption under Robinson-Patman, I pre-
sume some of these practices would be illegal under Robinson-Patman. 
Mr. Cutler. If I could try to answer that, [Representative] Cor-
man ... . [A]bsent the one case of these resales . . . , I suppose the lack of 
exemption would make no difference, because the Robinson-Patman Act 
would not apply for other reasons, because you are not discriminating be-
tween two people engaged in commerce and competing with one another. 
Further, there is a real question as to whether the Robinson-Patman Act 
applies under any circumstances where you are bidding under a competi-
tive bid. So for both of these reasons, the answer to your question would 
be that the same pricing practices might still lawfully prevail under Robin-
son-Patman without the exemption for the government . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
21 William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs for the National Associ-
ation of Wholesalers, testified: 
Over the years, the Robinson-Patman Act has not been extended to 
cover sales to the Government. In the days when Government purchases 
constituted a relatively small volume in the marketplace, this exemption 
posed few problems. But today, with the vast growth in Government pur-
chases, Federal, State, and local, ... the continued exemption creates 
many unfair competitive situations. 
We believe that Congress must turn its attention to this problem. 
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III 
The 1 gislative histo of the Robinson-Patman Act ~ly 1 
reveals t at ongress mtended to exclude governmental en-
titles om tll.e c s proscnpt10ns to some extent. ow-
ever, ongress 1 no cu on e issue Be ore us and there-
fore did not provide one clear rationale governing coverage 
and noncoverage. In an area in which bright lines are 
needed to guide state and local governments in their purchas-
ing practices, the majority fails to identify any principle trig-
gering inclusion or exclusion. _1 ~ -f\ 
Moreover, oEe cannot 5!?ubt that state, count;y, and munici- J ()0 fUL 
pal governments and manlilacturers of commoditTeShave \~ / ~ 
struCtured their marketing relationships with each other on 
the longstanding assumption that the Robinson-Patman Act ~ 
Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act, Hearings Before the Spe-
cial Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of 
the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74 (1969-1970). See id., at 76-77 (Everette 
Macintyre, acting chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) (affirming 
that sales to the Federal Government, even in the resale context, are not 
subject to the Robinson-Patman Act). 
Harold Halfpenny, legal counsel for the Automotive Service Industry 
Association, focused most precisely on the problem of which petitioners 
complain-i. e., competitive injury to private industry when governmental 
entities receive more favorable prices on purchases of commodities for 
resale. 
[W]hile the Act is silent on the subject, its legislative history and subse-
quent interpretation support the proposition that sales made to Federal or 
State governmental bodies are not subject to the provisions of the Act. 
This may be injurious to competition in several ways . ... 
[T]here are "second line" situations where competition exists between the 
Government and private indsutry in the resale of commodities. 
The Federal Trade Commission has not recommended legislation to 
make the Robinson-Patman Act applicable to sales to governmental pur-
chases. However, in our opinion, Congress should consider acting on its 
own volition. 
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does not apply to those transactions. That understanding 
finds substantial support among the courts and commen-
tators. State and local governments have developed pro-
grams for providing services to the public, including medical 
care to the indigent and the medically needy, 22 based on the 
same assumption. The majority's holding that sales of com-
modities to state and local governments for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise are covered by the Act will en-
gender significant disruption-not only through government 
and industry reexamination and restructuring of marketing 
relationships, but also, unfortunately, through possible ter-
mination of services and supplies to needy citizens 23 and 
through litigation associated with the process of reexamina-
tion. 24 The Court rests its decision primarily on one state-
ment in the legislative history, 25 taken in isolation from other 
remarks designed to assure concerned House members that 
the Act would not force the abandonment of governmental 
below-market buying practices which the majority's holding 
now calls into question. Given Congress' failure to delineate 
the extent of the Robinson-Patman Act's coverage or 
22 See, e. g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §§ 14100-14126 (1980 & Supp. 
1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, ~~5-1 to 5-14 (Supp. 1982--83); Mont. Code 
Ann. §§53-6-103 to 53-6-144 (1981); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§365, 365-a 
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982); Tex. Human Res. Code Ann. 
§§ 32.001-32.037 (1980); Va. Code§§ 63.1-134 to 63.1-144 (1980). 
23 The administrative burden of developing internal accounting and 
recordkeeping procedures to segregate commodities purchased for resale, 
plus the additional financial strain of paying higher prices for these pur-
chases, may induce state and local governments to terminate programs and 
services already in place. More significantly, however, the uncertainty 
generated by the majority's failure to establish clear lines of demarcation 
for coverage and noncoverage and the fear of exposure to treble damages 
liability might well cause cautious legislators facing budgetary dilemmas to 
eliminate these programs. 
24 I note that the Court has not indicated that today's holding will have 
only prospective effect. 
z.o> See ante, at 10. 
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noncoverage of state and local governments, I would allow 
Congress to speak on this issue rather than disrupt long-
standing practices and programs and judicially arm private 
litigants with a powerful treble damages action against these 
governments. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment 
below. 
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[January -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue rresented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical 
· products to hos itals eperatea h/ state and local govern-
~ for resale in competition with private retail pharma-
cies is exempt from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and 
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondent~ are fifteen pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 
and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University 
operates a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical 
school. Located in the University's medical center are two 
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, ex-
isting as a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 15 & 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of 
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
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Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. §(i3(a) & 
(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers 
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's 
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at 
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like 
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital 
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation 
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of§ 2. In granting respondents' motions, the Dis-
trict Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that 
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged 
1 Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .... " 
2 Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section." 
' Section 13c provides: 
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public librar-
ies, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 
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price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-
chases were not exempt under § 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, with-
out regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of 
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with 
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional gov-
ernmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). 5 The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam deci-
sion, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memoran-
dum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 6 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of 
federal law.-- U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for 
~ ~Q"ASl:lffifltie~ in traditional governmental functions. 7 
6 Petitioner's claims were dismissed solely on the basis that state pur-
chases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 2d, at 103 
n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule of 
law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims. 
6 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
7 Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
p~armaceutical drugs is not ':indisputably" an attribute of st.at~ 
e1gnty. See EEOC v. Wyomtng, -- U. S. --, -- (1983), (Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-
81-827-0PINION 
4 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
Rather, the issue before us is limited to state purchases for 
the purpose of competing against private enterprise-with 
the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental nmc-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt 
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 More-
over, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory lan-
guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of 
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in 
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain)!{ate pur- .D.c 
chases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by-
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 413 & n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
8 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying 
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption 
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchas-
ing for their own use. ~e note 20, infra. 
9 The wor~"person"~'persons" ~used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. 
'
0 See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
son" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
' . 
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than 
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the 
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discus-
sion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person" 
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Ac!.: See also Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1918) (foreign nation is a "per-
son" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the ap-
plicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as 
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a 
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur-
poses as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
A~t.'' City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific 
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435 
U. S., at 401 n. 19. 
u The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "per-
son.'' See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
12 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose con-
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t..lO+ 
U. S., at 397 n. 14. ~ we erceive any reason to con-
strue the word "person" in at ct any differently than we 
have in the Clayton Act, which it amendsA13 "<.... In sum, the 
plain language of the Act strongly suggests' that there is no 
exemption for state purchases to compete with private 
enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
~eveals no such c:trary intention. 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
13 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen. 
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply 
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act con-
tains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration. 
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by 
the courts.''). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising 
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should 
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of 
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy 
~ or a new theo~ The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the 
~ purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119 
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinso bill is to strengthen Clayton 
Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same) . ...........,-.--...... 
- Pa.-hnAIII 
0/Y'c"J.. ~ 10 ~ 
\Ad~ ~CA_ 
~liot.s. -\o 5\-A\es. · 
~"~ "· 
~A"'OA~O Oi\ b.' 
'\0~ 0.::,. ,!lSI I ~~I 
(l'\'12.) . 
81-827-0PINION 
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 7 
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. I d., at 787 (citing United States v. P hiladel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350--351 (1963); Califor-
nia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482,485 (1962)). 15 In City of La-
fayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in 
competition with a private utility, we held that no exe~ 
for local governments would be implied. The Cour1:6f'empha-
sized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he eco-
nomic choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as 
they are to assure maximum benefits for the community con-
stituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the 
broader interests of national economic well-being than are 
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the in-
terests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., 
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16 
14 See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313 
(1978) ~ atm ~'broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust 
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added). 
15 See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. 
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975). 
16 In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to 
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the 
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Brock & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." ®---------3> -p.ui &1\ 'P . q 
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from 
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from tax-
ation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the ac-
tual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-
Patman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small 
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the 
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Be-
cause there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail 
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers 
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient, 
private retail distribution systems. 
) 
r 
~ . ' 
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The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for J tate t . c. . 
purchases. There is nothing whatever in the Senate or 
House Committee reports, or in the floor debates, focusing 
on the issue. Some members of Congress were aware of the 
possibility that the Act would apply to governmental pur- U1 
chases. Most members, however, were lnotfconcernedlwith 
state purchases, but with possible limitations on the Lederal Q:l(f . 
Government. The most relevant legislative history is the 
testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B. Teegarden, 
before the House Judiciary Committee. 17 Although the tes-
'
7 [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting 
of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the 
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any 
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
/~. 
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timony is ambiguous on the application of the Act to state 
purchases for consumption, one conclusion is certain: 
Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply to the 
purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circum-
stances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemp-
tion found by the courts below for all such purchasing. 18 In 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then 
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H. R. 1,995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
'
8 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further pre-
clude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." I d., at 250. 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the Robinson-
Patman Act was pending before Congresw he Court stated that it could 1' 
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the 
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a 
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being 
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of 
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an 
exemption for the f.ederal ~overnment's purchases. The existence of such 
an exemption is riOt before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 
U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the Sherman 
Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden 
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the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legis-
lative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemp-
tion, to enter private competitive markets with congression-
ally approved price advantages. 19 
clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with pri-
vate purchasing. ~P J:tis flt:li"~eses, this elimisated the Patiesale fer thee 
.Aet te Bflplyte state ag&'R~i&~ That assumption, however, is inapplicable 
here. 
19 Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. e.\~~.r;f,e..A ~ \...:.. t4A.~~ v.,)(k.Q -lo 
!f, at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General Yil&d th& plu;alii& ~ 
~~'ederal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a con-
struction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in vi-
olation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. 
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the 
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corpora-
tion that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1!55,156, at 
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply 
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. 
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 1!55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
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Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of district courts confirm that 
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
\ therefore to th~ subsequent event~R w:kiefi PC~HeleHts cz. 
J Pel~ ~ • 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House 
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His in-
terpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpret-
ing-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are 
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the 
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on 
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent 
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Gener-
al's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to 
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal pur-
chases to the Act. 
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Rep-
resentative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
urchases for use in traditiona functions. 'lor. ~ t)~\ ..eM-\ 4 4.u:lic.c. ·~ •nos~ re.c.~,.-l ~ ... ,c.-
20 The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's mvt\~t k.~Arl>~.•'\ Ml £JCE.tnp-
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary +ieN ov j,...,..u,..,l '.\ foY 
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an ~\fto\c.. ~\u- Cf'r ·, r.e ~ 
1 
5.QI:l. 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de- ~ 34 ;_ (' ~·-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per- 1 ~ • 
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies0.._ with 81 Cong. A 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu- I 
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by deft-
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the state agency competed with pri-
vate retailers, although he was aware of such practices by in-
stitutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little 
nition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 
18 n. 10; 81 Gong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption 
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here. 
21 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 91st Gong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant Direc- ~· 
1 
cxl_ b2~ ( 
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); Harold Half-
penny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Associatiol)i Small ) 
Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommit- 1\ 
tee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Gong. 15-16 (1967-1968) 
[hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC Commis-
sioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases ..-.. 
"probably" exempt). But see id., at 8q(@) (remarkS of Charles Fort, 
President Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act I. ) 
may prohibit this practice .. "~There also was testimony that institu- ( j ·~. 1 M 8(g \. :SCUfY\1. :J 
tional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail ,.... 
pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses com-
plained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, see id., at 
A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. ~ 
22 See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra 20, at 74. /!\ 
23 After hearing his testimony, the ubcommittee posed further ques- • 
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, jtate, and private group I. c · 
health care programs; (ii) the ~ederal ~overnment's ability to purchase from ~ . 
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) 
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpa-
tients or even nonpatients." !d., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 24 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 21.®----e. 
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved§ 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority 
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most sim-
ilar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
24 Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the 'b1 e • i6y aadL 
eenellisor, aal;~ of the Subcommittee repo -"the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring t e intent of an earlier one." 
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer 
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 
117-118~. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 758 
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 200 n. 7 (1977) 
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense 
part of the le 'slative history."). 
26 t is clear from the ouse u comrm ee s conclusions that it did not 
focus on the question presented by this case. The Subcommittee found 
that the difference between drug prices for retailers and government cus-
tomers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by ei-
ther cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors 
inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it stated that "[n]umerous acts and poli-
cies of individual manufacturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-
Patman Act .... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit-
tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory prices-about 
which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report 
did include the awkwardly worded statement: "There is no basis apparent 
... why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to 
discriminatory drug sales favoring € 010ovemment@ institutional purchas-
ers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription drug competition 
at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." Id., at 79A.(8HlflR&B~ A 
~ This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that private in- ' 
stitutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through 
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said n . e 
about the unfair competition at issue in this case. e Subcommittee also 7.$ 
cone u e that t e 19 es1gne to afford immunity to " 
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Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief fo~ Respondent . 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmlloties in these L 
1\ !:'-broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held,.Qr suggested ,A 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 'l:1 (iii) 
respondents cite no jtourt of f ppeals decision that has ex- I. t.. . 
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the J!Istrict Jl'ourt cases upon which re- I .c... 
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that 
\ 
private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the non-
profit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 20, at 78, 
but that would indicate more the construction of § 13c than it would the 
intent of the 1936 Congress. 
26 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n. 
~· 
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 
513 (1972). 
Z7 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to ,$tate I.e.. 
purchases. See ~1\28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor nl\. 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually 
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases 
presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added); 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
28 See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involv-
ing .federal i overnment as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney Gener-
al's o pinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790, 
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices), 
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that 
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state 
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 87l !9r7~ Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 ~p1955) (Act inapplicable~_Ahere was 
no proof that sales affected'praiiitiff adversely)" ,«ff'd on opinion below, 
234 F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956)~ Gen-
eral Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-Q03 
(WD Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding 
be..c.AIJk the Act inapplicabl~~ "[n]either the government nor a city in its pur-
A chase of property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its 
governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be 
engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 
132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robin-
son-Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 
780 (1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F. 
Supp., at 16. 
29 Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77....{)094 
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dis-
miss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state 
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (com-
plaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers sub-
ject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association 
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore.- ~ept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral A 
~ ,~ 
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. ;::d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied), 
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has sug-
l CU\.l- gested in1alternative holdingL that there is an exemption for state pur-~ 
chases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
A No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4 (ldahoAMay 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), affd, 
J 378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within 
scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental ex-
emption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases predate 
our decision in City of Lafayette. 
30 See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332 
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
r,.. citRed ~d27, supra. 
espon ents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; 31 others do not foreclose our holding; 32 
and in some cases they support it. 33 Thus, Congress cannot 
28~287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchase~~ 
") f!88iii'9~ State agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 I). 
(CA7 1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing 
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any ex-
emption for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi 
Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & 
Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 
851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand 
Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency ex-
empt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other 
business corporations). 
"See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 & 
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is 
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opin-
ion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to 
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962). 
~1>5 . 32 Some deal only with sales to the federal government. See Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F: Sarlo,=-v eterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted inJ973-2Zrade Cas. (CCH) ~ 74,642. Almost all [ 
fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State pur- ,... 
chases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Execu-
tive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962). 
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be said to have left untouched a universally held interpreta-
tion of the Act. ~1 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
chases by a State for the ur ose of competin with a price 
advantag n the rivate retail mar 
IS. 
VI 
The Robin~n-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of pol-
icy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words 
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what 
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941). 
[194&-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with pri-
vate enterprise, it is subject to Act). 
" In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, the 
Department of Justice stated: 
AThe mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to en-
gage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activi-
ties of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the 
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the fed-
eral government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned 
enterprise to the same standards recjuir[ed] of all who engage in commer-
cial transactions in the market. A 
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890 
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de 
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the 
charter of a ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign 
activity that would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
·' 
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"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and im-
pulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Un-
derwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is re-
plete with references to the economic evil of large 
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for 
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is 
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think 
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny 
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson 
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the 
strongest competitor of them all . .a.. ls- To create an exemption 
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
3~ 
1\ ;!(Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, 
A supra ~~ 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protec-
. tion of private rights"). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical 
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in 
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from 
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and 
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents are fifteen pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 
and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University 
operates a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical 
school. Located in the University's medical center are two 
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, ex-
isting as a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 15 & 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of 
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and 
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(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers 
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's 
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at 
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like 
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital 
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation 
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c.3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the Dis-
trict Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that 
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged 
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-
'Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities oflike grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .... " 
2 Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section." 
3 Section 13c provides: 
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public librar-
ies, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and 
its agencies. 
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chases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, with-
out regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of 
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with 
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional gov-
ernmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). 5 The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam deci-
sion, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memoran-
dum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 6 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of 
federal law. -- U. S. -- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for 
use in traditional governmental functions. 7 Rather, the 
5 Petitioner's claims were dismissed solely on the basis that state pur-
chases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 2d, at 103 
n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule of 
law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims. 
6 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
7 Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably'' an attribute of state sover-
eignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming,- U.S.-,- (1983); Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. , 452 U. S. 264, 
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in 
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of 
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental func-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt 
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 More-
over, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory lan-
guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of 
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state pur-
chas~s from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by-
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
8 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying 
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption 
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchas-
ing for their own use. See note 20, infra. 
9 The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. 
'
0 See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
son" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person" 
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than 
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the 
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discus-
sion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435 
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to con-
within the meaning of § 8 of the Shennan Act). See also Pfizer, Inc . v. 
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "per-
son" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the ap-
plicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as 
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a 
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur-
poses as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act." City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific 
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435 
U. S., at 401 n. 19. 
11 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "per-
son." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains tenns general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
12 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose con-
duct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
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strue the word "person" in that Act any differently than we 
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undis-
puted that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil 6, 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). In sum, the plain 
language of the Act strongly suggests that there is no exemp-
tion for state purchases to compete with private enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
and history here reveals no such contrary intention. 
A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
13 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen. 
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply 
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act con-
tains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration. 
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by 
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising 
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should 
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of 
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy 
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the 
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do."); id., at 3119 
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen 
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same). 
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might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); Califor-
nia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 15 In City of La-
fayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in 
competition with a private utility, we held that no exemption 
for local governments would be implied. The Court empha-
sized the purpos-es and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he eco-
nomic choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as 
they are to assure maximum benefits for the community con-
stituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the 
broader interests of national economic well-being than are 
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the in-
terests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., 
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16 
'
4 See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-313 
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust 
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added). 
15 See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. 
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719-720 (1975). 
16 In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to 
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the 
,, .. 
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JusTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." 
B 
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from 
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from tax-
ation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the ac-
tual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-
Patman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small 
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the 
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Be-
cause there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail 
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers 
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient, 
private retail distribution systems. · 
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The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for state 
purchases. There is nothing whatever in the Senate or 
House Committee reports, or in the floor debates, focusing 
on the issue. Some members of Congress were aware of the 
possibility that the Act would apply to governmental pur-
chases. Most members, however, were concerned not with 
state purchases, but with possible limitations on the Federal 
Government. The most relevant legislative history is the 
testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B. Teegarden, 
before the House Judiciary Committee. 17 Although the tes-
17 [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting 
of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the 
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any 
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
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timony is ambiguous on the application of the Act to state 
purchases for consumption, one conclusion is certain: 
Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply to the 
purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circum-
stances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemp-
tion found by the courts below for all such purchasing.'8 In 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then 
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
18 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further pre-
clude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." I d., at 250. 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the Robinson-
Patman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could 
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the 
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a 
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being 
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of 
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an 
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of 
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the 
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, 
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the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legis-
lative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemp-
tion, to enter private competitive markets with congression-
ally approved price advantages. 19 
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not com-
pete with private purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the ra-
tionale for the Act to apply to state agencies. That assumption, however, 
is inapplicable here. 
19 Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
I d., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his 
reference was to "the Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons 
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the 
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such mat-
ters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emer-
gency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates 
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at 
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply 
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. 
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attar-
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of district courts confirm that 
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to these subsequent events. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House 
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His in-
terpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpret-
ing~r erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are 
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the 
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on 
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent 
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Gener-
al's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to 
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal pur-
chases to the Act. 
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Rep-
resentative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Depart-
ment of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immu-
nity for state enterprises, see note 34, infra. 
20 The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per-
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
I • 
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the state agency competed with pri-
vate retailers, although he was aware of such practices by in-
stitutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little 
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by 
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., 
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption 
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here. 
21 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Direc-
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Har-
old Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association); 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on 
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC 
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State pur-
chases "probably'' exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort, 
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act 
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony 
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than 
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many wit-
nesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, 
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. 
22 See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 20, at 74. 
23 After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group 
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase 
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and 
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to out-
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 24 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 21. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that 
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The 
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices 
for retailers and government customers "is extremely sub-
stantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost jus-
tifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other fac-
tors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it 
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu-
facturers seem ... violative of the Robinson-Patman Act 
.... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit-
tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory 
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. 
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded 
statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate 
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to dis-
criminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institu-
patients or even nonpatients." !d., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved § 13c issues. I d., at 7 4. His disclaimer of FTC authority 
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most sim-
ilar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
24 Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of 
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, 
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc: v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act 
are in no sense part of the legislative history."). 
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tional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is 
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa-
vored retail druggists." I d., at 79. This unexceptional 
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional pur-
chases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through 
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said noth-
ing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this 
case. 25 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 27 (iii) 
25 The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-
signed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the ex-
tent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. 
No. 1983, supra note 20, at 78, but that would indicate more the construc-
tion of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
26 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19, 
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 
508, 513 (1972). 
27 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state 
purchases. See nn. 28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all 
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases pre-
senting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added); 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting 
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that 
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
28 See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involv-
ing Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790, 
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was 
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), affd on opinion below, 234 
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD 
Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act 
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of 
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its govern-
mental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be en-
gaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132 
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-
Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F. 
Supp., at 16. 
29 Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77--D094 
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dis-
miss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state 
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (com-
plaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers sub-
ject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association 
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, 
oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c ap-
plied), vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has 
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state 
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is 
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited, n. 27, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; 31 others do not foreclose our holding; 32 
suggested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state 
purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., No. 4--{)6-5, slip op. at 4 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opin-
ion), affd, 378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State Univer-
sity within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called govern-
mental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases 
predate our decision in City of Lafayette. 
80 See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332 
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 
28~287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases, 
State agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7 
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 
F . Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption 
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, 
Ltd., 547 F . Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. 
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 851, 
858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp . 
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency ex-
empt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other 
business corporations). 
81 See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 & 
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is 
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
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and in some cases they support it. 33 Thus, Congress cannot 
be said to have left untouched a universally held interpreta-
tion of the Act. 34 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
chases by a State for the purpose of competing with a price 
advantage. 
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opin-
ion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to 
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962). 
32 Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 74,642. Almost 
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State pur-
chases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Execu-
tive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962). 
33 See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977); 
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with pri-
vate enterprise, it is subject to Act). 
34 In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, the 
Department of Justice stated: 
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to en-
gage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activi-
ties of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the 
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the fed-
eral government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned 
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commer-
cial transactions in the market." 
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890 
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteci-
mientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a 
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that 
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
. ,, 
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VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of pol-
icy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words 
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what 
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 
Corp. 312 U. 8., 600, 606 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and im-
pulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Un-
derwriters, 322 U. 8., at 553. The legislative history is re-
plete with references to the economic evil of large 
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for 
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is 
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think 
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny 
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson 
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the 
strongest competitor of them all. 35 To create an exemption 
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
86 Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings , 
supra, n. 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection 
of private rights") . 
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Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Supreme Court Bars 
Some Cut-Rate Sales 
By Makers of Drugs 
By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter 
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court said 
drug manufacturers must stop selling at cut· 
rate prices to commercial pharmacies run 
by government-owned hospitals. 
The Justices ruled 5·4 that federal anti· 
trust law doesn't permit drug companies to 
discriminate against private retail pharma-
cists by offering lower prices to state, city 
and county hospital pharmacies with which 
they compete. 
The ruling, written by Justice Lewis 
Powell, didn't say whether manufacturers 
may still offer discounts to state and local 
governments for purchases of drugs or other 
items that aren't going to be sold over the 
counter. The decision was limited to com· 
mercia! pharmacies run by public hospitals 
for their patients, often indigents. 
The opinion said the Robinson·Patman 
Act, which prohibits price discrimination, 
applies equally to drug-company sales to 
public hospital pharmacies and those of pri· 
vate pharmacies. 
The case involved a lawsuit by a group of 
Alabama retail druggists, who claimed that 
15 major drug makers were unfairly selling 
at .low prices to a pharmacy run by the Uni· 
versity of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham. 
A federal district court dismissed the suit, 
gui de lo laphroaig, wrilc Julius Wile Sons & Co., 1 Hollow Lane, lake Success, NY. 11 042_ Saying State and local governments were ex· 
~;,;;;,;;;,;;;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;,;;;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;,;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;w---1 empt from the price-discrimintion Ia w. A 






(800) 854-8063 National 
(714) 640-1813 local 
(800) 432-7071 California 
the high court reversed the ruling. 
Dissenting Justices-Sandra Day O'Con· 
nor, William Brennan, William Rehnquist 
and John Stevens-said purchases by state 
and local governments should be exempt be-
cause Congress didn't address the issue 
when it passed the law. 
Pentagon Official Says 
Reagan Should Delay 
Tax-Rate Cut for 1983 
By a WALL STREET JouRNAL Staff Reporter 
WASHINGTON-The second-ranking offi· 
cia! at the Pentagon suggested the president 
should delay this year's 10% personal tax· 
rate cut, but acknowledged he might be sent 
to the "woodshed" for the comment. 
Paul Thayer, who recently became dep· 
uty Defense secretary, made th~ suggestion 
in questioning by the House Budget Commit· 
tee. It sparked a testy exch<.nge between 
Mr. Thayer and Rep. Jack Kemp (R., N.Y.), 
a champion of tax cuts, accordng to a tran-
script of the hearing. . 
Mr. Thayer, who had been chairman and 
chief executive officer of LTV Corp., has 
been in his job for only a few weeks. 
"Thon >'~~ked at yesterday's hearing 
· ' · -- ,..re,r-ol. 
"el 
tri 
_By now, you've probably decided 
You may have also decided 
capital involved in choosing the 
ware, and the right people. We 1 
free seminar will tell you why. 
· We'll demonstrate how yo· 
your order entry, billing, invent 
payables, and payroll-in shor 
pany's accounting. We'll do it 2 
small step at a time, or in one 
All with no contract to sigr 
investment. And, most importc 
of your business. ADP, alone, 
ing services by on-line and 01 
by pick-up and delivery meth 
your individual needs. You cr 
help you need now, then gro 
Before you risk your b1 
the high price of a compute! 
· point to attend our free sem 
nothing to lose, because thl 
ends with a handshake, noJ 
Call today to make yo 
seminar now being held in 
Atlanta Area Dates 
Atlanta March 8th, 9tl 
15th, 16th, 22 
23rd, 24th 
Boston Area Dates 
Newton March 4th, 1' 
V.brcester March 8th 
Framingham March 9th 
Nashua, NH March 15th 
Danvers March 16th 
Boston March22nd, 
Braintree March 24th 
Long Island Area Dates 
Melville March 8th, 
lOth, 15th, 
22m!, 23rd 
Miami Area Dates 
West Palm Beach March 8th 
lOth 
Miami March 151 
17th 
Ft. Lauderdale March 22 
24th 
job 12/28/82 
THIRD DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, 
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
' r 
The i ssue presented is whether \ sale ~toA~~Qrchases 
<:~ ) { \ 
1~1 I 
OJlfV ,( j 
by State and local fhospi tals of pharmaceutical products 
for resale in competition with private retail pharmacies 
I L .. 
~Le exempt from the proscriptions of the Clayton Act, 18 
Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 




association of retail 
pharmacists and pharmacies doing business in Jefferson 
w 
• County, Alabama',' Ji! rQ§ "''IIICo fa s {assignee of its members' 
~ commenced this action in 1978 in the D~ 
for the Northern District of Alabamal/; -
-~ 
-------c below) are Ftffeen ;-
defendants A~ pharmaceutical manufacturers~ 
the Boa r d o f Trustees of the University of Alabama/.\ 
) 
--------------~~--~~~~and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The 
University operates a medical center, including hospitals, 
-------.... - . ,_jYAeH.,......with - tate .,,......,.;.loy and [ m:dical 
2. 
school. Located in the University's medical center are 
two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county 
hospital, existing as a public corporation 
_jttjt:e!ts:llll-~~ Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive 
relief under § § 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
o.na 
§§15~ 26, for alleged violations 
ttY\d 
of §2(a)~) of the 
Clayton Act, as amended by the 
a.J 
u.s.c. §§13 (a) ~f). Petitioner 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
(}.t 
contends that j:espondent 
manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their products to 
the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper Green 
charjeJ petdlaYJer'.5. fl'lttr~J.f'r> 
Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those ~·=·=-•~~~i~~--5'l•L•c~] 
~r like products~~~~-.-~--~=-~-. .... L Petitioner 
1section 2 (a) of 
Robinson-Patman Act, 
relevant part: 
the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
15 U.S.C. §13 (a), provides in 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate 
in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce, where such 
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or 
resale within the United States ... , and where 
the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any 
person who either grants or knowingly receives 
the benefit of such discrimination, or with 
customers of either of them •... 
3. 
i*d:lle-r alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies 
knowingly induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2 
sold 
and drugs so procured to the 
general public in direct competition with privately owned 
pharmacies. 
/+f; f;Mer 




discrimination is not exempted from the proscriptions of 
3 the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c. 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, se:tting forth as:- ground~ 00£ 
-Dismissal that state purchases 4 are exem~as a matter of 
law CE:om the sanctions of §2} In granting respondents' 
motions, the District Court expressly accepted as true the 
allegations that local retail pharmacies had been injured 
2section 2(f), 15 u.s.c. §13(f), provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination 
in price which is prohibited by this section. 
3section 13c provides: 
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of 
this title, shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, 
hospitals, and charitable institutions not 
operated for prof' . 
a~ 
4656 F.2d 92 8 (CAS 1981) (reprinting District 
Court's opinion~ Appendix). 
4. 
by the challenged price discrimination and that at least 
some of the state purchases were not exempt under §13c. 5 
The District Court held that "governmental purchases are, 
without regard to 15 u.s.c. §13c, beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 
traditional governmental purposes." 656 F.2d 92, 102 
(1981). 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
affirmed~$l"~..r~y "on the basis of the district 
court's Memorandum of Opinion." 7 656 F.2d, at 93. 
We granted certiorari because :he · S1!Ue-:pJ;~sente.d is 
1 '> ('("~ '· ( 11 $ ~ ~ g 2 
A important question of federal law6 
We 
__::;- set1<1ed-by this Court. arul[ now reverse. 
()./lR ~ 4(} 
5"state purchases" ~-•{sales to and purchases by 
a State and its agencies. 10 
6Petitioner's antitrust claims were 
solely on the basis that State purchases are 
the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F.2d, at 103 
oe s not here base i.ts d1:Ci "S ion -upo-n--..-t'lb---a.-e+-'5 
doctrine as explicated Parker 
341 1943 .... " . e ave- no-o-ccasion 
"· . 
w ether some ot er rule of law might justify dismissal of 
petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims. 
7The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, 
agreed that "[t)he claims against the Board must ... be 
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself." 
656 F.2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages 
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this 
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision. 





The issue pres~nted by this case is We 
are not concerned with sales to or purchases by the 
federal government. Nor are we concerned with State 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental 
functions. 8 
i!o- /flY! 1 t-ed. tb 
1 zl:y Rather, the issue before us 
tJ.jltfiiS"f 
State purchases for the purpose of competing ~ private 
e nte rprise--with the advantage of discriminatory prices--
market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that 
the Act exempts such State purchases. Assuming, without 
deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply 
_______ 6i)_we -~ 
ondents argue that application of the Act to 
purcha s by bhe State of Alabama would present a 
signi icant ri~ of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and 
that therefore i any construction of the Act to include such 
purchases~ See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago, 440 u.s. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, 
however, of a constitutional issue ~ising from the 
application of the Act in this case~:!\e retail sale of 
pharmace ical drugs is not 'Indisputably ' [an] 
attribu e[] o f state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. Wyoming, 
( 1982) (quoting Hodel v. 
inia Surface Minin & Reclamation Association Inc., 
, ( It 1s s1mp y too ate 1n t e 
day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate States under 
its €ommerce ~lause powers when they are engaged in 
propfletary ac"ti vi ties. See, e. g. , Parden v. Terminal 
Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188-189, 192-193 (1964). If the 
Tenth Amendment protects certain State purchases from the 
Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, those purchases be protected 
on a case-by-case basis. Cf. Cit of Lafa ette v. 




ul 111e State purchases ~ for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, and that ( therefore such purchases 
• 
{• .I 
are exempt, we that exemption appll~~ where a 7 
State has chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
In construing a statute, we look first to the 
~ f-t:t tttfory -
~nguage itself. The Robinson-Patman Act 
~es n~ by its ter~exempt State purchases. The only 8 
is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 u.s.c. §13c. 9 
Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory 
language--'persons' and 'purchasers'~ficiently broad 
_(_ 12, 
to cover governmental bodies. 15 u.s.c. §~3(a,f) ." 656 8 
F 2d t 99 . 10 . , a This concession was compelled by several 
thf$ 
f -.. c t' d . . 11 o ~ our s ec1s1ons. In City of Lafayette v. 
9The District Court properly assumed, for purposes 
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the 
hospital purchases would not be covered by the §13c 
exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express 
exemption would support summary judgment in cases against 
State hospitals purchasing for their own use. 
10The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly 
in the antitrust statutes. See 15 u.s.c. §§7, 12, 15. 
11see, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 u.s. 159, 162 
(1942) (holding that the words "any person" in §7 of the 
Sherman Act include States); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~ 
7. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 395 (1978), we 
r. 
stateJ without qualification that -t!!:E::I!:I!ai~.--""' 
v 
~t:e:~-=!t!ll!!b:lt:;=IWIM"Ulhe definition of 'person' or 'persons' 
embraces both cities and States." 12 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette13 
~~CJ 
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 u.s. 390, 396 (1906) 
( ing-:; t a municipality is a "person" within the 
meaning of §8 of the Sherman Act and the city could 
maintain a treble-damages action under §7, the predecessor 
of §4 of the Clayton Act). See also Pfize Inc. v. 
Government of India, 4 34 U.S. 308, 317 ( 197 ) (hold· n'J 
hat a foreign nation is a "person" · ·' '1• §4 of the 
Clayton Act) . 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to 
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive 
standards of other federal laws which impose ... sanctions 
u~on 'persons.'" Cit~ of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
L1ght Co., 435 U.S. 89, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. 
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934). One case is of 
particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. v. United 
States, 313 u.s. 450 (1941), the Court considered the 
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1) 
(1976 ed.) (repealed in 1978), "a statute which 
essentially is an anti trust provision serving the same 
purposes as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act." City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 
402 n.l9. The Court here expressly found that a 
municipality was a "person" within the meaning of the 
statute. See 313 u.s., at 467-468. See also City of 
Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 401-402 n.l9. 
12The word "purchasers" necessarily has a meaning as 
inclusive as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 
( 19 36) (remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton 
Anti trust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. 
The pending bill does not segregate any particular class 
of purchasers, or exempt any special class of 
purchasers."). 
l3The only apparent difference between the scope of 
the Q laws is the extent to which the activities 
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's 
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the ~ommerce Clause, 
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 4 - u.s. 1~ 199-
201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover 
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is 
Footnote continued on next page. 
TV\ st-tm > 
S trOV\Jf 1 
e K~wtp troJII 
fhe f la. l'll 
su11es~ 
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8. 
from the case before us on the ground that it involved the 
Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 
()tAf 
Such 
distinction ignores specific reference to the 
,p(' 
Robinson-Patman Act in *-- discussion of the all-inclusive 
nature of the term "person." 435 u.s., at 397 n.l4. Nor 
do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in 
that-Ac~~fferently than we have in the Clayton Act, 




g IZIJt&lil 'h!l compete with privy 
enterpris~ u_n_l_e_s_s----a---d--i _f _f_e_r_e_n_t legislative intent is 
otherwise subject to the Act. 
14 Indeed, the House committee report specifically 
states that "[t)he special definitions of section 1 of the 
Clayton Act will apply without repeti tio to the terms 
concerned where they appear in this bil , since it is 
r)o~t. 6-~~f'j, designed to become by amendment a part of hat act." H.R. 
~11 t+1t ~ Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d S . 17 (1936): S. 
? 11Y rrc6-l Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1 76 . See 80 Cong. 
tl\ ;J,et1 7 Rec. 3116 ( 19 36) ("Many have comp ned because the 
/u"1utJ1C ' provisions of the bill apply to 1 any person engaged in 
commerce. 1 The original Clayton Act contains that 
exact language, and it" is carried into the bill under 
consideration. The language of the Clayton Act w used 
because it has been construed b the courts." ;zhat t e 
the Clayton and Rob1nson-Patman Acts 
construed consistent! with eac 
iven their common 
) (remarks of Rep. 
("The.._ Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a 
new policy or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted 
in 1914, and it was the purpose of that act to do just 
what this law sets out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 
( 19 36) (remarks of Senator Logan) • 
1 
9. 
apparent from the purpose and history 
A 1 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes 
of the antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. 
On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the 
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has 
recognized that those laws represent "a carefully studied 1 
[-them] 
attempt to bring within~~._.-aama ........ ~ 
engaged in business whose activities might restrain or 
monopolize commercial intercourse among the states." 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 
322 u.s. 533, 553 (1944) . 16 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State 1 
~ -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.__. .. ~ See, 
v. Alaska, 451 u.s. 259, 266 (1981): Train v. 
Public Interest Research GrouJ?, Inc., J26 u.s. 
L (1976) z ' 'I a 1 • 'iP'iiitiM3 iii i be Court has_......, 
considered "how far Congress intendea to extend its 
mandate under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the 
answer in its "purpose and legislative history." Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 197 (1974). See 
FTC v. Sim_2licity Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959): 
AUtomatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72, 
78 (1953). 
l6see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 
434 U.S. 308, 312-313 (1978): Mandeville Island Farms, 
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 u.s. 219, 236 
(1948) (atating that antitrust laws are "comprehensive in 
[their] terms and coverage, protecting all who are made 
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be 
perpetrated") (emphasis added). 
10. 
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court observed that "our 
cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy 
presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust ~' at 787 (citing United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351 (1963); 1 
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)) • 17 In City 
of Lafayette, in applying anti trust laws to a city in 
competition with a private utility, we held that no 
exemption for local governments would be implied. JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, writing for the Court, emphasized the purposes 1 
and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic choices 
~ =tf 
made by public corporation~ •.• f esigned as they are to 
assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, 
are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader 
interests of national economic well-being than are those 1 
of private corporations acting in furtherance of the 
interests of ..• its shareholders." 435 u.s.' at 403~ 
17see, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & 
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 
(1981); Cit~ of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 
435 u.s. 3 9, 398, 399 (1978); Abbott Laboratories v. 
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 u.s. 1, 12 
(1976); United States v. National Assn. Securities 




These principles, and the purposes they further, have 
been helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson- 1 
Patman Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMON stated for the Court in 
Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 
Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
It has been said, of course, that the 
antitrust laws, and Robinson-Patman in 1 
particular, are to be construed liberally, and 
that the exceptions from their application are 
to be construed strictly. United States v. 
McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956); 
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733 1 
(1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 u.s. 
642, 646-647 (1969). The Court has recognized, 
also, that Robinson-Patman "was enacted in 1936 
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large 
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 1 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater 
purchasing power." FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 
U.S. 341, 349 (1968). Because ~the Act ( ~ 
18I . '1 . . f n one Important sense, reta1 ompet1t1on rom 
State agencies can be more invidious than that from chain-
stores, i1 'r I i h the Robinson-Patman Act .-r'r i l&Ill •:r 
· See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 
75-76 (1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.q,.,363 U.S. 536, 
543-544 (1960)-.- Y:Oiume ...., purchas~ permits any 
larqe, ~la · 1 efficient~retail organization to pass on 
cost savings to c sumers, ) and to that extent, consumers 
benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the extent 
that lower prices result from l~s overhead, in the form 
of no taxes, federal grants, State subsidies, afltd free 
public services, agencies merely redistribute the burden 
of ~ costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at 
large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act 
would give State agencies a significant additional 
advantage in the commercial market, perhaps enough to ~ 
eliminate marginal or small priva~ competitors. 
Co rs, as citizens, ult~'matel rl pay for the full 
costs of t s~l~ by 
1
th ate agencies involved in 
this case. ~ -(is. eason to assume that such 
agencies will provid e retail distribution 1f more 
efficiently than private retail pharmacistsA onsumers 
._. .. 111:1~""" will suffer to the extent that ~t te retail 
activities eliminate more efficient, private retail 
distribution systems. 
12. 
remedial, it is to be construed broadly to 1 
effectuate its purposes. See Tchere12nin v. 
Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 336 (1967): Peyton v. 
Rowe, 391 u.s. 54, 65 (1968). 
1 
Thus, in view of the Act's remedial purposes, and the 
broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court, 
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels 
us to create an exemption is on those who would argue that 
Congress intended -but did not choose to say so~-that 1 
' .. 
State agencies could compete with private business free 
from the Act's constraints. 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting 
respondents' contention that there is an exemption for 1 
State purchases. ae 33£&. iiM& i leaving 
to compete unfairly with the 
an issue of 
Yet there is nothing whatever in the 
Senate or House committee reports, or in the floor 1 
foe ust'Aj o.., 
debates, the issue. 
I 
There is, however, evidence that some members of 
th"'r 
Congress were aware of the possibility .. the 










the federal Government-,.IIIIJ!•M••-'1~ 
13. 
The 
most relevant legislative history is the testimony of the 
Act's principal draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the 
6ommittee. 19 
19 
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your 
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to 
the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present 
Clayton Act does so ••.. 
Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government 
gets huge discounts..... Now, would that 
discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should 
unless a discount contrary to the present bill 
would be barred--that is, the present law--would 
be barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: 
The Federal Government is not in competition 
with other buyers from these concerns. 
The Federal Government is saved by the same 
distinction.... They are not in competition 
with anyone else who would buy. 
Rep. Hancock: It would eliminate 
competitive bidding all along the line, would it 
not, in classes of goods that would be covered 
by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding 
on Government orders? 
Rep. Hancock: Government, State, city, 
municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would 
not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It 
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding 
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would 
with the Government. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
14. 
~ ~ i(} ~ lf"h 
~ atta•'ll] 1Fh&~ 'i'&8'!1lE&tua 'aa&l:i!JB'I !lftiseat the application of 1 
the Act to State purchases for consumption, one conclusion 
is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would 
apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at least 
some circumstances. Thus, his comments arferd ne SYppo~  
the exemption found by the courts below for all such 1 
purchasing. 20 In the absence of any other relevant 
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the 
city, county exactly the same as anybody else, 
same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell 
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would 
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in 
this way. In the final analysis, it would 
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a 
particular case. If the two hospitals are in 
competition with each other, I should say that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 19 35 Hearings] . 
20Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief 
to the House committee. He first rejected outright the 
desirability of ~ exemptions. See 1935 Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 249. He then posed the question whether "the 
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that 
"[t]he answer is found in the principle of statutory 
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit 
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or 
privileges of the sovereign unless it so expressly 
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence 
from the common law ..... " But he also noted that 
"requiring a showing of effect upon competition, will 
further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the 
Government." Id., at 250 (footnotes omitted). 
The "statutory construction" referred to by Teegarden 




evidence, it 2 tli 
see 
cannot~•a .. a~i~s~•.eeea••~•,t~e legislative 
an unexpressed 
exemption, enter ~ private competitive 
markets with 
Act, 
[S] tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in 
matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily 
apply to the Government unless it is expressly 
so provided: and it does not seem to have been 
e policy of the Congress to make such statutes 
app ble to the Government .... ~ 4 
~----..... The Acfl ~: :~ , ! 7 9 $,. merely amended 
the ActJ -,r' Q hJP Liz; tf J!L •• ,t::tnd, in so far as 
I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded 
heretofore as applicable to Go t 
contracts ~ !'rffVr~'~Rtf- &elu'.rb>' j.~ ave e 
Id., at 54~ f~ter in t e letter1 u[~~hrase "Federal 
Governmenij.\' and 3d ' 'ng other reasons "for avoiding a 
J Footnote continued on next page. 
1 
16. 
F{~ ~ ~ ~ '(___If(, M ;;:;;;<.~  ondents nevertheless argue that subsequent · 
legislative events and decisions of LZ azul District 
Courts confirm that State purchases are outside the 
.1! a.l !;'11 · ' ~') 
construction that would make theftatute applicable to the 
Government in violation of th apparent policy of the 
Congress in such matters". The Attorney General 
or-_ ..... pressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western 
Un1 Tele ra h Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which 
~ Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph 
rates to a federal corporation that competed with private 
enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the 
Act's applicability to State agencies. Indeed, in the 
following year, the Attorney General of California 
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See 19 32-19 39 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
,[55, 156, at 415-416 ( 19 37) . Two other early State 
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether 
the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See 
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ,[55,157, at 416 (1937): 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 
142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United 
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to 
municipal and public institutions." W. Patman, The 
Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) 
(interpreting Attorney General's op1n1on as exempting 
State purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some 
weight, but he appears only to be interpreting--or 
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions 
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951 
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser" 
to include "the United States, any State or any political 
subdivision thereof." H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951): H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is 
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable 
that he believed that the original intent needed to be 
stated exp~ neg~ee-- -his ~ea~i "; of the Attorney 
General' s ,(const!uct_ion of the Ac t(!)' ·;X:~tra"W In any 
case, Congress's failure to pass these bills probably 
stems from a reluctance to subject federal purchases to 
the Act. 
It bears repeating, however, that none of these 
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the 
State purchases alleged here: purchases to gain 
competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional functions. 




fL ~, ' as of the the 2 
01'\ 
subsequent events 
investigating practices in the pharmaceutical industry ~ 
ir'IJJca.ted {he A-ct d.rd ;,or ~owr 
---2-'~a~~ination in favor of State hospital~ 2 
and t_ Chairman Paul Dixon 
- Fetfera.( TJ-a.~ CdM,... f$Siiiu) 
£2 st~t, 4Lf~, 
1., u .~.t ~ 13c 
22The most important r elevant event n the Robinson-
Patman Act's post-enactment history is t e amendment in foi 
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions. Whether the( 
existence of an exemption in §13c suppor s an exemption 
all State purchases depends upon whether 
§13c is interpreted to apply to ~State agencies. That 
is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare 81 Cong. Rec. 8706 ( 193 7) (remarks of Rep. 
Pettengill) (readi.mj similar amendment .as- not includ I "a 
charitable institution that was not supported in any part 
by public funds"))._ Hf::!tR. ep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d A, If} 
Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) with 81 Cong. Rec. 8706 (1937) , .. 
(statement of Rep. Wal er) ( e.Einq- ha.t §13c woulcl apply 
to institutions financed by cities, counties, and States). 
See also Cit~ of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397 n.l4 
(i ~ing widiin the Nonprofit Institutions Act "public 
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local 
government"): Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19 
n .10: 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 ( 19 37) (exemption codifies the 
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address :!iCE 1'ht~ l~$tA.t' lurR6) 
23 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman 
Act: Hearings Before the Spec1al Subcommittee on Small 
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select 
Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 73-77, 623 (1969-
1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, 
National Association of Wholesalers: Harold Halfpenny, 
counsel for the Automative Association of Wholesalers): 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory 
Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the 
House OI,. Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Ear~ 
Kintner, former FT Commissioner, on behalf of NARD). There 
----------~~~~~~~ also was that institutional purchasers 
frequently drugs at lower prices than 'fll~ I 1 
Foot te continued on next page. ~
18. 
~----...., 
~ede~al _ _:rrade Commissio disclaimed any authority over 
transactions involving State health care programs. 24 It 
wlr.e1her 
is not at all clear, however, ~[chairman Dixon 
a ;n IVvct, r-
,..illlillli:2:11w:::::O:v cases the State agency ~ competmg 2 
with private retailers, although he was aware of such 
practice by institutional purchasers. 25 Other statements 
express little more than informed, interested opinions on 
the issue presented, and ~not entitled to the 
consideration appropriate for the constructions given 2 
contemporaneously with the Act's passage. 26 See supra, at 
~retail pharmacies, see id., at 15, 
and many witnesses complained that 
adversely affected competition, see 
253-262, 273, 291. 
24see H.R. Rep. 
258, 318, 1093-1094, 
this discrimination 
id., at A-140-141, 
at 74. 
poseJ. his tes , 
further ues tions 
on the market 
expanding 
care programs~ ( i i) 
ent~ to purchase from _ drug 
facturers at su stantially below wholesale cost~ and 
hospitals, 'both nonprofit and proprietary, selling 
atients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his 
]; I I s to the Subcommittee, Chairman--nixon declined to 
discuss further the last categor , which involved §l3c 
1ssues. Id., at 74. H1s disclaimer envisioned 
State purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in 
competition with private enterprise. Thus, ~he issue Jl 
presente'OA i1 I 1 i:11 •••8 is most similar to thl. issuer' -
I I • • not discussed 
by Chairman Dixon. 
26Assuming that this post-enactment commentary 
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to iillr Congress .-,. 
-i-tlill•ii!i•--qui te a leap given the brevity and conclusory 
Footnote continued on next page. 
19. 
n. 21. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's that 
~·d 
it ~ not focusi:';a~lit;1!1~ on the question presented by 
this case. The Subcommittee found that the difference 
For 
between drug prices t• § 7 retailers and 
government~omers is ~xtremely substantial" and "not 
always fully explainable by either cost justifiable 
quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors 
inherent in bulk distribution." ~ ~ext 
~lr:i) 
conclusion ,~it stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies 
of individual manufacturers seem and in some instances 
appear violative of the Robinson-Patman Act ••.• " 
0 ep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968) ) Thus, it 
22 
22 
is quite possible that the Subcommittee considered some 23 
State purchasing at discriminatory prices--about which it 
had heard testimony--to be unlawful. The Subcommitte 
nature of the Subcommittee report--"the views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring 
the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Price, 
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer Product 
Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. , 44 7 U.S. 102, 
117-118 & n.l3 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
u.s. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 
434 U.S. 192, 200 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 




report did include th awkwardly worded statement: "There 
is no basis apparent ..• why the mandate of the Robinson-
Patman Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug 2 
sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, 
profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription 
drug competition at the retail level with disfavored 
retail druggists." Id., at 79 (emphasis added}. 27 This 
unexceptional statement, however, simply says that private 2 
MtJ.Y 
institutional purchases not ~, .. =-••••;~ facilitate 
~-~ tJtrll(.(j~ 
unfair l competition ~ sales at 
discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing 
expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this 
case. 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, 
courts considering the coverage have concluded 
)+--
that !} , does not apply to government purchasersja.D 
(()W'"'t 
~ nola e has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, 
if:;
~ 
27The Subcommitte~ so concluded that the 1938 
Amendment was "design~ to afford immunity to private 
nonprofit insti tutionsr ... o the extent the sales are for 
the nonprofit institu1:ion' s 'own use,'" H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more 





under either ~(a) rn whe-.:- the 2 
discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or 
county. There are serious infirmaties in this broad 
assertion: (i) this Court has never held or suggested that 
an exemption for State purchases existed; 28 (ii) the 
number of judicial decisions even considering the Act's 2 
application to purchases by State agencies is relatively 
f I 
small; 29 (iii) we are cite Q no Court of Appeals -
decision that has expressly adopted1 before the decision 
I interpretation of §2; (iv) some of the 
District Court cases upon which respondents rely are 
simply inapposite; 30 (v) it is not clear that 2.!!Y. 
28rndeed, our opinions suggest--_...._ 
precisely the opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., 
at 397 n.l4; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 n.lO; 
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
u.s. 508, 513 (1972). 
Fewer 
29The parties than a 
dozen cases, many with unpublished opinions, that 
involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to 
State purchases. See notes 30-32, infra. Cf. Blue Chip 
Starnes v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723, 733 (1975) 
(aff1rming rule adopted by "virtually all lower federal 
courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases 
presenting this question over the past quarter century") 
(emphasis added); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 
U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting consistent, "longstanding" 
construction of Robinson-Patman Act after "nearly four 
decades of litigation"). 
30~ Pacific Enginee r ing & Production Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1175,054, at 96,721, 
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (di c ta) (involving federal government 
as ultimate purchaser; relying on Attorney General's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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22. 
published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
(:xempti~~ State purch~ to dismiss a Robinson-Patman 
Act claim alleging injury as a result of government 
competition in the private market; 31 and (vi) there are 26 
several cases that suggest the Robinson-Patman Act is 
op1n1on as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition 
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 
(1977); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under 
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on 
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in 
its purchase of property considered necessary for the 
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in 
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in 
buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), 
aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving 
issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to 
State agency), cert. denied, 318 u.s. 780 (1943). 
31cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 
No. C-77-0094 (D Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished 
opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice 
Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to State 
}gencies), aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) lCI liM! 
(COmplaint insufficient because it failed to ~~¥ 
products or purchasers subject toSU~inatory 
treatment); Portland Retail Dru ists~ssociation v. 
Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (b Or. Sept. 11, 1972) 
(unpublished, oral opinion), vacated nd remanded, 510 
F.2d 486 (CA9 1974) ~13c applied to the purchases 
and sales), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 1 (1976). One 
District Court has suggested in alternative hol~gs that 
there is an exemption for State purchas._ for 
nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (D Idaho May 26, 1966) 
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) 
(purchases by Utah State University within the scope of 
Nonprofit Institutions Act; expressly not addressing 
whether there is a "so-called governmental exempt ion") , 
cert. denied, 389 u.s. 898 (1967). 
:a f the ill&&e l'rae•a•wtd hare i111 it · See Sachs v. Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 16 (SONY 1955) 
(dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d (CA2 ), cert. 
R~nied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956). 




applicable to State purchases for resale purposes. 32 This 
judicial track record is in no sense comparable to the 
of judical decisions upon which this Court unbroken chain 
r ~ "'''tl~5-'r 
~ relied .......... ~~·~or ascertaining a construction of 
the anti trust laws that Congress over a long period of 
~Ao~lJ '/'htff' be 
time has chosen to preserve. 'lvl'e ? 
<et ~~s t111 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations 
of various commentators and executive officials. But the 
2 
most authoritative of these sources indicate that the 2 
question presented is unsettled, 33 others do not foreclose 
32see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. 
Supp. 328, 330-333 (ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611, 
612 (CAB 1981); Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. 
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill. 
1979) ( Act inapplicable to purchases by the 
Army and Air Force Exchange Service because of sovereign 
immunity, but possibly · State agencies 
would face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687-
692 (CA7 1980); A.J. Goodman & Sons v. United Lacquer 
Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D Mass. 1949). 
Other cases cut against~ exemption for State purchases. 
See Munici,ali~ of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cablef Ltd., 547 
F. Supp. 6 3, 6 1 (fi Alaska 1982); Sterling Ne son & Sons 
v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (D. Idaho 1965), 
aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 
u.s. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & 
Development Association, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY 
1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 
439, 443 (ND Ohio 1952). 
33see SA z. Cavitch, Business Organizations 
§105D.Ol[8) [c), at lOSD-45 to -46 (1978) (opinions 
"divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and ~Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70 
(1982) ~I g • !J \"there is some conflict among the 
authorities as to whether sales to states and 
munici~alities are excluded from Robinson-Patman 
liabil1ty"); id. §24.06[2), at 24-75 to 24-76; E. Kintner, 
A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 ( 1970) ("Although [the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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our holding, 34 and in some cases support it. 35 Thus, 
Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a 
universally held interpretation of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments- 2: 
-whether legislative, judie ial, or in commentary--rarely 
have considered the specific issue before us. There is 
simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to 
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing--
with a price advantage--in the private retail market. 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, 
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to 
promote. Though Congress is well aware of these 
Attorney General's] opinion appears to have settled the 
matter where the federal government is concerned, some 
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act 
to purchases by state and local governments.")~ F. Rowe, 
Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 84 
n.l66 (1962). 
34some deal only with sales to the federal 
government. See Letter from Comptroller General to 
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973), 
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819 
(1973). Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, 
whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail 
sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive 
Order 10,9 36, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 
(1962). 
35see 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979)~ 47 N.C.A.G. 





criticisms~ the Act has remained in effect for almost half 2 
[x] 
"[ t is not for [this Court] to 
indulge in ..• policy-making in the field of antitrust 
legislation .... Our function ends with the endeavor to 
ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of 
the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of 2 
Congress." United States v. Cooper, 312 u.s., 600, 606 
(1941} 0 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act 
to all combinations of business and capital organized to 
suppress commercial competition is in harmony with the 3 
spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." 
South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 u.s., at 553. The 
legislative history is replete with references to the 
economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other 
large organizations for resale in competition with the 3 
small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the 
absence of exemption, to think that 
congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses~ such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, 
J 
Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest 3 
26. 
pl-.tJ.r ltl ~ c eu 1TttA,f 
prod.t.A-tt"5 
------~--
competitor of them all. 3 create an exemption here 
clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
We hold that sales to ~ purchases "by) State and 
local government hospitals for resale in competition with 3 
private pharmacies are not exempt from the proscriptions 
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is reversed and remanded for 
r It .-
~oceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 3 
C2 i-_Lc_e n_j:( __ I'\O_te __ '_1 ' __ a_r_ 2 ___ :!_) 
job 12/29/82 
THIRD DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, 
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of 
pharmaceutical products to hospitals operated by State and 
local governments for resale in competition with private 
retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the 
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 u.s.c. §13 (the Act). 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists 
and pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, 
Alabama, commenced this action in 1978 in the District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama as the assignee 
of its members' claims. Respondents, the defendants 
below, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the Cooper 
Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates a 
medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school. 
Located in the University's medical center are two 
2 0 
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, 
existing as a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive 
relief under §§4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 u.s.c. §§15 
and 26, for alleged violations of §2 (a) and (f) of the 
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
u.s.c. §§13 (a) and (f). Petitioner contends that the 
respondent manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their 
products to the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper 
Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged 
petitioner's members for 1 ike products. Petitioner 
alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly 
induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2 and sold 
1sect ion 2 (a) of 
Robinson-Patman Act, 
relevant part: 
the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
15 u.s.c. §13 (a), provides in 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate 
in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce, where such 
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or 
resale within the United States •.• , and where 
the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any 
person who either grants or knowingly receives 
the benefit of such discrimination, or with 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
3 • 
drugs so procured to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
3 from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c. 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, on the ground that state 
purchases4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of §2. In granting respondents' motions, the 
District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations 
that local retail pharmacies had been injured by the 
challenged price discrimination and that at least some of 
the state purchases were not exempt under §13c. 5 The 
customers of either of them .•.. 
2section 2(f), 15 u.s.c. §l3(f), provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination 
in price which is prohibited by this section. 
3section 13c provides: 
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of 
this title, shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, 
hospitals, and charitable institutions not 
operated for profit. 
4 "State purchases" are defined as sales to and 
purchases by a State and its agencies. 
5656 F.2d 92, 98 (CAS 1981) (reprinting District 
Court's opinion as Appendix). 
4 . 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, 
without regard to 15 u.s.c. §13c, beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 
traditional governmental purposes." 656 F.2d 92, 102 
(1981) . 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a 
divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the 
district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F.2d, at 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important 
question of federal law. u.s. (1982). We now 
reverse. 
II 
The issue here is very narrow. We are not concerned 
with sales to the federal government. Nor are we 
6Petitioner's antitrust claims were dismissed 
solely on the basis that State purchases are exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F.2d, at 103 n.lO. We 
thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule 
of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-
Patman Act claims. 
7The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, 
agreed that "[t]he claims against the Board must ... be 
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself." 
656 'F.2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages 
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this 
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision. 
5. 
concerned with State purchases for consumption in 
traditional governmental functions. 8 Rather, the issue 
before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise--with the advantage 
of discriminatory prices--in the retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that 
the Act exempts such State purchases. Assuming, without 
deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to 
State purchases for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, and that such purchases are 
therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not 
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the private 
8Respondents argue that application of the Act to 
purchases by the State of Alabama would present a 
significant risk of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and 
that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
.. includ~such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, 
however, of a constitutional issue arising from the 
application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably '[an] 
attribut~] of state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. Wyoming, 
U.S. __ , __ (198/.) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Minin & Reclamation Association Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288 
) . It 1s s1mp y too ate 1n t e day to suggest that 
Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause 
powers when they are engaged in proprietary activities. 
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188-
189, 192-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects 
certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such 
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions, 
those purchases must be protected on a case-by-case basis. 
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 




In construing a statute, we look first to the 
statutory language itself. The Robinson-Patman Act by its 
terms does not exempt State purchases. The only express 
exemption is that for nonprofit institutions contained in 
9 15 U.S.C. §13c. Moreover, as the courts below conceded, 
"[t]he statutory language--'persons' and 'purchasers'--is 
sufficiently broad to cover governmental bodies. 15 
u.s.c. §§12, 13(a,f) ." 656 F.2d, at 99. 10 This 
concession was compelled by several of this Court's 
d 
. . 11 ec1s1ons. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
9The District Court properly assumed, for purposes 
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the 
hospital purchases would not be covered by the §13c 
exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express 
exemption would support summary judgment in cases against 
State hospitals purchasing for their own use. $u. roU. 2.2. ~· 
10The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly 
in the antitrust statutes. See 15 u.s.c. §§7, 12, 15. 
11see, e. ~., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 
(1942) (the wor s "any person" in §7 of he Sherman Act 
include States); Chattanoo a Foundr & Pie Works v. City 
of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) ( a a municipality 
is a "person" within the meaning of §8 o the Sherman Act 
and maintain a treble-damages action under 
§7, the predecessor of §4 of the Clayton Act). See also 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 317 
(1978) (a foreign nation is a "person" under §4 of the 
Clayton Act) . 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to 
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, we 
stated without qualification that "the definition of 
'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12 
from the case before us on the ground that it 
Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. Such a 
distinction ignores our specific reference to the 
Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive 
standards of other federal laws which impose ••. sanctions 
upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Li~Jht Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
Un1ted States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944): Oh1o v. 
Helvering, 292 u.s. 360, 370 (1934). One case is of 
particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. v. United 
States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the 
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1) 
(1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which essentially 
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the 
anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 402 n.l9. 
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a 
"person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U.S., at 
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401-402 
n.l9. 
12The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive 
as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) 
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton Anti trust Act 
contains terms general to all purchasers. The pending 
bill does not segregate any particular class of 
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers."). 
13The only apparent difference between the scope of 
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities 
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's 
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, 
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-
201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover 
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is 
otherwise subject to the Act. 
8. 
nature of the term "person." 435 U.S., at 397 n.l4. Nor 
do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in 
that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act, 
which it amends. 14 In sum, the plain language of the Act 
strongly suggests that there is no exemption for State 
purchases to compete with private enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a 
different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose 
A-.., 
and history of the Act. examination of the 
legislative purpose and history reveals no such contrary 
intention. 15 
/ 
14 Indeed, the House and Senate ~ommittee reports 
specifically state that "[t)he speciaT definitions of 
section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply without repetition 
to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that 
act." H.R. Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 
(1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 
80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) ("Many have complained because 
the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in 
commerce.' The original Clayton Act contains that 
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under 
consideration. The language of the Clayton Act was used 
because it has been construed by the courts."). Given 
their common purposes, it should not be surprising that 
the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts 
should be construed consistently with each other. See 80 
Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Michener) ("The 
Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a 
new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it 
was the purpose of that act to do just what this law sets 
out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 (1936) (remarks of 
Senator Logan) . 





Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes 
of the antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. 
On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the 
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has 1 
recognized that these laws represent "a carefully studied 
attempt to bring within [them] every person engaged in 
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize 
commercial intercourse among the states." United States 
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 1 
553 (1944) • 16 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 
773 (1975) , the Court observed that "our cases have 
repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption 
15Although the face of the Act clearly contains no 
express exemption in favor of State purchases, we 
ertheless consider the legislative history. See, e. 
Watt v. Alaska, 451 u.s. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. 
orado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 
9-10 (1976). The Court previously has considered "how far 
Congress intended to extend its mandate under" the 
Robinson-Patman Act and found the answer in its "purpose 
and legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Cogp Paving 
Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 (1974). See FTC v. Simplicity 
Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959); Automatic Canteen 
Co. of ~merica v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 72, 78 (1953). 
:A'See, e. g.~fizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 
434 u.s. 308, 312-313 (1978); Mandeville Island Farms, 
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 u.s. 219, 236 
(1948) (antitrust laws are "comprehensive in [their] terms 
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the 
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated") 
(emphasis added) . 
10. 
against implicit exemptions" from the antitrust laws. 
Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National J 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351 (1963): California v. FPC, 369 
u.s. 482, 485 (1962)) . 17 In City of Lafayette, applying 
antitrust laws to a city in competition with a private 
utility, we held that no exemption for local governments 
would be implied. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court, J 
emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: 
"[T] he economic choices made by public corporations 
designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for 
community constituency, are not inherently more likely to 
comport with the broader interests of national economic 1 
well-being than are those of private corporations acting 
1fte orjCH'll~at/7JII. anJ 
in furtherance of the interests off . its shareholders." 
435 U.S., at 403 (footnotes omitted). See also id., at 
408. 18 
National Gerimedical Hospital & 
Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 
r.sni•iuu: Fewer & Light Ce. C -
18 In one important sense, retail competition from 
State agencies can be more invidious than that from chain-
stores, the particular targets of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have 13 
been helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-
Patman Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMON stated for the Court in 
Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn. , 
•• 1, 11-12 (1976): 
been said, of course, that the 
laws, and Robinson-Patman in 
· cular, are to be construed liberally, and 
that the exceptions from their application are 
to be construed strictly. United States v. 
McKesson & Robbins, 351 u.s. 305, 316 (1956); 
FMC v. Seatrain inas, Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733 
(1973); Perkins v. St~ ard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 
642, 646-647 (1969). The urt has recognized, 
also, that Robinson-Patman ' as enacted in 1936 
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large 
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones virtue of their greater 
purchasing power " FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 u.s. 
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 
U.S. 341, 349 (1968). Because the Act is 
remedial, it is to be construed broadly to 
effectuate its purposes. ~Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 u.s. 332, 3 6 ~(196'n; Peyton v. 
Rowe , 3 91 U. S . 54 , 6 5 ( 19 8 ) • 
/ 
See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 u.s. 69, 75-76 
(1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 u.s. 536, 543-544 
( 19 60) • Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to 
~s, and .to that extent, consumers benefit merely 
~ tr~m -~ economy of scale. But to the extent that lower 
prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal 
grants, State subsidies, free public services, and freedom 
from taxation, State agencies merely redistribute the 
burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens 
at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act ~uld ,_\ 
give State agencies a ~~gnificant additional advantag
o/' ~'CJ the commercial marke qt perhaps enough to eliminate 
marginal or small private competitors. Consumers, as 
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the 
drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case. 
Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies 
will provide retail distribution more efficiently than 
private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer to the 
extent that State retail activities eliminate more 







Thus, in view of the Act's remedial purposes, and the 
broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court, 
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels 
) us to create an exemption is on those who ~~~ argue that 
Congress intended, but did not choose to say, that State 16 
agencies 
fll4-1_ 
compete with private business free from the 
Act's constraints. 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting 
respondents' contention that there is an exemption for 17 
State purchases. Surely Congress would have discussed an 
issue of such importance before leaving State purchasers 
free to compete unfairly with the private sector. Yet 
~there is nothing whatever in the Senate or House committee ~ 
reports, or in the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 17 
There is evidence that some members of Congress were 
aware of the possibility that the Act would apply to 
governmental purchases. Most members, however, were not 
wi/11 
concerned ---- State purchases, but ?, • ::t, possible 
limitations on the federal Government. The most relevant 18 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's 
... 
13. 
principal draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House 
Judiciary Committee. 19 Although the testimony 
19 
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your 
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to 
the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present 
Clayton Act does so i ··· ~ 
/*~r. Lloyd: For i~tance, the Government 
gets huge discounts.r:~·. Now, would that 
discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should 
unless a discount contrary to the present bill 
would be barred--that is, the present law--would 
be barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: 
The Federal Government is not in competition 
with other buyers from these concerns . •••• 
~ The Federal Government is saved by the same 
:J distinction.... They are not in competition 
with anyone else who would buy. 
Rep. Hancock: It would eliminate 
competitive bidding all along the line, would it 
not, in classes of goods that would be covered 
by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding 
on Government orders? 
Rep. Hancock: Government, State, city, 
municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No: I think not. 
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would 
not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No: I would not want it. It 
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding 
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would 
with the Government. 
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the 
city, county exactly the same as anybody else, 
same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell 
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would 
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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ambiguous on the application of the Act to State purchases 
for consumption, one conclusion is certain: Teegarden 18 
expressly stated that the Act would apply to the purchases 
of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. 
Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found 
by the courts below for all such purchasing. 20 In the 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in 
this way. In the final analysis, it would 
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a 
particular case. If the two hospitals are in 
competition with each other, I should say that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings]. 
20Teegarden subsequently submit ted a writ ten brief 
to the House committee. He first rejected outright the 
desirability of ~ exemptions. See 1935 Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 249. He then posed the question whether "the 
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that 
"[t)he answer is found in the principle of statutory 
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit 
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or 
privileges of the sovereign unless it so expressly 
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence 
from the common law •.. .. " But he also noted that 
"requiring a showing .of erfect upon compe.t.-'tion, will 
preclude y possib ility of the bill af ting the 
a-~~~-- I at 25 0 (footnotes omitted). ~e 
construe 1 eegarden ~F 
, construc.t.ion- -of • 1 
cited suggest that this sovereign exceptio 
a government, when it passes a law, gives up 
only what it expressly surrenders. In the same year that 
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court stated 
that it could "perceive no reason for extending [the 
presumption against including the sovereign in a statute] 
so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from the 
otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, 
all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which 
is as capable of being obstructed by state as by 
individual action." United States v. California, 297 U.S. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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absence of any other relevant evidence, we cannot see a 19 
legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed 
exemption, to enter private competitive markets with 
congressionally approved price advantages. 21 
# 
175, 186 (l936)~ee California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553, 
562-563 (1957). • In the context of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, the rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden 
relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal 
government's purchases. The existence of such an 
exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper 
Corp., 312 u.s. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a 
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for 
treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that 
governmental purchasing would not compete with private 
purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the 
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies. That 
assumption, however, is inapplicable here. 
21six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney 
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from 
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to 
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539 
(1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the 
Act, the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., 
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily 
apply to the Government unless it is expressly 
so provided: and it does not seem to have been 
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes 
applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended 
the [Clayton Act] and, in so far as I am 
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded 
heretofore as applicable to Government 
contracts. 
Id~, at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General 
used the phrase "Federal Government," ibid., and gave 
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make 
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of 
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., 
at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon 
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 
U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the Court upheld the 
granting of favorable telegraph rates to a federal 
corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the 
Act's applicability to State agencies. Indeed, in the 
following year, the Attorney General of California 
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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t 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its 19 
legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that 
subsequent legislative events and decisions of District 
Courts confirm that State purchases are outside the scope 
of the Act. We turn therefore to the subsequent events on 
which respondents rely. 
A 
Act's proscriptions. See 1932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
1155,156, at 415-416 (1937). Two other early State 
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether 
the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See 
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 1155,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 
142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United 
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to 
municipal and public institutions." W. Patman, The 
Robinson-Patrnan Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patrnan Act 30 (1963) 
(interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting 
State purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some 
weight, but he appears only to be interpreting--or 
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions 
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951 
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser" 
to include "the United States, any State or any political 
subdivision thereof." H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is 
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable 
that he believed that the original intent needed to be 
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney 
General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, 
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably sterns from 
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. 
It bears repeating, however, that none of these 
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the 
State purchases alleged here: purchases to gain 
cornpeti tive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional functions. 
20 
17. 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 22 Testimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price 20 
discrimination in favor of State hospitals,23 and Federal 
Trade Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any 
22The most important relevant event in the Robinson-
Patman Act's post-enactment history is the amendment in 
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 
u.s.c. §13c. Whether the existence of an exemption in 
§13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases 
depends upon whether §13c is interpreted to apply to State 
agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a 
substantial issue in its own right. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 ( 1968) (suggesting that 
§13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (statement of Rep. Walter) (§13c would 
apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and 
States). See also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 
n.l4 (Nonprofit Institutions Act includes "public 
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by local 
government")~ Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19 
n.lO~ 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (exemption codifies the 
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here. 
23see, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman 
Act: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Small 
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select 
Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 73-77, 623 (1969-
1970) (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, 
National Association of Wholesalers~ Harold Halfpenny, 
counsel for the Automative Association of Wholesalers)~ 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory 
Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the 
House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl 
Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, on behalf of NARD). 
There also was testimony that institutional purchasers 
frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail 
pharmacies, see id., at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many 
witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely 
affected competition, see id., at A-14~141, 253-262, 273, 
291. ~ 
18. 
authority over transactions involving State health care 
programs. 24 It is not at all clear, however, whether 
Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the State 21 
agency competed with private retailers, although he was 
aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 25 
Other statements express little more than informed, 
interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not 
entitled to the consideration appropriate for the 
constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 26 See supra, at~ & n.21. 
24 See H.R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74. 
25After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee 
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the 
eroding influence on the retail druggists' market 
presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private 
group health care programs; (ii) the federal government's 
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at prices 
substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) instances of 
hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to 
outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his 
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to 
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c 
issues. Id., at 74. His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority 
envisionea-5tate purchases for welfare programs, not for 
resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the 
issue presented here is most similar to the issue not 
discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
26Assuming that this post-enactment commentary 
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite 
a leap given the brevity and conclusory nature of the 
Subcommittee report--"the views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 u.s. 304, 313 
(1960). See, e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 u.s. 102, 117-118 & n.l3 (1980); 
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979); 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions 
that it did not focus on the question presented by this 
case. The Subcommittee found that the difference between 22 
drug prices for retailers and government customers "is 
extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable 
by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies 
of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." 
H.R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968}. In 22 
the next conclusion, it stated that "[n] umerous acts and 
policies of individual manufacturers seem~ in 
----.. 
some 
instances app~ violative of the Robinson-Patman Act .••. " 
Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommittee 
considered some State purchasing at discriminatory prices- 23 
-about which it had heard testimony--to be unlawful. The 
Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded 
statement: "There is no basis apparent ... why the mandate 
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to 
discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 u.s. 192, 200 (1977} 
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the 
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history."}. 
23 
20. 
institutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the 
extent there is prescription drug competition at the 
retail level with disfavored retail druggists." Id., at 
79 (emphasis added) .27 This unexceptional statement, 
however, simply says that private institutional purchases 24 
may not facilitate unfair retail competition through sales 
at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing 
expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this 
case. 
B 24 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, 
courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that 
it does not apply to government purchasers; no court has 
imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either 
§2(a) or §2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 25 
sale to a State, city, or county. There are serious 
infirmaties in this broad assertion: (i) this Court has 
27The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private 
nonprofit institutions ..• to the extent the sales are for 
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more 
the construction of §13c than it would the intent of the 
1936 Congress. 
21. 
never held or suggested 
~ALJ 
that~n exemption for State 
purchases ~ .. li~ , 28 (ii) the number of judicial decisions 
even considering the Act's application to purchases by 25 
State agencies is relatively small: 29 (iii) respondents 
cite no Court of Appeals decision that has expressly 
adopted their interpretation of §2 before the decision 
below; ( iv) some of the District Court cases upon which 
respondents rely are simply inapposite;30 (v) it is not 26 
28Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the 
opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.l4; 
Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19 n.lO; California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 u.s. 508, 
513 (1972). 
29The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many 
with unpublished opinions, that involve the application of 
the Robinson-Patman Act to State purchases. See notes 30-
32, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually 
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds 
of reported cases presenting this question over the past 
quarter century") (emphasis added); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp 
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting consistent, 
"longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
30see Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[75,054, at 96,721, 
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving federal government 
as ultimate purchaser; relying on Attorney General's 
opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition 
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 
(1977); General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under 
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on 
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in 
its purchase of property considered necessary for the 
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in 
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in 
buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), 
aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving 
issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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clear that~ published District Court opinion has relied 
solely on a State purchase exemption to dismiss a 
Robinson-Patman Act claim alleging injury as a result of 
government competition in the private market~ 31 and (vi) 
1JW( 
there are several cases that suggestf'n e Robinson-Patman 26 
Act is applicable to State purchases for resale 
purposes. 32 This judicial track record is in no sense 
State agency), cert. denied, 318 u.s. 780 (1943). 
31cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 
No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpubl1shed op1n1on) 
(consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-
Patman Act claims based on sales to State agencies) , 
aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient 
because it failed to identify products or purchasers 
subject to discriminatory treatment)~ Portland Retail 
Druggists Association v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 
(D Ore. Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral opinion), 
vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§13c 
applied to the purchases and sales), vacated and remanded, 
425 u.s. 1 (1976). One District Court has suggested in 
alternative holdings that there is an exemption for State 
purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966) 
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) 
(purchases by Utah State University within the scope of 
Nonprofit Institutions Act~ expressly not addressing 
whether there is a 11 so-called governmental exempt ion 11 ) , 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). See also Sachs v. 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 
1955) (dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956). All of these cases predate 
our decision in City of Lafayette. 
32see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. 
Supp. 328, 330-333 (ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611, 
612 (CAS 1981) ~ Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. 
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill. 
1979) (Act 1napplicable to purchases by the Army and Air 
Force Exchange Service because of sovereign immunity, but 
possibly State agencies would face an opposite result), 
aff'd, 632 F.2d 680, 687-692 (CA7 1980)~ A.J. Goodman & 
Sons v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp. 
890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against ~ 
exemption for State purchases. See Municipality of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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23. 
comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon 
which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a 
construction of the anti trust laws that Congress over a 2~ 
tJbtl 
long period of time has chosen to preserve. Cf~~29, 
supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations 
of various commentators and executive officials. But the 
most authoritative of these sources indicate that the 27 
question presented is unsettled 33 others do 
our holding, 34 and in some cases f.,~rt 
not foreclose 
't 35 1 • Thus, 
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641 
(Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 
F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858-
859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Sperry 
Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association, 
152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. 
University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio 
1952). 
33see SA z. Cavitch, Business Organizations 
§l05D.Ol[8] [c), at lOSD-45 to -46 (1978) (opinions 
"divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70 
(1982) ("there is some conflict among the authorities as 
to whether sales to states and municipalities are excluded 
from Robinson-Patman liability"); id. §24.06 [2], at 24-75 
to 24-76; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 
(1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears 
to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the 
applicability of the act to purchases by state and local 
governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n.l66 (1962). 
34some deal only with sales to the federal 
government. See Letter from Comptroller General to 
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973), 
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[74,642, at 94,819 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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24. 
Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a 
universally held interpretation of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments- 28 
-whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary--rarely 
have considered the specific issue before us. There is 
simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to 
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing--
with a price advantage--in the private retail market. 28 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, 
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to 
promote. Although Congress is well aware of these 
criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half 29 
a century. "[I)t is not for [this Court] to indulge in 
policy-making in the field of antitrust 
legislation .... Our function ends with the endeavor to 
(1973). Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, 
whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail 
sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive 
Order 10,936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 
(1962). 
35see 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 
No. 1, 112, 113, 115 (1977); Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 
(1948-1949). 
25. 
ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of 
the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of 29 
Congress." United States v. Cooper, 312 u.s., 600, 606 
(1941}. 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act 
to all combinations of business and capital organized to 
suppress commercial competition is in harmony with the 30 
spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." 
South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 u.s., at 553. The 
legislative history is replete with references to the 
economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other 
large organizations for resale in competition with the 30 
small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the 
absence of an explicit exemption, to think that 
congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, 
Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest 31 
competitor of them all. 36 To create an exemption here 
36under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would 
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small, 
private retailers. See 19 3 5 Hearings, supra note 19, at 
261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of 
private rights"}. 
26. 
clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
We hold that/\ sale pharmaceutical products to 
State and local government hospitals for resale in 3: 
;~ 
competition with private pharmacies G!F not exempt from 
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed 
tltf ~,it) 
and~manded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
job 12/30/82 






THIRD DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmfceutical Associatio~f 
/) 
Inc. v. Abbott Laqpratories, No. 81-827 
.J# 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of 
pharmaceutical products to hospitals operated by State and 
local governments for resale in competition with private 
retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the 
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 u.s.c. §13 (the Act). 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists 
and pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, 
Alabama, commenced this action in 1978 in the District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama as the assignee 1 ~ 
of its members' claims. Respondents, the defendants 
below, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the Cooper 
Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates a 
medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school. 21 
Located in the University's medical center are two 
2. 
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, 
existing as a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive 
relief under §§4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§15 2~ 
and 26, for alleged violations of §2(a) and (f) of the 
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
u.s.c. §§13 (a) and (f). Petitioner contends that the 
respondent manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their 
products to the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper 3( 
Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged 
petitioner's members for like products. Petitioner 
alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly 
induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2 and sold 
1section 2 (a) of 
Robinson-Patman Act, 
relevant part: 
the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
15 u.s.c. §13 (a), provides in 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate 
in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce, where such 
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or 
resale within the United States ... , and where 
the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any 
person who either grants or knowingly receives 
the benefit of such discrimination, or with 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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3. 
drugs so procured to the general public in direct 3~ 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
3 from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 u.s.c. §13c. 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, on the ground that state 4< 
purchases4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of §2. In granting respondents' motions, the 
District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations 
that local retail pharmacies had been injured by the 
challenged price discrimination and that at least some of 4! 
the state purchases were not exempt under §13c. 5 The 
customers of either of them .••• 
2section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination 
in price which is prohibited by this section. 
3section 13c provides: 
Nothing in sections 13 to 13b and 2la of 
this title, shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, 
hospitals, and charitable institutions not 
operated for profit. 
4 "State purchases" are defined as sales to and 
purchases by a State and its agencies. 
5656 F.2d 92, 98 (CAS 1981) (reprinting District 
Court's opinion as Appendix). 
*( 
4. 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, 
without regard to 15 u.s.c. §13c, beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 5l 
traditional governmental purposes." 656 F.2d 92, 102 
(1981) . 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a 
divided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the 
district court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F.2d, at 
5~ 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important 
quest ion of federal law. u.s. (1982). We now 
reverse. 
II 
The issue here is very narrow. We are not concerned 61 
with sales to the federal government. Nor are we 
6Petitioner's antitrust claims were dismissed 
solely on the basis that State purchases are exempt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F.2d, at 103 n.~O. We 
thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule 
of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-
Patman Act claims. 
7The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, 
agreed that "[t]he claims against the Board must •.. be 
treated as equivalent to claims against the State itself." 
656 F.2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages 
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this 
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision. 
5. 
concerned with State purchases for consumption in 
traditional governmental functions. 8 Rather, the issue 
before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise--with the advantage 
of discriminatory prices--in the retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that 
the Act exempts all State purchases. Assuming, without 
deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to 
State purchases for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, and that such purchases are 
therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not 
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the private 
8Respondents argue that application of the Act to 
purchases by the State of Alabama would present a 
significant risk of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and 
that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, 
however, of a constitutional issue arising from the 
application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably '[an] 
attribut[e] of state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. Wyoming, 
u.s. __ , __ (1983) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 
(1981)). It is too late in the day to suggest that 
Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause 
powers when they are engaged in proprietary activities. 
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188-
189, 192-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects 
certain State purchases from the Act's 1 imitations, such 
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions, 
those purchases must be protected on a case-by-case basis. 
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 





In construing a statute, we look first to the 
statutory language itself. The Robinson-Patman Act by its 
terms does not exempt State purchases. The only express 
exemption is that for nonprofit institutions contained in 
15 u.s.c. §13c. 9 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, 81 
"[t]he statutory language--'persons' and 'purchasers'--is 
sufficiently broad to cover governmental bodies. 15 
u.s.c. §§12, 13(a,f)." 656 F.2d, at 99. 10 This 
concession was compelled by several of this Court's 
decisions. 11 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
9The District Court properly assumed, for purposes 
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the 
hospital purchases would not be covered by the §13c 
exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express 
exemption would support summary judgment in cases against 
State hospitals purchasing for their own use. See note 22 
infra. 
10The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly 
in the antitrust statutes. See 15 u.s.c. §§7, 12, 15. 
11see, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 u.s. 159, 162 
(1942) (the words "any person" in §7 of the Sherman Act 
include States); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City 
of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) (a municipality is a 
"person" within the meaning of §8 of the Sherman Act and 
can maintain a treble-damages action under §7, the 
predecessor of §4 of the Clayton Act). See also Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Government of India, 434 u.s. 308, 317 (1978) (a 
foreign nation is a "person" under §4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to 
require compliance by municipalities with the substantive 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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7. 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, we 
stated without qualification that "the definition of 
'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from 
the case before us on the ground that it involved the 9 
Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13 Such a 
distinction ignores the specific reference to the 
Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive 
standards of other federal laws which impose ... sanctions 
upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. 
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934). One case is of 
particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. v. United 
States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the 
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41(1) 
(1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which essentially 
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the 
anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act." City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 402 n.~9. 
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a 
"person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 u.s., at 
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 401-402 
n.l9. 
" 12The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive 
as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) 
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton Anti trust Act 
contains terms general to all purchasers. The pending 
bill does not segregate any particular class of 
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers."). 
13The only apparent difference between the scope of 
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities 
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's 
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, 
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 199-
201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover 
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is 
otherwise subject to the Act. 




do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in 9 
that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act, 
which it amends. 14 In sum, the plain language of the Act 
strongly suggests that there is no exemption for State 
purchases to compete with private enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a 
different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose 
and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative 
purpose and history reveals no such contrary intention. 15 
14 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports 
specifically state that "[t)he special definitions of 
section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply without repetition 
to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that 
act." H.R. Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 
(1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 
80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) ("Many have complained because 
the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in 
commerce.' The original Clayton Act contains that 
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under 
consideration. The language of the Clayton Act was used 
because it has been construed by the courts."). Given 
their common purposes, it should not be surprising that 
the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts 
should be construed consistently with each other. See 80 
Cong. Rec. 8137 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Michener) ("The 
Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a 
new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it 
was the purpose of that act to do just what this law sets 
out to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 (1936) (remarks of 
Senator Logan). 
l5Although the face of the Act clearly contains no 
express exemption in favor of State purchases, we 
nevertheless consider the legislative history. See, e. 




Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes 
of the antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. 
On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the 
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has 
recognized that these laws represent "a carefully studied 111 
attempt to bring within [them] every person engaged in 
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize 
commercial intercourse among the states." United States 
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 u.s. 533, 
553 (1944) . 16 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 u.s. 11! 
773 (1975) , the Court observed that "our cases have 
repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption 
against implicit exemptions" from the antitrust laws. 
_g_!.-' Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. 
Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 
9-10 (1976). The Court previously has considered "how far 
Congress intended to extend its mandate under" the 
Robinson-Patman Act and found the answer in its "purpose 
and legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving 
Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 (1974). See FTC v. Simplicity 
Pattern Co., 360 u.s 55, 69-70 (1959); Automatic Canteen 
Co. of America v. FTC, 346 u.s. 61, 72, 78 (1953). 
l6see, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 
434 U.S. 308, 312-313 (1978); Mandeville Island Farms, 
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 
(1948) (antitrust laws are "comprehensive in [their] terms 
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the 
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated") 
(emphasis added). 
10. 
Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-351 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 12 
u.s. 482, 485 (1962)) . 17 In City of Lafayette, applying 
antitrust laws to a city in competition with a private 
utility, we held that no exemption for local governments 
would be implied. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court, 
emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: 12 
11 [T) he economic choices made by public corporations ... , 
designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for the 
community constituency, are not inherently more likely to 
comport with the broader interests of national economic 
well-being than are those of private corporations acting 13 
in furtherance of the interests of the organization and 
its shareholders. 11 435 u.s., at 403 (footnotes omitted). 
See also id., at 408.18 
17 See, e. g., National Ger imedical Hospital & 
Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 u.s. 378, 388 
(1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 398, 399; Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
U.S. 1, 12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. 
Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975). 
18 In one important sense, retail competition from 
State agencies can be more invidious than that from chain-
stores, the particular targets of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 75-76 
(1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-544 
(1960). Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have 
been helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson- 13~ 
Patman Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in 
Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 
Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the 
antitrust laws, and Robinson-Patman in 
particular, are to be construed liberally, and 
that the exceptions from their application are 
to be construed strictly. United States v. 
McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956); 
FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 u.s. 726, 733 
(1973); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 u.s. 
642, 646-647 (1969). The Court has recognized, 
also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large 
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater 
purchasing power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 u.s. 
166, 168 (1960); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 
U.S. 341, 349 (1968). Because the Act is 
remedial, it is to be construed broadly to 
effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. 
Rowe, 3 91 U.S . 54 , 6 5 ( 19 6 8) . " 
Thus, in view of the Act's remedial purposes, and the 
consumers, and to that extent, consumers benefit merely 
from economy of scale. But to the extent that lower 
prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal 
grants, State subsidies, free public services, and freedom 
from taxation, State agencies merely redistribute the 
burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens 
at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act could 
give State agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate 
marginal or small private competitors. Consumers, as 
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the 
drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case. 
Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies 
will provide retail distribution more efficiently than 
private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer to the 
extent that State retail activities eliminate more 







broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court, 
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels 
us to create an exemption is on those who argue that 
Congress intended, but did not choose to say, that State 16~ 
agencies may compete with private business free from the 
Act's constraints. 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting 
respondents' contention that there is an exemption for 17( 
State purchases. Surely Congress would have discussed an 
issue of such importance before leaving State purchasers 
free to compete unfairly with the private sector. Yet 
there is nothing whatever in the Senate or House Committee 
reports, or in the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 17~ 
There is evidence that some members of Congress were 
aware of the possibility that the Act would apply to 
governmental purchases. Most members, however, were not 
concerned with State purchases, but with possible 
limitations on the federal Government. The most relevant 18( 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's 
principal draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House 
Judiciary Committee. 1 9 Although the testimony 
19 
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your 
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to 
the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present 
Clayton Act does so. 
Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government 
gets huge discounts. Now, would that 
discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should 
unless a discount contrary to the present bill 
would be barred--that is, the present law--would 
be barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: 
The Federal Government is not in competition 
with other buyers from these concerns .•.. 
The Federal Government is saved by the same 
distinction.... They are not in competition 
with anyone else who would buy. 
Rep. Hancock: It would eliminate 
competitive bidding all along the line, would it 
not, in classes of goods that would be covered 
by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding 
on Government orders? 
Rep. Hancock: Government, State, city, 
municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would 
not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It 
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding 
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would 
with the Government. 
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the 
city, county exactly the same as anybody else, 
same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell 
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would 
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in 




ambiguous on the application of the Act to State purchases 
for consumption, one conclusion is certain: Teegarden 18 
expressly stated that the Act would apply to the purchases 
of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. 
Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found 
by the courts below for all such purchasing. 20 In the 
this way. In the final analysis, it would 
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a 
particular case. If the two hospitals are in 
competition with each other, I should say that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H.R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings]. 
20Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief 
to the House committee. He first rejected outright the 
desirability of ~ exemptions. See 1935 Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 249. He then posed the question whether "the 
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that 
"[t]he answer is found in the principle of statutory 
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit 
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or 
privileges of the sovereign unless it so expressly 
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence 
from the common law ..... " But he also noted that 
"requiring a showing of effect upon competition, will 
further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the 
Government." Id., at 250 (footnotes omitted). 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this 
sovereign-exception rule of statutory construction simply 
means that a government, when it passes a law, gives up 
only what it expressly surrenders. In the same year that 
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court stated 
that it could "perceive no reason for extending [the 
presumption against including the sovereign in a statute] 
so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from the 
otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, 
all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which 
is as capable of being obstructed by state as by 
individual action." United States v. California, 297 U.S. 
175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, the rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no 19 
legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed 
exemption, to enter private competitive markets with 
congressionally approved price advantages. 21 
relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal 
government's purchases. The existence of such an 
exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper 
Corp., 312 u.s. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a 
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for 
treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that 
governmental purchasing would not compete with private 
purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the 
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies. That 
assumption, however, is inapplicable here. 
2lsix months after the Act was passed, the Attorney 
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from 
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to 
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539 
(1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the 
Act, the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., 
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily 
apply to the Government unless it is expressly 
so provided; and it does not seem to have been 
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes 
applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended 
the [Clayton Act] and, in so far as I am 
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded 
heretofore as applicable to Government 
contracts. 
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General 
used the phrase "Federal Government," ibid., and gave 
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make 
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of 
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., 
at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon 
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 
U.S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the Court upheld the 
granting of favorable telegraph rates to a federal 
corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the 
Act's applicability to State agencies. Indeed, in the 
following year, the Attorney General of California 
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See 19 3 2-19 39 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
,!55, 156, at 415-416 (1937). Two other early State 
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its 19 
legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that 
subsequent legislative events and decisions of District 
Courts confirm that State purchases are outside the scope 
of the Act. We turn therefore to the subsequent events on 
which respondents rely. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See 
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, 1932-1939 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ,155,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 
142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United 
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to 
municipal and public institutions." W. Patman, The 
Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) 
(interpreting Attorney General's op1n1on as exempting 
State purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some 
weight, but he appears only to be interpreting--or 
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions 
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951 
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser" 
to include "the United States, any State or any political 
subdivision thereof." H.R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1951); H.R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is 
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable 
that he believed that the original intent needed to be 
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney 
General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, 
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably stems from 
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. 
It bears repeating, however, that none of these 
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the 
State purchases alleged here: purchases to gain 
competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional functions. 
20 
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Act held in the late 1960s. 22 Testimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price 20 
discrimination in favor of State hospitals, 23 and Federal 
Trade Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any 
authority over transactions involving State health care 
22The most important relevant event in the Robinson-
Patman Act's post-enactment history is the amendment in 
1938 excluding eleemosynary institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 
u.s.c. §13c. Whether the existence of an exemption in 
§13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases 
depends upon whether §13c is interpreted to apply to State 
agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a 
substantial issue in its own right. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968} (suggesting that 
§13c does not include government agencies} with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937} (statement of Rep. Walter} (§13c would 
apply to institutions financed by cities, counties, and 
States}. See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 397 
n.J.4 (Nonprofit Institutions Act includes "public 
l:lbrar ies," which "are, by definition, operated by local 
government"}~ Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 
n.lO~ 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937} (exemption codifies the 
i~ention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act} . We 
need not address this issue here. 
23see, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman 
Act: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Small 
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select 
Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 73-77, 623 (1969-
1970} (William McCamant, Director of Public Affairs, 
National Association of Wholesalers~ Harold Halfpenny, 
counsel for the Automative Association of Wholesalers}; 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory 
Agencies of the Select Committee on Small Business of the 
House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 
(1967-1968} [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl 
Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, on behalf of NARD}. 
There also was testimony that institutional purchasers 
frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail 
pharmacies, see id., at 15, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many 
witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely 
affected competition, see id., at A-140 to -141, 253-262, 
2 7 3 , 2 91. -- ·'\ 
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programs. 24 It is not at all clear, however, whether 
Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the State 2: 
agency competed with private retailers, although he was 
aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 25 
Other statements express little more than informed, 
interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not 
entitled to the consideration appropriate for the 
constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 26 See supra, 
24 See H.R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74. 
25After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee 
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the 
eroding influence on the retail druggists' market 
presented by: (i} expanding federal, State, and private 
group health care programs: (ii} the federal government's 
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at pr1ces 
substantially below wholesale cost: and (iii} instances of 
hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to 
outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his 
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to 
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c 
issues. Id., at 74. His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority 
envisionea-5tate purchases for welfare programs, not for 
resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the 
issue presented here is most similar to the issue not 
discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
26Assuming that this post-enactment commentary 
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite 
a leap given the brevity and conclusory nature of the 
Subcommittee report-- "the views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 u.s. 304, 313 
(1960}. See, e. g., Consumer Product Safet Commission v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-118 & n.).3 (1980}: 
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 u.s. 750, 7~8 (1979}: 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 (1977} 
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the 
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history."}. 
19. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions 
that it did not focus on the question presented by this 
case. The Subcommittee found that the difference between 22 
drug prices for retailers and government customers "is 
extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable 
by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies 
of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." 
H.R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In 22 
the next conclusion, it stated that "[n]umerous acts and 
policies of individual manufacturers seem .•• violative of 
the Robinson-Fa tman Act ...• " Ibid. Thus, it is quite 
possible that the Subcommittee considered some State 
purchasing at discriminatory prices--about which it had 23 
heard testimony--to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report 
did include the awkwardly worded statement: "There is no 
basis apparent why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman 
Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales 
favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit 23 
or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription drug 
competition at the retail level with disfavored retail 
druggists." Id. , at 79 (emphasis added) .27 This 
Footnote(s) 27 will appear on following pages. 
20. 
unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that private 
institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail 24 
competition through sales at d i scr imina tory prices. The 
Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair 
competition at issue in this case. 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, 24 
courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that 
it does not apply to government purchasers. They insist 
that no court has imposed liability upon a seller or 
buyer, under either § 2 (a) or §2(f), when the 
discriminatory price involved a sale to a State, city, or 25 
county. See Brief for Respondent University 31-32. There 
are serious infirmaties in these broad assertions: (i) 
this Court has never held or suggested that there is an 
exemption for State purchases; 28 (ii) the number of 
27The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private 
nonprofit institutions •.• to the extent the sales are for 
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more 
the construction of §l3c than it would the intent of the 
1936 Congress. 
28Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the . .li-:. 
opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.)- 4; r 
Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 n.~O; California 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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judicial decisions even considering the Act's application 25 
to purchases by State agencies is relatively small: 29 
(iii) respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that 
has expressly adopted their interpretation of §2 before 
the decision below: (iv) some of the District Court cases 
upon which respondents rely are simply inapposite: 30 (v) 26 
it is not clear that~ published District Court opinion 
has relied solely on a State purchase exemption to dismiss 
a Robinson-Patman Act claim alleging injury as a result of 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 u.s. 508, 
513 q~72). 
The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many 
with unpublished opinions, that involve the application of 
the Robinson-Patman Act to State purchases. See notes 30-
32, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually 
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds 
of reported cases presenting this question over the past 
quarter century") (emphasis added): Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp 
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting consistent, 
"longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
3°see Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,175,054, at 96,721, 
96,742 (D Utah 1974) (dicta) (involving federal government 
as ultimate purchaser: relying on Attorney General's 
opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
551 F.2d 790, 798 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition 
despite different prices), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 879 
(1977): General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 
37 F. Supp. 598, 602-604 (WD Ky.) (finding no "sale" under 
the Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable on 
the ground that "[n] either the government nor a city in 
its purchase of property considered necessary for the 
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in 
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in 
buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), 
aff'd, 132 F.2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving 
issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales to 
State agency), cert. denied, 318 u.s. 780 (1943). 
22. 
government competition in the private market; 31 and (vi) 
there are several cases that suggest that the Robinson- 26 
Patman Act is applicable to State purchases for resale 
purposes. 32 This judicial track record is in no sense 
comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon 
31cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 
No. C-77-0094 (Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) 
(consent by plaintiffs to dismiss with prejudice Robinson-
Patman Act claims based on sales to State agencies) , 
aff'd, 630 F.2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient 
because it failed to identify products or purchasers 
subject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail 
Druggists Association v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 
(D Ore. Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral opinion), 
vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§13c 
applied to the purchases and sales), vacated and remanded, 
425 U.S. 1 (1976). One District Court has suggested in 
alternative holdings that there is an exemption for State 
purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., No. 4-66-5, op. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966) 
(unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 F.2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) 
(purchases by Utah State University within the scope of 
Nonprofit Institutions Act; expressly not addressing 
whether there is a 11 so-called governmental exempt ion 11 ) , 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967). See also Sachs v. 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 
1955) (dicta), aff'd per curiam, 234 F.2d 959 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 352 U.S. 925 ( 1956) • All of these cases predate 
our decision in City of Lafayette. 
32see Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. 
Supp. 328, 330-333 (ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 611, 
612 (CAS 1981); Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. 
Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 287, 291 (CD Ill. 
1979) (Act inapplicable to purchases by the Army and Air 
Force Exchange Service because of sovereign immunity, but 
possibly State agencies would face an opposite result), 
a f f ' d , 6 3 2 F • 2 d 6 8 0 , 6 8 7-6 9 2 ( CA 7 19 8 0 ) ; A • J . Goodman & 
Sons v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 F. Supp. 
890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against A..!!.Y. 
exemption for State purchases. See Municipality of 
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 641 
(Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 
F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851, 858-
859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 u.s. 936 (1966); Sperry 
Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Association, 
152 F. Supp. 91, 95, 96 (EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. 
University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 443 (ND Ohio 
1952). 
23. 
which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a 
construction of the anti trust laws that Congress over a 27 
long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited note 29, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations 
of various commentators and executive officials. But the 
most authoritative of these sources indicate that the 27 
question presented is unsettled: 33 others do not foreclose 
our holding: 34 and in some cases they support it. 35 Thus, 
Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a 
33see SA z. Cavitch, Business Organizations 
§105D.Ol [8] [c], at lOSD-45 to A -46 (1978) {opinions 
"divided" whether Act is applicable): 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70 
(1982) ("there is some conflict among the authorities as 
to whether sales to states and municipalities are excluded 
from Robinson-Patman liability"): id. §24.06[2], at 24-75 
to 24-76: E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 202-203 
(1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears 
to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the 
applicability of the act to purchases by state and local 
governments."): F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n.K66 (1962). 
34some deal only with sales to the federal 
government. See Letter from Comptroller General to 
Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration (July 17, 1973), 
reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642, at 94,819 
(1973). Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, 
whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail 
sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Executive 
Order 10,9 36, !dent ical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 
(1962) 0 
35see 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979): 47 N.C.A.G. 
No. 1, 112, 113, 115 (1977): Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 
(1948-1949) 0 
24. 
universally held interpretation of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments- 28 
-whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary--rarely 
have considered the specific issue before us. There is 
simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to 
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing--
with a price advantage--in the private retail market. 28 
VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, 
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to 
promote. Although Congress is well aware of these 
criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half 29 
a century. And it certainly is "not for [this Court] to 
indulge in policy-making in the field of antitrust 
legislation .... Our function ends with the endeavor to 
ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of 
the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of 29 
Congress." United States v. Cooper, 312 u.s., 600, 606 
(1941}. 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act 
to all combinations of business and capital organized to 
' . 
25. 
suppress commercial competition is in harmony with the 
spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth." 30 
South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 u.s., at 553. The 
legislative history is replete with references to the 
economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other 
large organizations for resale in competition with the 
small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the 30 
absence of an explicit exemption, to think that 
congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, 
Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest 
competitor of them all. 36 To create an exemption here 31 
clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to 
State and local government hospitals for resale in 
competition with private pharmacies is not exempt from the 31 
proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of 
36under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would 
accrue, precisely as intended, to the benefit of small, 
private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 
261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of 
private rights"). 
26. 
the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 32 
7. 
Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 395 (1978), for example, we 
stated without qualification that "the definition of 
'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from 
the case before us on the ground that it involved the 9 
Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13 Such a 
distinction 
~ 
ignores ;p;;? specific reference to the 
Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive 
standards of other federal laws which impose .•. sanctions 
upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. 
Helvering, 292 u.s. 360, 370 (1934). One case is of 
particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. v. United 
States, 313 u.s. 450 (1941), the Court considered the 
applicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 
32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 u.s.c. §41 (1) 
(1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which essentially 
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the 
anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act.'~, City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 402 n.l9. 
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a 
"person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U.S., at 
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401-402 
n.l9. 
12The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive 
as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) 
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The Clayton Anti trust Act 
contains terms general to all purchasers. The pending 
bill does not segregate any particular class of 
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers."). 
13The only apparent difference between the scope of 
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities 
complained of must affect interstate commerce. Congress's 
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, 
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 u.s. 186, 199-
201 (1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover 
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is 
otherwise subject to the Act. 
1 
50 
concerned with State purchases for consumption in 
traditional governmental functions. 8 Rather, the issue 
before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise--with the advantage 6 
of discriminatory prices--in the retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that 
~ 
the Act exempts such State purchases. Assuming, without 
deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to 
State purchases for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, and that such purchases are 
therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not 
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the private 
8Respondents argue that application of the Act to 
purchases by the State of Alabama would present a 
significant risk of conflict with the Tenth Amendment and 
that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago, 440 u.s. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, 
however, of a constitutional issue ar1s1ng from the 
application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably ' [an] 
attribut[e) of state sovereignty.'" See EEOC v. Wyoming, 
U.S. __ , __ (1983) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 u.s. 264, 288 
(1981)). It is si•p~ too late in the day to suggest that 
Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause 
powers when they are engaged in proprietary activities. 
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 188-
189, 192-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects 
certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such 
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions, 
those purchases must be protected on a case-by-case basis. 
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
u.s. 389, 413 n.42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
7 
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absence of any other relevant evidence, we 1\ ~t ~ a zJ' 
legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed 
exemption, to enter private competitive markets with 
congressionally approved price advantages. 21 
relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal 
government's purchases. The existence of such an 
exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper 
Corp., 312 u.s. 600, 604-605 (1941} (United States not a 
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for 
treble damages}. Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that 
governmental purchasing would not compete with private 
purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the 
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies. That 
assumption, however, is inapplicable here. 
2lsix months after the Act was passed, the Attorney 
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from 
the Secretary of War regarding the Act's application "to 
government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 539 
(1936}. In ruling that such contracts are outside the 
Act, the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., 
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily 
apply to the Government unless it is expressly 
so provided; and it does not seem to have been 
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes 
applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended 
the [Clayton Act] . . . and, in so far as I am 
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded 
heretofore as applicable to Government 
contracts. 
Id. , at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General 
used the phrase "Federal Government," ibid., and gave 
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make 
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of 
the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., 
at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon 
Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 
U.S. 415, 425 (1928}, in which the Court upheld the 
granting of favorable telegraph rates to a federal 
corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the 
Act's applicability to State agencies. Indeed, in the 
following year, the Attorney General of California 
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See 1932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH} 
,155,156, at 415-416 (1937}. Two other early State 
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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18. 
programs. 24 It is not at all clear, however, whether 
Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the State 21 
agency competed with private retailers, although he was 
aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 25 
Other statements express little more than informed, 
interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not 
entitled to the consideration appropriate for the 
constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 26 See supra, at & n.21. 
24see H.R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74. 
25After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee 
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the 
eroding influence on the retail druggists' market 
presented by: (i} expanding federal, State, and private 
21 
group health care programs; (ii} the federal government's 
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at prices 
substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii} instances of 
hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to 
outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his 
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to 
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c 
issues. Id., at 74. His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority 
envisionea-5tate purchases for welfare programs, not~or 
resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the 
issue presented here is most similar to the issue ot-
discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
26Assuming that this post-enactment commentary 
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite 
a leap given the brevity and conclusory nature of the 
Subcommittee report--"the views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 u.s. 304, 313 
(1960}. See, e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 u.s. 102, 117-118 & n.l3 (1980}; 
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979}; 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 (1977} 
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the 
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history."}. 
20. 
unexceptional ~however, simply says that private 
institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail 24 
competition through sales at discriminatory prices. The 
Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair 
competition at issue in this case. 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, 24 
courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that 
it does not apply 
4~~ 
to government purch& 1\no court has 
imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either 
§2(a) or §2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, 
~ 






There are serious 
(i) this Court has 
never held or suggested that there is an exemption for 
State purchases; 28 (ii) the number of judicial decisions 
27The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 
Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to private 
nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for 
the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more 
the construction of §13c than it would the intent of the 
1936 Congress. 
28rndeed, our opinions suggest precisely the 
opposite. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 397 n.l4; 
Abbott Laboratories, 425 U.S., at 18-19 n.lO; California 




universally held interpretation of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
-whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary--rarely 28 
have considered the specific issue before us. There is 
simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to 
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing--
with a price advantage--in the private retail market. 
VI 28 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, 
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to 
promote. Although Congress is well aware of these 
criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half 
~t.--1--~w 
a century. ~''ii]-t -i-s ~1not for [this Court] to indulge in 29 
policy-making in the field of antitrust 
legislation .... Our function ends with the endeavor to 
ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of 
the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of 
Congress." United States v. Cooper, 312 u.s., 600, 606 29 
{1941}. 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act 
to all combinations of business and capital organized to 
job 12/30/82 
THIRD DRAFT: Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, 
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-827 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of 
pharmaceutical products to hospitals operated by State and 
local governments for resale in competition with private 
retail pharmacies is exempt from the proscriptions of the 
Patman 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists 
and pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, 
Alabama, commenced this action in 1978 in the District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama as the assignee 
of its members' claims. Respondents, the defendants 
below, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the Cooper 
Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates a 
medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school. 




pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, 
existing as a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages ana injunctive 
J ,/ 
( 3~ 5tt.tt. 1-31) +31-'> 
the Clayton Act~ fs u.s.c. §§l5 relief under §§4 ana 16 of 
ana 
1
26' for alleged violations 
'38 s. ra,t. 1-30) 
/ 
of §2(a) ana (f) of the 
'11 Stut. 15"26 
Clayton Act, [as amended by the Robinson-Patman 
.J 
u.s.c. §§13 (a) ana (f). Petitioner contends that the 
respondent manufacturers violated §2(a) 1 by selling their 
products to the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper 
Green Hospital Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged 
petitioner's members for 1 ike products. Petitioner 
alleges that the respondent hospital pharmacies knowingly 
induced such lower prices in violation of §2(f) 2 ana sola 
1
sect ion , 2 (a)~ !:Wai!b.i~~~:1t:1JR~i,~,~, .. •~•liiDMN~~ 
§13 (a), provides 
relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
either directly or inai rectly, to a i scr imina te 
in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade ana quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce, where such 
commoa it ies are sola for use, consumption, or 
resale with in the Un i tea States ... , ana where 
the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any 
person who either grants or knowingly receives 
the benefit of such discrimination, or with 
Footnote continued on next page. 




drugs so procured to the general public in direc t 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
j 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U.S.C. §13c. 3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, on the ground that state 
purchases4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the 
District Court expressly accepted as true the allegations 
that local retail pharmacies had been injured by the 
challenged price discrimination and that at least some of 
the state purchases were not exempt under §13c. 5 The 
customers of either of them .•.• 
2section 2 (f), 15 u.s.c. §13 (f), provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination 
in price which is prohibited by this section. 
3section 13c providesr_.,..h.f' R_6hl'11~n- fa1'm4.-a l'k.t] 
Nothing in C,. , 
· sha'i~pply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, 
hospitals, and charitable institutions not 
operated for profit. 
4 "state purchases" are defined as sales to and 
purchases by a State and its agencies. 
5{56 F.2d J92, J98 ttA5 /1981) (reprinting District 




District Court held that v(.governmental purchases are, 
without regard to 15 u.s.c. §13c, beyond the intended 
reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at 
least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 
traditional governmental purposes." 1656 F.2d ,/92, ~02 
~981) . 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a 
divided per curiam decision, affirmed ~on the basis of the 
district court's Memorandum of Opinion." v'656 F.2d, at 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important 
question of federal law. u.s. We now 
reverse. 
II 
The issue here is very narrow. We are not concerned 
with sales to the federal government. Nor are we 
6Petitioner's antitrust claims were dismissed 
solely on the basis that Stat7. purchases ar~ exe~pt from 
the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F.2d, at ~03 n.~O. We 
thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule 
of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-
Patman Act claims. ~ ~ 
7The District Court, and thus the Court of Apdbali 
agreed that~" [t]he claims against the Board mus~ .• be 
_,treated as equivalent to claims against the State itsel ." 
V656 F.2d, atV99. Accordingly, both courts held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages 
against the University. Petitioner did not challenge this 
holding in its appeal from the District Court's decision. 
5. 
concerned with State purchases for consumption in 
traditional governmental functions.8 Rather, the issue 
before us is limited to State purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise--with the advantage 
of discriminatory prices--in the retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that 
the Act exempts such State purchases. Assuming, without 
deciding, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to 
State purchases for consumption in tracE tional 
governmental functions, and that such purchases are 
therefore exempt, we conclude that the exemption does not 
apply where a State has chosen to compete in the 
8Respondents argue applicatio of the to 
purchases by the St te of Alabama would 
significant risk of co flict with the 
that we therefore shou d avoid any J con truction of 
_) that include~ such pu~ bases. S~e NL v. ~Catholi 
~ica o, 440 U.S. 90,V50l {1979). The_r_e--~i-s~~o--~-1~.s-k~, 
howeve of a const"tutional e arising f om the 
licatr n of the A t in this ca e: The retail sal :~ j) 
phar ut"cal drug is not "indisputably a,
attribut of state sovereignty.~ See EEOC v. Wyomrng, 
U.S. __ , __ {1983) Hodel v. ' Virginia Surface 
Minin & Reclamation Association Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 
(1981 . It is simply too late in the day to suggest tha~ 
ongress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause 7 
powers when/ they are engaged in propr jetary activities . 
See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S.Jl84, 18-
..;.iMPiiiiii~l93 fi:964). If the Tenth Amendment protects 
~ certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such 
as for consumption in traditional governmental functions, 
tho~ purchases must be PJ.Otected on a case-by-case basis. 
Cf. City of Lafayette v. Lfiuisiana Power & Light Co., J435 






In construing a statute, we look first to the 
statutory language itself. The Robinson-Patman Act by its 
terms does not exempt State purchases. The only express 
exemption is that for nonprofit institutions contained in 
15 u.s.c. §13c. 9 Moreover, as the courts below conceded, 
J .. [t] he statutory language--'persons' and 'purchasers'--is 
sufficiently broad to cover governmental bodies. 15 
u.s.c. §§12, 13(a,f}." F.2d, 
/ 
at 99.10 This 
concession was compelled by several of this Court's 
decisions. 11 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
9The District Court properly assumed, for purposes 
of making its summary judgment, that at least some of the 
hospital purchases woyld not be covered by the §13c 
exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express 
exemption would support summary judgment in cases agai~t 






..::::L:_;:i:...;gt.;;.h.::..t=---=C::..:o=-.=--' 4 3 5 u.s. ('{978), for example, we 
I . 
stated without qualification ~the definition of 
'person' or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from 
the case before us on the ground that it involved the 9 
Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13 Such a 
distinction ignores our specific reference to the 
Robinson-Patman Act in our discussion of the 
ft ff 
standards of othey federal laws which j,mposej. . . js nctions 
upon 'persoys. '" City of ,Lafa~tte v. Louis1an Power & 
)Jight co., 435 y.s."389,".foo t'J-978). SeEJ Cal'fornia v. 
Junited States, 320 u.s. ~ 577, ~~85-586 r.l944) ~ Ohio v. 
J Helvering, ~292 u.s. ~360, v3,70 ~L934). One ase is of 
particulJ r relevance. _}n Junion Pacific R. v. ~United 
States, 313 u.s . ./450 (1941), the Court considered the 
~ppl icabiJs i ty to a city of § 1 of the Elk ins Act, c~;;. I, 08, 
32 Stat. 847, as amended, "34 Stat. 1 587, ./49 U.S.C. §41(1) 
(1976 ed.) (repealed v'l978), V"a statute which essentially 
is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the 
anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robins2n-
--.___ .... tman Act." City of Lafayette, "435 u.s., at "402 n.l9. 
The Court expressly found that a municipality was a 
"person" within the meaning of the s 1j, tute. J313 u.s., at 
467-468. See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., at 401~ 
n.l9. \.. 
12The word "purchasers" )las a meaning ~ inclgsive 
as the word "person." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (~936) 
(remarks of Senator Robinson) ~The Clayton Antitrust Act 
contains terms general to all purchasers. The pending 
bill does not segregate any particular class of 
purchasers, or exempt any special class of purchasers."). 
13The only apparent differ e nce betwe en the scope of 
the relevant laws is the extent to which the activities 
complained of must affect interstate comme rce. Congress's 
decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
tra~actions within iJs reach under the Commer~ Clv;se, 
see gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., J419 U.S. 186, 199-
201 ~1974), does not mean that Congress chose not to cover 
the same range of "persons" whose conduct "in commerce" is 
otherwise subject to the Act. 
8. 
nature of the term "person." J435 u.s., at ~97 n~4. Nor 
do we perceive any reason to construe the word "person" in 
that Act any differently than we have in the Clayton Act, 
which it amends. 14 In sum, the plain language of the Act 
strongly suggests that there is no exemption for State 
purchases to compete with private enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a 
different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose 
and history of the Act. An examination of the legislative 
purpose and history reveals no such contrary intention. 15 
( fY'r-tt.r~$ oF $eV!. LoJ411) 
14 Indeed, the House a d Senate Committee reports 
specifically state that V" t]he special definitions of 
section 1 of the Clayton Ac will apply without repetition 
to the terms concerned wh re they appear in this bilv, 
since ~t is designedJo bee me by amendment a 2art of tha 
~ - apt:."- -H.R.~.tLNo. 2287, Pt. -.~ 1, .,....74th Cong., .72d Sess. 7 
~ ("1936); ..rs • .1Rep?>._l502, v74th c;p,ng., ....... 2d Sess. \..S (i936). See 
lao Cong. Rec. '-'3116 (1936) (''~pny have complained because 
the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in 
commerce.' The original Clayton Act contains that 
exact language, and it is carried into the bill under 
consideration. The language of the Clayton Act was used 
because it has been construed by the courts."). Given 
their common purposes, it should not be surprising that 
the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts 
should be c.9nstrue<;1 consistently with eac~ other. Se_~ "'So 
Cong. Rec. 8137 ('1936) (remarks of Rep. Michener) r'The 
Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a 
new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it 
- ~J as the purpose of that act to do just what this law sets 
~-.. o t to do."); 80 Cong. Rec. 3119, 6151 (1936) (remarks of 
~ ~ Sen a tor Logan)r.-" ( purpos.P oF R. l:.rll rs h:> s~"'ff1tr.11 Cltty'llM /t-(.t) 
~ ~ " 
(/')\ / l5Although the face of the Act clearly contains no 
express exemption in favor of State purchases, we 
nevertheless consider the legislative history. See, e. 




Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes 
of the antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patrnan Act. 
On numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the 
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has 
recognized that these laws representv(.a carefully studied 1 
attempt to bring within [them] every person engaged in 
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize 
commercial intercourse among the states." JUnited States 
V. 
1south-Eastern ..:J • • • ,; " Unuerwr1ters Assoc1at1on, 322 U.S. 533, 
~53 M.-944) • 16 InJGoldfarb v. JVirginia State Bar, -'421 U.S. 1 
J 77 3 ~97 5) , the Court observed that V.'our cases have 
repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption 
against implicit exemptions" from the antitrust laws. 
J 1 J ./ ./. J J . 
fq • , W a t t v . A 1 ask a , 4 51 U • S • 2 59 , 2 6 6 (19 81 ) ~ T r a 1 n .1 . 
J
JCOlora o Public Interest Research Grou , Inc., ~26 u.s. 1, 
9-10 976). The Court previously has considered "how far 
Congress intended to extend its mandate under" the 
Robinson-Pa trnan Act and foJ,nd the answer in its "purpose '7 
and legislative history." Gulf Oil Co~v. "cj;PP Paving 
Co., "'419 U.S.A t'£l>!97t){ 'b:. See FT v. Simplicity 
Pattern Co., ./3'60 U.S 1~, ~69-70 lfl9j-_9); ut0:rnatic Canteen 
Co. of Arne ric a v. ®' 3 4 6 U.S . .161, 7 2 , v7 8 9 53) • 
J 16see~. ., J'Pf' er Inc. v. JGovernrnent of India, 
434 U.S.~ 2-31 ; ~andeviJ,le Island Far!lls, 
~ v. }.me · n Cry al Sugar Co., \0:134 U.S. \1219, 11236 
~948) (antitrust laws are "comprehensive in [their] terms 
and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the 
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated") 
(emphasis added) . · 
10. 
Id., atv;87 (citingJUnited States v. ~hiladelphia National 
Bank, 1374 u.s. /321, ~50-351 (I963); "'california v.~~69 
u.s. ~82, / 485 (\962)) • 17 In City of Lafayette, applying 
antitrust laws to a city in competition with a private 
utility, we held that no exemption for local governments 
would be implied. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court, 
emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: 
11 [T] he economic choices made by public corporations ... , 
designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for the 
community constituency, are not inherently more likely to 
comport with the broader interests of national economic 
well-being than are those of private corporations acting 
in furtherance of the interests of the organization and 
its shareholders. 11 435 u.s., at '{o tJ ~feetRete~ omit:ted-~ 
I 18 ~,~ ,__,,!> a'l'f 
See also id., at 408. 
"f2lJ 
17see, e. g., /National Gerim d'cal Ho ital & 
ntolo Center v. Blue Cross, 4 2 U.S. 378 388 
98 · City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., t ~98, \3'99; \Abbott 
Labor to ies v:l~ortla d Retail Dru its Assn., Inc.,V425 
U.S. 1, 12 fJ.976~ United Stajles y. National Assn 
Securities Dealer1f. 422 u.s. \lt94, "'719 n_975). 
---------- 18 In one important sense, retail competition from 
State agencies can be more invidious than that from chain-
stores, thel particular targets of
1
the R~binson-P,tma~Act. 
Sie e. . Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC 440 U.S. 69, 75-76 
\)-979); T v.JAnheuser-Busch, Inc~63 U.S. "536, ~43-544 
(119 60) . olume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
These principles, and the purposes they further, have 
been helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson- 1 
Patman Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in 
JAbbott Laboratories v. \/Portland Retai 1 Druggists Assn., 
" " J. Inc., 425 u.s. 1, 11-12 ('{976): 
" I 
11 It has been said, of course, that the 
antitrust laws, and Robinson-Patman in 
particular, are to be construed liberally, and 
that the except ions from the }r application are 
to be construed ictly. United Sta?fs v. 
McKesson & Robbin , 351 u.s. "'305, 316956); 
M v. Seatrain Li es, Inc., "411 U.S. J726, 733 
73); JPerkins v. "Standard Oil Co., J395 u.s. 
1642, 646-647 P-1:969). The Court has recognized, 
also, that Robinson-Patman 'was enacted in 1936 
to curb and prohibit all devices by which large 
buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones b~· tue of their greater 
J,>Urchas ing power. ' TC v. ~Broch & Co., ~63 ~S. 
166, lj)8 ~960); T v. "E"red Meyer, Inc., 390 
U.S. ~41, 349 68). Because the Act is 
remedial, it is to be construs.e broadly to 
~ffectuate its p~poses. See Tcherepnin v. 
,Knighth '-'389 T.!JS. 332!1 336 (1967); V'Peyton v. 
"Rowe' "3 91 u.s. 54 ' 6 5 r 19 6 8) . II 
Thus, in view of the Act's remedial purposes, and the 
consumers, and to that extent, consumers benefit merely 
from economy of scale. But to the extent that lower 
prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal 
grants, State subsidies, free public services, and freedom 
from taxation, State agencies merely redistribute the 
burden of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens 
at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act could 
give State agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate 
marginal or small private competitors. Consumers, as 
citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs of the 
drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case. 
Because there is no reason to assume that such agencies 
will provide retail distribution more efficiently than 
private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer to the 
extent that State retail activities eliminate more 







broad scope of its language as interpreted by this Court, 
the burden of showing that the legislative history compels 
us to create an exemption is on those who argue that 
Congress intended, but did not choose to say, that State 1 
agencies may compete with private business free from the 
Act's constraints. 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting 
respondents 1 contention that there - is an exemption for 1 
State purchases. Surely Congress would have discussed an 
issue of such importance before leaving State purchasers 
free to compete unfairly with the private sector. Yet 
there is nothing whatever in the Senate or House Committee 
reports, or in the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 1 
There is evidence that some members of Congress were 
aware of the possibility that the Act would apply to 
governmental purchases. Most members, however, were not 
concerned with State purchases, but with possible 
limitations on the federal Government. The most relevant 1: 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's 
principal draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House 
I 
I 
Judiciary Committee. 19 Although the testimony 
19 
Rep. Lloyd: Would this bill, in your 
judgment, prevent the granting of discounts to 
the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present 
Clayton Act does so. 
Mr. Lloyd: For instance, the Government 
gets huge discounts. Now, would that 
discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should 
unless a discount contrary to the present bill 
would be barred--that is, the present law--would 
be barred by that bill. 
As ide from that, my answer would be this: 
The Federal Government is not in competition 
with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same 
distinction.... They are not in competition 
with anyone else who would buy. 
Rep. Hancock: It would eliminate 
competitive bidding all along the line, would it 
not, in classes of goods that would be covered 
by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding 
on Government orders? 
Rep. Hancock: 
municipality. 
Government, State, city, 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
Rep. Michener: If it did do it, you would 
not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It 
certainly does not eliminate competitive bidding 
anywhere else, and I do not see how it would 
with the Government. 
Rep. Hancock: You would have to bid to the 
city, county exactly the same as anybody else, 
same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
Rep. Hancock: Would they or could they sell 
to a city hospital any cheaper than they would 
to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in 




ambiguous on the application of the Act to State purchases 
for consumption, one conclusion is certain: Teegarden J 
expressly stated that the Act would apply to the purchases 
of municipal hospitals in at least some circumstances. 
Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemption found 
by the courts below for all such purchasing. 20 In the 
this way. In the final analysis, it would 
depend upon numerous questions of fact in a 
particular case. If the two hospitals are in 
competition with each other, I should say that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does 
not save it from the bill. , 
Heari s on H.R . ..!4995 et al. be ore the Ilouse Committ 
the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 08-209 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 1935 Hearings]. 
on 
935) 
20Teegarden subsequently submit ted a written brief 
to the House committee. He first rejected outright the 
desirabilitytof ~ exemptions. See 1935 Hearings, supra 
note 19, at 249. He then posed the question whether "the 
bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmen__tal 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that 
"[t)he answer is found in the principle of statutory 
construction that a statute will not be construed to limit 
or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives, or 
privileges of the sovereign unless it so expressly 
provides--a principle inherited by American jurisprudence 
from the common law ..... " But he also noted that 
"requiring a showing of effect upon competition, will 
further preclude any possibility of the bill affecting the 
Government." Id., at 250 (footnotes omitted). 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this 
sovereign-exception rule of statutory construction simply 
means that a government, when it passes a law, gives up 
only what it expressly surrenders. In the same year that 
Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court stated 
that it could "perceive no reason for extending [the 
presumption against including the sovereign in a statute] 
so a s to exempt a business carried on by a state from the 
otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, 
all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which 
is as capable of being obstructed by state as by 
jndi~idual action." Juyited States v. "califor;nia, "297 Ju.s./'" o.T 
-175, 186 1936). See California v. 7Taylor, 
0
353 U.S.J;\~A '-J~..t.l--
V562-56?;.) In the context of the Robinson-Patman 
Act, th~ rule of statutory construction on which Teegarden 





absence of any other relevant evidence, we cannot see a 1~ 
legislative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed 
exemptio~, to enter private competitive markets with 
congressionally approved price advantages. 21 
relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the federal 
government's purchases. The existence of su~h an 
exempti~n is not before us. Ct. J united States v. Cooper 
Corp., "312 u.s . ../600, v'604-605 '(1941) (Un1ted States not a 
"person" under the Sherman Act for purposes of suing for 
treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that 
governmental purchasing would not compete with private 
purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the 
rationale for the Act to apply to State agencies. That 
assumption, however, is inapplicable here. 
2lsix months after the Act was passed, the Attorney 
General of the United States responded to an inquiry from 
the Secretary of War regarding the {\pt' s application "to 
~9vernment contracts for supplies." "'38 Op. Atty. Gen.vS39 
V-t-936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the 
Act, the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., 
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily 
apply to the Government unless it is expressly 
so provided; and it does not seem to have been 
the policy of the Congress to make such statutes 
applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended 
the [Clayton Act] and, in so far as I am 
aware, the latter Act has not been regarded 
heretofore as applicable to Government 
contracts. 
Id. , at J5 40. Later in the letter, the 1}k torney General 
used the phrase "Federal Government," Vi bid., and gave 
other reasons "for avoiding a construction that would make 
the statute applicable to the Government in violation of 
the~pparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., 
at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon 
jEmergepcy F~eet Corp. v.lwestern Union Telegraph Co.,~75 
U.S. \/415, "425 t'l928), in which the Court upheld the 
granting of favorable telegraph rates to a federal 
corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the 
Act's applicability to State agencies. Indeed, in the 
following year, the Attorney General of California 
expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
1 Act's proscriltions. SFe "1932-1939 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,[55, 156, at 415-416 ('d937). Two other early State 
attorney general opinions simply do not consider whether 
Footnote continued on next page. 
16. 
v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its l 
legislative history, respondents nevertheless argue that 
subsequent legislative events and decisions of District 
Courts confirm that State purchases are outside the scope 
of the Act. We turn therefore to the subsequent events on 
which respondents rely. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
the Act applies to State purchases for re~il sales. See 
Opinion of Attorney Ge~ral .9f Min~sota,932-1939 Trade 
Cas. )CCH) ~[55,157, at ~16 ('1.937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 
v-142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United 
States] Attorney General's reasons may be also applied to 
municipal and public institutions." W. Pve;tm~If, The 
Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W VFa.tftan, 
vcomplete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act ~0 (~963) 
(interpreting Attorney General's opinion as exempting 
State purchases). His interpretation is entitled to some 
weight, but he appears only to be interpreting--or 
erroneously extending--the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions 
probably are better reflected in his introduction in 1951 
and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "purchaser" 
to include "the United State~ any ~tate or any political 
~ybdivision thereo~" H.R. 1-452, 82d Cong., Vlst Sess. 
("1951); H.R . ./3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. K953). There is 
no legislative history on these bills, but it is arguable 
that he believed that the original intent needed to be 
stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney 
General's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, 
Congress's failure to pass these bills probably stems from 
a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. 
It bears repeating, however, that none of these 
views--including Representative Patman' s--focuses on the 
State purchases alleged here: purchases to gain 
competitive advantage in the private market rather than 





Act held in the late 1960s. 22 Testimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price 
discrimination in favor of State hospitals, 23 and Federal 
Trade Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any 
authority over transactions involving State health care 
22The most important relevant event in the Robinson-
J?atman Act's post-enactment history is the amendm~nt J,n 
Vl938 ex~luding eleemosynary institutions,V52 Stat.\446, 15 
u.s.c. §13c. Whether the existence of an exemption in 
§13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases 
depends upon whether §l3c is interpreted to apply to State 
agencies that perform the functions listed. That is a 
substantial issue in its o~ right. -~Compare H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8,~8 r.t968) (suggesting that 
§13c does n~t include government agencies) with ~1 Cong. 
Rec . ./8706 ~.L937) (statement of Rep. /walter) (§13c would 
apply to institutions financed by cit i;zs, counties, ~nd 
States) . 91lC.See also City of Lafayette, 435 u.s., .~at 397 
Jn.l4 ~flF~ · , 'i!!~ · includes v"public 
libraries," which "are, by definition, operated by lo:!l .A 
government"); ~bbott Laboratories, " 425 u.s., at 18..,._--, 
n.lO; " 81 Cong. Rec. '18705 (\;{937) (exemption codifies the 
intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act) . We 
need not address this issue here. 
23see, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman 
Act: Hearings Before the Spec1al Subcomm1 ttee on Small 
Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select 
Commit tee on Small Business of / the j!ouse of 
Representatives, 9lst Cong. '43-77, l/623 (1969-
1970) (William McCamant, Director of Publi:% Affairs, 
National Association of Wholesalers; Harold Halfpenny, 
counsel for the Automative Association ·of Wholesalers); 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory 
A encies of the Select Committee on Small Business o the 
House of Representatives, 90th Cong 15-16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl 
Kintner, former FTC Commissioner, on behalf of NARD). 
There also was testimony that institutional purchasers 
frequently obtain drugs at )_ower pr i~es than do retail 
pharmacies, see id., at 111 ~58,1318,Vl093-1094, and many 
witnesses complained that this dj,scriminat.ipn a~versely 










programs. 24 It is not at all clear, however, whether 
Chairman Dixon contemplated cases in which the State 
agency competed with private retailers, although he was 
aware of such practices by institutional purchasers. 2 5 
Other statements express little more than informed, 
interested opinions on the issue presented, and are not 
entitled to the consideration appropriate for the 
constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 26 See supra, at & n. 21. 
24see H.R. Rep. No. v(983, supra notev;2 , at~4. 
25After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee 
posed further questions for Chairman Dixon about the 
eroding influence on the retail druggists' market 
presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private 
group health care programs; (ii) the federal government's 
ability to purchase from drug manufacturers at prices 
substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) instances of 
hospitals, ""both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to 
outpatients or even nonpatients." Id., at ~3. In his 
response to the Subcommittee, Chairman Dixon declined to 
discuss further the last category, which involved §13c 
issues. Id., atV74. His disclaimer of F.T.C. authority 
envisione~tate purchases for welfare programs, not for 
resale in competition with private enterprise. Thus, the 
issue presented here is most similar to the issue not 
discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
26Assuming that this post-enactment commentary 
before the Subcommittee can be imputed to Congress--quite 
a leap given the brE;vity and conclusory nature of the 
Subcommittee report-.V'the views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardoJ?.s basis for in~ ring . t;.he in te\).1; of. pm 
e1rlier one." United States v. Price, '161 U.S. '-104, "313 __ ...., 
/t0960). S~e, e. g.,~onsumer Product Safet Cornmiss'on v. 
GTE Sylvan1a, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 17-118 & .13 9 ; 
o/Oscar Mayer & Co. v. -IEvq.ns, ./441 u.s. -/750, ..f759 79); 
../United Air Lines, Inc. v.VMcMann, "434 U.S. Vj_92, 200 977) 
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the 
Act are in no sense part of the legislative history."). 
19. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions 
that it did not focus on the question presented by this 
case. The Subcommittee found that the difference between 
drug prices for retailers and government customers v(, is 
extremely substantial" and /.'not always fully explainable 
by either cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies 
of scale, or other factors inherent in bulk distribution." 
J ./.1 8 .L h ./2d H.R. Rep. No. 9 3, 90t Cong., Sess. 77 In ,. '-
/ 
the next conclusion, it stated that " [ n] umerous acts and 
policies of individual manufacturers seem ... violative of 
1f 
the Robinson-Patman Act[- ..• " v'Ibid. Thus, it is quite 
possible that the Subcommittee considered some State 
purchasing at di scr imina tory prices--about which it had 2 
heard testimony--to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report 
did include the awkwardly worded statement: v{There is no 
basis apparent .•• why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman 
Act should not be applied to discriminatory drug sales 
favoring nongovernmental institutional purchasers, profit 2 
or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription drug 
competition at the retail level with disfavored retail 
druggists." J Id. , ctmphasis added) . 27 This 
Footnote(s) 27 will appear on following pages. 
20. 
unexceptional statement, however, simply says that private 
institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail ~ 
competition through sales at d i scr imina tory prices. The 
Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair 
competition at issue in this case. 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, 
courts considering the Act's coverage have concluded that 
it does not apply to government purchasers; no court has 
imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under either 
§2 (a) or §2 (f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. There are serious 
infirmaties in this broad assertion: (i) this Court has 
never held or suggested that there is an exemption for 
State purchases; 28 ( i i) the number of judicial decisions 
27The Sub9ommittee also concluded that the 1938 
Amendment was V"designed to afford immunity to private 
nonprofit institutions •.. to the extent the sales are for 
_Jhe nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H.R. Rep. No. 
1983, supra note ~2, at V78, but that would indicate more 
the construction of §13c than it would the intent of the 
1936 Congress. 
28 rndeed, our opinions suggest precisely the 
o p po s i t e . S e e C i t y of La faye t t e , 4 3 5 U . S . , at 3 9 7 n . 14 ; 
Abbott Laboratories, 425 u.s., at 18-19 n.lO; California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 
513 (1972). 
21. 
even considering the Act's application to purchases by 
State agencies is relatively small; 29 (iii) respondents 2 
cite no Court of Appeals decision that has expressly 
adopted their interpretation of §2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the District Court cases upon which 
respondents rely are simply inapposite; 3 0 (v) it is not 
clear that~ published District Court opinion has relied 2 
solely on a State purchase exemption to dismiss a 
Robinson-Patman Act claim alleging injury as a result of 
29The par ies cite fewer han a dozen cases, many 
with unpublis ed opinions, that involve the application of 
the Robinson- atman Act to Stat purchases. See notes 30-
32, ipfra. f.VBlue Chi Starn s v. VManor Drug Stores, f421 
U.S. '1723, 73 ((975) (affirmin rule adopted byl"virtually 
all lower federal courts faci g the issue in the hundreds 
of reported cases presenting this question over the past 
quarter centpry") (e~hasis a d~d) ;VGulf Oil Corp. v.\ICopp 
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 ('t1.974) (adopting consistent, 
"longstanding" construction of Robinson-Pa~-~;fct after 
"nearly four decades of litigation").  
30see vf>acific En ineerin & Produ ion Co. v. ~.{err­
McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,054, at 
96,742 (I'Uta 197 (dictt (involvi g federal government 
as ultimate purchaser\ elying on Attorney General's 
9pinion as sole su~?.,ctf, 'fj'd iyart and '-tev'd in part, 
\t1.551 F.2d09o, 798-7fCCA10) (fipdin legitima~E}--competition 
despite _.different prices), 't:ert. deni~d, ~34 u.s. "'879 
~7) ;'tenera rod cts C r . v.Vstruck Const. Co., 
-./37-'f. Supp. 98, 602-6 D Ky. (finding no "sale" under 
the Act and alte5ratively holdi g the Act inapplicable on 
the ground that '[n] either the government nor a city in 
its purchase of property considered necessary for the 
purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in 
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in 
buying vlnd resel~ing that 9rticle") (emphasis supplied), 
aff'd, 32 F.2d "425, V428 ("CA6 vi942) (expressly reserving 
issue whether Robinson-Patmap Act appli~~ to sales to 
~State agency), cert. denied, ~18 u.S.~80 (~943). 
22. 
government competition in the private market; 31 and (vi) 
there are several cases that suggest that the Robinson-
Patman Act is applicable to State purchases for resale 2 t 
purposes. 3 2 This judicial track record is in no sense 
comparable to the unbroken chain of judical decisions upon 
( f xpf'ft;.$1~ 
a1e"'cy 
j 1'\ .a 
e; (h,, 
no t acfclre>5111J wht'f/ur st-ate 
eKfVV!fi FrtJwt ~tl l,.)hel1 elllrJt'd 
hus{neo$~ ftl fht sa111t tnannfT as 
bu{./t~.,~$ {dlf•r-~ t NM~ J . 
23. 
which this Court previously has relied for ascertaining a 
construction of the anti trust laws that Congress over a 
long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited note 29, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations 
of various commentators and executive officials. But the 
most authoritative of these sources indicate that the 
question presented is unsettled; 33 others do not foreclose 
our holding;34 and in some cases they support it.35 Thus, 
Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a 
3 
~ ~"'PP' 1 ~sz 
J 33see v5A vz. JCavitch, vBusiness v r nizations £. 
-.jOVl 
§l05D.Ol[8) [c) (1~) (opinions 
/'divided" whether Act is applicable); J.J4 J. Kalinxski, 
~rust Laws and Trade Regulation §24.06, at 24-70 
~ .(~~·) ("there is some conflict among the authorities as 
1 
to whether sales to states and municipJ:li ties are t ttJea 
{_ouere& oy -----} •: H ' ' OF iii 'J I IE Di:iidl Piil!J iJ.F id. § 24.06 [ 2); • . --"-'i, 
'') ' · "E . ./Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer ~203 
f1..e .ft.f ) 970) ('Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears 
J 
to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the 
applicability of1 thz act ,10 purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n.l66 {1962). 
34some deal only with sales to 
government. See Letter from Comptroller G neral to 
Robert F. Sar~o, Ve+erans Administration (July 17, 1973), 
reprinted in ~973-] Trade Cas. (CCH) ,174,642~1/1111~~~~·=-"' 
Almost all fail to mention, much Iess decide, 
whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail 
sales. See Re~rt of the Attorney General Under Execut~e 
017der 10~936 , Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 
f.J.9 6 2) • [1ttt1SJ -Itt liD 
35 I I ffi / .z J ~--~ ~ee b2 Op. Cal. Atty. en. 741 r~979); 47 N.C.A.G. 
1, ~12, "' 115 (1977); Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 
(iF {.i-4-fe ajtiiCy (tJ/n(JeW~ wtf11 prtvafe 
f tt terrrf~(' > r+- r> 54 bJ'e c; h 
/(oloJVt.~n- f~-thl&~Jt If ~1) , 
24. 
universally held interpretation of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
-whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary--rarely 
have considered the specific issue before us. There is 
simply no unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to 
exempt purchases by a State for the purpose of competing--
with a price advantage--in the private retail market. 
VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, 
both for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to 
promote. Although Congress is well aware of these 
criticisms, the Act has remained in effect for almost half 
a century. v([I]t is not for [this Court] to indulge in 
tN~ 1; /0 [ policy-making in the field of antitrust 
legislation ...• Our function ends with the endeavor to 
ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of 
the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of 
~. . . {; £.orf · 
~, - 312 u.s., t/600, ...1606 / Congress." United States v. 
general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act 
to all combinations of business and capital organized to 
25. 
suppress commercial competition is in harmony with the 




322 u.s. , South-Eastern at J 553. The 
legislative history is replete with references to the 
economic evil of large organizations purchasing from other 
large organizations for resale in competition with the 
small, local retailers. There is no reason, in the 
absence of an explicit exemption, to think that 
congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, 
Alabama, protection from the competition of the strongest 
compe titor of them all. 36 To c r eate an ex e mption here 
clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VI I 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to 
State and local government hospitals for resale in 
competition with private pharmacies is not ex empt from the 
proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of 
36 under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would 
accrue, precisely as iD;tflnded, to the benefit of _9mall, 
J;>rivate retailers. See "1.935 Hearings, supra note'--'l9, at 
261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection of 
private rights"). 
26. 
the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
( 
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No. 81-827--Jefferson County Pharmaceutical 
Assn, Inc., v. Abbott Laboratories, et al 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The question in this case is whether the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 u.s.c. §13, applies to state and 
local governments that have entered the commercial 
marketplace as retailers of goods to the general public in 
competition with private firms. Because this is a 
substantial question, and because I think the decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered the 
2. 
question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of 
certiorari. 
I 
Petitioner is an association of retail 
pharmacists doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama. 
[~ Respondents are fJn drug companies and certain state 
and county pharmacies operated in conjunction with state 
and county hospitals.l In its complaint, petitioner 
alleged that the state and county pharmacies were 
receiving preferential prices from the drug manufacturers 
and were using their favored position to compete with 
private pharmacies in retail sales to the general public. 
Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale 
prices, followed by retail sales to consumers, violated 
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13. 2 Petitioner 
1The respondent pharmacies include those operated 
by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of 
the Medical College of the University of Alabama. 
2under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful 
for any person engaged in commerce ••. to discriminate in 
price between differ e nt purchasers of commodities of like 
grade and quality •.. where such commodities are sold for 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
sought injunctive relief and treble damages. 3 
The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The 
court found that sales to governmental agencies are 
"beyond the intended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price 
Discrimination Act, at least with respect to purchases for 
hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 
Pet. at 20a. In reaching this conclusion the court relied 
primarily on statements by H. B. Teegarden, the chief 
draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act, and by other 
commentators and government officials indicating that 
sales to governmental agencies are beyond the intended 
scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district and 
use, consumption or resale with in the United States ,..... •• :~ 
and where the effect of such discrimination may oe 
substantially to lessen competition or injure 
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly 
receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U.S.C. 
§13. 
3The District Court found that one of the 
defendants--the Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama--was immune from any claim to damages by virtue of 
the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed from 
suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief. 
4see w. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-
Patman Act 30-32 (1963). But Congressman Patman did not 
address the question whether the Act applies to 
governmental purchases for retail resale. The district 
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General 
indicating that the Act did not apply to sales to the 
federal government. Again, however, the question was 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to 
governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding 
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light 
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed 
on the basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark 
dissented. 
assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies." 
3 8 Op • At t ' Y1' G en . 5 3 9 ( 19 3 6 ) • 
~L------- The Lrrstrict Court also relied on the fact that 
Congress has on two occasions considered, without 
enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable to sales 
to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1951); H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). 
However, neither of these bills was specifically directed 
to the question of sales to governmental agencies for 
resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana 
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. CummTnS News Co., 632 F. 2d 
680, 688 (CA7 1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable 
inferences [can] be drawn from the failure of the Congress 
to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation 
placed upon the existing law by some of its members, 
including the inference that the existing legislation 
already incorporated the offered change." United States 
v. Wise, 370 u.s. 405, 411 (1962). 
5In only two of the cited cases, however, did the 
district court hold that sales to governmental agencies in 
competition with private firms were not covered by the 
Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not 
reach the question. A See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (CA9 1967); Portland Retail Druggists 
Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974), 
remanded on other 1ssues, 425 u.s. 1 (1976). Cf. 
Champaign-urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News 
Co., 632 F.2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military 
exchange store for resale to military personnel are not 
subject to the Robinson-Patman Act); General Shale 
Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 
598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd on othergrounds, 132 F. 
2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither the government nor a city in 
its purchase of property is in competition with 
another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling 
the article.") (emphasis added). 
5. 
II 
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting 
' opinion, the Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental 
distinction between government purchases for its own 
consumption and government purchases for resale to the 
general public. 6 It may be agreed that the legislative 
history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and subsequent 
interpretations of the Act, indicate that governmental 
bodies are not subject to the Act when purchasing for 
their own consumption. Such an exemption properly may be 
implied because, as a consumer, the government does not 
use the advantage of cheaper wholesale prices to injure 
competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in his testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee that the federal 
government would continue to be able to purchase goods at 







is not in 
from these 
6Petitioner only argues that purchases by the 
government pharmacies for the purpose of resale to members 
of the general public are covered by the Robinson-Patman 
Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for the 
purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered 
by the Act. 
[wholesalers] • [T] o have a d i scr imina t ion, 
there must be a relative position between the 
parties to the discrimination which constitutes 
an injury to one as against the other. I think 
the answer is to be found in that. 
"In other words, if seller A makes a price 
to a retailer in New York and a different price 
to a retailer in San Francisco, all other things 
aside, no case of discrimination could be 
predicated there, because the two are not in the 
same sphere at all. 
"The Federal Government 
same distinction, not of 
function. They are not ~ 
anyone else who wotiiO buy." 
is saved by the 
location but of 
competition with 
6. 
In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase 
for retail resale is a completely different animal from a 
~ ~ purchase for consumption." ~et •1 at 29a. An exemption for 
government purchases for consumption rests on 
considerations of policy and legislative intent wholly 
inapplicable to government purchases for resale to the 
public generally. Indeed, this Court recognized just such 
a distinction in its decision in Abbott Laboratories v. 
7Hearings Before the House Committee on the 
Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). The quotation in text is 
included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting opinion. 
Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of 
this case is Teegarden's response to the question put to 
him by Congressman Hancock as to whether a wholesaler 
could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper price 
than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would ~~ 
have to answer it in this way. . .. fi If the two hospitals ~ 
are in competition with each other, ~should say then that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it 
from the bi 11. If they are not in competition with each 
other, then they are in a different sphere." Id., at 209. 
7. 
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U.S. 1 (1976). The ~ 
issue in that case was whether ~ the purchase of drugs by 
pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from the 
Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The exemption is limited, 
extending only to "purchases of •.• supplies for their own 
use by schools ..• hospitals, and charitable institutions 
not operated for profit." 15 U.S .C. § l3c .~The Court held 
that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for resale 
to former patients, for dispensation to employees and 
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or 
of their dependents), and for resale to members of the 
general public, the exemption was not available. · The 
Court noted that to extend the exemption to cover retail 
resales to walk-in customers "would make the commercially 
advantaged hospital pharmacy just another community drug 
store open to all comers for prescription services and 
devastatingly positioned with respect to competing 
commercial pharmacies." 425 U.S., at 17-18. 
This case is indistinguishable in principle from 





competitor rather than a consumer it loses its claim to 
exemption. When it acts solely as a consumer, it may 
claim exemption because the basic purpose of the Act--
protection of competition--is no longer at issue. Thus, 
whether or not the Nonprofit Institutions Act applies 
directly to government hospitals, 8 the distinction it 
draws between purchases for consumption and purchases for 
resale to the general public is equally applicable to 
government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals. 
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a 
barrier to the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to 
the state and county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs 
to members of the general public is hardly an attribute of 
state sovereignty. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
. ( 
~and Regulation Assnh' _ _ u.s. _ _ (1981). 
u.s. 
III 
We have stated repeatedly that "the anti trust 
8see Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
389, 397 n.~4 (1978). 
9. 
laws and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be 
construed liberally, and that the exceptions from their 
application are to be construed strictly." Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn, supra, 425 
u.s. ' at A 11. And we have said that implied anti trust 1)?/J, 
is true whether the ::::.::--" immunity is not favored. This 
institution seeking the exemption is private or the 
political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 (1978). 
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and 
legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and 
despite the Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, 
the Court of Appeals implied an exemption for sales to 
government pharmacies that compete in the retail market 
with private pharmacies. The purpose of the Robinson-
~atrnan Act was 
e._\ large buYers 
"to curb and prohibit all devices by which 




gained discriminatory preferences over 
by~  of their greater purchasing 
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 
It is not easy to a s sume that Congress intended 
to protect s mall business from what was seen as the unfair 
10. 
competition of large corporations only to leave these very 
same businesses vulnerable to the greatest potential 
competitor of all--the government. The dec is ion of the 
Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, and 
I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari. 
No. 81-827--Jefferson County Pharmaceutical 
Assn, Inc., v. Abbott Laboratories, et al 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The question in this case is whether the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13, applies to state and 
local governments that have entered the commercial 
marketplace as retailers of goods to the general public in 
competition with private firms. Because this is a 
substantial question, and because I think the decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered the 
2. 
question incorrectly, I dissent from the denial of 
certiorari. 
I 
Petitioner is an association of retail 
pharmacists doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama. 
Respondents are fifteen drug companies and certain state 
and county pharmacies operated in conjunction with state 
and county hospitals. 1 In its complaint, petitioner 
alleged that the state and county pharmacies were 
receiving preferential prices from the drug manufacturers 
and were using their favored position to compete with 
private pharmacies in retail sales to the general public. 
Petitioner alleged that these preferential wholesale 
prices, followed by retai 1 sales to consumers, viola ted 
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 u.s.c. §13. 2 Petitioner 
1The respondent pharmacies include those operated 
by the county hospital and by the hospitals and clinics of 
the Medical College of the University of Alabama. 
2under the Robinson-Patman Act it is "unlawful 
for any person engaged in commerce •.. to discriminate in 
price between different purchasers of commodities of like 
grade and quality ... where such commodities are sold for 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
sought injunctive relief and treble damages. 3 
The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama dismissed the complaint. The 
court found that sales to governmental agencies are 
"beyond the intended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price 
Discrimination Act, at least with respect to purchases for 
hospitals and other traditional governmental purposes." 
Pet. at 20a. In reaching this conclusion the court relied 
primarily on statements by H. B. Teegarden, the chief 
draftsmen of the Robinson-Patman Act, and by other 
commentators and government officials indicating that 
sales to governmental agencies are beyond the intended 
scope of the Act. 4 The court cited several district and 
use, consumption or resale within the United States ..• , 
and where the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or injure 
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly 
receives the benefit of such discrimination." 15 U.S.C. 
§13. 
3The District Court found that one of the 
defendants--the Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama--was immune from any claim to damages by virtue of 
the Eleventh Amendment but could not be dismissed from 
suit in light of the claims for injunctive relief. 
4see W. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-
Patman Act 30-32 (1963). But Congressman Patman did not 
address the question whether the Act applies to 
governmental purchases for retail resale. The district 
court also cited a 1936 opinion by the Attorney General 
indicating that the Act did not apply to sales to the 
federal government. Again, however, the question was 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
appellate court decisions holding the Act inapplicable to 
governmental purchases, 5 and indicated that such a holding 
was supported by Tenth Amendment considerations in light 
of this Court's decision in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed 
on the basis of the District Court's opinion. Judge Clark 
dissented. 
assumed to relate to "Government contracts for supplies." 
38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936). 
The District Court also relied on the fact that 
Congress has on two occasions considered, without 
enacting, legislation to make the Act applicable to sales 
to governmental agencies. See H.R. 4452, 82nd Cong., lst 
Sess. (1951): H.R. 3377, 83rd Cong., lst Sess. (1953). 
However, neither of these bills was specifically directed 
to the question of sales to governmental agencies for 
resale to the general public. But see Champaign-Urbana 
News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummln5 NeWs Co., 632 F. 2d 
680, 688 (CA7 1980). Moreover, "several equally tenable 
inferences [can] be drawn from the failure of the Congress 
to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation 
placed upon the existing law by some of its members, 
including the inference that the existing legislation 
already incorporated the offered change." United States 
v. Wise, 370 u.s. 405, 411 (1962). 
5In only two of the cited cases, however, did the 
district court hold that sales to governmental agencies in 
competition with private firms were not covered by the 
Act, and in both instances the court of appeals did not 
reach the question. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (CA9 1967): Portland Retail Drugg1sts 
Assn v. Abbott Laboratories, 510 F.2d 486 (CA9 1974), 
remanded on other 1ssues, 425 U.S. 1 (1976). Cf. 
Champaign-urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummns News 
Co., 632 F.2d 680 (CA7 1980) (purchases by a military 
exchange store for resale to military personnel are not 
subject to the Robinson-Patman Act): General Shale 
Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 
598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd on othergrounds, 132 F. 
2d 425 (CA6 1942) ("Neither the government nor a city in 
its purchase of property is in competition with 
another buyer who may be engaged in buying and reselling 
the article.") (emphasis added). 
5. 
II 
As Judge Clark explained in his dissenting 
opinion, the Court of Appeals blurred the fundamental 
distinction between government purchases for its own 
consumption and government purchases for resale to the 
general public. 6 It may be agreed that the legislative 
history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and subsequent 
interpretations of the Act, indicate that governmental 
bodies are not subject to the Act when purchasing for 
their own consumption. Such an exemption properly may be 
implied because, as a consumer, the government does not 
use the advantage of cheaper wholesale prices to injure 
competition. Thus, Teegarden explained in his testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee that the federal 
government would continue to be able to purchase goods at 





is not in 
from these 
6Petitioner only argues that purchases by the 
government pharmacies for the purpose of resale to members 
of the general public are covered by the Robinson-Patman 
Act. Petitioner does not contend that purchases for the 
purpose of supplying the hospitals' own needs are covered 
by the Act. 
[wholesalers]. fT]o have a discrimination, 
there must be a relative position between the 
parties to the discrimination which constitutes 
an injury to one as against the other. I think 
the answer is to be found in that. 
"In other words, if seller A makes a price 
to a retailer in New York and a different price 
to a retailer in San Francisco, all other things 
aside, no case of discrimination could be 
predicated there, because the two are not in the 
same sphere at all. 
"The Federal Government 
same distinction, not of 
function. They are not ~ 
anyone else who wotiiCl buy." 







In short, and to quote Judge Clark, "a purchase 
for retail resale is a completely different animal from a 
purchase for consumption." Pet. at 29a. An exemption for 
government purchases for consumption rests on 
considerations of policy and legislative intent wholly 
inapplicable to government purchases for resale to the 
public generally. Indeed, this Court recognized just such 
a distinction in its decision in Abbott Laboratories v. 
7Hear ings Before the House Committee on the 
Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess., 209 (emphasis added). The quotation in text is 
included in Judge Clark's persuasive dissenting opinion. 
Particularly relevant in light of the circumstances of 
this case is Teegarden's response to the question put to 
him by Congressman Hancock as to whether a wholesaler 
could sell goods to a city hospital at a cheaper price 
than that offered to privately owned hospitals: "I would 
have to answer it in this way. . . . If the two hospitals 
are in competition with each other, I should say then that 
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it 
from the bill. If they are not in competition with each 
other, then they are in a different sphere." Id., at 209. 
7. 
Portland Retail Druggists Assn., 425 U.S. 1 (1976). The 
issue in that case was whether the purchase of drugs by 
pharmacies in nonprofit hospitals was exempt from the 
Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the exemption provided in 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The exemption is limited, 
extending only to "purchases of •.. supplies for their own 
use by schools ... hospitals, and charitable institutions 
not operated for profit." 15 u.s.c. §13c. The Court held 
that to the extent the drugs had been purchased for resale 
to former patients, for dispensation to employees and 
students (other than for the personal use of themselves or 
of their dependents), and for resale to members of the 
general public, the exemption was not available. The 
Court noted that to extend the exemption to cover retail 
resales to walk-in customers "would make the commercially 
advantaged hospital pharmacy just another community drug 
store open to all comers for prescription services and 
devastatingly positioned with respect to competing 
commercial pharmacies." 425 U.S., at 17-18. 
This case is indistinguishable in principle from 
Portland Retail Druggists. When a hospital acts as a 
8. 
competitor rather than a consumer it loses its claim to 
exemption. When it acts solely as a consumer, it may 
claim exemption because the basic purpose of the Act--
protection of competition--is no longer at issue. Thus, 
whether or not the Nonprofit Institutions Act applies 
directly to government hospitals, 8 the distinction it 
draws between purchases for consumption and purchases for 
resale to the general public is equally applicable to 
government hospitals as to private nonprofit hospitals. 
Nor do I think that the Tenth Amendment is a 
barrier to the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to 
the state and county hospitals. The retail sale of drugs 
to members of the general public is hardly an attribute of 
state sovereignty. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
and Regulation Assn, u.s. (1981). 
III 
we have stated repeatedly that "the anti trust 
8see Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U.S. 389, 397 n.l4 (1978). 
9. 
laws and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be 
construed liberally, and that the exceptions from their 
application are to be construed strictly." Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn, supra, 425 
U.S., at 11. And we have said that implied anti trust 
immunity is not favored. Id. This is true whether the 
institution seeking the exemption is private or the 
political subdivision of a state. See Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 {1978). 
Yet despite these principles, despite the purposes and 
legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, and 
despite the Court's decision in Portland Retail Druggists, 
the Court of Appeals implied an exemption for sales to 
government pharmacies that compete in the retail market 
with private pharmacies. The purpose of the Robinson-
Patman Act was "to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virture of their greater purchasing 
power." FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 u.s. 166, 168 
{1960). It is not easy to assume that Congress intended 
to protect small business from what was seen as the unfair 
10. 
competition of large corporations only to leave these very 
same businesses vulnerable to the greatest potential 
competitor of all--the government. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals is wrong, the question is important, and 
I therefore dissent from the denial of certiorari. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81--827 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[January -, 1983] 
JusTiCE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical 
products to hospitals operated by State and local govern-
ments for resale in competition with private retail pharma-
cies is exempt from the proscriptions of the - . . ' . .. .. 
~----~"'~--ua••R•obinson-Patman Ac~--11.... 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and 
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents, the defendants below, are fifteen 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama, and the Cooper Green Hospital Phar-
macy. The University operates a medical center, including 
hospitals, and a medical school. Located in the University's 
medical center are two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital 
is a county hospital, existing as a public corporation under 
Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damage and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 and 
81-827-0PINION 
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26, for alleged violations of § 2(a) and (f) of the layton Act,~ 
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 13(a) and (f). Petitioner contends that the respondent 
manufacturers violated § 2(a) ' by selling their products to 
the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospi-
tal Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged petitioner's 
members for like products. Petitioner alleges that the re-
spondent hospital pharmacies knowingly induced such lower 
prices in violation of § 2(f) 2 and sold drugs so procured to the 
general public in direct competition with privately owned 
pharmacies. Petitioner also alleges that the price dis-
crimination is not exempted from the proscriptions of the Act 
by 15 U. S. C. § 13c.3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim, on the ground that state purchases 4 are ex-
' Section 2(a)~-.i•••••-.. ._.~,_.,.llliilllt--llillt•.__...,.~......,...._ 
~15 U.S. C.§ 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
./ ( ---~~shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States .. . , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .. . . 
2 Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
G It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of uch commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section. 
3 Section 13c provides: 
Nothing in • ••••• • -••••• ... shall apply to pur-
tiiJt"t bases of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, 
ublic libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not oper-
. . 
ed for profit. 
'"State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and 
its agencies . 
ftctJ 
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empt as a matter of law from the sanctions of § 2. In grant-
ing respondents' motions, the District Court expressly ac-
cepted as true the allegations that local retail pharmacies had 
been injured by the challenged price discrimination and that 
at least some of the state purchases were not exempt under 
§ 13c. 5 The District Court held that "governmental pur-
chases are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the 
intended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination 
Act, at least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 
traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 
(1981). 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a di-
r----- vided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the dis-
J"ict- C<lll(t's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 7 
antetl--ee~orari to resolve this important question of 
federal law. U. ~).(1982). We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is very narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government. Nor are we concerned with 
State purchases for consumption in traditional governmental 
functions. 8 Rather, the issue before us is limited to State 
6 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as 
Appendix). 
• Petitioner's antitrust claims were dismissed solely on the basis that 
State purchases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 
2d, at 103 n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some 
other rule of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman 
Act claims. 
7 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
8 Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
81--827-0PINION 
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purchases for the purpose of competing against private enter-
prise-with the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the 
retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all State purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to State 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental nmc-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
In construing a statute, we look first to the statutory lan-
guage itself. The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does 
not exempt State purchases. The only express exemption is 
that for nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 9 
Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory Ian-
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitution 
issue arising from the application of the A:_~jE this case: '!:,.¥_retail s of 
Ph:il'IIla~eutical drugs is not "indisputablyv/f(""nfattribut.tf"yor stat saver-
~ See EEOC v. Wyoming, - U. S. -, - (1983)){·---...tt. 
Hodel v. Virginia S1a~e Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 
U. S. 264, 288 (1981 . t is too late in the day to suggest that Congress 
cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are 
engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parde!.LY. . ..T.ermJ:n.aL.Rail:: ~ 
way, 377 U. S. 184, 18A--idlff93 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment 
protects certain State purchases from the Act's limitations, such as for con-
sumption in traditional governmental functions, those purchases must ~e 
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of La a ette v. Louisiana & 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413 n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
9 The District Court properly assumei:l, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying 
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption 
would support summary judgment in cases against State hospitals purchas-
ing for their own use. See note 22 infra. 
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guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 10 This concession was compelled by several of 
this Court's decisions. 11 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 12 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before us on the ground that it involved the Sherman 
Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. 13 Such a distinc-
See also Pfi'"'• Inc. v. G"""'";..,.' of /Mia, 434 U.S. 308, 31~8). -' -( J 
foreign nation is a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 8 ~ The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 58&-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicabil-
ity to a city of§ 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 
Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which 
essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur oses · 
price-discrimination provisions of the · son- atman Act." City of La-
'S ayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Court expressly found that a munici-
~-: was a "person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U.S., at 
\...:::::./ 'lOJ-"'1 • See also City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 40tMJf$ n. 19. 
\ ~. 
12 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "per-
son." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Senator Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
13 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
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tion ignores the specific reference to the Robinson-Patman 
Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term 
"person." 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14. Nor do we perceive any 
reason to construe the word "person" in that Act any differ-
ently than we have in the Clayton Act, which it amends. 14 In 
sum, the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that 
there is no exemption for State purchases to compete with 
private enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent . from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
and history reveals no such contrary intention. 15 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp . v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose con-
duct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
14 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifi_yally state 
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton A ( will apply 
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appe in this bill, 
since it is desi e9 to become by amendment a part of th t ac~ ~ 
ep. No. 87, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d ess. 7 (1936); S. ep.k~502, 74th-
Cong. , 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936)~(~' ~::!:ny!.!!:ha~v~e:...!c~o.!-7m!:.----,--------
plained because the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in ( 1 J F l 
commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, re mt~ r~~~. ~ 0 
and it is carried into the bill under consideration. The language of the se11 • L o j A~ J 
Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by the courts.''). 
Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising that the common 
terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed con-
sistently with each other. See~ 8137 .-,(remarks of Rep. 
Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a 
new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the purtJ!QO§lS !-----1 
of that act to do just what this Jaw sets out to do."); 311~
".SS:l'IIIM; (remarks of Senator Logan) r--------~--:---.,..__ 
15 Although the face of the Act clearly contains no express exemption in 
favor of State purchases, we nevertheless consider the legislative history. 
See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. Colorado 
( p 14 rpo!»~ oF Aobi~Hdt\ 
b ill is to <; rrr ... 1th t'tj 
Gtayto~ A-ct) ; 
i tl. ~t 6 151 
-) 
( 4J4 rl"~$ by Sel\, 
Lc~r'") {saYJ~e). 
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A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 16 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); Califor-
nia v. FPC, 369 U. S. 482, 485 (1962)). 17 In City of La-
fayette, applying antitrust laws to a city in competition with 
a private utility, we held that no exemption for local govern-
ments would be implied. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the 
Court, emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust 
laws: "[T]he economic choices made by public corporations 
Publiclnterest Research Group, Inc ., 426 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1976). The Court 
previously has considered "how far Congress intended to extend its man-
date under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the answer in its "pur-
pos~Aand legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 
186; 197 (1974). See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S 55 0 
(1959); Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U. . 1, 72, 78 
(1953). 
16 See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, U.S. 308,~ 32-313 
(197~~ Mandeville Island Farms, Inc . v. Ameri an Crystal Sugar its 
334 U. S. 219, 236 (1948) ( · omprehensive in .-
terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the for idden 
practices by whomever they may be perpetrate<\(') (emphasis added). If». 
17 See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital'& Gerontology Center v. ~ 
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399· Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc ., 425 
f U. S. 1, 12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 
Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975). 
ftct iS 
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, designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for 
the community constituency, are not inherently more likely 
to comport with the broader interests of national economic 
well-being than are those of private corporations acting in 
furtherance of the interests of the organization and its share-
holders." 435 U. S., at 403 See also 
id., at 408. 18 
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JusTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
'
8 In one important sense, retail competition from State agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. See e. g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 
69, 75-76 (1979); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc ., 363 U. S. 536, 54~4 
(1960). Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively efficient, retail 
organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to that extent, con-
sumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the extent that 
lower prices result from lower overhead, in the form of federal grants, 
State subsidies, free public services, and freedom from taxation, State 
agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers 
to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act 
could give State agencies a significant additional advantage in certain com-
mercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small private 
competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs 
of the drugs sold by the State agencies involved in this case. Because 
there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail distribu-
tion more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer 
to the extent that State retail activities eliminate more efficient, private 
retail distribution systems. 
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ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 64&-647 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Brock & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." 
Thus, in view of the Act's remedial purposes, and the broad 
scope of its language as interpreted by this Court, the burden 
of showing that the legislative history compels us to create an 
exemption is on those who argue that Congress intended, but 
did not choose to say, that State agencies may compete with 
private business free from the Act's constraints. 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for State 
purchases. Surely Congress would have discussed an issue 
of such importance before leaving State purchasers free to 
compete unfairly with the private sector. Yet there is noth-
ing whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or 
in the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 
There is evidence that some members of Congress were 
aware of the possibility that the Act would apply to govern-
mental purchases. Most members, however, were not con-
cerned with State purchases, but with possible limitations on 
the federal Government. The most relevant legislative his-
tory is the testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H.B. 
Teegarden, before the House Judiciary Committee. 19 Al-
19~ep] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting of 
81-827-0PINION 
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though the testimony is ambiguous on the application of the 
Act to State purchases for consumption, one conclusion is 
certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply 
to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some cir-
cumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the ex-
emption found by the courts below for all such purchasing. 20 
discounts to the United States Government? 
----=::M~r. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
• Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it shouldRnless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is -- #'" 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction. . . . They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. A 
{!iep] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
rRepJ Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
~.Teegarden: No; I think not. 
~ei?] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
f.\__ _c_~titive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
l1J Govet;ijmellt 
~eEJ Hancock: Yo would have to bid to the city, countyo\exactly the 4 
same as anybody else same quantity, same price, same quality? . 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
@.ep] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any 
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? ~ 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal- :}-- H' 1 
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular c?,e. 
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should sayJ!:.hat 
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
20 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
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In the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no leg-
islative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed ex-
emption, to enter private competitive markets with congres-
sionally approved price advantages. 21 
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogative r prlVl eges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a rinci le inherited b 
American jurisprudence from the common law. . . ... " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition~ll fUrther preclude 
any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." !d., at 25~ H • • 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surren~d~e:rrs~.~~~~~~~~~:::~--=---:-:---:-:----
~ 1[ t I ' 2 b' 2 1 .. , the Court stated that 1t coul t~R Rob;., so"'-
---- "perceive no reason for extending [the presumption agains 
1 
' ra the Pat~~)1 b t/1 IV~!. 
sovereign statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from 
the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in p E 11d tllj ~Fore Cof'\J rt'~1>, 
scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed 
by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 297 U. S. 
175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 562--563 (1957). 
In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of statutory construc-
tion on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the 
federal government's purchases. The existence of such an exemption is 
not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-Q05 
(1941) (United States not a "person" under the Sherman Act for purposes 
of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that 
governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. 
For his purposes, this eliminated the rationale for the Act to apply to State 
agencies. That assumption, however, is inapplicable here. 
2
' Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies. " 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
81-827-0PINION 
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of District Courts confirm that 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General used the phrase 
"Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a con-
struction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in vi-
olation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. 
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp . v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the 
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corpora-
tion that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to State agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. Seefi932-1939f\Trade Cas. (CCH) 1[ 55,156, at 415-416 
(1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply do not 
consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See 
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, N-932-1939~Trade Cas. (CCH) 
1r 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, -- -~ 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (inter r in Attor<..:- ---1~1! ~overt\ Me.,ta.l 
ney General's opinion as exempting~ urc ases). His interpretation L~ 
is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erro-
neously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and reasoning. Rep-
resentative Patman's personal intentions probably are better reflected in 
his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "pur-
chaser" to include "the United States, any State or any political subdivision 
thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on these bills, but it is ar-
guable that he believed that the original intent needed to be stated ex-
pressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Ge~eral's contrary construe-
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State purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to the subsequent events on which respondents 
rely. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 22 Testimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of State hospitals, 23 and Federal Trade 
tion of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to pass these bills probably 
stems from a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. 
It bears repeating, however, that none of these views-including Repre-
sentative Patman's-focuses on the State purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional functions. 
22 The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain State purchases de-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to State agencies that 
perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
estin that § 13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) ( of Rep. Walter)(§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by ci ies, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette 
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14 · · nclu es pu 1c 1 rar-
ies " which "are b definition, operated by loca government":,;) 7;A~b;:bo:::t~t --..--:---------~ 
Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 1 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937 (exemp- 1. 
tion codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). \r< l'lll. ,.. l<s of) 
We need not address this issue here. c._:?.,.,.____ R.er· Wtdrer 
23 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
~ 1 at Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
b 
2 
~ ( Patman Act of the Select Committee oy Small Business o the Hous_e o!~ 
L 
___ _::_L------~RMe~pC:resentatives, 91st Cong.J 73-77 (1969-1970) (William 
amant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association of WholP!utl-
er; Harold Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative~ssociation~!Sli! R.. 0)~ 
jfj•aSmall Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before ) 
the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Com-
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Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving State health care programs. 24 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the State agency competed with 
private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by 
institutional purchasers. 25 Other statements express little 
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 26 See supra, at -- - -- and n. 21 
COIU\$, For e NAt' 
~ 15-16 (1967-1968) [he inafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, 
~ former FTC Commissioner, 1 · , 6 I 1• There also was testi-
mony that institutional purchasers freque~tain drugs at lower prices 
than do retail pharmacies, see id., at Jf; 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many 
witnesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected compe-
tition, see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 29r, 
24 See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 22, at 74. 
25 After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private group 
health care programs; (ii) the federal government's ability to purchase from 
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) 
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpa-
tients or even nonpatients." I d., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved§ 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of F.T.C. author-
ity envisioned State purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in com-
petition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most 
similar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
26 Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the brevity and 
conclusory nature of the Subcommittee report-"the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." 
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer 
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 
117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 Ur-·.;S~ . ..,!;75=--......,.___, 
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 200 (1977) ("Leg- -----
islative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense part 
of the legislative history."). 
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that 
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The 
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices 
for retailers and government customers "is extremely sub-
stantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost jus-
tifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other fac-
tors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 
90th Gong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it 
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu-
~urers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman 
\.Y Ac~ ... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Sub-
committee considered some State purchasing at discrimina-
tory prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be un-
lawful. The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly 
worded statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the 
mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied 
to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernme,ntal insti-
tutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is 
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa-
vored retail druggists." Id., at 79 (emphasis added). 27 
This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that pri-
vate institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail 
competition through sales at discriminatory prices. The 
Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair com-
petition at issue in this case. 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
27 The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-
signed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the ex-
tent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,' " H. R. Rep. 
No. 1983, supra note 22, at 78, but that would indicate more the construc-
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court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmaties in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held or suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 28 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by State agencies is relatively small; 29 (iii) 
respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the District Court cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 30 (v) it is not clear that 
28 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n. 
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 
513 (1972). 
29 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State /i) 
purchases. See notes 30-32, irifra. Cf. Blue Chi Stam s y, Manor -& 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 73 (1975) (affirming rule adopteq by "virtually 
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases ---@ 
presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added i_ _ 2 01 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200..(U974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). ~
ao s~Pacijic Engineering & Production Co. v. K -McGee CorpHW, 
fi.974-yr'rade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 ( Utah 1974) (dicta) ) ( 
"nnvolving federal government as ultimate purchase~elymg on Attorney 
~l's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F . 2d 
O~(CA10) (finding legitimate petitwn espite different prices), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); eneral Shale Products Cor . v. Struck 
~nst. C~ 37 F. Supe. 598, 602-6 (WD Ky (finding no "sale" under the 
 Act and alternatively holding the Act inapplicable.(i !IIi' a a .• I ("~inc e ---.. 
"[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of property considered :..__...--" 
necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in 
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and resell-
ing that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) 
(expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales 
to State agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943). 
~ttcV..s tr. Brt:Jwn- Forfi'Jalll Ou;ti/Jer!(. Coef· > 
/3'f p, ~1Af(J· '1
1 
16 ( ~ (J NY 1'1!>5) (!tct irtttfPitrahle ~ince fhpre 
wa$ ()'0 prooF that f.a l-t> a FFect~d pIa irt t,fJ- od.verrsrly) j 
c.FF'•tf or\ 'fl'l!'ol'\ htlow ') 23'# F. 2& 'ff;"1 (C. A2) ( e!' Ct.N'J&)•"l)) 
cert. de111ied,. 3'i2. U.s. '12.':> (1'15"6). Th.e ~tV!~ cot-trt also 
i VJducd~d iVl d.tctq +haf 1f w,.~ IAncft'ar wl-teth~r-
' t'he Rohln5t;vt ~ PatmA~ Act af'pli~d w s't"a fe pV!r-t:-h a?e:$, ~ 
/ 
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
State purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 31 and (vi) there are several cases that 
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to State 
purchases for resale purposes. 32 This judicial track record is 
(ex prts>ly not 
~to.+e a.1tVt.cy 
w~e V\ eY\jaqfJd 
I~ fh.e ~v.Jt 
tJtldr t'~~,, j whe11tt'r 
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited note 29, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; 33 others do not foreclose our holding; 34 
and in some cases they support it. 36 Thus, Congress cannot 
be said to have left untouched a universally held interpreta-
tion of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
chases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price 
advantage-in the priva~teu:e.uu.'UI:~ar,KQ:I~ 
3 &> 
33 See 5A Z. Ca itch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c]* 8 c_overe& b'1 
(he ltd '' ) ·) 
•••• (197 ) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable);y 4. 
Kalinowski, Ant1 st Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) 
"there is some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to sta s _ 
and municipalities are I I · 2 3 !' · 1 Q • 11 li 1 ... id. L--- ----
§ 24.06[2] , E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 
-203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to 
have settled the matter where the federal government is concerned, some 
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to purchases by 
state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the 
Robinson-Patman Act 84 n. 166 (1962). 
34 Some deal only with sales to the federal government. See Le 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Admin' ation 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~74,642 41( D 
-.,. Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, whether tlie Act ap-
plies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral Under Executive Order 1(}.,{136, Identical Bidding in Public Procure-
ment 11 (1962). ____....., 
85 See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. No. 1, 112, 113, 
115 (1977); Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727~ .. ·-· 
( ;F -sh'k a1ency 
pr- 1"Vate et~teF-pn$(' J 
taM f!h.S IN/ /1J 
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VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in ... policy-making 
in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our function ends 
with the endeavor to ascertain from the words used, con-
strued in the light of the relevant material, what was in fact 
the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper, 312 U. S., 
600, 606 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and im-
pulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Un-
derwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is re-
plete with references to the economic evil of large 
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for 
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is 
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think 
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny 
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson 
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the 
strongest competitor of them all. 36 To create an exemption 
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to State 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
116 Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, 
supra note 19, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protec-
tion of private rights"). 
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Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical 
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in 
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from 
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and 
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the 
Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates 
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school. 
Located in the University's medical center are two pharma-
cies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as 
a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of I 
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and 
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(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers 
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's 
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at 
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like 
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital 
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation 
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of§ 2. In granting respondents' motions, the Dis-
trict Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that 
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged 
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-
'Section 2(a) , 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States .. . , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .... " 
2 Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section." 
3 Section 13c provides: 
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public librar-
ies, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and 
its agencies. 
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chases were not exempt under § 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, with-
out regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of 
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with 
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional gov-
ernmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam deci-
sion, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memoran-
dum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 5 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of 
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for 
use in traditional governmental functions. 6 Rather, the 
6 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must .. . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
6 Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably'' an attribute of state sover-
eignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming, -- U. S. --, -- (1983); Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in 
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state pur-
chases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional 
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of 
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental func-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt 
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 More-
over, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory lan-
guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of 
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
7 1t may be that sales only to indigent citizens, not otherwise able to 
purchase pharmaceutical products in the retail market, are not "in compe-
tition" with sales by private retailers. We here need not define, however, 
precisely when a state agency is "in competition" with private enterprises: 
The District Court correctly assumed that the private and state pharma-
cies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d, at 98. See also 
note 8, infra. 
8 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying 
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption 
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchas-
ing for their own use. See note 20, infra. 
9 The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. 
. . 
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this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than 
the Robinson-Patman Act.'2 Such a distinction ignores the 
10 See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
son" under§ 7 of the Shennan Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person" 
within the meaning of § 8 of the Shennan Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "per-
son" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585--586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the ap-
plicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as 
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a 
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur-
poses as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act." City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific 
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435 
U. S., at 401 n. 19. 
11 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "per-
son." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains tenns general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
12 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 19S-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose con-
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specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discus-
sion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435 
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to con-
strue the word "person" in that Act any differently than we 
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undis-
puted that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). In sum, 
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is 
no exemption for state purchases to compete with private 
enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
and history here reveals no such contrary intention. 
A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
duct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
'
3 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen. 
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply 
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act con-
tains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration. 
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by 
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising 
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should 
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of 
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy 
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the 
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do."); id., at 3119 
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen 
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same). 
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merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. Id., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350--351 (1963); Cali-
fornia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 15 In City of 
Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in compe-
tition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for 
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized 
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic 
choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as they 
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constitu-
ency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the 
broader interests of national economic well-being than are 
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the in-
terests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., 
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16 
14 See, e. g. , Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313 
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust 
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added). 
15 See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. 
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975). 
16 In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 64(H)47 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to 
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the 
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from 
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from tax-
ation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the ac-
tual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-
Patman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small 
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the 
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Be-
cause there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail 
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers 
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient, 
private retail distribution systems. 
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65 (1968)." 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for state 
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing 
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in 
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. Some members of 
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would 
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, 
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible 
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal 
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary 
Committee. 17 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the 
17 [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting 
of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so . . .. 
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the 
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality? 
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application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one 
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the 
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at 
least some circumstances. Thus, his comments directly con-
tradict the exemption found by the courts below for all such 
purchasing.'8 In the absence of any other relevant evidence, 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any 
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then 
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H. R . 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
' 8 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further pre-
clude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." !d., at 250. 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the Robinson-
Patman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could 
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the 
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a 
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being 
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of 
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an 
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of 
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we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by an unex-
pressed exemption, to enter private competitive markets 
with congressionally approved price advantages. 19 
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the 
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, 
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not com-
pete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable I ~~ 
here. 
19 Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his 
reference was to "the Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons 
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the 
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such mat-
ters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emer-
gency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates 
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1155,156, at 
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply 
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. 
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 1!55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of district courts confirm that 
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to these subsequent events. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His in-
terpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpret-
ing-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are 
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the 
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on 
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent 
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Gener-
al's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to 
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal pur-
chases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Represent-
ative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to fed-
eral purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Rep-
resentative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Depart-
ment of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immu-
nity for state enterprises, see note 34, infra. 
20 The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per-
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the state agency competed with pri-
vate retailers, although he was aware of such practices by in-
stitutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little 
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by 
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., 
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption 
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here. 
21 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Direc-
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Har-
old Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association); 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on 
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC 
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State pur-
chases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort, 
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act 
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony 
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than 
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many wit-
nesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, 
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. 
22 See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 20, at 74. 
22 After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 24 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 19. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that 
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The 
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices 
for retailers and government customers "is extremely sub-
stantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost jus-
tifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other fac-
tors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it 
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu-
facturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman Act 
.... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit-
tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory 
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. 
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group 
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase 
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and 
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to out-
patients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved § 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority 
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most sim-
ilar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
24 Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress--quite a leap given the failure of 
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, 
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act 
are in no sense part of the legislative history."). 
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The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded 
statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate 
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to dis-
criminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institu-
tional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is 
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa-
vored retail druggists." Id., at 79. This unexceptional 
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional pur-
chases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through 
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said noth-
ing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this 
case. 25 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
:University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 27 (iii) 
25 The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-
signed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the ex-
tent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H. R. Rep. 
No. 1983, supra n. 20, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction 
of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
211 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19, 
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 
508, 513 (1972). 
27 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state 
purchases. See nn. 28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that 
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all 
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases pre-
senting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added); 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. CoppPaving Co., 419 U.S. 186,200-201 (1974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
28 See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involv-
ing Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790, 
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was 
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), affd on opinion below, 234 
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Canst. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD 
Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act 
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of 
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its govern-
mental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be en-
gaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132 
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-
Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F. 
Supp., at 16. 
28 Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77--0094 
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dis-
miss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state 
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (com-
plaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers sub-
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state 
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is 
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited, n. 27, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; 31 others are not necessarily inconsistent 
ject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association 
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, 
oral opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c ap-
plied), vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has 
suggested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state 
purchases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opin-
ion), aff'd, 378 F. 2d 212, 21~216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State Univer-
sity within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called govern-
mental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases 
predate our decision in City of Lafayette. 
00 See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332 
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases, 
state agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7 
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption 
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, 
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637--&11 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. 
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 851, 
858--859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp. 
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency ex-
empt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other 
business corporations). 
31 See- 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 & 
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with our holding; 32 and in some cases they support it. 33 
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a uni-
versally held interpretation of the Act. 34 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is 
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opin-
ion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to 
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962). 
82 Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1[74,642. Almost 
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State pur-
chases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Execu-
tive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962). 
33 See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977); 
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with pri-
vate enterprise, it is subject to Act). 
34 In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, 
the Department of Justice stated: 
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to en-
gage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activi-
ties of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the 
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the fed-
eral government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned 
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commer-
cial transactions in the market." 
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890 
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteci-
mientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a 
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that 
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
I' 
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considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
chases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private 
retail market with a price advantage. 
VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of pol-
icy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words 
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what 
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 
corp. 312 u. s., 6oo, 606 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and 
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern 
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is 
replete with references to the economic evil of large organiza-
tions purchasing from other large organizations for resale in 
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no rea-
son, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that 
congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Ala-
bama, protection from the competition of the strongest com-
petitor of them all. 35 To create an exemption here clearly 
would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
36 Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, 
supra, n. 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection 
of private rights"). 
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VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
r further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
"'f{~ To: The Chief Justice 
SUP. 0 '- '-'-:- ~ " - r. tl. S. Justice Brennan 
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pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
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Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents,.- tlie 8ekB82mt:! ae~ are fifteen 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama, and the Cooper Green Hospital Phar-
macy. The University operates a medical center, including 
hospitals, and a medical school. Located in the University's 
medical center are two pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital 
is a county hospital, existing as a public corporation under 
Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief , 
-a under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 M& , 
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26, for alleged violations of § 2(a) and (f) of th Clayton Act,'( , 
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Ac . 15 U. S. C. j 3B .2)\-t\-t-. 1 30, l 
§§ 13(a) ~(f). Petitioner contends that e respondent 
man acturers violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to 
the University's two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospi-
tal Pharmacy at prices lower than those charged petitioner's 
members for like products. Petitioner alleges that the re-
spondent hospital pharmacies knowingly induced such lower 
prices in violation of § 2(f) 2 and sold'@.rugs so p!'oeure~ to the l ~ \ 
general public in direct competition with privately owned 
pharmacies. Petitioner also alleges that the price dis-
crimination is not exempted from the proscriptions of the Act 
by 15 U. S. C. § 13c.3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint fe:F ~llPe tr?-
state a elaim, on the ground that state purchases 4 are ex-
1.\ 1 Section 2(a),lll.&f t!.e Clsyteft Ae~, as ~WReAiilaa 8;' the &eeiBeen Patman_9-
' ~ 15 U.S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
j.. A.lt shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
~ merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
- within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .... ;, 
2 Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
[
~It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section. A 0 -p ~ ~ l 
3 Section 13c provides: o\ --------[~ ~~~~t.:sott- f\ MA N c... 
U
ANothing in iiatieRe 13 tie 18e att8 81a of ~his li~fshall apply to pur-
bases of their supplies for their own use by schools, cji~-ges, universities, 
public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not oper-
ted for profit. f.. 
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and 
its agencies. 
81-827-0PINION 
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 3 
empt as a matter of law from the sanctions of § 2. In grant-
ing respondents' motions, the District Court expressly ac-
cepted as true the allegations that local retail pharmacies had 
been injured by the challenged price discrimination and that 
at least some of the state purchases were not exempt under 
~ The District Court held that "governmental pur-
are, without regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the 
. mtended reach of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination 
/ 
Act, at least with respect to purchases for hospitals and other 
. traditional governmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 
/ (1981)!5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a di-
/
1 vided per curiam decision, affirmed "on the basis of the dis-
1 trict court's Memorandum of Opinion." 656 F . 2d, at 93/ ~ 
\ 
\ 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question o£9 
-
U.S.- ~· U.S. (1982). We now reverse. 
-:: " " 1\ ,, 
II 
The issue here is ~arrow. We are not concerned WI,......;;·t~h;__ __ --1~ 
sales to the federal governmen~ ~ , r • congo~o'!("with 1\ rot. 
${ate purchases for consumption in traditional governmental J 
functions.J'1 Rather, the issue before us is limited to 1tate Q.c 
656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as 
Ap~ndix). ~ 
5 J'Petitioner's MiliwBt' claims were dismissed solely on the basis that 
1c.. ,State purchases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 
2d, at 103 n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some 
other rule of law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman 
Act claims. 
~ /The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
'1 /Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
_;_ x.c.d. •. I 
- :1~ i 
A 
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purchases for the purpose of competing against private enter-
prise-with the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the 
retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all %tate purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to ,State O..C. 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental func-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
l:A QQBstwiHg 8 statl.lt9, WQ 199k &st te the statutory lan• 0 
~Ia8'9 its91P. The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does 
not exempt ,itate purchases. The only express exemption is 
that for nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c/ l? 
Moreover, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory Ian-
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the ActJ!l this casej...The retail sale of v 0 iJ (V c,.... 
pharmaceutical drugs is not ''indisputabl~~rattributterof state sover- J / f / 1 
Yeignty~ See EEOC v. Wyoming, - U. S. --, -- (1983)_4q~eting$1o j.._ 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 
"")._ U. S. 264, 288 (198!)). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress 
cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are 
engaged in proprietan:'activities. Se~, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Rail-
way, 377 U. S. 184, 18$ lBQ, 19Q lg31(1964). If the Tenth Amendment 
protects certain $tate p~chases from the Act's limitations, such as for con-
sumption in traditional governmental functions, those purchases must be 
protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City o La a ette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413 . 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
S /The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying 
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption 
would support summary judgment in cases against ttate hospitals purchas- ~c.. 
~ ing for their own use. See note '4J:..nfra. 
~ 
----, 
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guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. )6q This concession was compelled by several of 
this Court's decisions . .l!•t> In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that ''the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States."Ji•• 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before l:Uii QR tae g;F9\iRQ u~a~it involved the Sherman 
Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act. d, 'l. Such a distinc-
'\ Jd'Tbe word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. . 
Jtf ee e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (tlte weftls-l!aey9' ~.} .. .t~ , s n 
;person". .§ 7 of the Sherman Act iBelaEie Stat-g); Chattanooga Foundry & a 
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (~municipality is a 
"person" within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act aRd caD maint~ 
~~~tma~~~·:OB-WM'ief'+T:-1, ~predeeessor of§ 4 ef the Cl~). 8 
See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 31IA._1978) (~ 1\ 
foreign nation is a ''person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). p \.__ 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance -€.. 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose . .. sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. Cc. v"" 
v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the applicabil-
ity to a city of§ 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as amended, 34 
Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a statute which 
essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same purposes as the anti-
price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act." Cit o La-
fayette , 435 U. S. , at 402 n. 19. The Court expressly found that a munici-
...._----"'P;:;;;ality was a ''person" within the meaning of the statute. 313 U. S., at 
4~ss:-<- See also City of Lafayette, 435 U. S. , at 4019.@n. 19. 
) 
11 .li'Th;-word ''purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word ''per-
son." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Senat.&t Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to ~ purchasers. The ~. 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
12. PThe only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
81-827-0PINION 
6 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBO'IT LABS. 
tion ignores the specific reference to the Robinson-Patman 
Act in our discussion of the all-inclusive nature of the term 
"person." 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14. Nor do we perceive any 
reason to construe the word ''person" in that Act any differ-
ently than we have in the Clayton Act, which it amends. J,( 'l In 
sum, the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that 
there is no exemption for $tate purchases to compete with D.c. 
private enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent . from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
and history reveals no such contrary intention.~ 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of ''persons" whose con-
duct ''in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
' 3 J( Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
, since it is design~d to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. £ 
d---i:tep. No. 2287, Pt~th Cong., 2d Sess. a1 (1936); S. Rep~502, 74th c. ~~ • Cl · 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936~(';_MfOY have com-"'"'(~ 
plained because the provisions of the bill apply to 'any person engaged in k ~ 
commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act contains that exact language, 
and it is carried into the bill under consideration. The language of the 
Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by the courts.''). 
Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising that the common 
terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should be construed con-
·~. ,ctt sistently with each other. See 80 Ceftg. Rwi'\8137 +l~(remarks of Rep. 
11 
1\ Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy or a ,'.:/ 
new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the purpos; / 
of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); 89 Gong. Ree,~ll%{ *' 1 at 
L_-,...-_:!.~~~~~(~re~m~ar~ks~of~S~e~n Logan)9')t, ~ 15 Although the face o e-'Act clearly contains no express exemption iii\ 1 
favor ofJtate purchases, we nevertheless consider the legislative history. ; I 
See, e. g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. Colorado \ t' \\
1 
. 
k~~ o-: ~o·"'~OO\. 0 t ~ . .t.L .. 0 h V) -~(\ ~]'\.\~ 
CJC\.\-o!l( h c..."T ) \ ~·, 
cJ.- (o\~\ ( ~ 
~ ~~. ':_~ ) 
I '--J \ 
0'-'.SOJ'('t& ) 0 
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A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944).11'4 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. !d., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); Califor-
nia v. FPC, 369 U. S. 482, 485 (1962)).~ 15 In City of La-
~ uu-A , fayette,A.applying antitrust laws to a city in competition with 
" a private utility, we held that no exemption for local govern-
ments would be implied. JUS'fiG'S BRENNAN, ·.witing ~~he / 
Court, emphasized the purposes and scope of the antitrust 
laws: "[T]he economic choices made by public corporations 
Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1976). The Court' 
previously has considered ''how far Congress intended to extend its man-
date under" the Robinson-Patman Act and found the .answer in its ''pur- · 
pos~and legislative history." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. \ 
186, 197 (1974). See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S 55, 69-70 ' 
(1959); Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61 72, 78 1 
(1953. r 
!- 14 ..!"See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-313 · J:, 
.. 1 .......__ (19781 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar C~ , --.-~ .. u x.tl !'..'-d'f' ~ '-T' rJ -~ ,::. ,w::-;-_; . . 
~ . . '~ 334 . S. 219, 236 (1948) (aRtitru&t law:& aFe<'o?~prehensive ~ ., ..., 1 til t\c.l:- ~ 1 
.... "Y' _ ~J_,t'::. 1' r o•i• d.~' )' - - \ terms and coverage, protecting all who are made vic~rl5iUilen L -= "L"'"'"' 'J :J 
• : ' ,. u.s.~ ~ "' u> ~ • practices by whomever they may be perpetrat~~ (emphasis added). 
r,~. ~.'T 1 A l. as/See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. /\ 
~ - .,_w:q d:A_t!.r TI'\~N c.. , Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378,388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S., at 398, 
.. ~ • .\.c C _ O'C\~iro c:.. (,\,.4~ 399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
· · - ' I ~ S~ I ;j12 (1976); UniW States v. N ati<=l Assn. of S.curitie• D•alero, 
:- 422 u. s. 694, 7191(1975). 
I 
--~ 1.... -11...0 
~ 1.- \ 
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. . . , designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for 
the community constituency, are not inherently more likely 
to comport with the broader interests of national economic 
well-being than are those of private corporations acting in 
furtherance of the interests of the organization and its share-
holders." 435 U. S., at 403rfiuotnotes ottriLLed7. See also 
id., at 408.18. '"' }c:::o 
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JusTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
18 In one important sense, retail competition from sftate agencies can be ~ 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the p~i~ular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. See e. g. , emr:~ A:&P Tet! Ga. v. FTC, 440 U. Sr .e. 
69, 76-76 (19'79), PTC v. A16h9i1Bfl:l' B11sG~, !~. , 863 U. S. -586, 543 844 e. 
)- (196Q).. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively efficient, retail 
organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to that extent, con- r-' 
sumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the extent that 1\.e.su \,\:,tJ 
~ r ·, \, u-\ ~'a\ c.~ 1 lower rices Feslo\lt fr~ lower overhead, iH tbe fui'H!o ;/ federal grants, 
!k. tate subsidies, free public services, and freedom from ation, State O.c.. 
agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the actual consumers 
to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act 
.k, could give $'tate agencies a significant additional advantage in certain com- ~" I. 
mercia! markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small private 
competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the full costs 
Q..c. of the drugs sold by the ~ate agencies involved in this case. Because 
there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail distribu-
tion more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers will suffer 
1-c. to the extent that .State retail activities eliminate more efficient, private 
retail distribution systems. 
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ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 64&-&i7 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." 
'W ) 'Fhu~, in view of !he Act's remedial purposes, and the broad 
. _ ofCOpe of its la;zylige as interpreted by this Court, t:Re bw-den ..1.- ax.t.. ~ • 0 \lk 1<12..-
~~ng ~h~jthe legislative history compels us to create an -----
L------- exemptiOn 1s 8R i:k88e \viu~ arga~ that Congress intended, but 
.Q.c_ did not choose to say, 1i:Rat ,81iate a8'eBeies may eefftfJeie \wt:R ~ . 
pl'iua1ie l:n:~si:ftes~ fieee fr em t'ke f .. :et's eonitraints 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for State 
purchases. Sl:H'el;y CaRg:l'iBB weald :ksve ei~Ctl~Beti an iBS\ie 
.Q~....,~~w.c.;:;~9i:Bf*l~~=~~Ree:-ae-::~:e~p:~:~~~~~: ~b; :;:;.....t:Pi~:ee-~~t~&&-~ ~ 
ing whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or "' 
in the floor debates focusing on the issue."::! 
C: There is ev=idene~ t~~ome members of Congress were 
aware of the possibility that the Act would apply to govern-
mental purchases. Most members, however, were not con-
cerned with State purchases, but with possible limitations on 
the federal Government. The most relevant legislative his-
tory is the testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B. 
Teegarden, before the House Judiciary Committee.Jo(•'T AI-
•1 ~ep]Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting of 
81-827-0PINION 
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though the testimony is ambiguous on the application of the 
Q..c, Act to .%tate purchases for consumption, one conclusion is 
certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply 
' 
to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some cir-
cumstances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the ex-
emption found by the courts below for all such purchasing. ae"as 
unts to the United States Governm:ent? 
Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
[~.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts ... . 
1\ o , ~ould that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it shoul4-.,unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns. . . . 
.. . . ~~ 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinctiol)f . . . They 
J ~not in competition with anyone else who would buy. l @ep] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
" " line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
[ ) 
" " [ ] 
" (\ 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
fRep] Hancock: Governm~nt, State, city, municipality. 
~.i'eegarden: No; I think not. 
~ep]Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
l ] ~ep:]Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, countyf.\.exactly the If'· 
1\ f\ same as anybody els~ame quantity, same price, same quality? 0' 
'] Mr. Teegarden: No. ------~=-------------------l1 (. l @ep] Hancock: W auld they or could they sell to a city hospital any L..:-
1\ 1\ cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say~hat ~ -\_~K\- ) ,...-
the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H. R . 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20~209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
: ~ rTeegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
~~'by, . .;ln 0 uJ'1';) 
.,_; A 
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In the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no leg-
islative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed ex-
emption, to enter private competitive markets with congres-
sionally approved price advantages.* ,q 
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether ~'the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogative or privi eges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common lavtJ . . .. " But he also noted ..:z • 
that ''requiring a showing of effect upon competitiont will further preclude I . . ) 
any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." [ I d., at 259\'YOOt~ 
omitte~ r . u 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. In tlte eame ,eM tlta+J 0 B · 
·-r:J--~!tgi!&liio~iiia.MtMM~M'· 188!~.-te~to..wt.,:\the Court stated that it could ( \.0~ ~ RO~- hk -
' erceive no reason for extending [the presumption agamst 4Aeladin__j(the \ ~ o.c\ wc:w  
sovereign·i~tatute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a state ~. ·~~ C~ 0 
the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in L '• . . ' \3 
scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed 1 ~ 
by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 297 U. S. 
175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 562-563 (1957). 
In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of statutory construc-
tion on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an exemption for the 
federal government's purchases. The existence of such an exemption is 
not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-Q05 
(1941) (United States not a ''person" under the Sherman Act for purposes 
of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden clearly assumed that 
governmental purchasing would not compete with private purchasing. 
For his purposes, this eliminated the rationale for the Act to apply to jtate 1c 
agencies. That assumption, however, is inapplicable here. 
1'1 ,t" Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application ''to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of fistrict fourts confirm that 9-.c:.. 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government . . .. 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General used the phrase 
"Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a con-
struction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in vi-
olation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. 
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the 
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corpora-
tion that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to $'tate·agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See~932-1939"Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at 415-416 
(1937). Two other early ,State attorney general opinions simply do not 
consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. See 
Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota,)932-1939..,.Trade Cas. (CCH) 
~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney --
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-
ney General's opinion as exempting~A'urchases). His interpretation 
is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpreting-or erro-
neously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and reasoning. Rep-
resentative Patman's personal intentions probably are better reflected in 
his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the Act to define "pur-
chaser" to include "the United States, any State or any political subdivision 
thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on these bills, but it is ar-
guable that he believed that the original intent needed to be stated ex-
pressly to negate his reading of the Attorney General's contrary construe-
81--827-0PINION 
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~ate purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to the subsequent events on which respondents 
rely. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s . .-.zoTestimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of ¢.ate hospitals,2il"zand Federal Trade ~"'\ 
l m&~ be. n4\,.;'oll1Abie ~ 
tion of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to pass these bills}Pesael~ 
~ a reluctance to subject federal purchases to the Act. 
1'1\o,~ovc:.r It bears repeating, hewev~ that none of these views-including Rep re-
I\ sentative Patman's-foc~es on the ,itate purchases alleged here: pur- O..C. 
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional functions. 
20 .z-rrhe most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain ~ate purchases de- ~c. 
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to $tate agencies that O..c.. 
perform the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7--8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (stateiRiiR~of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14 (Neft~Pefit IastitYtieas A~ncludes "public librar-
,)._-ies," which "are, gy defini~operated by local government"); Abbott 
Laboratories, 425 U. S., at l~n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (193~exemp­
tion codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). 
We need not address this issue here . 
.:z.l _...See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
-, Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the ]iouse of .JL 
1 Representatives, 91st Cong.(Ist Sess) 73-77c§23)(196~197~) (_William -<-
;-::3. , o.l ~Ca,rnant, Director of Public Affairs, National Association o Wholesai- = 
-:;-~~~ ( j ~ el}i)t_Iarold Halfpe~y, counsel for. the Automativ1Associatio~ ef Vlflele e 
__j ~;Small Busmess Problems m the Drug Industry: Heartngs Before 
the Subcommittee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Com- -e. 
mittee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong~ 
81-827-0PINION 
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Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
.Q.c._ over transactions involvingfttate health care programs.ac-z. ... It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the ,.s'tate agency competed with ~ 
private retailers, although he was aware of such practices by 
institutional purchasers.•.u Other statements expres~little _e:l 
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre- 1\ 
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contt_mporaneously with the Act's 
passage.~-<~ See supra, at~-~and n. 21.l.5 CT~ 9 \l 
1\ 1\ I (~a-l-e. yu r c.~Q~tt,S 1 ., , ) 1\ A ~ " ,.oo,,..b '1 fJ'£11\PT 
~1~16 (1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 eari s] (E;_ar ntner, a • · 
fonner FTC Commissioner~ on e a o N AR . There also was es l· 
mony that institutional purchasers frequently ob ain dru at lower rices ' f than do retail pharmacies, see id., at , 58, 318, 109~1094, and many~ 
.I~~ , \ ~ 1'\ ·~ witnesses complained that this discri ation adversely affected compe- 2. 
~ J Pot I H s.s ~. \. ~ tition, see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 2~ 1\ 
'D r~q,~ ~>~..S.. u .a. see H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note z:£, at 74!' 0 
- ------''=-'--___; l5 »After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques- A 
tions for Chainnan Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private group 
health care programs; (ii) the federal government's ability to purchase from 
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) 
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpa-
tients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
committee, Chainnan Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved§ 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of w~ author-
CL ity envisioned ,State purchases for welfare programs, not for r~ale in com-
petition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most 
similar to the issue not discussed by Chainnan Dixon. 
~4 _..Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the brevity and 
conclusory nature of the Subcommittee report-''the views of a subsequent 
Congress fonn a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." 
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer 
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 
117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750 758 
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 2 (1977) ("Leg-
islative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense part 
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It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that 
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The 
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices 
for retailers and government customers "is extremely sub-
stantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost jus-
tifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other fac-
tors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it 
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu-
facturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman 
Aci . . . " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Sub-
committee considered some _State purchasing at discrimina- k 
tory prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be un-
lawful. The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly 
worded statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the 
mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied 
to discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental insti-
tutional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is 
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa:___...e... 
vored retail druggists." I d., at 79 (emphasis added).@.J · 
This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that pri-
vate institutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail 
competition through sales at discriminatory prices. The 
l Subcommittee said nothing expressly about the unfair com-rn at issue in this case. B 
j Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
1 
considering the Act's coverage have conclude~ t~at it does 
1 not apply to government purchasers. They ms1st that no 
I . 
I 25 ~e Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-
\__--stgned to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the ex-
tent the sales are for ths nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H. R. Rep. 
0 No. 1983, supra note 22'; at 78, but that would indicate more the construe-
/\ tion of § 13c than it wo"tild the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
( :;(8- 30) 
J«. 
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court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmaties in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held;?.r suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-q, a.7 
tion to purchases by ptate agencies is relatively small;,.. (iii) 
respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the District Court,..cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite;~ (v) it is not clear that 
Z.v 4 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n. 
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 
513 (1972). 
t. 7 --The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State 
purchases. See notesA~infra. Cf. Blue Chi Stam s v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 73 (1975) (affinning rule adopted by "virtually 
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases 
presenting this question over the past quarter century'') (em basis added · 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200 (1974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
:z._ ''nearly four decades of litigation"). 
•see Pacific Engineering & Producti Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
1 
[ J ,..1974-1ATrade Cas. (CCH) ~75,054, at 96,721, 96,742 @Utan ffi74) (dicta) 
" " (involving federal government as ultimate purchase~Telying on Attorney ~ { 
General's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d ~ 
l -!qq j 790, 798"(CA10) (finding legitimate com etition despite different rices), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); eneral ~PrQdu_c:t.LG!rP. v. Struck .:z 
3 Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 60~Ky~finding no "sale" under the ~. 
1\ Act and alternatively holding theA Act inapp cable .QR the grotmd=that...: l'l~ I} 
~·urc.A- "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of property considered..,... 
necessary for the purposes of carrying out its governmental functions is in 
competition with another buyer who may be engaged in buying and resell-
ing that article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) 
fLc... 
(expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-Patman Act applies to sales 
to ,State agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 (1943). 
t:"' """ \ \'o . 
~-·-~ __ ~_.~_, ._,_~---------~ 
. ' . 
:d~~: 
-:;. - ~4! 
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
Q..c. _state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market;~ and (vi) there are several cases that 
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to $'tate .2..c.. 
purchases for resale purposes ... ~ This judicial track record is 
.:.
4 
.x"Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dis-
\ .m.. f Mt t\ tVD 
' rei' d.. ·,o,) J "d) 
miss with re 'udice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to $tate Q.c. 
agencies), aff 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint insufficient because 
it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to discriminatory treat-
ment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 
d- 71-543 <@Ore. Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral opinion), vacated andre- ) 
manded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applie~te-the pW'(lhases aHEf" I\ 
(}- I!J!Wee), vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). ' dne District Court has 
suggested in alternative holdings that there is an exemption for ,State pur- Slc 
chases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
1 _ 1 · . \ No. 4-Q6-5:iop. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), aff'd, 378 
~15-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within ~ 
~ \ 3c. scope of"~eR~I'eRt IostitutieBs Ae(; expressly" oet adlk~ l, du:..~ ~~) 
~"so-called overnmental exemm_i.on" cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 
c-< (196'Tl. !See also Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. , 134 F. upp. , i 
16 (SDNY 1955) (dicta), affd per curiam, 234 F. 2d 959 (CA2), cert. de-
nied 352 1956 . All oft ese cases pr ate our dec1s1on m , tty 
of Lafayette. cv r ( pe.r c.- ur 1 ~"" ) 9-
30 ... See Burge v. Bryant Public School \ istrict, 520 . Supp. 328, 330-33ID' Z. 
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 61 , 612 1 CA8 1981; Champaign-Urbana' "' . 
1 1 
1 i NewsAgency, Inc.v . J.L.CumminsNewsCo.,479 . Supp.281 ,~76,9D! 28fo -J 
·. c.H- \o.o •.LON (CD Ill. 1979) ~ct inapplicable to1purchasest2y the A :r:my :;md ~etr \ 1\ 1\. 
G li:xchaRge 8emee eeeause ef se¥ereigft-immw:Ut.1,. but possibly Stat~ agen- \ ·'---e_1 ~  
C ~'Q'J:) ciesA~ face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 68<Y;)87-692~A7 '-----;f' cle.rl\ \ 
I'-
0 
1980); A.J. Goodman & SonJ v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., sr---e... ' e. ' 
3 
F ~ SutaP,· .§.90,:J893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption 
Qc a# f{)r,ate purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, 
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633,' 641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. 
4 
.e 
Rangen, Inc., 23 . upp. 393, 399 (Idaho 19~, affd, 351 F. 2d 851, 1\ 
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp. 
v. Nassau Research & Development Associa~ 152 F. Supp. 91, 95'"'-96~ e.~ 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F . Supp. 439, '(' 1\. 
443 (ND Ohio 1952[_( E:J.yre.ss ~ '\ nG -\- "'PO~ £.. .!>.S 1 t.t\ 
W~.e.-\-'r.'C.r ~\ A\~ A0,4L'NC 
()( e..m -pi- .r r o "" ~ d- ' u.> rt ~ ?li 
E..~C\ 1\ C\~d._ l \ .... (.\ b0.StN€..~ 
• '" d C'f \ N. -rn.<:.. S AM C.. ""- A I'\ .-,<-. 
1\ :5 ofue...r b•Jsl t-H:...:.S 
1..' \ 
C::. r- \'o f' a:\' 'DN..S ) 
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
7 cited note 2!t,' supra. 
1\ Responde'tits also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; ar 3~thers do not foreclose our holding; 1M"?."' 
and in some cases they support it. 311 33Thus, Congress cannot 
be said to have left untouched a universally held interpreta-
tion of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
chases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price 
advantage-in the private retail market. 
~~ ~ ,-t(3. ~ ~VI'f>· lq82.) ) -
..arsee 5A Z. CaW.tch, Business Organizations § 105D.01(8][c], at 1Q9D -45 JL 
)-- to 196D-46 (1972:) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. 
Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation§ 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) 
(''there is some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states 
""-- and municipalities are e:*lllwaee fpgm Rgi:JmseH Patman liabi~~); id. 
o § 24.06[2j at 24-75 to 24-fij; E. Kintner, A Robinson-Patmani>rimer 
~203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opinion appears to 
~ settled the matter where the federal government is concerned, some 
controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to purchases by 
state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the 
l 14 .12. ) Robinson-Patman Ac~~4 a. 16i'(1962). -~ 
32. MSome deal only with sales to the federal government. See £ Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~74,642~at 94,~19 Q 
o {1Si'S~ Almost all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act ap-
plies to State purchases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral Under Executive Order 1~36, Identical Bidding in Public Procure- -'<. 
ment 11 (1962). ~ ..JL-
u .. See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. ~ 112,(!ill (l ~ _ 
n A 115 (1977); Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 ~ v ~Y~ .c_( 
1"\.~ ~ 9 f c..k.s wdl-. 'f.r' " ~tc:. 
E.N~c:.rpr'I.S <:. 1 \t IS 
.:S u 'bj e.~\- "to f.\ c..+ ) 
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VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in ~x>olicy-making 
in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our function ends 
with the endeavor to ascertain from the words used, con-
strued in the light of the relevant material, what as in fact .... 
the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 312 U. S., 
600, 606 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and im-
pulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Un-
derwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is re-
plete with references to the economic evil of large 
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for 
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is 
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think 
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny 
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson 
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the 
strongest competitor of them all.~ To create an exemption 3 "" 
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to ~ate ..Q.c 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
3'1 .iii'Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, 
1 supra note 1~ at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protec-
A tion of private rights"). 
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Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
RIDER A 
In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, 
at 25, the Department of Justice stated: 
The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned 
enterprise to engage in commercial activity should not be 
sufficient to immunize all activities of the enterprise 
from the antitrust laws. That test removes the clearly 
sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust 
scrutiny of the federal government while holding the 
commercial activities of a state-owned enterprise to the 
same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commercial 
transactions in the market. 
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1890 (1977}. Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General 
de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964} 
(the charter of a ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not 
a sovereign activity that would justify applying the sovereign 
immunity doctrine}. 
2nd CHAMBERS DRAFT 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-827 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[January - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical 
products to hospitals operated by state and local govern-
ments for resale in competition with private retail pharma-
cies is exempt from the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and 
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents, are fifteen pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 
and the Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University 
operates a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical 
school. Located in the University's medical center are two 
pharmacies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, ex-
isting as a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 15 & 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of 
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
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Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. §§ 13(a) & 
(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers 
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's 
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at 
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like 
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital 
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation 
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c.3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the Dis-
trict Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that 
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged 
1 Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .... " 
2 Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section." 
3 Section 13c provides: 
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public librar-
ies, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 
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price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-
chases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, with-
out regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of 
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with 
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional gov-
ernmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981) ." The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam deci-
sion, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memoran-
dum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 6 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of 
federal law.-- U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for 
consumption m traditional governmental functions. 7 
• Petitioner's claims were dismissed solely on the basis that state pur-
chases are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. See 656 F. 2d, at 103 
n. 10. We thus have no occasion to determine whether some other rule of 
law might justify dismissal of petititioner's Robinson-Patman Act claims. 
6 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself. " 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
7 Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably" an attribute of state sover-
eignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming, -- U. S. --, -- (1983); (Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-
81--827-0PINION 
4 JEFFERSON CTY. PHARMA. ASSN. v. ABBOTT LABS. 
Rather, the issue before us is limited to state purchases for 
the purpose of competin~ against private enterprise-with 
the advantage of discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental func-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt 
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 More-
over, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory lan-
guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of 
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in 
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain State pur-
chases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by-
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 413 & n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
8 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See note 3, supra, and accompanying 
text. Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption 
would support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchas-
ing for their own use. See note 20, infra. 
9 The word "person" or "persons" is used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. 
10 See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
son" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than 
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the 
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discus-
sion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person" 
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act. See also Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "per-
son" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 58&-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the ap-
plicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as 
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a 
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur-
poses as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act.'' City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific 
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435 
U. S., at 401 n. 19. 
11 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "per-
son.'' See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
12 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose con-
duct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
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U. S., at 397 n. 14. Nor do we perceive any reason to con-
strue the word "person" in that Act any differently than we 
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends. 13 In sum, the 
plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is no 
exemption for state purchases to compete with private 
enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
and history reveals no such contrary intention. 
A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
'
3 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen. 
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply 
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act con-
tains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration. 
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by 
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising 
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should 
be construed consistently with each other. See 80 id., at 8137 (remarks of 
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy 
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the 
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119 
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson bill is to strengthen Clayton 
Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same). 
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might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 14 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. !d., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); Califor-
nia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 15 In City of La-
fayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in 
competition with a private utility, we held that no exemption 
for local governments would be implied. The Court, empha-
sized the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he eco-
nomic choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as 
they are to assure maximum benefits for the community con-
stituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the 
broader interests of national economic well-being than are 
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the in-
terests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., 
at 403. See also id., at 408. 16 
"See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313 
(1978) (rating "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust 
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added). 
15 See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. 
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975). 
16 In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to 
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the 
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These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JuSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." 
B 
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from 
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from tax-
ation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the ac-
tual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-
Patman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small 
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the 
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Be-
cause there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail 
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers 
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient, 
private retail distribution systems. 
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The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for State 
purchases. There is nothing whatever in the Senate or 
House Committee reports, or in the floor debates, focusing 
on the issue. Some members of Congress were aware of the 
possibility that the Act would apply to governmental pur-
chases. Most members, however, were not concerned with 
state purchases, but with possible limitations on the federal 
Government. The most relevant legislative history is the 
testimony of the Act's principal draftsman, H. B. Teegarden, 
before the House Judiciary Committee. 17 Although the tes-
17 [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting 
of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the 
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any 
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
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timony is ambiguous on the application of the Act to state 
purchases for consumption, one conclusion is certain: 
Teegarden expressly stated that the Act would apply to the 
purchases of municipal hospitals in at least some circum-
stances. Thus, his comments directly contradict the exemp-
tion found by the courts below for all such purchasing. 18 In 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then 
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill. 
Hearings on H. R. 1,.995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
18 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra note 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition . . . will further pre-
clude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." Id., at 250. 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the Robinson-
Patman Act was pending before Congress the Court stated that it could 
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the 
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a 
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being 
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of 
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an 
exemption for the federal government's purchases. The existence of such 
an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 
U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the Sherman 
Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, Teegarden 
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the absence of any other relevant evidence, we find no legis-
lative intention to enable a State, by an unexpressed exemp-
tion, to enter private competitive markets with congression-
ally approved price advantages. 19 
clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not compete with pri-
vate purchasing. For his purposes, this eliminated the rationale for the 
Act to apply to state agencies. That assumption, however, is inapplicable 
here. 
19 Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General used the phrase 
"Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons "for avoiding a con-
struction that would make the statute applicable to the Government in vi-
olation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such matters," id., at 541. 
The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emergency Fleet Corp. v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 (1928), in which the 
Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates to afederal corpora-
tion that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at 
415--416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply 
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. 
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 38 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of district courts confirm that 
state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to the subsequent events on which respondents 
rely. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 20 Testimony before the House 
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His in-
terpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpret-
ing-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are 
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the 
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on 
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent 
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Gener-
al's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to 
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal pur-
chases to the Act. 
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Rep-
resentative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional functions. 
:>)The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per-
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies) with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
435 U. S., at 397 n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by defi-
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Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of state hospitals, 21 and Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving state health care programs. 22 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the state agency competed with pri-
vate retailers, although he was aware of such practices by in-
stitutional purchasers. 23 Other statements expressed little 
nition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 
18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption 
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here. 
21 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Direc-
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesaler&); Harold Half-
penny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association; Small 
Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on Small 
Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16 (1967-1968) 
[hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC Commis-
sioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State purchases 
"probably" exempt). But see id., at 80, 86 (remarks of Charles Fort, 
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act 
may prohibit this practice .... "). There also was testimony that institu-
tional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than do retail 
pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many witnesses com-
plained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, see id., at 
A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. 
22 See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 20, at 74. 
23 After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, State, and private group 
health care programs; (ii) the federal government's ability to purchase from 
drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and (iii) 
instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to outpa-
tients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage.24 See supra, at ~11, and n. 21. 25 
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved § 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority 
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most sim-
ilar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
20 Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the brevity and 
conclusory nature of the Subcommittee report-"the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." 
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, e. g., Consumer 
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 
117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 758 
(1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 200 n. 7 (1977) 
("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense 
part of the legislative history."). 
'" It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that it did not 
focus on the question presented by this case. The Subcommittee found 
that the difference between drug prices for retailers and government cus-
tomers "is extremely substantial" and "not always fully explainable by ei-
ther cost justifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors 
inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it stated that "[n]umerous acts and poli-
cies of individual manufacturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-
Patman Act .... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit-
tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory prices-about 
which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. The Subcommitte report 
did include the awkwardly worded statement: "There is no basis apparent 
... why the mandate of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to 
discriminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institutional purchas-
ers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is prescription drug competition 
at the retail level with disfavored retail druggists." /d., at 79 (emphasis 
added). This unexceptional opinion, however, simply says that private in-
stitutional purchases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through 
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said nothing expressly 
about the unfair competition at issue in this case. The Subcommittee also 
concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "designed to afford immunity to 
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Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmaties in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held or suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 26 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 2:1 (iii) 
respondents cite no Court of Appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the District Court cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 28 (v) it is not clear that 
private nonprofit institutions ... to the extent the sales are for the non-
profit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra note 20, at 78, 
but that would indicate more the construction of § 13c than it would the 
intent of the 1936 Congress. 
26 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397 n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19 n. 
10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 
513 (1972). 
27 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to State 
purchases. See notes 28-30, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually 
all lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases 
presenting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added); 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
28 See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involv-
ing federal government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney Gener-
al's opinion as sole support), affd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790, 
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices), 
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any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 29 and (vi) there are several cases that 
suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state 
purchases for resale purposes. 30 This judicial track record is 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Act inapplicable since there was 
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely). Affd on opinion below, 
234 F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956). Gen-
eral Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Canst. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 
(WD Ky.1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding 
the Act inapplicable since "[n]either the government nor a city in its pur-
chase of property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its 
governmental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be 
engaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 
132 F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robin-
son-Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 
780 (1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F. 
Supp., at 16. 
29 Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 
(Utah, Aug. 15, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dis-
miss with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state 
agencies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (com-
plaint insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers sub-
ject to discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association 
v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore. Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral 
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied), 
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has sug-
gested in alternative holdings that there is an exemption for state pur-
chases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4 (Idaho May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), affd, 
378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University within 
scope of§ 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called governmental ex-
emption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases predate 
our decision in City of Lafayette. 
30 See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332 
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA81981) (per curiam); Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 
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in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited note 27, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; 31 others do not foreclose our holding; 32 
and in some cases they support it. 33 Thus, Congress cannot 
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases but 
possibly State agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 
(CA7 1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing 
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any ex-
emption for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi 
Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637--M1 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & 
Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 
851, 858-859 (CA9 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand 
Corp. v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency ex-
empt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other 
business corporations). 
31 See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 & 
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is 
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opin-
ion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to 
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962). 
82 Some deal only with sales to the federal government. See Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 74,642. Almost all 
fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State pur-
chases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Execu-
tive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962). 
33 See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977); 
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be said to have left untouched a universally held interpreta-
tion of the Act. 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
chases by a State for the purpose of competing-with a price 
advantage-in the private retail market. 
VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of pol-
icy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words 
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what 
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941). 
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with pri-
vate enterprise, it is subject to Act). 
In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, the 
Department of Justice stated: 
The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to en-
gage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activi-
ties of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the 
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the fed-
eral government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned 
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commer-
cial transactions in the market. 
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890 
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de 
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F . 2d 354, 360--362 (CA2 1964) (the 
charter of a ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign 
activity that would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
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"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and im-
pulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern Un-
derwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is re-
plete with references to the economic evil of large 
organizations purchasing from other large organizations for 
resale in competition with the small, local retailers. There is 
no reason, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think 
that congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny 
small businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson 
County, Alabama, protection from the competition of the 
strongest competitor of them all. 34 To create an exemption 
here clearly would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
34 Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, 
supra note 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protec-
tion of private rights"). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical 
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in 
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from 
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and 
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the 
Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates 
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school. 
Located in the University's medical center are two pharma-
cies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as 
a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of 
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and 
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(0. Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers 
violated § 2(a)' by selling their products to the University's 
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at 
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like 
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital 
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation 
of § 2(0 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the Dis-
trict Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that 
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged 
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-
1 Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to Jessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .... " 
1 Section 2(0, 15 U. S. C. § 13(0, provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section." 
•·Section 13c provides: 
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public librar-
ies, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and 
its agencies. 
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chases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, with-
out regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of 
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with 
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional gov-
ernmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam deci-
sion, affinned "on the basis of the district court's Memoran-
dum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 5 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of 
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for 
use in traditional governmental functions. 6 Rather, the 
'The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
' Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably'' an attribute of state sover-
eignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming,- U.S.-,- (1983); Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in 
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state pur-
chases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by-
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of 
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental func-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt 
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 More-
over, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory lan-
guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of 
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
1 Special solicitude for the plight of indigents is a traditional concern of 
state and local governments, and a State's aid to indigents is an exercise of 
its sovereign powers. If, in special circumstances, sales were made by a 
State to a class of indigents, the question presented, that we need not de-
cide, is whether such sales would be ''in competition" with private enter-
prise. The District Court correctly assumed that the private and state 
pharmacies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d, at 98. 
See also note 8, infra. 
8 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption would 
support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for 
their own use. See n. 20, infra. 
• The words "person" and ''persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. 
--·-- --- --·- - ------ ------
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this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that ''the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than 
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the 
10 See, e. g., Geargia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
son" under§ 7 of the Shennan Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person" 
within the meaning of § 8 of the Shennan Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "per-
son" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585--586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the ap-
plicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as 
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U.S. C. §41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a 
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur-
poses as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act.'' City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific 
Court expressly found that a municipality was a ''person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462--463. See also City of Lafayette, 435 
U. S., at 401 n. 19. 
11 The word ''purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word ''per-
son." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
12 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 1~201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of ''persons" whose con-
duct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
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specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discus-
sion of the all-inclusive nature of the term "person." 435 
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to con-
strue the word "person" in that Act any differently than we 
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undis-
puted that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). 14 In sum, I 
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is 
u Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t)he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the tenns concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 31.16 (1936) (remarks of Sen. 
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply 
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act con-
tains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration. 
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by 
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising 
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should 
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of 
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy 
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the 
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119 
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen 
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same). 
14 JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, questions our use of 
antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. She would 
distinguish all of these cases, that uniformly hold States to be included in 
the word "persons," because none has held "that States or local govern-
ments are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers 
under the provisions of the Clayton Act.'' Post, at 4 (emphasis in origi-
nal). The dissent takes no notice, however, of our decision last term in 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 843 
(1982), in which the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal 
laws imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply to 
municipalities as well as to other corporate entities." No authority is cited 
for the dissent's distinction between "persons" entitled to sue under the 
antitrust laws and "persons" subject to suit under those laws. 
-------·---- - - -----------
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no exemption for state purchases to compete with private 
enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
and history here reveals no such contrary intention. 
A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United· States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 15 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. I d., at 787 (citing United States v. P hiladel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); Cali-
fornia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 16 In City of I 
11 See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313 
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust 
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added). 
••see, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. 
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975). 
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Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in compe-
tition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for 
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized 
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic 
choices made by public corporations ... , designed as they 
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constitu-
ency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the 
broader interests of national economic well-being than are 
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the in-
terests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., 
at 403. See also id., at 408. 17 
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
17 In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to 
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the 
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from 
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from tax-
ation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the ac-
tual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-
Patman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small 
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the 
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Be-
cause there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail 
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers 
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient, 
private retail distribution systems. 
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& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Brach & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for state 
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing 
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in 
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 18 Some members of 
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would 
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, 
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible 
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal 
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary 
18 JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, repeatedly emphasizes 
that Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the issue presented here. 
See post, at 6, 7, and nn. 10, 14, 15. This may well be true, as the likeli-
hood of state entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936. 
It cannot be contended, however, that Congress specifically intended to al-
low the competition at issue here. In any event, the absence of congres-
sional focus is immaterial where the plain language applies. See, e. g., 
Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); De Lima v. Bidwell, 
182 U. S. 1, 197 (1901); South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 
356-358. 
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Committee. 19 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the 
application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one 
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the 
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at 
least some circumstances. 00 Thus, his comments directly 
"[Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting 
of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: T"M Federal Government is 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the 
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any 
c"Maper than t"My would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If t"M two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say t"Mn 
that t"Mfact that one is operated by t"M city does not save it from t"M b~iilioil.,_., .. , ...... 
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before t"M House Committee on t"M Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20&-209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
,., JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be 
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contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all 
such purchasing.21 In the absence of any other relevant evi-
dence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by 
an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive mar-
kets with congressionally approved price advantages. 22 
"purchasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. See post, 
at 1. He joins in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, however, on the basis of a 
novel theory: that state and local agencies may never be in "competition" 
with private parties within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. This, of 
course, is an economic fiction: If in fact a State participates in the private 
retail pharmaceutical market, it is clear that it is competing with the pri-
vate participants. JUSTICE STEVENS relies on one statement by witness 
Teegarden in the 1935 House hearings, but attaches no significance to a 
further statement by the same witness: "In the final analysis, it would de-
pend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. If the two 
hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then that the fact 
that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill." See 1995 
Hearings, supra n. 19, at 209. 
21 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
mittee~ He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1995 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether ''the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further pre-
clude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." /d., at 250. 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the Robinson-
Patman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could 
''perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the 
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a 
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being 
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of 
'•e 
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of district courts confirm that 
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an 
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of 
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 
312 U. S. 600, 604--605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the 
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, 
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not com-
pete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable 
here. 
22 Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government .... 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] ... and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his 
reference was to ''the Federal Government," ibid., and gave other reasons 
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the 
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such mat-
ters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emer-
gency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425 
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates 
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at 
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply 
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. 
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
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state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to these subsequent events. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 28 Testimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
Representative Patman ''presumed that the [United States] Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His in-
terpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpret-
ing-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are 
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the 
Act to define ''purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on 
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent 
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Gener-
al's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to 
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal pur-
chases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Represent-
ative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to fed-
eral purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong. , 1st Sess. 
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Rep-
resentative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Depart-
ment of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immu-
nity for state enterprises, see note 37, infra. 
11 The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per-
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
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industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of state hospitals, 24 and Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving state health care programs. 25 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the state agency competed with pri-
vate retailers, although he was aware of such practices by in-
stitutional purchasers. 25 Other statements expressed little I · 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes ''public libraries," which "are, by 
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., 
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption 
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here. 
10 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Smatl Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Direc-
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id. , at 623 (Har-
old Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association); 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on 
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 1fr.16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC 
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'l Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State pur-
chases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort, 
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act 
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony 
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than 
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many wit-
nesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, 
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. 
•See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 23, at 74. 
• After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group 
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more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 27 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 22. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that 
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The 
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices 
for retailers and government customers "is extremely sub-
stantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost jus-
tifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other fac-
tors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it 
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu-
facturers seem . . . violative of the Robinson-Patman Act 
.... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit-
tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory 
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. 
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded 
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase 
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and 
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to out-
patients or even nonpatients." Id., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved § 13c issues. I d., at 7 4. His disclaimer of FTC authority 
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most sim-
ilar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
n Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of 
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, 
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act 
are in no sense part of the legislative history."). 
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statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate 
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to dis-
criminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institu-
tional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is 
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa-
vored retail druggists." I d., at 79. This unexceptional 
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional pur-
chases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through 
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said noth-
ing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this 
case.~ I 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 29 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 30 (iii) 
18 The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-
signed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the ex-
tent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,"' H. R. Rep. 
No. 1983, supra n. 23, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction 
of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
21 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19, 
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 
508, 513 (1972). 
10 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state 
purchases. See nn. 31-33, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all 
-,. 
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 31 (v) it is not clear that 
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 32 and (vi) there are several cases that 
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases pre-
senting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added); 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
11 See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involv-
ing Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790, 
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was 
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), aff'd on opinion below, 234 
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD 
Ky. 1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act 
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of 
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its govern-
mental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be en-
gaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132 
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-
Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F. 
Supp., at 16. 
•cr. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 
(Utah, Sept. 6, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss 
with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state agen-
cies), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint 
insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to 
discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Ab-
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state 
purchases for resale purposes. 83 This judicial track record is I 
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited, n. 27, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; 34 others are not necessarily inconsistent 
bott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral 
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied), 
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has sug-
gested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state pur-
chases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
No. 4--66--5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), 
aff'd, 378 F. 2d 212, 21&-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University 
within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called govern-
mental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All ofthese cases 
predate our decision in City of Lafayette. 
• See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332 
(ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CAS 1981) (per curiam); Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases, 
state agencies might face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7 
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption 
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, 
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. 
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), aff'd, 351 F. 2d 851, 
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp. 
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency ex-
empt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other 
business corporations) . 
.. See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 & 
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski, 
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unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
chases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private 
retail market with a price advantage. 38 I 
VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of pol-
icy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words 
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what 
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 
Corp. 312 U. -8., 600, 606 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and 
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern 
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is 
replete with references to the economic evil of large organiza-
tions purchasing from other large organizations for resale in 
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no rea-
son, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that 
18 The dissent of JUSTICE O'CONNOR relies in large part, not on the 
words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on assertions that a 
"general consensus [existed] in the legal and business communities that 
sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-Patman 
Act." Post, at 9. See also post, at 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR is correct that some in the business and legal community did 
think that an exemption existed for all state purchases. See post, at 
12-14, nn. 19 and 20. But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the 
opinion of commentators, see n. 34, supra; the views expressed that the 
Act is applicable to state purchases, see infra, at 11, and n. 22, 18, and n. 
36; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department of Justice, see 
infra, at 18, and n. 37. It is more accurate to say that this was an unset-
tled question of federal law that demanded this Court's attention. 
. 't, 
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with our holding; 86 and in some cases they support it. 36 
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a uni-
versally held interpretation of the Act. 37 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) (''there is 
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opin-
ion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to 
purchases by state and local governments."); F . Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962). 
16 Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) n4,642. Almost 
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State pur-
chases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Execu-
tive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962). 
111 See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977); 
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with pri-
vate enterprise, it is subject to Act). 
17 In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, 
the Department of Justice stated: 
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to en-
gage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activi-
ties of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the 
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the fed-
eral government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned 
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commer-
cial transactions in the market." 
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890 
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteci-
mientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a 
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that 
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine) . 
. -
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congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Ala-
bama, protection from the competition of the strongest com-
petitor of them all. 39 To create an exemption here clearly 
would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
• Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1995 Hearings, 
supra, n. 17, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection 
of private rights"). 
... ;. 
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The issue presented is whether the sale of phannaceutical 
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in 
competition with private retail phannacies is exempt from 
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail phannacists and 
phannacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the 
Cooper Green Hospital Phannacy. The University operates 
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school. 
Located in the University's medical center are two phanna-
cies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as 
a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of § 2(a) and (f) of 
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and 
I 
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(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers 
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's 
two phannacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Phannacy at 
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like 
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital 
phannacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation 
of § 2(0 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned phannacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c. a 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that state purchases • are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the Dis-
trict Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that 
local retail phannacies had been injured by the challenged 
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-
1 Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween difl'erent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States ... , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them .... " 
1 Section 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section." 
1 Section 13c provides: 
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public librar-
ies, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 
• "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and 
its agencies. 
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chases were not exempt under § 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, with-
out regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of 
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with 
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional gov-
ernmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam deci-
sion, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memoran-
dum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93.6 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of 
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for 
use in traditional governmental functions.' Rather, the 
'The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t)he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
• Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bi8hop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably" an attribute of state sover-
eignty. See EEOC v. Wyoming, - U. S. -, - (1983); Hcxkl v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation A11ociation, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 
288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regu-
late States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in 
proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 
184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amendment protects certain state pur-
chases from the Act's limitations, such as for consumption in traditional 
governmental functions, those purchases must be protected on a case-by-
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of 
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental func-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt 
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c. 8 More-
over, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory lan-
guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C.§§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of 
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Lauisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
' Special solicitude for the plight of indigents is a traditional concern of 
state and local governments. If, in special circumstances, sales were t 
made by a State to a class of indigents, the question presented, that we 
need not decide, is whether such sales are "in competition" with private 1 
enterprise. The District Court correctly assumed that the private and 
state phannacies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d, at 
98. See also note 8, infra. 
'The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See n. 3, mpra, and accompanying text. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption would 
support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for 
their own use. See n. 20, infra. 
'The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. 
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that ''the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than 
the Robinson-Patman Act. I% Such a distinction ignores the 
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discus-
son" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person" 
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a ''per-
son" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.'" City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the ap-
plicability to a city of §1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as 
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U.S. C. §41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a 
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur-
poses as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act." City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific 
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435 
U. S., at 401 n. 19. 
11 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word ''per-
son." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
11 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of ''persons" whose con-
duct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
'I 
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sion of the all-inclusive nature of the tenn "person." 435 
U.S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to con-
strue the word ''person" in that Act any differently than we 
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends," and it is undis-
puted that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). 14 In sum, 
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is 
no exemption for state purchases to compete with private 
11 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t)he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the tenns concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen. 
Logan) ("[M)any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply 
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act con-
tains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration. 
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by 
the courts."). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising 
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should 
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of 
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy 
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the 
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do."); id., at 3119 
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen 
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same). 
u JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, questions our use of 
antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. She would 
distinguish all of these cases uniformly holding States to be included in the I 
word "persons," because none has held "that States or local governments 
are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers under the 
provisions of the Clayton Act." Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). The dis-
sent takes no notice, however, of our decision last term in Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 56 (1982), in which I 
the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal laws imposing 
civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply to municipalities I 
as well as to other corporate entities." No authority is cited for the dis-
sent's distinction between "persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust 
laws and "persons" subject to suit under those laws. 
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enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An exammation of the legislative purpose 
and history here reveals no such contrary intention. 
A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
might restrain or monopolize commercial interc.ourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944). 16 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, ~1 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. ld., at 787 (citing United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); Cali-
fornia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 18 In City of 
Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in compe-
11 See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 312-313 
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust 
laws") (applying Shennan Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville 
Ialand Farms, Inc. v. American Cryatal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 
(1948) ("[Shennan] Act is comprehensive in its tenns and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added). 
11 See, e. g., Natiooal Gerimedical HoB'pital & Gerontology Center v. 
Blue CroBB, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399; Abbott Labora.toriea v. Portland Retail Druggista Aaan., Inc., 425 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United Statea v. National Aaan. of Securitiea Deal-
ers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975). 
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tition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for 
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized 
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic 
choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as they 
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constitu-
ency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the 
broader interests of national economic well-being than are 
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the in-
terests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., 
at 403. See also id., at 408. 17 
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail ~gists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Robinson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. McKesson 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
17 In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing pennits any large, relatively 
efticient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to 
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of seale. But to the 
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from 
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from tax-
ation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the ac-
tual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-
Patman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small 
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the 
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this ease. Be-
cause there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail 
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers 
will su1fer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient, 
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Lims, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 646-647 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for state 
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing 
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in 
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 18 Some members of 
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would 
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, 
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible 
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal 
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary 
Committee. 11 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the 
11 JUSTICE O'CoNNOR's dissenting opinion repeatedly emphasizes that 
Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the issue presented here. 
See post, at 6, 7, and nn. 10, 14, 15. This may well be true, as the likeli-
hood of state entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936. 
It cannot be contended, however, that Congress specifically intended to al-
low the competition at issue here. In any event, the absence of congres-
sional focus is immaterial where the plain language appli~ gJ·. A 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. ~ ); 
Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); De Lime, v. idwell, ~ 
182 u. s. 1, 197 (1901). 
11 [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting 
\ 
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application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one 
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the 
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at 
least some circumstances . ., Thus, his comments directly 
of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
[Rep.) Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be halTed-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Gavernment iB 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . . They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
[Rep.) Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Go¥rnment orders? 
[Rep.) Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
[Rep.) Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
[Rep.) Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the 
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
[Rep.) Hancock: Would they or could they aell to a city koapital any 
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned lwapital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If the two koapitals are in competition with each other, I ahou.ld aay then 
tMt the fact that one iB operated by the city does not aave it from the bill. 
If they are not in competition with each other, then they are in a different 
sphere. 
The facts of the situation are not present upon which to predicate a dis-
crimination in the nature of the case. I do not see that that question be-
comes any different under this bill from what it is under the present section 
2 of the Clayton Act, for that bill also prohibits discrimination generally in 
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contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all 
such purchasing.11 In the absence of any other relevant evi-
dence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by 
an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive mar-
kets with congressionally approved price advantages. 11 
the same tenns that this does. But it dift'ers in the breadth of the excep- I 
tions. That is the only dift'erence between the two bills. 
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the HOU8e Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. ~209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
• JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be 
"purchasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. See post, 
at 1. He joins in JUSTICE O'CoNNOR's dissent, however, on the basis of a 
novel theory: that state and local agencies may never be in "competition" 
with private parties within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. This is an\ 
economic fiction: If in fact a State participates in the private retail pharma-
ceutieal market, it competes with the private participants. JusTICE STE-
VENS relies on one statement by witness Teegarden in the 1935 House 
hearings, but attaches no significance to a further statement by the same 
witness: "In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions 
of fact in a particular case. If the two hospitals are in competition with 
each other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city 
does not save it from the bill." See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 209
1 (emphasis added). 
11 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law . . .. " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition . . . will further pre-
clude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." I d., at 250. 
All the eases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the Robinson-
Patman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could 
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the 
81-827-0PINION 
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Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of district courts confirm that 
sovereign by its own statute) 80 as to exempt a business carried on by a 
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being 
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of 
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an 
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of 
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the 
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, 
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not com-
pete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable 
here. 
• Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S)tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government. . . . 
The [Robinson-Patman Act) merely amended the [Clayton Act) ... and, 
in 80 far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
ld., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his 
reference was to "the Federal Government," ilnd., and gave other reasons 
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the 
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such mat-
ters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emer-
gency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415, 425 
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates 
to afederal corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
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state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to these subsequent events. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s.18 Testimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939) Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at 
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply 
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. 
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939) Trade Cas. 
(CCH), 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States) Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His in-
terpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpret-
ing-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are 
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the 
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on 
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent 
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Gener-
al's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to 
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal pur-
chases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Represent-
ative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to fed-
eral purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Rep-
resentative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Depart-
ment of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immu-
nity for state enterprises, see note 37, infra. 
•The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
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industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of state hospitals, 14 and Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving state health care programs. 26 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the state agency competed with pri-
vate retailers, although he was aware of such practices by in-
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per-
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by 
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Labcrratories, 425 U. S., 
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption 
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here . 
.. See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Direc-
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Har-
old Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association); 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on 
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 1&-16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC 
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'! Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State pur-
chases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort, 
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act 
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony 
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than 
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many wit-
nesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, 
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. 
•See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 23, at 74. 
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stitutional purchasers. • Other statements expressed little 
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage.17 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 22. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that 
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The 
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices 
for retailers and government customers ''is extremely sub-
stantial" and ''not always fully explainable by either cost jus-
tifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other fac-
tors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it 
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu-
facturers seem ... violative of the Robinson-Patman Act 
. . . . " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit-
• After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
tions for Chainnan Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group 
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase 
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and 
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to out-
patients or even nonpatients." /d., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved § 13c issues. /d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority 
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most sim-
ilar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
17 Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of 
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one. " United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, 
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commi&Bion v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act 
are in no sense part of the legislative history."). 
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tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory 
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. 
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded 
statement: "There is no basis apparent . . . why the mandate 
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to dis-
criminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institu-
tional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is 
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa-
vored retail druggists." ld., at 79. This unexceptional 
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional pur-
chases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through 
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said noth-
ing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this 
case.28 
. B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(0, when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 28 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 80 (iii) 
• The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-
signed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the ex-
tent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. 
No. 1983, supra n. 23, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction 
of § 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
• Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratmies, 425 U. S., at 18-19, 
n. 10; Califarnia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 
508, 513 (1972). 
• The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 11 (v) it is not clear that 
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 12 and (vi) there are several cases that 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state 
purchases. See nn. 31-83, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all 
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases pre-
senting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added); 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Capp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
11 See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) , 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involv-
ing Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790, 
~799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Broum-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was 
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), aff'd on opinion below, 234 
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (:per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD 
Ky. 1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act 
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of 
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its govern-
mental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be en-
gaged in lnA.ying and ruelling that article") (emphasis supplied), aff'd, 132 
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-
Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F. 
Supp., at 16. 
•ct. Mountain View Ph.arrruu:y v. Abbott Labcrratories, No. C-77~ 
(Utah, Sept. 6, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss 
with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state agen-
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state 
purchases for resale purposes. a This judicial track record is 
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited, n. 27, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; u others are not necessarily inconsistent 
cies), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint 
insufficient because it failed to identify products or purcllasers subject to 
di8criminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Ab-
bott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral 
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied), 
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has sug-
gested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state pur-
chases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), 
aff'd, 378 F. 2d 212, 21~216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University 
within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called govern-
mental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases 
predate our decision in City of Lafayette. 
• See Burge v. Bryant Public School Di8trict, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-832 
(ED Ark. 1980), aff'd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA81981) (per curiam); Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 
~287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases, 
state agencies might face an opposite result), aff'd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7 
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption 
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, 
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. 
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), aff'd, 351 F. 2d 851, 
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp. 
v. NaBsau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency ex-
empt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other 
business corporations) . 
.. See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 &; 
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with our holding; 16 and in some cases they support it. • 
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a uni-
versally held interpretation of the Act. 17 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J . Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is 
some confiict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opin-
ion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to 
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act§ 4.12 (1962). 
• Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [197~2] Trade Cas. (CCH) ,74,642. Almost 
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State pur-
chases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Execu-
tive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962). 
•See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977); 
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with pri-
vate enterprise, it is subject to Act). 
wr In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, 
the Department of Justice stated: 
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to en-
gage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activi-
ties of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the 
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the fed-
eral government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned 
enterprise to the same standards requir{ed] of all who engage in commer-
cial transactions in the market." 
Reprinted in Antit1'U8t E:temptiom and Immunities: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the HOU8e of Repreaentativea, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890 
(1977). Cf. Victory Tmnaport Inc. v. ComiBaria General de Abasteci-
. mientoay Tmnaportes, 336 F . 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a 
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that 
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
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chases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private 
retail market with a price advantage. • 
VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of pol-
icy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words 
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what 
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and 
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern 
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is 
replete with references to the economic evil of large organiza-
tions purchasing from other large organizations for resale in 
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no rea-
son, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that 
•The dissent of JUSTICE O'CoNNOR relies in large part, not on the 
words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on assertions that a 
"general consensus [existed] in the legal and business communities that 
sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-Patman 
Act." Post, at 9. See also post, at 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR is correct that some in the business and legal community did 
think that an exemption existed for all state purchases. See post, at 
12-14, nn. 19 and 20. But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the 
opinion of commentators, see n. 34, .upra; the views expressed that the 
Act is applicable to state purchases, see .upra, at 10, 12-13 n. 22, and 19, I 
and n. 37; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department of Jus-
tice, see .upra, at 19, and n. 37. It is more accurate to say that this was 
an unsettled question of federal law that demanded this Court's attention. 
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congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Ala-
bama, protection from the competition of the strongest com-
petitor of them all. • To create an exemption here clearly 
·would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
• Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, 
I'Upra, n. 20, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection I 
of private rights"). 
~~L~ 
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No. 81-827 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., PETITIONER v. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES ET AL. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the sale of pharmaceutical 
products to state and local government hospitals for resale in 
competition with private retail pharmacies is exempt from 
the proscriptions of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
I 
Petitioner, a trade association of retail pharmacists and 
pharmacies doing business in Jefferson County, Alabama, 
commenced this action in 1978 in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama as the assignee of its members' 
claims. Respondents are 15 pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, and the 
Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy. The University operates 
a medical center, including hospitals, and a medical school. 
Located in the University's medical center are two pharma-
cies. Cooper Green Hospital is a county hospital, existing as 
a public corporation under Alabama law. 
The complaint seeks treble damages and injunctive relief 
under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26, for alleged violations of§ 2(a) and (f) of 
the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act (the Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) and 
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(f). Petitioner contends that the respondent manufacturers 
violated § 2(a) 1 by selling their products to the University's 
two pharmacies and to Cooper Green Hospital Pharmacy at 
prices lower than those charged petitioner's members for like 
products. Petitioner alleges that the respondent hospital 
pharmacies knowingly induced such lower prices in violation 
of § 2(f) 2 and sold the drugs to the general public in direct 
competition with privately owned pharmacies. Petitioner 
also alleges that the price discrimination is not exempted 
from the proscriptions of the Act by 15 U. S. C. § 13c.3 
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground 
that state purchases 4 are exempt as a matter of law from the 
sanctions of § 2. In granting respondents' motions, the Dis-
trict Court expressly accepted as true the allegations that 
local retail pharmacies had been injured by the challenged 
price discrimination and that at least some of the state pur-
'Section 2(a), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a), provides in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where 
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States . . . , and where the effect of such discrimination 
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them . .. . " 
2 Section 2(f), 15 U.S. C. § 13(f), provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course 
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price 
which is prohibited by this section." 
8 Section 13c provides: 
"Nothing in [the Robinson-Patman Act] shall apply to purchases of their 
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities , public librar-
ies, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 
' "State purchases" are defined as sales to and purchases by a State and 
its agencies. 
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chases were not exempt under§ 13c. 656 F. 2d 92, 98 (CA5 
1981) (reprinting District Court's opinion as Appendix). The 
District Court held that "governmental purchases are, with-
out regard to 15 U. S. C. § 13c, beyond the intended reach of 
the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, at least with 
respect to purchases for hospitals and other traditional gov-
ernmental purposes." 656 F. 2d 92, 102 (1981). The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a divided per curiam deci-
sion, affirmed "on the basis of the district court's Memoran-
dum of Opinion." 656 F. 2d, at 93. 5 
We granted certiorari to resolve this important question of 
federal law. --U.S.-- (1982). ·We now reverse. 
II 
The issue here is narrow. We are not concerned with 
sales to the federal government, nor with state purchases for 
use in traditional governmental functions. 6 Rather, the 
5 The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals, agreed that "[t]he 
claims against the Board must . . . be treated as equivalent to claims 
against the State itself." 656 F. 2d, at 99. Accordingly, both courts held 
that the Eleventh Amendment bars petitioner's claim for damages against 
the University. Petitioner did not challenge this holding in its appeal from 
the District Court's decision. 
6 Respondents argue that application of the Act to purchases by the 
State of Alabama would present a significant risk of conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment and that we therefore should avoid any construction of the Act 
that includes such purchases. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
440 U. S. 490, 501 (1979). There is no risk, however, of a constitutional 
issue arising from the application of the Act in this case: The retail sale of 
pharmaceutical drugs is not "indisputably" an attribute of state sover-
eignty. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Associa-
tion, Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 288 (1981). It is too late in the day to suggest 
that Congress cannot regulate States under its Commerce Clause powers 
when they are engaged in proprietary activities. See, e. g., Parden v. 
Terminal Railway, 377 U. S. 184, 187-193 (1964). If the Tenth Amend-
ment protects certain state purchases from the Act's limitations, such as 
for consumption in traditional governmental functions, those purchases 
must be protected on a case-by-case basis. Cf. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
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issue before us is limited to state purchases for the purpose of 
competing against private enterprise-with the advantage of 
discriminatory prices-in the retail market. 7 
The courts below held, and respondents contend, that the 
Act exempts all state purchases. Assuming, without decid-
ing, that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state 
purchases for consumption in traditional governmental func-
tions, and that such purchases are therefore exempt, we con-
clude that the exemption does not apply where a State has 
chosen to compete in the private retail market. 
III 
The Robinson-Patman Act by its terms does not exempt 
state purchases. The only express exemption is that for 
nonprofit institutions contained in 15 U. S. C. § 13c.8 More-
over, as the courts below conceded, "[t]he statutory lan-
guage-'persons' and 'purchasers'-is sufficiently broad to 
cover governmental bodies. 15 U. S. C. §§ 12, 13(a,f)." 656 
F. 2d, at 99. 9 This concession was compelled by several of 
this Court's decisions. 10 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413, and n. 42 (1978) (plurality 
opinion). 
7 Special solicitude for the plight of indigents is a traditional concern of 
state and local governments. If, in special circumstances, sales were 
made by a State to a class of indigents, the question presented, that we 
need not decide, would be whether such sales are "in competition" with pri-
vate enterprise. The District Court correctly assumed that the private 
and state pharmacies in this case are "competing pharmacies." 656 F. 2d, 
at 98. See also note 8, infra. 
8 The District Court properly assumed, for purposes of making its sum-
mary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be 
covered by the § 13c exemption. See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
Therefore, we need not consider whether this express exemption would 
support summary judgment in cases against state hospitals purchasing for 
their own use. See n. 20, infra. 
• The words "person" and "persons" are used repeatedly in the antitrust 
statutes. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7, 12, 15. 
10 See, e. g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) (state is a "per-
I' 
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Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 395 (1978), for example, 
we stated without qualification that "the definition of 'person' 
or 'persons' embraces both cities and States." 11 
Respondents would distinguish City of Lafayette from the 
case before because it involved the Sherman Act rather than 
the Robinson-Patman Act. 12 Such a distinction ignores the 
specific reference to the Robinson-Patman Act in our discus-
son" under§ 7 of the Sherman Act); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906) (municipality is a "person" 
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 318 (1978) (foreign nation is a "per-
son" under § 4 of the Clayton Act). 
The Court has not considered it at all "anomalous to require compliance 
by municipalities with the substantive standards of other federal laws 
which impose ... sanctions upon 'persons.' " City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 400 (1978). See California v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585-586 (1944); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
360, 370 (1934). One case is of particular relevance. In Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941), the Court considered the ap-
plicability to a city of § 1 of the Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847, as 
amended, 34 Stat. 587, 49 U. S. C. § 41(1) (1976 ed.) (repealed 1978), "a 
statute which essentially is an antitrust provision serving the same pur-
poses as the anti-price-discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act.'' City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 402 n. 19. The Union Pacific 
Court expressly found that a municipality was a "person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 313 U. S., at 462-463. See also City of Lafayette, 435 
U. S., at 401 n. 19. 
11 The word "purchasers" has a meaning as inclusive as the word "per-
son." See 80 Cong. Rec. 6430 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Robinson) ("The 
Clayton Antitrust Act contains terms general to all purchasers. The 
pending bill does not segregate any particular class of purchasers, or ex-
empt any special class of purchasers."). 
12 The only apparent difference between the scope of the relevant laws is 
the extent to which the activities complained of must affect interstate com-
merce. Congress's decision in the Robinson-Patman Act not to cover all 
transactions within its reach under the Commerce Clause, see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 199-201 (1974), does not mean 
that Congress chose not to cover the same range of "persons" whose con-
duct "in commerce" is otherwise subject to the Act. 
• , r 
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sion of the all-inclusive nature of the tenn "person." 435 
U. S., at 397, n. 14. We do not perceive any reason to con-
strue the word "person" in that Act any differently than we 
have in the Clayton Act, which it amends, 13 and it is undis-
puted that the Clayton Act applies to states. See Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-261 (1972). 14 In sum, 
the plain language of the Act strongly suggests that there is 
no exemption for state purchases to compete with private 
13 Indeed, the House and Senate Committee reports specifically state 
that "[t]he special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply 
without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, 
since it is designed to become by amendment a part of that act." H. R. 
Rep. No. 2287, Pt. 1, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). See 80 Cong. Rec. 3116 (1936) (remarks of Sen. 
Logan) ("[M]any have complained because the provisions of the bill apply 
to 'any person engaged in commerce.'. . . The original Clayton Act con-
tains that exact language, and it is carried into the bill under consideration. 
The language of the Clayton Act was used because it has been construed by 
the courts.''). Given their common purposes, it should not be surprising 
that the common terms of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts should 
be construed consistently with each other. See id., at 8137 (remarks of 
Rep. Michener) ("The Patman-Robinson bill does not suggest a new policy 
or a new theory. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, and it was the 
purpose of that act to do just what this law sets out to do.''); id., at 3119 
(remarks of Sen. Logan) (purpose of Robinson-Patman bill is to strengthen 
Clayton Act); id., at 6151 (address by Sen. Logan) (same). 
14 JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her dissenting opinion, questions our use of 
antitrust cases to define a word common to the antitrust laws. She would 
distinguish all of these cases uniformly holding States to be included in the 
word "persons," because none has held "that States or local governments 
are persons for purposes of exposure to liability as purchasers under the 
provisions of the Clayton Act.'' Post, at 4 (emphasis in original). The dis-
sent takes no notice, however, of our decision last term in Community 
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 56 (1982), in which 
the Court stated that the antitrust laws, "like other federal laws imposing 
civil or criminal sanctions upon 'persons,' of course apply to municipalities 
as well as to other corporate entities.'' No authority is cited for the dis-
sent's distinction between "persons" entitled to sue under the antitrust 
laws and "persons" subject to suit under those laws . 
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enterprise. 
IV 
The plain language of the Act is controlling unless a differ-
ent legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and his-
tory of the Act. An examination of the legislative purpose 
and history here reveals no such contrary intention. 
A 
Our cases have been explicit in stating the purposes of the 
antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act. On nu-
merous occasions, this Court has affirmed the comprehensive 
coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these 
laws represent "a carefully studied attempt to bring within 
[them] every person engaged in business whose activities 
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among 
the states." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 553 (1944)J5 In Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), the Court observed 
that "our cases have repeatedly established that there is a 
heavy presumption against implicit exemptions" from the 
antitrust laws. I d., at 787 (citing United States v. P hiladel-
phia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 350-351 (1963); Cali-
fornia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)). 16 In City of 
Lafayette, supra, applying antitrust laws to a city in compe-
15 See, e. g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-313 
(1978) (noting "broad scope of the remedies provided by the antitrust 
laws") (applying Sherman Act cases to construe Clayton Act); Mandeville 
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 236 
(1948) ("[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.") (emphasis added). 
16 See, e. g., National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. 
Blue Cross, 452 U. S. 378, 388 (1981); City of Lafayette, 435 U. S., at 398, 
399; Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
U. S. 1, 11-12 (1976); United States v. National Assn. of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719-720 (1975). 
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tition with a private utility, we held that no exemption for 
local governments would be implied. The Court emphasized 
the purposes and scope of the antitrust laws: "[T]he economic 
choices made by public corporations . . . , designed as they 
are to assure maximum benefits for the community constitu-
ency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the 
broader interests of national economic well-being than are 
those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the in-
terests of the organization and its shareholders." 435 U. S., 
at 403. See also id., at 408. 17 
These principles, and the purposes they further, have been 
helpful in interpreting the language of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated for the Court in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 
u. s. 1, 11-12 (1976): 
"It has been said, of course, that the antitrust laws, 
and Rob'inson-Patman in particular, are to be construed 
liberally, and that the exceptions from their application 
are to be construed strictly. United States v. M eKes son 
& Robbins, 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956); FMC v. Seatrain 
17 In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can be 
more invidious than that from chain-stores, the particular targets of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. Volume purchasing permits any large, relatively 
efficient, retail organization to pass on cost savings to consumers, and to 
that extent, consumers benefit merely from economy of scale. But to the 
extent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, resulting from 
federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and freedom from tax-
ation, state agencies merely redistribute the burden of costs from the ac-
tual consumers to the citizens at large. An exemption from the Robinson-
Patman Act could give state agencies a significant additional advantage in 
certain commercial markets, perhaps enough to eliminate marginal or small 
private competitors. Consumers, as citizens, ultimately will pay for the 
full costs of the drugs sold by the state agencies involved in this case. Be-
cause there is no reason to assume that such agencies will provide retail 
distribution more efficiently than private retail pharmacists, consumers 
will suffer to the extent that state retail activities eliminate more efficient, 
private retail distribution systems. 
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Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 733 (1973); Perkins v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 646--647 (1969). The Court 
has recognized, also, that Robinson-Patman 'was en-
acted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which 
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over 
smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing 
power.' FTC v. Brach & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960); 
FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U. S. 341, 349 (1968). 
Because the Act is remedial, it is to be construed broadly 
to effectuate its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 
389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 
65 (1968)." 
B 
The legislative history falls far short of supporting re-
spondents' contention that there is an exemption for state 
purchases of "commodities" for "resale." There is nothing 
whatever in the Senate or House Committee reports, or in 
the floor debates, focusing on the issue. 18 Some members of 
Congress were aware of the possibility that the Act would 
apply to governmental purchases. Most members, however, 
were concerned not with state purchases, but with possible 
limitations on the Federal Government. The most relevant 
legislative history is the testimony of the Act's principal 
draftsman, H.B. Teegarden, before the House Judiciary 
Committee. 19 Although the testimony is ambiguous on the 
'
8 JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion repeatedly emphasizes that 
Congress in 1936 did not focus specifically on the issue presented here. 
See post, at 6, 7, and nn. 10, 14, 15. This may we.ll be true, as the likeli-
hood of state entities competing in the private sector was remote in 1936. 
It cannot be contended, however, that Congress specifically intended to 
allow the competition at issue here. In any event, the absence of congres-
sional focus is immaterial where the plain language applies. See, e. g., 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U. S. 533, 551H>58 
(1944); Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); De Lima v. 
Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 197 (1901). 
'
9 [Rep.] Lloyd: Would this bill, in your judgment, prevent the granting 
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application of the Act to state purchases for consumption, one 
conclusion is certain: Teegarden expressly stated that the 
Act would apply to the purchases of municipal hospitals in at 
least some circumstances. 20 Thus, his comments directly 
of discounts to the United States Government? 
Mr. Teegarden: Not unless the present Clayton Act does so .... 
[Rep.] Lloyd: For instance, the Government gets huge discounts .... 
Now, would that discount be barred by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I do not see why it should, unless a discount contrary to 
the present bill would be barred-that is, the present law-would be 
barred by that bill. 
Aside from that, my answer would be this: The Federal Government is 
not in competition with other buyers from these concerns .... 
The Federal Government is saved by the same distinction . . . .. They 
are not in competition with anyone else who would buy. 
[Rep.] Hancock: It would eliminate competitive bidding all along the 
line, would it not, in classes of goods that would be covered by this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: You mean competitive bidding on Government orders? 
[Rep.] Hancock: Government, State, city, municipality. 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I think not. 
[Rep.] Michener: If it did do it, you would not want it, would you? 
Mr. Teegarden: No; I would not want it. It certainly does not eliminate 
competitive bidding anywhere else, and I do not see how it would with the 
Government. 
[Rep.] Hancock: You would have to bid to the city, county, exactly the 
same as anybody else; same quantity, same price, same quality? 
Mr. Teegarden: No. 
[Rep.] Hancock: Would they or could they sell to a city hospital any 
cheaper than they would to a privately-owned hospital, under this bill? 
Mr. Teegarden: I would have to answer it in this way. In the final anal-
ysis, it would depend upon numerous questions of fact in a particular case. 
If the two hospitals are in competition with each other, I should say then 
that the fact that one is operated by the city does not save it from the bill. 
If they are not in competition with each other, then they are in a different 
sphere. 
The facts of the situation are not present upon which to predicate a dis-
crimination in the nature of the case. I do not see that that question be-
comes any different under this bill from what it is under the present section 
2 of the Clayton Act, for that bill also prohibits discrimination generally in 
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contradict the exemption found by the courts below for all 
such purchasing. 21 In the absence of any other relevant evi-
dence, we find no legislative intention to enable a State, by 
an unexpressed exemption, to enter private competitive mar-
kets with congressionally approved price advantages. 22 
the same terms that this does. But it differs in the breadth of the excep-
tions. That is the only difference between the two bills. 
Hearings on H. R. 4995 et al. before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 208--209 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
1935 Hearings]. 
20 JUSTICE STEVENS agrees that state and local governments may be "pur-
chasers" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. See post, at 1. 
He joins in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, however, on the basis of a novel 
theory: that state and local agencies may never be in "competition" with 
private parties within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. This is an eco-
nomic fiction: If in fact a State participates in the private retail pharma-
ceutical market, it competes with the private participants. JUSTICE STE-
VENS relies on one statement by witness Teegarden in the 1935 House 
hearings, but attaches no significance to a further statement by the same 
witness: "In the final analysis, it would depend upon numerous questions 
of fact in a particular case. If the two hospitals are in competition with 
each other, I should say then that the fact that one is operated by the city 
does not save it from the bill." See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 209 
(emphasis added). 
21 Teegarden subsequently submitted a written brief to the House com-
mittee. He first rejected outright the desirability of any exemptions. 
See 1935 Hearings, supra n. 19, at 249. He then posed the question 
whether "the bill [would] prevent competitive bidding on Governmental 
purchases below trade price levels." He stated that "[t]he answer is found 
in the principle of statutory construction that a statute will not be con-
strued to limit or restrict in any way the rights, prerogatives or privileges 
of the sovereign unless it so expressly provides-a principle inherited by 
American jurisprudence from the common law .... " But he also noted 
that "requiring a showing of effect upon competition ... will further pre-
clude any possibility of the bill affecting the Government." !d., at 250. 
All the cases Teegarden cited suggest that this sovereign-exception rule 
of statutory construction simply means that a government, when it passes 
a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders. While the Robinson-
Patman Act was pending before Congress, the Court stated that it could 
"perceive no reason for extending [the presumption against binding the 
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v 
Despite the plain language of the Act and its legislative his-
tory, respondents nevertheless argue that subsequent legis-
lative events and decisions of district courts confirm that 
sovereign by its own statute] so as to exempt a business carried on by a 
state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being 
obstructed by state as by individual action." United States v. California, 
297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 
562-563 (1957). In the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, the rule of 
statutory construction on which Teegarden relied supports, at the most, an 
exemption for the Federal Government's purchases. The existence of 
such an exemption is not before us. Cf. United States v. Cooper Corp., 
312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941) (United States not a "person" under the 
Sherman Act for purposes of suing for treble damages). Moreover, 
Teegarden clearly assumed that governmental purchasing would not com-
pete with private purchasing. That assumption, however, is inapplicable 
here. 
22 Six months after the Act was passed, the Attorney General of the 
United States responded to an inquiry from the Secretary of War regard-
ing the Act's application "to government contracts for supplies." 38 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 539 (1936). In ruling that such contracts are outside the Act, 
the Attorney General explained: 
[S]tatutes regulating rates, charges, etc., in matters affecting commerce 
do not ordinarily apply to the Government unless it is expressly so pro-
vided; and it does not seem to have been the policy of the Congress to make 
such statutes applicable to the Government ... . 
The [Robinson-Patman Act] merely amended the [Clayton Act] . .. and, 
in so far as I am aware, the latter Act has not been regarded heretofore as 
applicable to Government contracts. 
Id., at 540. Later in the letter, the Attorney General clarified that his 
reference was to "the Federal Government," ibid. , and gave other reasons 
"for avoiding a construction that would make the statute applicable to the 
Government in violation of the apparent policy of the Congress in such mat-
ters," id., at 541. The Attorney General expressly relied upon Emer-
gency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U.S. 415, 425 
(1928), in which the Court upheld the granting of favorable telegraph rates 
to a federal corporation that competed with private enterprise. 
The Attorney General's opinion says nothing about the Act's applicabil-
ity to state agencies. Indeed, in the following year, the Attorney General 
of California expressly concluded that State purchases were within the 
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state purchases are outside the scope of the Act. We turn 
therefore to these subsequent events. 
A 
Respondents cite the hearings on the Robinson-Patman 
Act held in the late 1960s. 23 Testimony before the House 
Subcommittee investigating practices in the pharmaceutical 
Act's proscriptions. See [1932-1939] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 55,156, at 
415-416 (1937). Two other early State attorney general opinions simply 
do not consider whether the Act applies to State purchases for retail sales. 
See Opinion of Attorney General of Minnesota, [1932-1939] Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ~ 55,157, at 416 (1937); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 142 (1937). 
Representative Patman "presumed that the [United States] Attorney 
General's reasons may be also applied to municipal and public institutions." 
W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 168 (1938). See also W. Patman, 
Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 30 (1963) (interpreting Attor-
ney General's opinion as exempting all governmental purchases). His in-
terpretation is entitled to some weight, but he appears only to be interpret-
ing-or erroneously extending-the Attorney General's opinion and 
reasoning. Representative Patman's personal intentions probably are 
better reflected in his introduction in 1951 and 1953 of bills to amend the 
Act to define "purchaser" to include "the United States, any State or any 
political subdivision thereof." H. R. 4452, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 
H. R. 3377, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). There is no legislative history on 
these bills, but it is arguable that he believed that the original intent 
needed to be stated expressly to negate his reading of the Attorney Gener-
al's contrary construction of the Act. In any case, Congress's failure to 
pass these bills may be attributable to a reluctance to subject federal pur-
chases to the Act. For example, in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961, Represent-
ative Keogh also unsuccessfully introduced bills to extend the Act to fed-
eral purchases only for resale. See H. R. 430, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1961); H. R. 155, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H. R. 722, 85th Con g., 1st 
Sess. (1957); H. R. 5213, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
It bears repeating, moreover, that none of these views-including Rep-
resentative Patman's-focuses on the state purchases alleged here: pur-
chases to gain competitive advantage in the private market rather than 
purchases for use in traditional governmantal functions. For the Depart-
ment of Justice's most recent statements regarding an exemption or immu-
nity for state enterprises, see note 37, infra. 
23 The most important relevant event in the Robinson-Patman Act's 
post-enactment history is the amendment in 1938 excluding eleemosynary 
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industry indicated that the Act did not cover price dis-
crimination in favor of state hospitals, 24 and Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Paul Dixon disclaimed any authority 
over transactions involving state health care programs. 25 It 
is not at all clear, however, whether Chairman Dixon con-
templated cases in which the state agency competed with pri-
vate retailers, although he was aware of such practices by in-
institutions, 52 Stat. 446, 15 U. S. C. § 13c. Whether the existence of an 
exemption in § 13c supports an exemption for certain state purchases de-
pends upon whether § 13c is interpreted to apply to state agencies that per-
form the functions listed. That is a substantial issue in its own right. 
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 78 (1968) (sug-
gesting that § 13c does not include government agencies), with 81 Cong. 
Rec. 8706 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (§ 13c would apply to institu-
tions financed by cities, counties, and States). See also City of Lafayette, 
435 U. S., at 397, n. 14 (§ 13c includes "public libraries," which "are, by 
definition, operated by local government"); Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., 
at 18 n. 10; 81 Cong. Rec. 8705 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Walter) (exemption 
codifies the intention of the drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act). We 
need not address this issue here. 
24 See, e. g., Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act of the Select Committee on Small Business of the House of 
Representatives, 91st Cong. 73-77 (1969-1970) (William McCamant, Direc-
tor of Public Affairs, National Association of Wholesalers); id., at 623 (Har-
old Halfpenny, counsel for the Automative Service Industry Association); 
Small Business Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the Select Committee on 
Small Business of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 15-16 
(1967-1968) [hereinafter 1967-1968 Hearings] (Earl Kintner, former FTC 
Commissioner, counsel for the Nat'! Assn. of Retail Druggists) (State pur-
chases "probably" exempt). But see id., at 80 (remarks of Charles Fort, 
President, Food Town Ethical Pharmacies, Inc.) ("Robinson-Patman Act 
may prohibit this practice"); id., at 86 (same). There also was testimony 
that institutional purchasers frequently obtain drugs at lower prices than 
do retail pharmacies, see id., at 14, 258, 318, 1093-1094, and many wit-
nesses complained that this discrimination adversely affected competition, 
see id., at A-140 to A-141, 253-262, 273, 292. 
25 See H. R. Rep. No. 1983, supra, n. 23, at 74. 
81-827-0PINION 
JEFFERSON CTY. PHARM. ASSN. v: ABBOTT LABS. 15 
stitutional purchasers. 26 Other statements expressed little 
more than informed, interested opinions on the issue pre-
sented, and are not entitled to the consideration appropriate 
for the constructions given contemporaneously with the Act's 
passage. 27 See supra, at 9-11, and n. 22. 
It is clear from the House Subcommittee's conclusions that 
it did not focus on the question presented by this case. The 
Subcommittee found that the difference between drug prices 
for retailers and government customers "is extremely sub-
stantial" and "not always fully explainable by either cost jus-
tifiable quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other fac-
tors inherent in bulk distribution." H. R. Rep. No. 1983, 
90th Gong., 2d Sess. 77 (1968). In the next conclusion, it 
stated that "[n]umerous acts and policies of individual manu-
facturers seem ... violative of the Robinson-Patman Act 
... " Ibid. Thus, it is quite possible that the Subcommit-
26 After hearing his testimony, the Subcommittee posed further ques-
tions for Chairman Dixon about the eroding influence on the retail drug-
gists' market presented by: (i) expanding federal, state, and private group 
health care programs; (ii) the Federal Government's ability to purchase 
from drug manufacturers at prices substantially below wholesale cost; and 
(iii) instances of hospitals, "both nonprofit and proprietary, selling to out-
patients or even nonpatients." I d., at 73. In his response to the Sub-
committee, Chairman Dixon declined to discuss further the last category, 
which involved§ 13c issues. I d., at 74. His disclaimer of FTC authority 
envisioned state purchases for welfare programs, not for resale in compe-
tition with private enterprise. Thus, the issue presented here is most sim-
ilar to the issue not discussed by Chairman Dixon. 
-n Assuming that this post-enactment commentary before the Sub-
committee can be imputed to Congress-quite a leap given the failure of 
the Subcommittee report to rely on it for its conclusions-"the views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). See, 
e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U. S. 102, 117-118, and n. 13 (1980); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
U. S. 750, 758 (1979); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 
200, n. 7 (1977) ("Legislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act 
are in no sense part of the legislative history."). 
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tee considered some state purchasing at discriminatory 
prices-about which it had heard testimony-to be unlawful. 
The Subcommitte report did include the awkwardly worded 
statement: "There is no basis apparent ... why the mandate 
of the Robinson-Patman Act should not be applied to dis-
criminatory drug sales favoring nongovernmental institu-
tional purchasers, profit or nonprofit, to the extent there is 
prescription drug competition at the retail level with disfa-
vored retail druggists." ld., at 79. This unexceptional 
opinion, however, simply says that private institutional pur-
chases may not facilitate unfair retail competition through 
sales at discriminatory prices. The Subcommittee said noth-
ing expressly about the unfair competition at issue in this 
case. 28 
B 
Respondents also argue that, without exception, courts 
considering the Act's coverage have concluded that it does 
not apply to government purchasers. They insist that no 
court has imposed liability upon a seller or buyer, under ei-
ther § 2(a) or § 2(f), when the discriminatory price involved a 
sale to a State, city, or county. See Brief for Respondent 
University 31-32. There are serious infirmities in these 
broad assertions: (i) this Court has never held nor suggested 
that there is an exemption for State purchases; 29 (ii) the num-
ber of judicial decisions even considering the Act's applica-
tion to purchases by state agencies is relatively small; 30 (iii) 
28 The Subcommittee also concluded that the 1938 Amendment was "de-
signed to afford immunity to private nonprofit institutions ... to the ex-
tent the sales are for the nonprofit institution's 'own use,'" H. R. Rep. No. 
1983, supra n. 23, at 78, but that would indicate more the construction of 
§ 13c than it would the intent of the 1936 Congress. 
29 Indeed, our opinions suggest precisely the opposite. See City of La-
fayette, 435 U. S., at 397, n. 14; Abbott Laboratories, 425 U. S., at 18-19, 
n. 10; California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 
508, 513 (1972). 
80 The parties cite fewer than a dozen cases, many with unpublished 
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respondents cite no court of appeals decision that has ex-
pressly adopted their interpretation of § 2 before the decision 
below; (iv) some of the district court cases upon which re-
spondents rely are simply inapposite; 31 (v) it is not clear that 
any published District Court opinion has relied solely on a 
state purchase exemption to dismiss a Robinson-Patman Act 
claim alleging injury as a result of government competition in 
the private market; 32 and (vi) there are several cases that 
opinions, that involve the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to state 
purchases. See nn. 31-33, infra. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 731 (1975) (affirming rule adopted by "virtually all 
lower federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases pre-
senting this question over the past quarter century") (emphasis added); 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200-201 (1974) (adopting 
consistent, "longstanding" construction of Robinson-Patman Act after 
"nearly four decades of litigation"). 
8'See Pacific Engineering & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
[1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 75,054, at 96,742 (Utah 1974) (dicta) (involv-
ing Federal Government as ultimate purchaser) (relying on Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion as sole support), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 551 F. 2d 790, 
798-799 (CAlO) (finding legitimate competition despite different prices), 
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 879 (1977); Sachs v. Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9, 16 (SDNY 1955) (Act inapplicable because there was 
no proof that sales affected plaintiff adversely), aff'd on opinion below, 234 
F. 2d 959 (CA2) (per curiam), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 925 (1956); General 
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602-603 (WD 
Ky. 1941) (finding no "sale" under the Act and alternatively holding the Act 
inapplicable because "[n]either the government nor a city in its purchase of 
property considered necessary for the purposes of carrying out its govern-
mental functions is in competition with another buyer who may be en-
gaged in buying and reselling that article") (emphasis supplied), affd, 132 
F. 2d 425, 428 (CA6 1942) (expressly reserving issue whether Robinson-
Patman Act applies to sales to state agency), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 780 
(1943). The Sachs court also indicated, in dicta, that it was unclear 
whether the Robinson-Patman Act applied to state purchases. 37 F . 
Supp., at 16. 
82 Cf. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-()094 
(Utah, Sept. 6, 1977) (unpublished opinion) (consent by plaintiffs to dismiss 
with prejudice Robinson-Patman Act claims based on sales to state agen-
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suggest that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to state 
purchases for resale purposes. 33 This judicial track record is 
in no sense comparable to the unbroken chain of judical deci-
sions upon which this Court previously has relied for as-
certaining a construction of the antitrust laws that Congress 
over a long period of time has chosen to preserve. See cases 
cited, n. 27, supra. 
Respondents also seek support in the interpretations of 
various commentators and executive officials. But the most 
authoritative of these sources indicate that the question pre-
sented is unsettled; 34 others are not necessarily inconsistent 
cies), affd in part and rev'd in part, 630 F. 2d 1383 (CAlO 1980) (complaint 
insufficient because it failed to identify products or purchasers subject to 
discriminatory treatment); Portland Retail Druggists Association v. Ab· 
bott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (Ore., Sept. 11, 1972) (unpublished, oral 
opinion), vacated and remanded, 510 F. 2d 486 (CA9 1974) (§ 13c applied), 
vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 1 (1976). One District Court has sug-
gested in an alternative holding that there is an exemption for state pur-
chases for nonconsumption use. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
No. 4-66-5, slip op. at 4-5 (Idaho, May 26, 1966) (unpublished opinion), 
affd, 378 F. 2d 212, 215-216 (CA9) (purchases by Utah State University 
within scope of § 13c; expressly declined to address "so-called govern-
mental exemption"), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 898 (1967). All of these cases 
predate our decision in City of Lafayette. 
33 See Burge v. Bryant Public School District, 520 F. Supp. 328, 330-332 
(ED Ark. 1980), affd, 658 F. 2d 611 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); Champaign-
Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 479 F. Supp. 281, 
286-287 (CD Ill. 1979) (although Act inapplicable to federal purchases, 
state agencies might face an opposite result), affd, 632 F. 2d 680 (CA7 
1980); A.J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Manufacturing Corp., 81 
F. Supp. 890, 893 (Mass. 1949). Other cases cut against any exemption 
for state purchases. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, 
Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-641 (Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. 
Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 399 (Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F. 2d 851, 
858-859 (CA91965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966); Sperry Rand Corp. 
v. Nassau Research & Development Associates, 152 F. Supp. 91, 95 
(EDNY 1957). Cf. Reid v. University of Minnesota, 107 F. Supp. 439, 
443 (ND Ohio 1952) (expressly not addressing whether state agency ex-
empt from Act when engaged in a business in the same manner as other 
business corporations). 
34 See 5A Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 105D.01[8][c] (1973 & 
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with our holding; 35 and in some cases they support it. 36 
Thus, Congress cannot be said to have left untouched a uni-
versally held interpretation of the Act. 37 
In sum, it is clear that post-enactment developments-
whether legislative, judicial, or in commentary-rarely have 
considered the specific issue before us. There is simply no 
unambiguous evidence of congressional intent to exempt pur-
Supp. 1982) (opinions "divided" whether Act is applicable); 4 J. Kalinowski, 
Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 24.06, at 24-70 (1982) ("there is 
some conflict among the authorities as to whether sales to states and 
municipalities are covered by the Act"); id. § 24.06[2]; E. Kintner, A Rob-
inson-Patman Primer 203 (1970) ("Although [the Attorney General's] opin-
ion appears to have settled the matter where the federal government is 
concerned, some controversy has arisen over the applicability of the act to 
purchases by state and local governments."); F. Rowe, Price Discrimina-
tion Under the Robinson-Patman Act § 4.12 (1962). 
35 Some deal only with sales to the Federal Government. See Letter 
from Comptroller General to Robert F. Sarlo, Veterans Administration 
(July 17, 1973), reprinted in [1973-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~74,642. Almost 
all fail to mention, much less decide, whether the Act applies to State pur-
chases for retail sales. See Report of the Attorney General Under Execu-
tive Order 10936, Identical Bidding in Public Procurement 11 (1962). 
36 See 62 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 741 (1979); 47 N.C.A.G. 112, 115 (1977); 
[1948-1949] Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 723, 727 (if state agency competes with pri-
vate enterprise, it is subject to Act). 
37 In its 1977 Report of the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities, at 25, 
the Department of Justice stated: 
"The mere fact that a state has authorized a state-owned enterprise to en-
gage in commercial activity should not be sufficient to immunize all activi-
ties of the enterprise from the antitrust laws. That test removes the 
clearly sovereign activities of a state from the antitrust scrutiny of the fed-
eral government while holding the commercial activities of a state-owned 
enterprise to the same standards requir[ed] of all who engage in commer-
cial transactions in the market." 
Reprinted in Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1890 
(1977). Cf. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasteci-
mientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354, 360-362 (CA2 1964) (the charter of a 
ship to haul grain by a state instrumentality not a sovereign activity that 
would justify applying the sovereign immunity doctrine). 
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chases by a State for the purpose of competing in the private 
retail market with a price advantage. 38 
VI 
The Robinson-Patman Act has been widely criticized, both 
for its effects and for the policies that it seeks to promote. 
Although Congress is well aware of these criticisms, the Act 
has remained in effect for almost half a century. And it cer-
tainly is "not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of pol-
icy-making in the field of antitrust legislation. . . . Our 
function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words 
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what 
was in fact the intent of Congress." United States v. Cooper 
Corp. 312 U. S., 600, 606 (1941). 
"A general application of the [Robinson-Patman] Act to all 
combinations of business and capital organized to suppress 
commercial competition is in harmony with the spirit and 
impulses of the times which gave it birth." South-Eastern 
Underwriters, 322 U. S., at 553. The legislative history is 
replete with references to the economic evil of large organiza-
tions purchasing from other large organizations for resale in 
competition with the small, local retailers. There is no rea-
son, in the absence of an explicit exemption, to think that 
38 The dissent of JusTICE O'CONNOR relies in large part, not on the 
words of the statute, or its legislative history, but on assertions that a 
"general consensus [existed] in the legal and business communities that 
sales to governmental entities are not covered by the Robinson-Patman 
Act." Post, at 9. See also post, at 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR is correct that some in the business and legal community did 
think that an exemption existed for all state purchases. See post, at 
12-14, nn. 19 and 20. But to say there is a "consensus" is to disregard the 
opinion of commentators, see n. 34, supra; the views expressed that the 
Act is applicable to state purchases, see supra, at 10, 12-13 n. 22, and 19, 
and n. 37; and the most recent, relevant opinion of the Department of Jus-
tice, see supra, at 19, and n. 37. It is more accurate to say that this was--
an unsettled question of federal law that demanded this Court's attention. 
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congressmen who feared these evils intended to deny small 
businesses, such as the pharmacies of Jefferson County, Ala-
bama, protection from the competition of the strongest com-
petitor of them all. 39 To create an exemption here clearly 
would be contrary to the intent of Congress. 
VII 
We hold that the sale of pharmaceutical products to state 
and local government hospitals for resale in competition with 
private pharmacies is not exempt from the proscriptions of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals accordingly is reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
39 Under our interpretation, the Act's benefits would accrue, precisely as 
intended, to the benefit of small, private retailers. See 1935 Hearings, 
supra, n. 20, at 261 (Teegarden recommending passage "for the protection 
of private rights"). 
